A district court sentenced Antonio Martinez-Pomales to 10 years in prison and 5 years of supervised release for conspiring to distribute at least 5 kilograms of eocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He got somewhat lucky on the supervised-release front, because a statute authorizes a minimum supervised-release term of “at least 5 years,” see id. § 841(b)(1)(A), and permits a maximum term of life, see United States v. Cortes-Claudio, 312 F.3d 17, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2002). Martinez-Pomales later admitted violating conditions of his supervised release by (among other things) committing crimes of violence. So the court revoked his supervised release, sentenced' him to'24 months in prison, and imposéd a new 5-year supervised-release term too.

Martínez-Pomales contests here only the supervised-release part of his new sentence, insisting that the court plainly erred by not reducing, the. 5-year figure to 3. 1

In so..doing,- he argues (at least implicitly) in this,-multi-step way:

Step one: A federal statute, he points out, says that after revoking a 'person’s supervised release, a district court can impose a prison term followed by more supervised release — though the statute adds that the amount of supervised release is limited .to “the term of supervised release authorized by statute .for the offense that resulted in the original term .of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised 1 release.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). .

Step two: His original drug offense was a Class A felony, he concedes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559; id. § 3581(b). And, his argument continues, a supervised-release *12 term for a Class A felony may not exceed 5 years. Tellingly, he cites no statute to back up his claim, opting instead to rely on section 7B1.1 of the federal sentencing guidelines — but this section grades supervised-release infractions, not crimes that led to the original term of. supervised release, and so is not relevant for present purposes. See United States v. Tapia-Escalera, 356 F.3d 181, 185 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing, section 7Bl.l’s purpose). Still, what Martinez-Pomales says is an echo of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), which — with a key proviso (“[e]xcept as otherwise, provided”) — sets a maximum of 5 years’ supervised release for a Class A felony.

Step three: Believing that 5 years of supervised release was the statutory limit for his original drug crime — and noting that the court gave him 2 years in prison following the revocation of his first supervised release — he protests that any further supervised release could not exceed 3 years after doing the math required by section 3583(h) (discussed in step one): 5 — 2 = 3. Ergo, the district court plainly ■blundered by giving him 5 years — or so he tries to persuade us.

We can make short work of this argument, however, because a key premise of Martínez-Pomales’s' thesis is simply wrong: contrary to what he thinks, the maximum term of supervised release for his drug-conspiracy crime is not 5 years— it is life. Here is why. Although section 3583(b)(1) caps supervised release for Class A felonies at 5 years, there is an exception if another law “otherwise provide[s].” And 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is just such a law, mandating a minimum term of supervised release “of at least 5 years” for certain drug crimes, including the one for which Martinez-Pomales was originally sentenced. See Cortes-Claudio, 312 F.3.d at 21 (explaining that “[bjecause § 841 does ‘otherwise provide’ supervised release terms, its provisions” trump section 3583(b)’s). Also, the “at least 5 years” language means, we have held, that a defendant committing the qualifying. crime can face a life sentence of supervised release. See id. at 22-23; see also United States v. Matos, 328 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2003). Given, then, that the maximum supervised-release term for Martinez-Po-males’s initial drug crime was life, not 5 years, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred by hitting him with 5 years’ supervised release on top of 2 years’ reimprisonment, see, e.g., United States v. Neal 556 Fed.Appx. 495, 497 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), (rejecting an argument similar to Martínez-Pomales’s); United States v. Black, 455 Fed.Appx. 412, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (ditto) — even assuming, as he argues, that section 3583(h)’s subtraction principle is in play here. 2

Affirmed.