Muldoon v. Social Security

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Muldoon v. Social Security

Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 99-2013

EMMETT S. MULDOON,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. George A. O’Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Emmett S. Muldoon on brief pro se. Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Anita Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, on brief for appellee.

June 22, 2000 Per Curiam. Plaintiff, a state prisoner, appeals

the dismissal of his complaint challenging the

constitutionality of the provision of the Social Security

Act which disqualifies persons confined pursuant to a felony

conviction 1 from receiving social security disability

benefits while they are incarcerated.

42 U.S.C. § 402

(x)

(1998).

On appeal, plaintiff acknowledges that Section

402(x) has been upheld against constitutional challenge by

every court to consider the matter, but he argues that the

district court erred in relying on those cases. He urges

that his claims are entirely different from those raised and

rejected in prior cases. The "fundamental" basis of his

challenge, he explains, is that his due process right to

obtain private counsel of his choice is violated by the

suspension of these benefit payments. He wishes to hire

counsel to assist him in postconviction proceedings and in

1Effective April 7, 2000, an amendment enlarges the disqualified class to include those who are confined on or after the effective date pursuant to a conviction for "a criminal offense."

42 U.S.C. § 402

(x) (2000).

-2- civil suits connected to his former business. However,

there is no due process right to government expenditures

for such a purpose.

We also apprehend no merit to plaintiff's other

claims, which he characterizes as raising similarly unique

theories under a myriad of other constitutional provisions,

the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities

Act. There also was no prejudicial error in the district

court's failure to rule on plaintiff's motion to amend the

complaint by adding claims under

42 U.S.C. §§ 407

(a), (b).

The proposed amendment did not state a claim upon which

relief could be granted.

Affirmed.

-3-

Reference

Status
Published