[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 00-1296

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

LUIS RIVERA-NEWTON, a/k/a “EL MONO”,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

Edgar R. Vega-Pabon on brief for appellant. Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega- Pacheco, Assistant United States Attorney, and Michelle Morales, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

April 13, 2000 Per Curiam. Appellant Luis Rivera Newton appeals

from an order of pretrial detention. We have independently

reviewed the decision, “giving deference to the

determination of the district court.” United States v.

O’Brien,

(1st Cir. 1990). Upon careful

review of the sparse record before us and of the judge’s

reasons for ordering detention, we agree with the district

court that detention is warranted here on the grounds that

“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably

assure the appearance of the person as required and the

safety of any other person and the community.”

(e). We therefore affirm.

The presumption under

(e) applies

in this case because appellant is charged in a federal

indictment with drug trafficking offenses that carry a

maximum penalty in excess of ten years under the Controlled

Substances Act,

et seq. See United States

v. Dillon,

(1st Cir. 1991). Appellant

has produced evidence to rebut the presumption, including

evidence of family and business ties to Puerto Rico, of no

prior criminal convictions and of compliance with conditions

of pretrial release imposed by the Puerto Rico courts where appellant’s trial on murder charges has been pending for

almost five years.

Despite appellant’s evidence to rebut the

presumption, the district court properly ruled that the

statutory presumption continues to carry weight. See United

States v. Jessup,

(1st Cir. 1985). The

nature and circumstances of the offenses with which

appellant is charged indicate that appellant was involved in

the type of drug operations that were “at the center of

Congressional concern.”

. The number of co-

conspirators and the scope of the charged conspiracy,

involving the establishment of drug distribution points

throughout Puerto Rico, suggest a drug trafficking operation

that resembles the paradigm underlying the statutory

presumption. The district court’s finding that Rivera has

“ready access to large amounts of cash not derived from a

legitimate source” also suggests involvement in the kind of

lucrative drug operations with which Congress was concerned.

I. Risk of Flight

While the statutory presumption weighs in favor of

a finding that Rivera presents a risk of flight, several

factors weigh against such a finding. The district court

found that Rivera has strong family ties to Puerto Rico and

-3- he owns a business there. He has no prior criminal record.

In the context of the offenses charged in this case,

however, these factors do not tip the balance on the risk of

flight issue. See Palmer-Contreras,

(1 st

Cir. 1987)(affirming detention order where § 3142(e)’s

presumption applied despite appellants’ strong family ties

and the absence of any prior drug-related arrests or

convictions).

Rivera’s record of reporting daily to local

officials during the almost five years that he was on

release pending trial in the Puerto Rico courts weighs

against a finding of risk of flight. However, the district

court found that no action has occurred in the Puerto Rico

case since 1997 and that no trial date has been set.

Rivera’s reporting history is no guarantee that he won’t

flee when the trial date draws near. Rivera disputes

the district court’s findings that he violated the terms of

his release on local charges by participating in the

conspiracy charged and by working at his liquor store. We

need not resolve that issue. Even without relying upon

those findings of the district court, the risk of flight

determination, “while perhaps not inevitable, seems a

supportable exercise of [the district court’s] factfinding

-4- function.” United States v. Patriarca,

(1st

Cir. 1991).

II. Dangerousness

The § 3142(e) presumption is based, in part, upon

Congress’ findings that drug traffickers are often engaged

in continuing patterns of criminal activity. See Palmer-

Contreras,

. That generalization seems to

apply here, where the charged conspiracy spanned almost ten

years and continued for four years after Rivera’s arrest on

murder charges under Puerto Rico law. Rivera points to the

fact that he has no record of criminal convictions.

However, the indictment charges that his involvement in the

conspiracy began in 1988, when he was only twenty years old.

Therefore, his absence of a criminal record carries less

weight than it would for an older person.

The district court expressed specific concern about

the danger that Rivera’s release would present to witnesses

who would be testifying against him at trial. The

indictment charges that the conspiracy was accomplished by

the use of violence and specifically charges that Rivera

“planned or participated in the kidnaping, torturing and

execution” of four people (at the Cayey Massacre). The

magistrate-judge found that most of the government’s

-5- evidence against Rivera consists of statements of

cooperating witnesses or co-conspirators. Rivera argues

that this shows that the evidence against him is weak.

However, it also creates a special risk of danger if he is

released: danger of harm to prospective witnesses. Compare

Patriarca,

. That danger is especially

pronounced here because Rivera is charged with participating

in a conspiracy that regularly used violence to threaten and

intimidate.

For these reasons, along with others specified by

the district court judge, we agree with the district court

that Rivera’s detention pending trial is warranted on the

grounds of risk of flight and dangerousness.

The order of pretrial detention is affirmed.

-6-