USCA1 Opinion

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit











No. 99-1281



                        SAMSON OMOSEFUNMI,



                      Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                v.



          EDWIN MARTICIO; ROBERT LARCONE; UNITED STATES,



                      Defendants, Appellees.







           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



           [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]







                              Before



                    Selya, Boudin and Lynch,

                        Circuit Judges.

                                

                                

                                

                                

                                

     Samson Omosefunmi on brief pro se.

     Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Rayford A.

Farquhar, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.











November 16, 1999







                                

                                

  

            Per Curiam.  After a careful review of the record and

  the submissions of the parties, the court affirms the district

  court's dismissal of the complaint.  The district court lacked

  subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims under the

  Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.  2674, as any claim

  appellant submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization

  Service did not comply with the requirement of 28 C.F.R.  14.2

  that it include a demand for money damages in a sum certain. 

  See Coska v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997). 

  Appellant's claim that he was deprived of his eighth amendment

  rights is more properly termed a violation of his due process

  rights.  Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1988).  And

  while one cannot argue that racial harassment of detainees

  could ever be reasonably related to a legitimate administrative

  goal, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979),

  appellant's claim still fails.  No protected liberty interest

  has been identified.  See Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st

  Cir. 1991) ("Fear or emotional injury which results solely from

  verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient

  to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty interest.")

  (citations omitted).  Further, the alleged conduct, while

  deplorable, does not "shock the conscience."  See Brown v. Hot,

  Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 531 (1995)

  ("Although we have not foreclosed the possibility that words or

  verbal harassment may constitute "conscious shocking" behavior

  in violation of substantive due process rights, . . . our

  review of the caselaw indicates that the threshold for alleging

  such claims is high.") (citing Souza v. Pina, 53 F.3d 423, 427

  (1st Cir. 1995)).  No other basis for a constitutional violation

  appears in the complaint.

            Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).