United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 19-1432

JUAN C. PEREZ-TOLENTINO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

ANDREI IANCU, Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office; UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Lipez, and Barron, Circuit Judges.

Juan A. Vélez-Méndez on brief for appellant. W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney; Mariana E. Bauzá- Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division; and Antonio L. Perez-Alonso, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

December 21, 2020 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Juan C. Perez-Tolentino

("Perez") challenges the dismissal of his disability

discrimination suit against the United States Patent and Trademark

Office ("USPTO") and its director. The district court held that

the action could not proceed because Perez waived his

discrimination claim in a settlement agreement that allowed him to

resign from his job in lieu of being terminated. Although Perez

acknowledges the waiver, he argues that it is void because he did

not knowingly and voluntarily agree to it. He claims that the

district court erred in finding implausible his allegation of an

unenforceable waiver.

Having carefully reviewed the complaint and related

materials in the record, we agree with the district court's

analysis of the circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement

and the court's conclusion that the waiver is binding. See Beddall

v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co.,

(1st Cir. 1998) ("When

. . . a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked

to -- and admittedly dependent upon -- a document (the authenticity

of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into

the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)."). We add only the

following comments in response to Perez's arguments to this court.

(1) Perez's primary contention on appeal is that the

district court erred by failing to consider his psychiatric

- 2 - disability when reviewing the factors relevant to his waiver.

However, Perez neither alleges in his complaint nor argued in his

opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss that his ability

to understand and evaluate the settlement agreement or the waiver

was compromised by his mental state. Indeed, Perez's complaint

emphasizes his intellectual capability, alleging that his "medical

condition" -- described as "major stress" -- would not prevent him

from performing "the essential job functions of his position" on

a part-time basis. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 20.

Perez first reported his "recent" diagnosis of

depression and anxiety, and his "pharmacologic treatment for his

mental disorders," in his motion to alter and amend the district

court's judgment,1 but even then did not explain how those

conditions impaired his ability to consider the three-page

settlement agreement (a deficiency that persists on appeal).

Moreover, Perez was not left to his own devices in deciding whether

to sign the agreement; significantly, he was assisted throughout

the settlement process by his union representative, who also was

a signatory to the agreement.

Our caselaw clearly rejects the sufficiency of a bald

assertion of a psychiatric condition to void a waiver where the

surrounding circumstances otherwise demonstrate voluntariness.

1 Perez presents no argument on appeal concerning the denial of this post-judgment motion.

- 3 - See Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2002) (emphasizing precedent holding that "an incapacity

to knowingly and voluntarily execute a release will not be inferred

simply from the showing, standing alone, that the party suffered

from some psychiatric disorder"); Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp.

Union Emps. Supplemental Ret. Plan,

, 714 (1st Cir.

1999) (stating that "[t]he fact that [the employee] suffered from

various disorders, including depression, and was on medication is

insufficient, without more, to invalidate the Agreement"); Rivera-

Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean,

(1st

Cir. 1997) (stating that it is not "enough [for an employee] to

assert that the nature of [his] disability was psychiatric" because

"not all psychiatric disabilities inherently involve a question

about capacity to act knowingly and voluntarily" (emphasis

omitted)). Having failed to explain the relevance of his condition

to the district court, Perez waived this theory of involuntariness

as a basis for invalidating his express relinquishment of the

discrimination claim. See, e.g., Morais, 167 F.3d at 712.

(2) Perez also contends that, in evaluating the validity

of his waiver, the district court improperly disregarded guidance

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on

waivers of employment discrimination claims. Putting aside the

question of whether courts must adhere to such guidance, Perez is

simply wrong about the district court's analysis. As the court

- 4 - correctly explained in its order denying Perez's post-judgment

motion, its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis was fully

consistent with the EEOC guidelines as well as this court's

precedent. See EEOC, Understanding Waivers of Discrimination

Claims in Employee Severance Agreements, EEOC-NVTA-2009-3,

https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_severance-agreements.html

(last visited Nov. 30, 2020); Melanson,

& n.4

(identifying the "non-exclusive set of six factors" used to

determine the validity of a release). The court noted, inter alia,

the clarity of the agreement's language, Perez's ability as a

patent examiner to read documents, the time allowed for his review

of the agreement,2 and the content "incorporat[ing] exactly what

[Perez] requested from the USPTO."3 Although it acknowledged that

Perez was not represented by counsel and "had no input regarding

[the agreement's] terms," the court pointed out that the agreement

itself encouraged Perez to consult an attorney and that his union

representative also signed the agreement. Moreover, the court

observed, Perez "did not ask for assistance, clarification, or

2 Perez stated in his opposition to the USPTO's motion to dismiss that he was given six days to consider the three-page settlement agreement.

3 After he received notice of his termination, Perez asked for, and was given, the benefit of resigning with a release of claims.

- 5 - different terms," and the record does not indicate that the USPTO

"denied [him] an opportunity to negotiate."

(3) We deem meritless Perez's assertion that his

administrative claim of disability discrimination, pursued after

he signed the settlement agreement, shows that he did not

understand the waiver. Where all other factors point to Perez's

knowing and voluntary consent to the waiver, we cannot reasonably

give weight to his disregard of the agreement. Otherwise, as

appellees point out, a party could intentionally void an agreement

simply by breaching it.

In sum, the district court properly concluded that

Perez's allegations "fail[ed] to plausibly show that he did not

sign the [s]ettlement [a]greement 'knowingly and voluntarily.'"

Accordingly, the agreement precludes his disability claim, and the

district court properly dismissed his complaint.

Affirmed.

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