[NOT FOR PUBLICATION — NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 99-1868

ELAINE CHANDLER,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

RAYTHEON EMPLOYEES DISABILITY TRUST AND METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges,

and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.

John S. Wessler, with whom Nathanson, Wessler & Onerheim was on brief, for appellant. Jean M. Kelley, with whom Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, LLP was on brief, for appellees.

June 14, 2000 ______________ *Of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. SELYA, Circuit Judge. Ably represented, plaintiff-

appellant Elaine Chandler challenges a fiduciary's determination

deeming her ineligible to receive long-term disability benefits

under a plan sponsored by her employer, Raytheon Company. The

plan is subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

of 1974 (ERISA),

.

The denial of benefits occurred when the plan's claims

administrator, defendant-appellee Metropolitan Life Insurance

Company (Met Life), determined that, as of the critical date

(July 1995), Chandler was not "totally disabled" as that term is

defined in the plan. Chandler exhausted her administrative

remedies and then sought judicial review. See

(a)(1)(B). The district court rejected her plea. See

Chandler v. Raytheon Employees Disability Trust,

(D. Mass. 1999) (granting summary judgment for the

defendants). Chandler appeals that order.

We previously acknowledged that when a judge accurately

takes the measure of a case and articulates a convincing

rationale, "an appellate court should refrain from writing at

length to no other end than to hear its own words resonate."

Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co.,

(1st

Cir. 1996); accord Cruz-Ramos v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co.,

(1st Cir. 2000); Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas,

-3- Local 901,

(1st Cir. 1996); Holders Capital

Corp. v. California Union Ins. Co. (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza

Hotel Fire Litig.),

(1st Cir. 1993). This

principle has particular force where, as here, a case involves

no more than the application of uncontroversial legal rules to

a specific, highly idiosyncratic set of facts. Thus, we affirm

the judgment below for substantially the reasons elucidated in

Judge Saris's thoughtful rescript. See

.

We add only that we are fully persuaded that the

appropriate standard by which Met Life's decision must be gauged

is whether its actions can be deemed arbitrary and capricious.

See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,

(1989); Recupero v. New Engl. Tele. & Tel. Co.,

(1st Cir. 1997). Because the evidence of record here, taken

as a whole, affords reasonable support for Met Life's

determination, that rampart has not been breached. See Doyle v.

Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,

(1st Cir. 1998).

We need go no further.

Affirmed.

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