United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 20-2045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN A. SACCOCCIA,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Thompson, Selya, and Hawkins,* Circuit Judges.

Shon Hopwood, with whom Kyle Singhal, Ann Marie Hopwood, and Hopwood & Singhal PLLC were on brief, for appellant. Lauren S. Zurier, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Richard B. Myrus, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

August 18, 2021

* Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Stephen A.

Saccoccia, who is serving a 660-year prison sentence, seeks

compassionate release under

(c)(1)(A), as recently

amended by the First Step Act (FSA),

(b),

, 5239 (2018). Saccoccia argued below that several

factors, including his failing health and the unusual length of

his prison sentence, militate in favor of his release. The

district court disagreed and refused to exercise its discretion to

Saccoccia's behoof. Saccoccia renews his arguments on appeal.

After careful consideration, we leave him where we found him and

affirm the judgment below.

I

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the

case. Roughly three decades ago, a jury convicted Saccoccia (a

dealer in precious metals) of a panoply of criminal offenses

connected to his role in laundering more than $136,000,000 for a

Colombian drug cartel. The district court sentenced him to the

statutory maximum on each of the fifty-four counts of conviction

and ran the sentences consecutively to aggregate a 660-year term

of immurement. We affirmed Saccoccia's sentence, explaining that

his guideline sentencing range (GSR) was life imprisonment and

noting that the effect of the consecutive sentences imposed by the

district court was functionally equivalent to a life sentence

- 2 - without the possibility of parole. See United States v. Saccoccia

(Saccoccia I),

, 786 & n.28 (1st Cir. 1995).

In the past, Saccoccia has persistently challenged his

conviction, sentence, and forfeiture order. See, e.g., Saccoccia

v. United States,

, 173 n.4 (1st Cir. 2020);

United States v. Saccoccia, No. 91-115,

, at *1

(D.R.I. Aug. 2, 2004). Shortly after passage of the FSA, he moved

for compassionate release based on health-related concerns. He

ultimately withdrew that motion but — in May of 2020 — again sought

compassionate release. The motion was filed at the height of the

COVID-19 pandemic. In support, Saccoccia argued that there were

several "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a

sentence reduction pursuant to

(c)(1)(A), which is

commonly referred to as the compassionate-release statute.

(c)(1)(A)(i). First, Saccoccia pointed to his

chronic hypertension and hyperlipidemia, among other health-

related concerns, which he alleged placed him at heightened risk

for complications stemming from COVID-19. In subsequent filings,

Saccoccia also pointed to an elevated prostate-specific antigen

(PSA) level — an indicium of prostate cancer. Additionally,

Saccoccia argued that the sheer length of his prison term

constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for his

release.

- 3 - Because the district judge who originally sentenced

Saccoccia had retired, the compassionate-release motion was

referred to a different judge. The district court, in the person

of the newly assigned judge, denied Saccoccia's motion. See United

States v. Saccoccia (Saccoccia II), No. 91-115,

,

at *1 (D.R.I. Oct. 19, 2020). It concluded that Saccoccia did not

demonstrate that his hypertension and hyperlipidemia put him at

increased risk for severe complications from COVID-19 so as to

warrant compassionate release. See

. The court declined

to give substantive consideration to Saccoccia's arguments

regarding his other medical conditions, deeming them

insufficiently developed. See

at *2 n.1. The court also

concluded that the length of Saccoccia's sentence, even if

potentially cognizable as a reason for compassionate release, did

not, in the circumstances at hand, warrant such relief. See

. Completing its analysis, the court mulled the sentencing

factors limned in

(a) and determined that those

factors did not weigh in Saccoccia's favor. See

. This

timely appeal followed.

II

We begin our analysis with a concise explanation of the

statutory framework governing compassionate release and an

overview of how courts generally handle such motions. We then

address Saccoccia's claims with respect to his health-related

- 4 - concerns. Finally, we turn to his arguments concerning the length

of his sentence, matters ancillary to sentence length, and the

district court's treatment of the section 3553(a) factors.

A

Federal law has for some time provided that a court, on

motion of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), "may reduce the

term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable," upon a

finding that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."

(c)(1)(A) (2000); see also Comprehensive Crime

Control Act of 1984,

Stat. 1837, 1998-99

(1984). This compassionate-release statute carved out a narrow

exception to the general rule that "[t]he court may not modify a

term of imprisonment once it has been imposed."1

(c).

In 2018, Congress passed the FSA. See Pub. L. No. 115-

391,

(2018). Pertinently, the FSA amended the

1 The statute also allows a district court to reduce a sentence when a defendant with a mandatory life sentence reaches at least seventy years of age, has served at least thirty years, and is not a danger to the safety of the community. See

(c)(1)(A)(ii). Moreover, section 3582(c) creates other avenues for a sentence reduction. See, e.g.,

§ 3582(c)(1)(B); id. § 3582(c)(2). None of these other avenues is implicated here.

- 5 - compassionate-release statute to allow incarcerated individuals to

file their own motions seeking compassionate release as long as

they first apply to the BOP.2 See id. § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239;

(c)(1)(A) (2018). Saccoccia's motion was filed

under this revised regime.

To grant a sentence reduction in response to a prisoner-

initiated motion for compassionate release alleging "extraordinary

and compelling reasons," a district court must make several

findings. First, the court must find both that the defendant has

presented an "extraordinary and compelling reason" warranting a

sentence reduction,

(c)(1)(A)(i), and that "such

a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued

by the Sentencing Commission,"

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Put another

way, the district court must find that the defendant's situation

constitutes the type of "extreme hardship" that the compassionate-

release statute is designed to ameliorate. United States v.

2Such motions are variously referred to as sentence-reduction motions and compassionate-release motions. We use those terms interchangeably. So, too, the court below interchangeably referred to Saccoccia's request as one for "release" and one for a "sentence reduction." See Saccoccia II,

, at *4. Based on its use of the term "reduction," we conclude that the district court correctly understood that the compassionate-release statute contemplates any form of sentence reduction, including release. See

(c)(1)(A) ("[T]he court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment) . . . ." (emphasis supplied)).

- 6 - Havener,

(1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.). It must also

abide by any applicable policy guidance from the Sentencing

Commission, which is required by statute to "describe what should

be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence

reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of

specific examples."

(t).3 Then, the court must

consider any applicable section 3553(a) factors, see

(c)(1)(A), and "determine whether, in its discretion, the

reduction . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the

particular circumstances of the case." Dillon v. United States,

(2010) (describing similar two-part inquiry for

sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2), a provision adjacent

to section 3582(c)(1), employing similar language); see United

States v. Vaughn,

(1st Cir. 2015) (same).

At both steps of this pavane, our standard of review is

the same. Recognizing that the compassionate-release statute

provides that a district court's decision to grant or deny a

3 The current policy guidance, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §1B1.13 (Nov. 2018), provides that "[u]pon motion of the Director of the [BOP] under [section 3582(c)(1)(A)]," a court may grant relief, after considering the applicable factors listed at section 3553(a), when it finds both that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction" and that "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in

(g)."

§1B1.13(1)(A), (2). Section 1B1.13 also provides four categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons. See id. §1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D).

- 7 - compassionate-release motion is discretionary, see

(c)(1)(A), we review a district court's denial of a

compassionate-release motion for abuse of discretion, see, e.g.,

United States v. Long,

, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United

States v. Pawlowski,

, 330 (3d Cir. 2020); cf. United

States v. Concepcion,

(1st Cir. 2021) (reviewing

denial of motion for resentencing under FSA for abuse of

discretion); United States v. Rodríguez-Rosado,

(1st Cir. 2018) (reviewing denial of section 3582(c)(2) motion for

abuse of discretion). This standard of review, however, is not

monolithic. Under it, "we review the district court's answers to

legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and

judgment calls with some deference to the district court's exercise

of its discretion." Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar,

(1st Cir. 2020).

B

Saccoccia's first argument posits that his poor physical

health, in combination with his age (sixty-two at the time the

district court ruled) and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,

constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason sufficient to

ground his motion. He identifies two distinct aspects of his

health: an amalgam of diagnosed chronic conditions (including

hypertension and hyperlipidemia) and an elevated PSA level. The

district court determined that Saccoccia's hypertension and

- 8 - hyperlipidemia — the focus of his chronic health-related arguments

— did not clear the high bar needed for showing an extraordinary

and compelling reason to justify compassionate release. See

Saccoccia II,

, at *2. The court considered

Saccoccia's proffered medical evidence but concluded that neither

of these conditions was serious and that they did not comprise a

unique risk for severe complications arising from COVID-19. The

court found, for example, that Saccoccia did not suffer from

pulmonary hypertension, identified by the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC) as particularly problematic in light

of COVID-19's effects on the respiratory system. See

These findings are supported by the record, and we

discern nothing resembling an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Aponte-Guzmán,

(1st Cir. 2012). Health

concerns are not uncommon among people in their sixties, but not

every complex of health concerns is sufficient to warrant

compassionate release. This remains true even in the midst of the

COVID-19 pandemic. The risk of severe illness from COVID-19 might

in some cases justify compassionate release based on the criteria

set forth in the Sentencing Commission's current policy guidance

regarding a defendant's medical conditions and age, see USSG

§1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(B), but the district court, relying on then-

current CDC guidance, reasonably determined that Saccoccia's

- 9 - medical conditions did not establish any such vulnerability in his

particular case.

Even apart from such criteria, words have significance.

Words like "extraordinary" and "compelling," when used by Congress

in framing a statute, must be given their plain meaning. See Robb

Evans & Assocs. v. United States,

(1st Cir. 2017);

United States v. Carroll,

(1st Cir. 1997). The

district court's determination that Saccoccia's health concerns

and the threat of COVID-19 did not add up to an extraordinary and

compelling reason for a sentence reduction is also consistent, we

think, with the plain meaning of the words that Congress chose to

use.

Saccoccia trains more fire on the district court's

rejection of his plea for compassionate release based on his

elevated PSA level. In his view, the court should have treated

that elevated PSA level as the functional equivalent of a showing

of prostate cancer. Relatedly, he attacks, as legal error, the

district court's categorical treatment of some of his health-

related arguments — including, most notably, his prostate-cancer

argument — as "not developed." Saccoccia II,

, at

*2 n.1. As a component of this attack, he intimates that the lack

of a formal diagnosis should be disregarded because the BOP delayed

confirmatory tests.

- 10 - There is no doubt that Saccoccia properly raised

arguments related to potential prostate cancer before the district

court. In supplemental filings to his compassionate-release

motion, Saccoccia included (among other things) medical records

indicating that his PSA levels had increased from 2019 to 2020 and

that such an increase warranted further testing for prostate

cancer. But we understand the district court's treatment of

Saccoccia's prostate-cancer argument as "not developed" to mean

that — with only suggestive test results and in the absence of an

actual diagnosis — Saccoccia could not meaningfully represent that

he has prostate cancer. After all, an elevated PSA level is far

removed from a definite indicator of prostate cancer.

To be sure, an elevated PSA level (especially when it

represents a significant year-to-year rise) may indicate a need

for further testing. Here, however, a myriad of other possible

explanations exist for Saccoccia's test results. See U.S.

Preventive Servs. Task Force, Recommendation Statement, Screening

for Prostate Cancer,

, 1902-03 (2018). This is

particularly true given Saccoccia's chronic condition of benign

hypertrophy of the prostate, which itself may produce an elevated

PSA level. See

So, too, Saccoccia is in his sixties, and

aging itself is correlated with increased PSA levels. And in any

event, Saccoccia was tested again in August of 2020 — this time by

an outside lab — and that test yielded a PSA level lower than his

- 11 - immediately preceding test.4 This uncertainty, which can be

resolved to a large extent through further testing and

consultation, affords a plausible basis for the district court's

treatment of Saccoccia's prostate-cancer argument as "not

developed" when presented to the court.

Our takeaway from the district court's treatment of

Saccoccia's other health-related arguments, including his

prostate-cancer argument, as "not developed," is reinforced by the

fact that the court took pains to leave the door open for a future

compassionate-release motion should subsequent medical

developments warrant. See Saccoccia II,

, at *5

n.4. If, say, Saccoccia were actually to be diagnosed as having

prostate cancer, he could again move for compassionate release

with that diagnosis in hand.5 At this early stage, though, the

district court's refusal to accept Saccoccia's premature

characterization of his condition as "prostate cancer" was well

within the encincture of its discretion.

Saccoccia has a fallback position. He suggests that the

potential risk for prostate cancer is alone sufficient to justify

Saccoccia's PSA level in March of 2020 was 9.76 ng/ml. This 4

marked an increase from his February 2019 PSA level, which was 4.69 ng/ml. Upon subsequent testing, in August of 2020, Saccoccia was found to have a PSA level of 6.6 ng/ml. We do not mean to imply that a diagnosis of prostate cancer, 5

standing alone, would justify compassionate release. That would depend on a constellation of other factors, including the BOP's ability to treat such an illness within the federal prison system.

- 12 - a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons because the BOP

has dragged its institutional feet with respect to further PSA

testing. We accept the premise of Saccoccia's plaint: a district

court may find the existence of an extraordinary and compelling

reason sufficient to justify compassionate release based upon

material BOP interference in or stonewalling of medical testing or

treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Crowell, No. 16-107,

, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 14, 2020). But we reject the

conclusion that Saccoccia draws from this premise. The record in

this case does not show either material interference or

stonewalling on the BOP's part.

To the contrary, the record makes manifest that the BOP

has been monitoring Saccoccia's prostate condition and has made

reasonable efforts to ensure that he receives adequate medical

care. During the eighteen-month period from February of 2019 to

August of 2020, Saccoccia had no fewer than three PSA tests. See

supra note 4. In addition, the BOP sought to schedule a urology

consultation for July of 2020. The consultation had not yet taken

place at the time (three months later) that the district court

ruled on Saccoccia's motion. But this fact alone, in light of the

BOP's efforts to monitor Saccoccia's prostate condition, does not

evince undue delay.

To say more about Saccoccia's health-related concerns

would be to paint the lily. The bottom line is that the district

- 13 - court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Saccoccia's claims

that those concerns constituted an extraordinary and compelling

reason warranting compassionate release.

C

This brings us to Saccoccia's remaining argument. He

contends that the length of his 660-year sentence, combined with

his age, the duration of his confinement to date, and other

circumstances, collectively comprise an extraordinary and

compelling reason for compassionate release. This contention

raises a number of subsidiary questions.

The first question is whether — as Saccoccia would have

it — a district court may consider sentence length as an

extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.

This question is nuanced, partially because the compassionate-

release statute requires that a sentence reduction be "consistent

with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission."

(c)(1)(A). In Dillon, the Supreme

Court interpreted this language in the context of a different

ground for a sentence modification under section 3582(c). See

. The Court held that the phrase "consistent with

applicable policy statements" rendered the Sentencing Commission's

policy guidance binding upon courts mulling sentence-reduction

motions. See

- 14 - This holding presents a potential obstacle for

Saccoccia: section 1B1.13 does not explicitly allow for length of

sentence itself to serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason

for release, though there is a catch-all category for "[o]ther

[r]easons." See USSG §1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D) (providing four

categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons: (A) medical

reasons; (B) age; (C) family circumstances; and (D) "[o]ther

[r]easons"). But there is a rub: the Sentencing Commission's

current policy guidance predates the FSA. Since the Sentencing

Commission has not had a quorum from the time that Congress enacted

the FSA in 2018, it has not been in a position to provide updated

guidance. The result is that section 1B1.13 addresses the

compassionate release process as one instituted by motion of the

BOP, including the requirement that the "[o]ther [r]easons"

warranting relief must be "determined by the Director of the

[BOP]." Id. cmt. n.1(D).

Against this backdrop, Saccoccia argues that courts

confronted with prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate

release are not bound by the Sentencing Commission's current policy

guidance and so may decide for themselves what constitutes an

extraordinary and compelling reason sufficient to justify

compassionate release. This sort of argument — that section 1B1.13

is not an "applicable" policy statement constraining the courts

— has been viewed approvingly by the overwhelming majority of the

- 15 - courts of appeals that have passed on the issue. See, e.g., Long,

997 F.3d at 355; United States v. Aruda,

(9th

Cir. 2021) (per curiam); United States v. Elias,

(6th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy,

(4th

Cir. 2020); United States v. Gunn,

(7th Cir.

2020); United States v. Brooker,

(2d Cir. 2020).

But see United States v. Bryant,

(11th Cir.

2021). We have not had occasion to resolve the issue, and we need

not do so today. Cf. Privitera v. Curran (In re Curran),

(1st Cir. 2017) ("[C]ourts should not rush to decide

unsettled issues when the exigencies of a particular case do not

require such definitive measures."). Instead, we assume, for

argument's sake, that a court adjudicating a prisoner-initiated

motion for compassionate release may go beyond the confines of the

Sentencing Commission's current policy guidance (at least while

the Commission lacks a quorum) in determining whether a particular

circumstance or set of circumstances constitutes an extraordinary

and compelling reason to grant the motion.

This sets the stage for a second question. Even if we

assume — as we have done — that the Sentencing Commission's current

policy guidance is not binding in the circumstances of this case,

the question remains whether length of sentence can constitute an

extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.

Once again, we have the luxury of being able to defer the

- 16 - resolution of a thorny question. The circumstances of this case

permit us to leave this question unanswered and to assume,

favorably to Saccoccia, that length of sentence may itself

constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for

compassionate release.

The assumption that length of sentence, in the abstract,

may be considered as an extraordinary and compelling reason for

compassionate release is merely a starting point, not an end-

point. That assumed fact serves as a gateway for a case-specific

evaluation of the defendant's situation. See United States v.

Harris,

(11th Cir. 2021). Here, the district

court assumed that it had the authority to consider the sheer

length of Saccoccia's sentence as an extraordinary and compelling

reason for Saccoccia's compassionate release. See Saccoccia II,

, at *3. It nonetheless concluded that the length

of Saccoccia's sentence, even when viewed in conjunction with a

variety of other considerations cited by Saccoccia, did not warrant

his compassionate release. See

.

In reaching this conclusion, the court canvassed a

number of different factors, including the length of Saccoccia's

sentence, his claim that his sentence was disproportionate when

viewed in light of the offenses of conviction, his claim that his

sentence was unduly influenced by the then-mandatory nature of the

sentencing guidelines, and his claim that his advanced age and the

- 17 - length of time he already had served made recidivism unlikely and

counselled in favor of his release. See

. Though the

section 3553(a) factors may serve as an independent basis for a

district court's decision to deny a compassionate-release motion

and need only be addressed if the court finds an extraordinary and

compelling reason favoring release, the court below went the extra

mile: it wrapped the package and tied a bow on it by completing

a section 3553(a) analysis. See

. It found the section

3553(a) factors inhospitable to Saccoccia's plea for compassionate

release. See

We proceed to test the soundness of the district court's

conclusions. The critical question, of course, is whether the

district court abused its discretion in holding that Saccoccia's

particular circumstances related to his sentence and the section

3553(a) factors, fell short of warranting his compassionate

release. We find no such abuse.

A 660-year sentence, Saccoccia says, is "unfathomable."

But in legal matters, as in life, "[e]verything depends on

context." Rivera-Velásquez v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &

Ins. Co.,

(1st Cir. 2014). Viewed in context,

Saccoccia's 660-year sentence is readily comprehensible.

Saccoccia holds a special place in the pantheon of money

launderers, and his GSR was life imprisonment. See Saccoccia I,

. The sentencing court, working with a total of

- 18 - fifty-four counts and a series of relatively modest statutory

maxima, imposed the statutory maximum sentence on each count and

ran those sentences consecutively to effectuate a life sentence.

See

We affirmed that aggregate sentence on direct review,

acknowledging the seriousness of Saccoccia's criminal activity.

See

.

The district court reasonably determined that the

passage of time — even in light of the changed legal landscape

regarding the Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Booker,

(2005), and Saccoccia's other sentence-related

arguments — did not render that lengthy sentence either

unreasonable or incommensurate with the scope and gravity of

Saccoccia's offenses. The basis for this conclusion is nose-on-

the-face plain. The district court emphasized the seriousness of

Saccoccia's offenses. See Saccoccia II,

, at *3-

4. Then — highlighting the other factors that it considered most

telling — the court reviewed Saccoccia's criminal record, his age

at the time of the offenses of conviction, and his obstruction of

justice during his prosecution for money laundering. See

. Taking everything into account, the court rejected Saccoccia's

bid for compassionate release based on sentence length. See

.6 Relatedly, the court found that the section 3553(a)

6 These considerations were framed by the district court as distinguishing features from the defendant in Brooker. See

- 19 - factors, on balance, did not favor a sentence reduction. See

. It explained that granting Saccoccia's request would send

the wrong message and marshalled case law supporting the

proposition that a sentence reduction would both fail to account

for the seriousness of the offenses of conviction and undercut the

policy of promoting deterrence. See

In calumnizing the district court's conclusions,

Saccoccia seizes single-mindedly upon its statement that

compassionate release "would send the wrong message both to

[Saccoccia] and to society,"

as an indication that only a few

factors were considered. In his view, the court failed to consider

certain mitigating factors, such as his alleged prostate cancer,

the length of time already served, and alleged sentence disparities

(including disparities arising when his sentence is compared to

sentences imposed upon leaders of the drug cartel for whom

Saccoccia laundered money). But this is whistling past the

graveyard. The district court said that it exercised its broad

discretion in denying compassionate release in light of the

Saccoccia II,

, at *3. Saccoccia argues that the district court improperly grafted the criteria used by the Second Circuit in Brooker onto his case. Contrary to Saccoccia's importunings, the district court did not suggest that Saccoccia had to be held to the same criteria as the defendant in Brooker. Our understanding is that the district court looked to the Brooker decision in determining the type of factors to be considered when evaluating whether extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction existed. For that purpose, Brooker was an appropriate point of reference.

- 20 - "balance" of the factors,

and we have no reason not to take

this statement at face value. No more was exigible: "[m]erely

raising potentially mitigating factors does not guarantee" a

favorable decision. United States v. Dávila-González,

(1st Cir. 2010).

Our case law is pellucid that a district court, when

conducting a section 3553(a) analysis, need not tick off each and

every factor in a mechanical sequence. See United States v. Dixon,

(1st Cir. 2006) ("[I]t is not required to address

those factors, one by one, in some sort of rote incantation when

explicating its sentencing decision."). Instead, we presume

— absent some contrary indication — that a sentencing court

considered all the mitigating factors and that those not

specifically mentioned were simply unpersuasive. See United

States v. Martins,

(1st Cir. 2005).

This case law has evolved in the sentencing context

proper, but we think that it applies with at least equal force in

the compassionate-release context. Cf. Rodríguez-Rosado,

(applying similar proposition in analogous context of

section 3582(c)(2) motion). The common denominator is, of course,

the broad discretion afforded to the district court in evaluating

motions for compassionate release, as in sentencing matters, and

when weighing the section 3553(a) factors. See

(c)(1)(A) ("[T]he court . . . may reduce the term of

- 21 - imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable."); cf.

Aponte-Guzmán,

(explaining in the analogous

section 3582(c)(2) context that sentence reductions are

discretionary and not a matter of right).

Although Saccoccia argues that this court should require

further explanation from a district court (particularly where, as

here, the motion judge did not impose the defendant's sentence),

we think compassionate release motions should not devolve into

satellite sentencing hearings. The Supreme Court has explained

that a sentence modification in the analogous section 3582(c)(2)

context is "not a plenary resentencing proceeding." Chavez-Meza

v. United States,

(2018) (quoting Dillon,

). Relatedly, the Court has assumed for argument's

sake that "district courts have equivalent duties when initially

sentencing a defendant and when later modifying the sentence."

Id. at 1965. Building on this foundation, the Court explained

that, "[i]n some cases," as in the sentencing context, "it may be

sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply

relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has

considered the parties' arguments and taken account of the §3553(a)

factors." Id. at 1965-67. Here, the district court presented its

reasons (which do not reflect a failure to consider pertinent

factors) and explicitly adopted those in the government's

- 22 - briefing. See Saccoccia II,

, at *4. These various

reasons provide a sufficient basis for the district court's

decision. Our examination of the record reveals that the court

below did not trespass — or even closely approach — the margins of

its broad discretion in denying Saccoccia's motion.

III

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

- 23 -