Marcelo Ceballos challenges the indictment to which he pled guilty. Specifically, he argues on appeal that the there was no evidence presented to the grand jury of an essential element of the charge to which he pled guilty. Before pleading guilty to Count Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, which charged him with conspiring to commit money laundering, Ce-ballos moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support it. At the time that he pled guilty, however, Ceballos agreed that all pending motions (which included the *27 motion to dismiss the indictment) would be “deemed waived.” On appeal, Ceballos again challenges the factual basis for the indictment, arguing that there was no evidence presented to the grand jury to support a finding that he knew that the money he helped transfer represented proceeds from an unlawful activity.

“This circuit has ruled that a defendant who pleads guilty may not later contest the factual and theoretical foundations of the indictment to which he has pled.” United States v. Rivera Ramos, 856 F.2d 420, 423 (1st Cir. 1988). This appeal by Ceballos represents an effort to contest the factual foundation of Count Three of the indictment, to which he pled guilty. At his change-of-plea hearing, Ceballos specifically admitted that he knew that the money he helped transfer “came from drug transactions.” Ceballos’ appeal does not fall within any exception for challenges to “jurisdictional facts” alleged in the indictment. See Valencia v. United States, 923 F.2d 917, 921 (1st Cir. 1991). 1

Ceballos’ conviction and sentence are affirmed. See Loc. R. 27(c).