Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 18-1538

OSCAR NEFTALI CHAVEZ-MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges, and Katzmann, Judge.

Lidia M. Sanchez, on brief for petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Jeffrey R. Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, and Lance L. Jolley, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.

January 10, 2019

 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Acting Attorney General Matthew G. Whitaker has been substituted for former Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III as the respondent.  Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. KATZMANN, Judge. Petitioner Oscar Neftali Chavez-Mendez

(“Chavez-Mendez”), a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review

of a May 7, 2018 final order issued by the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of his

application for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (“INA”),

.

In his application, Chavez-Mendez alleged fear of

persecution from members of a neighboring village based on his

membership in a particular social group comprised of residents of

his hometown. In its decision, the BIA stated:

The respondent [Chavez-Mendez] credibly testified to the following. The respondent lived with his parents in a village of about 200 people in Guatemala. The village was downhill from another village, and when villagers from the respondent’s town would travel uphill to cultivate the land, various disputes broke out between the residents of both towns over access to the land and water. During the conflicts, villagers were armed with sticks and machetes. The respondent’s father participated in the conflict, and the opposing villagers once captured and threatened to kill the respondent’s uncle. The respondent never personally witnessed any of the altercations nor was he involved in any of the disputes, and the respondent and his siblings were never harmed as a result of these conflicts. The police or soldiers sometimes came to the village to restore the peace when the disputes broke out.

In denying Chavez-Mendez’s application, the BIA upheld

the immigration judge’s conclusion that he failed “to carry his

burden of proof to establish that he experienced past harm

sufficiently severe to qualify as persecution,” and failed “to

- 2 - carry his burden to establish a nexus between the harm that he

fears and his identified particular social group.” We agree.

Judicial review of the BIA’s denial of asylum is

deferential. See

(b)(4)(B). We examine fact-bound

challenges only to ensure that the BIA’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the administrative record as a whole. See

Makhoul v. Ashcroft,

(1st Cir. 2004). The denial

of asylum must be affirmed unless the administrative record

“unequivocally indicates error.”

. “We review the BIA’s

legal conclusions de novo, although we grant some deference to its

interpretations of statutes and regulations related to immigration

matters.” Aldana-Ramos v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2014).

To be eligible for asylum, the applicant must

demonstrate that he or she is a refugee as defined in INA §

101(a)(42)(A),

(a)(42)(A). Section 101(a)(42)(A)

of the INA defines a refugee as “any person who is outside any

country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or

unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself

or herself of the protection of, that country because of

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.”

(a)(42)(A); see also

Aldana-Ramos,

.

- 3 - Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination

that Chavez-Mendez did not suffer persecution in Guatemala as a

child. The harm his family suffered appears to be limited.

Neither Chavez-Mendez nor any of his immediate family members were

harmed. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s

determination that Chavez-Mendez failed to establish that the

dispute of the use of land is a protected basis for asylum relief.

“We have explained that, in general, [e]vents that stem from

personal disputes are . . . not enough to show the required nexus.”

Guerra-Marchorro v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2014)

(quoting Sompotan v. Mukasey,

(1st Cir. 2008));

see also Lopez-Lopez v. Sessions,

(1st Cir.

2018). Quite apart from failing to establish the requisite nexus,

Chavez-Mendez has not shown that the record compels the conclusion

that the Guatemalan government would be unable or unwilling to

protect him from persecutors. See

(a) (42)(A);

Morales-Morales v. Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2017).

Moreover, “a general difficulty preventing the occurrence of

particular future crimes” is not sufficient to show that the

government is unable or unwilling to protect him. Morales-Morales,

(quoting Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler,

(1st Cir. 2007)) (emphasis in original). Finally, Chavez-Mendez’s

asserted generalized fear of future harm from gangs or drug

traffickers is insufficient to meet his burden of proof for asylum.

- 4 - “[S]uch generalized evidence is not sufficient to compel a finding

of a well-founded fear of persecution.” Villafranca v. Lynch,

(1st Cir. 2015); Makhoul,

.

Chavez-Mendez’s petition for review is denied.

- 5 -