[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 99-1173 No. 99-1883 CHRISTOPHER J. HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

GEORGE A. VOSE, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Christopher J. Hightower on brief pro se. Michael B. Grant on brief for appellees.

October 30, 2000 Per Curiam. Christopher J. Hightower appeals

pro se from a judgment entered in favor of various officials

at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions

following a bench trial, as well from the denial of a post-

judgment motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The

claims that went to trial stem from events that occurred in

1993 when Hightower was a pretrial detainee. Hightower

alleged that prison officials violated his rights under the

First Amendment by disciplining him in retaliation for

expressing an intent to file a grievance. He further

alleged that his disciplinary hearing did not comport with

the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Hightower also alleged several state claims. The district

court concluded that Hightower failed to meet his burden as

to each of these claims. We affirm.

Hightower's main argument is that the district

court erred in its factual finding of no retaliation. We

review a district court's factual findings for clear error.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Our deference is even greater

where, as here, the factual findings are based on

credibility determinations. See Anderson v. City of

Bessermer City,

(1985); United States v.

Rostoff,

(1st Cir. 1999). In such cases, "error is seldom considered 'clear' unless the credibility

assessments were based on testimony which was inherently

implausible, internally inconsistent, or critically

impeached.'" Keller v. United States,

(1 st

Cir. 1994).

We discern no clear error here. Contrary to

Hightower's suggestion, we are not persuaded that the

testimony of prison officials was critically impeached at

trial. Nor do we think that Hightower's late-filed list of

"punishable conduct," attached to the Rule 60(b) motion,

demonstrates that defendant Yahn lied or that the

disciplinary board must have acted from an improper motive

in finding him guilty of threatening (but not guilty of

swearing). In this regard, we note that the text of

disciplinary rule (d)-- governing both swearing and

threatening--is arguably ambiguous, and Yahn's stated

interpretation is not obviously wrong. Under the

circumstances, we also find no abuse of discretion in the

denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt,

(1st Cir. 1997) (denial of Rule 60(b)

motion reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied,

(1998).

-3- We have carefully considered Hightower's remaining

arguments and find them to be without merit. The district

court considered the proffered testimony of Janet Speck.

The proffered evidence would have been insufficient reason

to set aside the district court's factual findings even if

it had been introduced. Hightower makes no persuasive

argument that the district court erred in concluding that he

failed to prove his due process claim, and he makes no

argument at all directed at his state law claims.

Affirmed.

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