Plaintiffs instituted this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress an array of alleged violations of their civil rights arising from an arrest for shoplifting. Five years later, the district court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), a sanction Plaintiffs here challenge. *227 Because the record fully justifies dismissal, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.

After the complaint was filed on December 30, 1997, the docket sheet reveals a series of motions triggering various orders then issued by United States District Judge Salvador E. Casellas. On September 30, 1999, Judge Casellas partially granted a motion to dismiss, eliminating certain defendants and substantive claims. Six months later, the district court permitted an extension of time to complete discovery and “admonished” the parties that “no further extensions will be granted.” 1 On August 10, 2000, the case was transferred to United States District Judge Jay A. Garcia-Gregory. On January 4, 2001, Judge Garcia-Gregory ordered the parties to answer a questionnaire within 15 days. Plaintiffs did not respond.

On July 2, 2002, the district court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution, noting the absence of any docket entries from them since July 31, 2000. The court set a July 9, 2002 deadline. Plaintiffs filed a response on July 10, 2002, one day late.

In its July 11, 2002 order, the district court predicated dismissal on Rule 41(b), which warrants the sanction “[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court,” and cited First Circuit precedent upholding such dismissals for “extremely protracted inaction (measured in years), disobedience of court orders, ignorance of warnings, or contumacious conduct.” See, e.g., Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 108 (1st 1995). The court documented Plaintiffs’ extended inactivity, noted it was neither explained nor excused in their untimely response, 2 and sua sponte dismissed the case in its entirety

Plaintiffs now contend the district court abused its discretion, characterizing the dismissal as drastic and draconian, a harsh alternative when the case had “progressed along” and appropriate alternatives like warnings or economic sanctions were available. They rely on Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002), which instructed a reviewing court to “balance the trial court’s authority to impose such a sanction against the obvious policy considerations that favor disposition *228 of cases on the merits.” According to Plaintiffs, that balancing, tipped by the presence of certain Plaintiffs, who are minors “entitled to special attention by the State,” demands a remand “for continuation of the proceedings a quo."

The record defies Plaintiffs’ gloss. Indeed, Chamorro demands we reject it. There, under similar though less egregious facts, 3 we catalogued the “protracted foot-dragging to defiance of court orders to ignoring warnings,” id., all present in this case, and concluded the justifications, rationalizations, and pleas for “a sympathetic ear to the importunings of those who claim that a trial judge abused his [ ] discretion by dismissing a case for want of prosecution,” were outweighed by the court’s authority to impose the sanction. Id. at 6. The “bedrock” for that conclusion persists: “the effective administration of justice requires that trial courts possess the capability to manage their own affairs.” Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)).

Because the record here also reflects a virtual absence of prosecution and Plaintiffs’ flagrant disregard of court orders, the district court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 41(b).

Affirmed.