[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 00-1386

LYNNE STANDIFIRD,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF BOXBOROUGH,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Lynne Standifird on brief pro se. John J. Davis, John J. Cloherty, III, and Pierce, Davis & Perritano, LLP on brief for appellee.

October 16, 2000 Per Curiam. Plaintiff Lynne Standifird appeals pro se from

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendant, Town of Boxborough, on her claim pursuant to

, arising out of a traffic stop by one of

defendant’s police officers. Review of a district court’s

summary judgment order is de novo. Soileau v. Guilford of

Maine, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 1997). Having reviewed

the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff and

resolving all reasonable inferences in her favor, we conclude,

essentially for the reasons stated by the district court, that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

defendant is entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff also appeals from the district court’s denial of

her motion for default judgment to be entered against defendant

for untimely filing its notice of removal and answer to the

complaint. Our careful review of the record reveals that the

notice of removal was timely filed, measured pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), within thirty days of defendant’s receipt of

the complaint. See

(b). Defendant filed its

request for an enlargement of time to file a responsive pleading

to the complaint seven days after the time for filing a

responsive pleading had expired. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c).

However, the district court has discretion to grant such a request for enlargement of time “where the failure to act was

the result of excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). “The

district court is afforded great leeway in granting or refusing

enlargements and its decisions are reviewable only for abuse of

that discretion.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez,

(1st Cir. 1994)(citations omitted). There was no abuse

of discretion here.

Finally, plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court

erred in failing to address her state-law claims. “As a general

principle, the unfavorable disposition of a plaintiff’s federal

claims at the early stages of a suit, well before the

commencement of trial, will trigger the dismissal without

prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims.” Rodriguez v.

Doral Mortgage Co.,

(1st Cir. 1995). Here,

however, the district court’s grant of summary judgment makes no

mention of any state-law claims.

At this stage of the proceedings, plaintiff cannot

profitably argue that the district court ought to have remanded

her case to state court because it raised no federal claims.

Plaintiff has waived any such argument by asserting in her

opposition to summary judgment, her motion for reconsideration,

and her appellate brief that there are genuine issues of fact

precluding summary judgment in defendant’s favor on the Fourth

-3- Amendment claim.

However, plaintiff may be on stronger ground with respect

to her objection to the court’s failure to address her state-law

claims. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, consistently maintained

below, as she does on appeal, that she seeks relief pursuant to

state law (although she has not clearly explained what her

state-law claims are). In these circumstances, we think the

district court judgment ought to be without prejudice to any

supplemental state-law claims.

The judgment of the district court granting defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is modified to provide for dismissal

of any state-law claims without prejudice. As modified, the

judgment is affirmed.

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