[NOT FOR PUBLICATION — NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 99-1967

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LUIS A. GARCIA-RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

Juan J. Hernandez Lopez De Victoria on brief for appellant. Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco and Camille Vélez-Rivé, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief for appellee. May 19, 2000 Per Curiam. The sole ground of this appeal is the

appellant's contention that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance and thereby induced him to plead guilty

to a crime that he did not commit. We have held, with a

regularity bordering on the monotonous, that claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel ordinarily cannot make their

debut on direct review of a criminal conviction, but, rather,

must first be presented to, and acted upon by, the trial court.

See United States v. Mala,

(1st Cir. 1993)

("Since claims of ineffective assistance involve a binary

analysis — the defendant must show, first, that counsel's

performance was constitutionally deficient and, second, that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense . . . — such claims

typically require the resolution of factual issues that cannot

efficaciously be addressed in the first instance by an appellate

tribunal.") (internal citations omitted); see also United States

v. Berríos,

, 841 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v.

McGill,

(1st Cir. 1991); United States v.

Hunnewell,

(1st Cir. 1989); United States v.

Costa,

(1st Cir. 1989); United States v.

Hoyos-Medina,

(1st Cir. 1989); United States v.

Kobrosky,

(1st Cir. 1983). Because the

-3- appellant's ineffective assistance claim was not raised in the

district court, this rule comes to mind here.

To be sure, a narrow exception to this rule exists

"where the critical facts are not genuinely in dispute and the

record is sufficiently developed to allow reasoned consideration

of an ineffective assistance claim." United States v. Natanel,

(1st Cir. 1991). Here, however, the record is

very scantily developed on the key issues, the subsidiary facts

are uncertain, and the parties' briefs are redolent with the

familiar scents of speculation and surmise. Thus, the

appropriate method for pursuing this claim is through a

collateral proceeding in the district court under

(1994 & Supp. 1996). See United States v. Soldevila-López,

(1st Cir. 1994); Mala,

; United

States v. Daniels,

(1st Cir. 1993); McGill,

n.5; Hunnewell,

n.1.

One circumstance in this case, however, requires us to

take a special prophylaxis. Like Mala,

, this

strikes us as the rare occasion on which the appointment of

counsel is warranted for the handling of a section 2255

proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2000)

(stipulating that, if "the interests of justice so require,

representation may be provided [under the Criminal Justice Act]

-4- for any financially eligible person who . . . is seeking relief

under section ... 2255 of title 28"). We thus direct the

district court, if appellant petitions for section 2255 relief

and demonstrates continued financial eligibility, to appoint

counsel for him under section 3006A(a)(2)(B).

We need go no further. Since the ineffective

assistance issue is not ripe for review, and the appellant

asserts no other grounds for appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

This ruling is without prejudice to the appellant's right to

raise his claim of ineffective assistance in a collateral

proceeding brought pursuant to

. The district

court shall, subject to the Criminal Justice Act's strictures,

appoint counsel for appellant should such a proceeding

eventuate.

It is so ordered.

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