United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 19-1842

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DOUGLAS NORRIS,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Ines McGillion, with whom Ines McGillion Law Offices, PLLC was on brief, for appellant. Robert E. Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

December 28, 2021 KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. During the search of a Brockton,

Massachusetts apartment pursuant to a warrant, police found a gun,

ammunition, cocaine, and various drug paraphernalia. Douglas

Norris, identified as one of the apartment's residents, was

convicted by a jury of several contraband-possession offenses,

including being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal,

Norris raises four groups of errors. He claims that: (1) the

district court improperly instructed the jury on joint possession;

(2) the government presented insufficient evidence on the element

of possession for all counts; (3) lay opinion testimony from law

enforcement witnesses was improperly admitted at trial; and

(4) the government did not allege or prove, and the jury was not

required to find, that Norris knew of his status as a felon that

prohibited him from possessing a firearm, contrary to the Supreme

Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States,

(2019). For the reasons that follow, we find no reversible error

and affirm Norris's convictions.

I.

A.

We begin, as did Norris's trial, with the apartment

search at the heart of this case. Because Norris has challenged

the sufficiency of the evidence against him, we recount the facts

in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v.

McBride,

(1st Cir. 2020).

- 2 - In the early morning of June 20, 2017, the Brockton

Police Department's (BPD) Special Reaction Team (SRT) executed a

search warrant at Apartment 2A of a building on North Warren

Avenue. Upon entering the unit, the SRT encountered several

occupants, though not Norris. In the first bedroom, referred to

in the trial as "Bedroom 1," officers saw a woman identified as

Nakaita Brown and a baby. Elsewhere in the apartment, they found

a man named Jose Lora and his fiancée Adris Pimentel. All of the

occupants were escorted to the kitchen while the search proceeded.

In Bedroom 1, officers observed clothing they identified

as "adult male attire," including pants, shirts, and sneakers, as

well as boxes for sneakers in men's sizes 10.5 and 11. Many of

these articles were found and photographed within the bedroom's

closet. Additionally, hanging in the closet was a black backpack

that contained a loaded firearm, a plastic bag containing twenty

loose rounds of .9 millimeter ammunition, and two digital scales.

The backpack's front pocket contained a single .45 caliber round

of ammunition and three plastic bags containing substances later

determined to be cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base. The gun,

ammunition, and magazine were swabbed for DNA, and the parties

stipulated that the lab identified a partial DNA profile

"consistent with a mixture of DNA from at least three individuals,"

at least one of whom was male and at least one of whom may have

been female.

- 3 - Officers also found within the closet another digital

scale with powder residue on it, a razor blade, some "cut baggies,"

a box of plastic sandwich bags, a metal object stamped with the

words "The Brick Press" -- which was identified as a piece of a

hydraulic press system (also called a "kilo press") used to pack

powdered drugs into a brick form -- and loose pieces of mail in

envelopes addressed to Norris.

Finally, one photograph of the closet depicts a hanging

black studded jacket, which was the subject of questions from

defense counsel at trial. The officers did not take the jacket

into evidence because they thought it had "no value," and, when

asked, the officers could not shed any light on whether the jacket

belonged to a man or woman.

From other rooms in the apartment, officers recovered

two additional plastic bags containing what was later identified

as cocaine and cocaine base respectively, a money counter,

additional scales, a rifle scope, a pistol magazine, and additional

components of the Brick Press.

After concluding the search, the officers left the

apartment around 6:30 or 7:00 A.M. and returned to the station.

Around 7:50 A.M., BPD Detective Brian Donahue revisited the North

Warren Avenue building to locate Norris, who had not been present

for the search. Detective Donahue saw Norris leave the property,

enter a gray Infiniti parked nearby, and drive away. Following in

- 4 - an unmarked car, Donahue called for a marked cruiser to stop

Norris. Once the Infiniti was stopped, Donahue approached the

vehicle and asked Norris for his name. Norris responded, "I'm the

one you're looking for."

Norris was charged in the operative superseding

indictment with four counts: being a felon in possession of a

firearm and ammunition (

(g)(1)); possessing a

substance containing cocaine base with intent to distribute (

(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii)); possessing cocaine with

intent to distribute (

(a)(1)); and possessing a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (

(c)(1)(A)).

B.

Beyond the evidence described above, the government

offered at Norris's trial additional evidence concerning Norris's

connection with Apartment 2A. First, about six months earlier,

BPD officers had responded to a 911 call at Apartment 2A and

encountered Norris, Brown, and a baby. Norris then told the

officers that he and Brown had had a disagreement, that he had

disconnected the cellphone service maintained in his name, and

that Brown wanted to leave. Officers stayed while Brown packed

some things and left the apartment.

Then, on June 14, 2017 -- six days before the search --

Norris attended a housing court trial where he successfully

- 5 - defended against an eviction action for the second-floor apartment

at the North Warren Avenue address.

The next day, June 15, BPD Detective Gary Mercurio

conducted surveillance of the North Warren Avenue property and

observed Norris leave the building, get into and out of a gray

Infiniti parked around the corner, then walk back to the building.

Finally, on June 17, Lora and his fiancée Pimentel moved

into a bedroom -- designated throughout the trial as "Bedroom 3"

-- in Apartment 2A, after arranging with Brown to pay a portion of

the rent. Lora testified that Norris, Brown (who he knew as

"Coco"), and the baby were living in the apartment, in Bedroom 1,

when Lora and Pimentel moved in. In the three days that Lora lived

in Apartment 2A before the search on June 20, he saw Norris use

Bedroom 1 to change clothes. Norris frequently left the apartment,

but Lora did see Norris at the apartment daily before the search,

including to share a Father's Day dinner prepared by Brown and

Pimentel. By contrast, Lora saw Brown "at the apartment almost

all the time." Pimentel testified that she saw Norris go into

Bedroom 1, "usually just [to] go to sleep," and Norris had told

her that the landlady was trying to evict him and Brown.

Lora also testified that at some point during his time

living at Apartment 2A, Brown had told him that she owned a gun

and had a license to carry. It is undisputed that Brown did not

- 6 - in fact have a license to carry a firearm or own any lawfully-

registered firearms.1

As part of the government's case-in-chief, the

prosecution entered a stipulation that Norris had previously been

"convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year within the meaning of

(g)(1)." This was the only evidence offered to prove Norris's

status as a felon.2

After a four-day trial, the jury found Norris guilty on

all four counts. The district court denied Norris's post-trial

motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, and he timely

appealed the convictions and those denials.

II.

Norris raises on appeal four categories of error, which

we address in turn. Because our understanding of the jury

instruction on joint possession informs the analysis of the

1Brown did not testify at Norris's trial. This hearsay statement was admitted as a statement against Brown's penal interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), after the district court found that Brown was unavailable because she indicated that she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify. Norris's presentence investigation report (PSR) indicates 2

that he had previously been convicted of, inter alia, two crimes that resulted in sentences of seven-to-nine years and four-to-five years of imprisonment, respectively.

- 7 - sufficiency of the evidence of possession, we first assess the

propriety of that instruction.

A.

In its proposed jury instructions, the government

submitted an instruction for "possession" that included a more-

or-less standard form of a so-called joint-possession instruction,

telling the jury that they could convict even if Norris possessed

the contraband jointly with someone else. Norris objected to the

inclusion of this instruction, arguing, as he does now, that joint

possession was not "the government's case" because the government

had argued that Norris alone possessed the gun and drugs.3 The

district court rejected Norris's argument and found the

instruction appropriate: "I think that is the case actually. I

mean, [the evidence has] presented an excellent picture, actually,

that [Brown] was in that bedroom, and she was in there most of the

time." The court ultimately included the following in its

instruction defining "possession" for the jury:

Possession also includes both sole possession and joint possession. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession, the possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession, possession is joint. So whenever I use the term "possession" in these instructions, and

3 Norris made no argument that finding possession to be proved by joint ownership constituted an improper amendment of the indictment, which simply alleged that he "knowingly possessed a firearm" and "knowingly and intentionally possessed with intent to distribute cocaine."

- 8 - I'll be using it again, the term includes actual and constructive possession, as well as joint and sole possession.

Norris renewed his objection to this instruction after

it was given. We review his preserved objection de novo. United

States v. Howard,

(1st Cir. 2012).

"When crafting jury instructions a judge must consider

all of the evidence introduced at trial, in other words, the

government's as well as the defense's."

. In Howard, we

held that a defendant may open the door to a joint-possession

instruction through his own evidence and arguments.

("The

evidence extant and Howard's own theory of the case made the joint

possession and aiding and abetting instructions appropriate.").

Howard had raised a nearly identical challenge to the

one Norris now presses, arguing that a joint-possession

instruction was inappropriate where, according to the defendant,

"the government did not present any evidence that the drugs

belonged to anyone else."

. There, police had found

drugs and a gun during the search of a house where two other people

resided.

. Howard introduced a stipulation that one

of the residents had multiple convictions for gun and drug

possession, and he repeatedly argued in closing that the contraband

belonged to them, rather than to him.

at 18–19 & n.4.

Howard thus argued "that to the extent the inference had

been raised that the drugs belonged to [the house's residents],

- 9 - there was no evidence that Howard was working in concert with

them."

. We found this argument unavailing because

Howard's own evidence had been used "to cast suspicion on [the

house's residents] and in doing so, raised an inference that he

possessed the drugs jointly with [them]."

.

So, too, here. Norris also attempted to pin the gun and

drugs on another occupant of the residence searched. He

successfully sought introduction of Brown's statement to Lora that

she owned a gun and had a license to carry, defeating the

government's attempt to bar such evidence. His counsel pressed

the testifying officers about a jacket photographed in Bedroom 1's

closet -- an arm's length from where the backpack was found --

suggesting the jacket was Brown's. In closing, his counsel both

reiterated this theory about the jacket and pointed to Brown's

statement about the gun in arguing that Brown, rather than Norris,

was the primary occupant of Bedroom 1 and thus actually possessed

the contraband.4 Moreover, that the DNA of at least one male and

perhaps one female was found on the gun and ammunition does provide

4 Specifically, as to the gun, Norris's counsel argued: "But, importantly, Coco also says she has a gun, okay? Not a small detail in a case involving a gun, right? She tells [Lora], 'I have a gun.' She lies about having a license, right? But she tells Mr. Lora, 'I have a gun' . . . . And Coco is the woman in the room with two open scales and an open safe, now has a gun, okay?"

- 10 - some support for the theory that Brown and Norris jointly possessed

these items. In short, "[t]he evidence extant and [Norris's] own

theory of the case made the joint possession . . . instruction[]

appropriate."

It matters not that the government and Norris

each argued for a different sole-possessor theory, because these

arguments permitted the jury to infer that both purported

possessors shared the contraband.5

Norris directs us to United States v. Ramos-González,

(1st Cir. 2015), in which we found that a boilerplate

joint-possession instruction was improperly given where "the

record contain[ed] no evidence of such a theory, and no party

argued it."

. There, the defendant had presented an

alibi defense contending that the truck containing the contraband

5 To distinguish Howard, our concurring colleague has retrieved and mined the trial record from Howard to show that the government in that case argued at trial for an alternative joint- possession theory. But our opinion in Howard did not mention, much less rely on, that fact at all. Rather, Howard relied solely on the fact that the defendant's evidence and argument made the joint-possession theory apt, just as here. See 687 F.3d at 18– 19. Adding belt to suspenders, with reference to both the drugs and the gun, the government here plainly argued to the jury, in the alternative, for joint possession: "[P]ossession can be sole or joint. In other words, more than one person can be in actual or constructive possession of an item." Our colleague reads the government as essentially abandoning that theory when it discussed the conduct of drug distribution. But even if the government advanced Norris as the sole drug dealer, that is not necessarily inconsistent with its position that Norris's possession of the contraband could be sole or joint. Moreover, we reject the notion that by advocating for its primary theory the government implicitly abandoned its fallback position that Norris was still guilty even if his possession was joint.

- 11 - was driven by another person, thus presenting the jury with an

either-or proposition that left no room for a joint-possession

theory. See

We reiterated the sound principle that, in

charging a jury, a district court must be "mindful of the facts of

the case before it."

That is precisely what the district

court here demonstrated when it remarked, in overruling Norris's

objection to the instruction, "I think that is the case actually.

I mean, [the evidence has] presented an excellent picture,

actually, that [Brown] was in that bedroom, and she was in there

most of the time."

B.

We turn next to Norris's argument that the government

failed to introduce sufficient evidence that he knowingly

possessed any of the drugs, gun, or ammunition, either directly or

constructively. Norris preserved this argument by timely raising

it in his post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal under

Rule 29, see United States v. Castro-Lara,

(1st

Cir. 1992), so we review the claim de novo, United States v.

Mendoza-Maisonet,

(1st Cir. 2020). We therefore

assess the evidence and "all plausible inferences drawn therefrom"

in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine

whether "a rational factfinder" could have found the elements

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Torres Monje,

(1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Santos-

- 12 - Rivera,

(1st Cir. 2013)). For this task, "we do

not view each piece of evidence separately, re-weigh the evidence,

or second-guess the jury's credibility calls." United States v.

Acevedo-Hernández,

(1st Cir. 2018). "Nor do we

have to be convinced 'that the government succeeded in eliminating

every possible theory consistent with the defendant's innocence.'"

Mendoza-Maisonet,

(quoting Acevedo-Hernández,

).

Possession can be actual -- meaning "hands-on physical

possession" -- or constructive. United States v. Padilla-Galarza,

(1st Cir. 2018). "[C]onstructive possession is shown

by proving that the defendant had 'dominion and control over the

area where the contraband was found,'" and it may be established

by circumstantial evidence. Mendoza-Maisonet, 926 F.3d at 12

(quoting Padilla-Galarza,

). And, as explained,

constructive possession can be joint. United States v. Hicks,

(1st Cir. 2009).

Here, the government introduced substantial evidence

that Apartment 2A and Bedroom 1 -- including its closet -- were

under Norris's "dominion and control." Six days before the search,

Norris appeared in court to defend successfully against eviction

from Apartment 2A, the same apartment where law enforcement had

encountered Norris and Brown six months earlier and where Norris

had stayed after the officers assisted Brown's departure. Though

- 13 - Lora and Pimentel resided at Apartment 2A only briefly, they

testified to witnessing Norris go into Bedroom 1 to sleep and

change clothes in the days leading up to the search. This evidence

is consistent with the officers' testimony that they found men's-

sized sneakers and what appeared to be men's pants and shirts in

Bedroom 1 and in the closet that contained the backpack housing

the gun. That closet also contained multiple pieces of mail

addressed to Norris.

True, Brown and the baby were also seen using Bedroom 1,

and Norris's counsel argued that Brown was its primary occupant.

However, there was no evidence introduced that any of Brown's

belongings or clothes were seen in the room, and while Norris

argues about the jacket hanging near the backpack, nothing at trial

beyond counsel's questions suggested that it was Brown's jacket.

Lora also testified that he saw Norris come and go frequently,

while Brown tended to stay in the apartment with the baby "almost

all the time." If one of two people is definitively distributing

drugs, the jury could reasonably infer from this contrasting

behavior that, as between the person who goes in and out and the

person who stays put to care for a baby, the former is more likely

the dealer.

Additionally, when Norris was pulled over shortly after

returning to North Warren Avenue and within a couple hours of the

search, he told Detective Donahue, "I'm the one you're looking

- 14 - for." While Norris argues that this "vague" statement could be

interpreted to mean that Norris knew, for example, "he was driving

without proper documentation," our standard of review means we

will not speculate at possible innocent interpretations. We need

consider only the inferences that are both reasonable and most

favorable to the verdict, which, in this case, suggest Norris

believed the police were looking for him because he had just

returned to his apartment and learned that it had been subjected

to a police raid in which his drugs and gun had been seized.

Taken together, all of this evidence, and the

prosecution-friendly inferences we must draw, provide sufficient

basis for a rational factfinder to conclude that Norris exercised

control over Bedroom 1 and its closet (and therefore, either by

himself or jointly with Brown, the gun and drugs) in the period

immediately leading up to the search.

Finally, as discussed above, the jury was permissibly

instructed that possession includes joint possession, so it could

have permissibly resolved any ambiguity about Brown's use of the

room, including from her statement to Lora about owning a gun, by

finding that the she and Norris jointly exercised control over the

contraband.

C.

We next take up Norris's claim that the district court

erroneously admitted as lay opinion law enforcement officers'

- 15 - testimony that several items found in Apartment 2A -- including

plastic sandwich bags, digital scales, and the Brick Press

hydraulic system -- were tools of the drug trade. Detective

Donahue testified that digital scales are "utilized basically by

narcotics distributors to basically weigh smaller amounts of

narcotics and . . . [t]hey're weighed when they're breaking it

down into smaller amounts of narcotics, basically for street-level

distribution." Detective Donahue provided similar testimony about

drug distributors' use of plastic bags to prepare units for street-

level sales.6 Finally, Detectives Donahue and Mercurio each

testified about the function of the Brick Press hydraulic system,

including through attempted physical demonstrations for the jury.7

We assume without deciding that the district court's

pretrial disposition of Norris's motion to exclude evidence based

6 Specifically, Detective Donahue said: [In my] [t]raining and experience, I know that the drug distributors will utilize the plastic bags to basically package up the narcotics. They'll pour it into the corners of the plastic bag, tie a knot so it's a small little package, and then rip that corner with the substance in it from the bag, or they'll cut it from the bag so it's a smaller item. That way they can utilize it so it's easier to sell on the street, street-level distribution, and it's a smaller item to conceal from law enforcement. 7 Detective Donahue testified that: This would be part of a hydraulic press system. This is the main box, but there's

- 16 - other parts that are involved too, and it's actually stated on it, "The Brick Press." . . . So this is just a partial of - - there's more components of this to a press. It's a hydraulic press system. And this actually on the tag here, above my initials and ID, it actually in small writing says "The Brick Press" on it. Detective Mercurio's testimony about the Brick Press primarily included an attempt to assemble the components (presented here with the court's interjecting questions omitted): So basically this is what is referred to as a base plate. The jack sits on top of the base plate. These screw into the base plate. (Witness demonstrating.) . . . This is notched so that it can fit onto the jack. These have holes. There would normally be four of these. These go into the hole. That goes over it in a perfect world. (Witness demonstrating.) This goes on top. . . . So that basically, so you have the base plate. You have the hydraulic jack. The hydraulic jack fits in the bottom of that. This goes on top. This wing nut would screw onto this nut. Pressure would be applied up, and it pushes it into the shape of a square. So basically that's how it works. . . . [Y]ou just use like a -- you need a screwdriver or something just to crank that. It applies pressure up. These wing nuts hold it down so that it compacts the items that are inside. . . . It's just hydraulic. . . . [The jack] pushes up through the bottom, and this plate that's in the bottom slides up through here, so it comes up further into this, and it pushes against this top plate. So it's not mechanical; it's just hydraulic. So you jack it up, and then you release it like a normal jack, so it just applies the pressure and pushes it into the shape. . . .

[Question from the prosecutor:] And what is it pushing into the shape?

- 17 - on these same objections preserved the objections. Compare United

States v. Almeida,

(1st Cir. 2014) (reviewing in

limine rulings for plain error only, where the defendant "did not

renew his objection to the challenged evidence at trial" and failed

to argue that the rulings were "final rather than tentative"),

with Rodriguez v. Señor Frog's de la Isla, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2011) (finding a particular ruling in limine was "final

enough" to render additional objections at trial unnecessary).

Our review is thus for abuse of discretion. Señor Frog's,

.

Substantively, Norris argues that the district court

abused its discretion in failing to observe the requirements of

Rule 702 (imposing heightened requirements for expert testimony)

and permitting the officers' testimony under Rule 701, which

provides that:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 701.

[Answer:] I mean, it's commonly referred to as a kilo press to press powdered drugs into a brick form.

- 18 - However, Norris acknowledges that we have previously

upheld the admission of similar lay opinion testimony about drug

distribution practices based on law enforcement experience and

that the district court apparently relied on that precedent. See

United States v. Moon,

, 147–48 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding

lay opinion testimony from law enforcement officer regarding drug

dealers' frequent possession of firearms "to protect themselves and

their drugs"); United States v. Valdivia,

, 50–51 (1st

Cir. 2012) (same regarding drug traffickers' typical use of third

parties' names in subscribing to cell phone services); United States

v. Ayala-Pizarro,

(1st Cir. 2005) (same regarding

heroin seized at drug points typically being packaged in "aluminum

decks" like the ones found in that case).

Rather than attempt to distinguish our precedent, at

least as to Detective Donahue's testimony, Norris instead argues

that "the First Circuit's precedents permitting lay opinion

testimony about drug distribution practices [are] based on an

erroneous legal principle that is in conflict with the law in all

other circuits." The government denies this is so. However,

three-judge panels of our circuit are bound by prior panel

decisions "closely on point," with only limited exceptions. United

States v. Lopez,

, 339–40 (1st Cir. 2018). As Norris

- 19 - has not argued that any such exception applies here, we decline to

go looking for one.8

Norris does contend that, even if the scales-and-baggies

testimony is governed by precedent, we should "draw the line" at

Detective Mercurio's attempted demonstration of the Brick Press,

because this testimony "purported to offer technical, specialized

knowledge." But setting aside whatever level of technical

knowledge may have been required for this testimony, Norris

entirely fails to address the government's argument that any error

from all of the challenged testimony was harmless in light of

similar -- and, indeed, much more extensive -- expert testimony

provided later in Norris's trial by Detective Thomas Keating. Cf.

United States v. Pena,

(1st Cir. 2018) (finding

that the defendant failed to show prejudice after assuming abuse-

of-discretion review applied and that an evidentiary ruling was

error).

Detective Keating was permitted to testify, without

objection, not only to the function of scales and "cut baggies" in

the drug trade, including the significance of residue found on

scales, but also to the use of razor blades and credit cards to

cut up cocaine, the street value of crack and powder cocaine in

8 Norris appears to have presented this argument primarily to preserve a challenge to our precedent in a potential en banc proceeding.

- 20 - Brockton, Massachusetts, and the import of the quantity of drugs

found at Apartment 2A. For example, Detective Keating testified,

without objection, in the following exchange:

Q. Now, based on your training and experience, can you tell the jury whether, in your opinion, possession of 46 grams of cocaine base in a bag with a loaded gun, ammunition, and two digital scales is consistent with distribution or possession for personal use? A. Distribution. Q. And based on your training and experience, could you tell the jury whether, in your opinion, possession of 32 grams of powder cocaine in a bag with a loaded gun, ammunition, and two digital scales is consistent with distribution or possession for personal use? A. Distribution.

Norris next argues in conclusory fashion that he was

prejudiced by Detective Mercurio's testimony because, without the

notice requirements for experts, he was not able to sufficiently

prepare his defense. But Norris makes no showing of what else he

would have done with additional notice of the Brick Press

demonstration testimony, and he was put on notice by the

government's pretrial motions practice that someone would provide

testimony about drug distribution practices. Norris does not argue

whether or how the jury's verdict could have turned on the Brick

Press demonstration rather than the testimony provided by

Detective Keating, let alone how it was not harmless in light of

the physical evidence (including the drugs themselves) recovered

- 21 - from the apartment. In the absence of such an argument, we see no

basis to conclude that any possible error here was not harmless.

D.

We end with Norris's fourth category of claims,

concerning the

(g) felon-in-possession count. In

February 2019, Norris moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new

trial under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33. In

June 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rehaif, which

held that a conviction under

(g) requires the

government to prove "both that the defendant knew he possessed a

firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of

persons barred from possessing a firearm."

.

Norris then filed a supplemental memorandum arguing for a new trial

on his section 922(g) count because that charge was not supported

by sufficient evidence that Norris knew of his status and because

the jury had not been instructed to find this element. On appeal,

Norris supplements this claim by arguing that the indictment failed

to allege the knowledge-of-status element.

As Norris raised his Rehaif claims for the first time in

a motion for a new trial or thereafter, we review only for plain

error. See United States v. Kinsella,

(1st Cir.

2010) (citing United States v. Brandao,

(1st Cir.

2008)); see also United States v. Burghardt,

(1st Cir. 2019) (observing that even arguments that "become

- 22 - available only as a result of intervening changes in law" can be

waived (quoting United States v. Sevilla-Oyola,

(1st Cir. 2014))). It matters not that Norris's original Rule 29

motion did argue that the evidence was insufficient, as he raised

only other bases for that challenge. See United States v. Marston,

(1st Cir. 2012) ("[W]hen a defendant chooses

only to give specific grounds for a Rule 29 motion, all grounds

not specified are considered waived and are reviewed under [the]

less forgiving 'clear and gross injustice' standard.").

To demonstrate plain error, "a defendant must show

'(1) an error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) which affects his

substantial rights . . . , and which (4) seriously impugns the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding.'"

Burghardt,

(alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. Correa-Osorio,

, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2015)). This

standard of review, and the third prong in particular, proves fatal

to Norris's Rehaif-based challenges.

In Greer v. United States, issued during the briefing of

this appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed that the substantial-

rights prong places the burden on the defendant to show "that, but

for the Rehaif error, the outcome of the district court proceedings

would have been different."

(2021). Greer

held that being a felon strongly implies knowing one is a felon,

and hence, a defendant will fail the third prong of plain-error

- 23 - review for Rehaif-based claims unless he shows on appeal that "he

would have presented evidence in the district court that he did

not in fact know he was a felon." Id.; see also Burghardt, 939

F.3d at 403–04 (same). Moreover, the Court held that "an appellate

court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record

-- not just the record from the particular proceeding where the

[alleged] error occurred."

.

Greer specifically addressed challenges to one court's

failure to instruct the jury that it needed to find the knowledge-

of-status element and to another court's failure to advise a

defendant on the element during his plea colloquy.

.

We also consider under Greer's purview Norris's challenges to the

indictment and to the sufficiency of the evidence of the knowledge-

of-status element. See United States v. Lara,

, 84–86

(1st Cir. 2020) (considering unpreserved Rehaif-based challenges

to the sufficiency of an indictment and of the evidence under forms

of plain-error review, with the latter challenge reviewed for

"clear and gross injustice" -- a "particularly exacting variant"

(quoting United States v. Valenzuela,

(1st Cir.

2017))).

Accordingly, here, as in Greer, we may properly examine

"relevant and reliable information from the entire record --

including information contained in a pre-sentence report."

. Norris's PSR indicates that he had previously

- 24 - received sentences of seven-to-nine years and four-to-five years

of imprisonment. It would require something quite extraordinary

to show that a person having received such sentences did not know

a sentence in excess of one year was possible. Norris offers no

such extraordinary proof or argument.

Norris's reply brief concedes "that [after Greer] his

claims of error based on the failures of trial proof and omission

of the element from the jury instructions would alone not warrant

relief under Rehaif."9 However, he continues to press the claim

that the insufficiency of his indictment merits dismissal of the

section 922(g) count. Specifically, he argues that he need not

show prejudice because this error is "structural." It is

structural, he says, because it infringed his Fifth Amendment right

to be indicted by a grand jury and his Sixth Amendment right to

notice of the accusation against him. We have already considered

this precise challenge in Lara, where we declined to decide whether

the sufficiency of an indictment was structural because, even if

it were, unpreserved structural errors are nonetheless subject to

plain-error review.

(citing Johnson v. United

States,

(1997)).

9As Norris has apparently abandoned any argument that the proof at trial was insufficient to prove the knowledge-of-status element, we need not consider his prior argument that the stipulation to his felon status could not alone provide sufficient evidence on this element.

- 25 - To be sure, we did not decide whether the insufficient

indictment in Lara affected the defendant's substantial rights.

We instead decided the appeal on the fourth prong of plain error,

reasoning that the error did not "seriously affect[] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" because

"the evidence that the element that was omitted ha[d] been

satisfied [wa]s nevertheless 'overwhelming and essentially

uncontroverted.'"

at 88 (quoting United States v. Cotton,

(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And

Norris points out that the indictment in Lara specified the

defendant's past crimes of conviction, a detail absent from

Norris's indictment.

at 87–88. True enough, but these are

distinctions without a difference for Norris. In resolving the

challenge there on plain error's fourth prong, we relied not on

the prior conviction details within the indictment's four corners,

but on the same bases that the Supreme Court in Greer invoked for

the substantial-rights prong: We looked to evidence outside of

the trial record that demonstrated the defendant's presumptive

awareness of his past convictions, and we observed that the

defendant failed to "develop any argument as to how the lack of

notice stemming from the omitted knowledge-of-status element

mattered, given this evidence of his prior criminal history." Id.

at 88.

- 26 - In short, Norris has made no showing that the Rehaif-

based errors in his indictment, evidence, and jury instructions

affected the outcome of his proceedings, and he has identified no

distinction from Greer and Lara that would permit us to grant

relief without such a showing.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

- Concurring Opinion Follows -

- 27 - THOMPSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. I

agree with most of the Court's conclusion. But I disagree that

the district court was in the right to have given--over Norris's

objection--a jury instruction on joint possession. To reach its

result, the Court shimmies past our clear case law reminding

district courts that jury instructions should be based not on what

the "standard charge" is, but what instructions fit based on the

facts and theories of the case. And instead, the Court stretches

other of our case law far beyond what it actually stands for. In

doing so, the Court opens the door to government windfalls in the

form of jury instructions justifying alternative routes to

conviction that the government not only didn't argue, but expressly

disavowed. Because I would conclude that instructional error was

nonetheless harmless in this case, though, I respectfully concur

in the judgment.

A.

In United States v. Ramos-González,

(1st

Cir. 2015), we concluded that the district court erred when it

delivered a joint-possession jury instruction where "the record

contain[ed] no evidence of such a theory, and no party argued it,"

. We suspected the district court there delivered the

joint-possession instruction "unthinkingly" and "simply because it

is part of the boilerplate jury charge on possession with intent

to distribute a controlled substance."

So we admonished the

- 28 - district courts to take care in delivering jury instructions.

"[B]oilerplate instructions," we said, "should not be used without

careful consideration being given to their applicability to the

facts and theories of the specific case being tried."

(quoting

United States v. Wolak,

(6th Cir. 1991)).

The government here does not dispute that it never argued

for a theory of joint possession below. Indeed, the government

expressly disavowed the contention that Brown had anything to do

with the contraband. (I'll get back to that in more detail in

just a bit.) That fact notwithstanding, the Court shoves away

Ramos-González because, it says, the facts there "left no room for

a joint-possession theory." Ante at 12. According to my

colleagues, that is so because the defendant presented an either-

or situation when he raised an alibi defense that someone else was

driving the truck containing the contraband when it was stopped by

police.10

But the traffic-stopped truck was also owned by the

defendant. Ramos-González,

. So, based on the

district court's thin theory of joint possession here--i.e.,

merely that Brown was "in that bedroom . . . most of the time,"

ante at 12--the facts in Ramos-González, too, could have supposedly

justified a joint-possession theory: the jury could have believed

The driver of the vehicle fled on foot and escaped. Ramos- 10

González,

. Police later IDed the defendant as the driver.

- 29 - the government that the defendant owned the truck; it could have

believed the defendant that he was not the driver on the day; but

it still could have believed that the defendant was somehow

involved.11 Ramos-González thus presents the same hypothetical

jury-could-believe-some-but-not-all justification for a joint-

possession instruction as the Court says exists here. Yet we said

that the joint-possession instruction in Ramos-González was not

proper because "the record contains no evidence of such a theory,

and no party argued it."

.12

Ramos-González out of the way, the Court thinks that the

instructions lined up with the facts of the case here because, it

says, Norris opened the door to a joint-possession theory. He did

so, the Court explains, because his theory of defense was that the

contraband wasn't his--it was Nakaita Brown's, who also lived in

the bedroom where the contraband was found. That follows, my

11 The government in Ramos-González also presented evidence from an FBI agent that, in his experience, the behavior at the defendant's residence reflected likely gang activity. Tr. of Jury Trial at 22:12–23:3, United States v. Ramos-González, No. 3:07- cr-00262 (D.P.R. Mar. 18, 2012), ECF No. 221; see also Tr. of Jury Trial at 89:10–21, Ramos-González, No. 3:07-cr-00262 (D.P.R. June 10, 2012), ECF No. 242 (emphasizing the same at closing argument). 12 The district court in Ramos-González instructed the jury that it could not find that the defendant possessed the cocaine if it did not believe he was there.

at 498–99. We have no idea how that meshed with a joint-possession instruction, though, because the defendant didn't object below (so the government never defended it), and the government defended it on appeal only on the ground that it was harmless where the evidence supported the sole- possession theory.

- 30 - colleagues say, even though the government not only admits that it

never suggested that Brown had any involvement with the gun or

drugs, the government also repeatedly rejected any such inference.

Indeed, it went to lengths in its closing argument to deflect any

possibility that Brown was a co-possessor of the contraband. To

highlight just a few instances from closing arguments:

• "In any event, the evidence in the case shows that [Brown is] not the person who possessed the firearm in the backpack, that loaded .9 millimeter pistol, because the person who was in possession of that firearm is the same person who possessed in that same backpack 46 grams of crack cocaine and possessed over 30 grams of powder cocaine, all with the intent to distribute it, and I suggest it's clearly not Nakasha [sic] Brown." • "[Norris is] trying to say [Brown's] the one who's cutting stuff up dealing drugs, et cetera, et cetera. How was she doing that exactly if she's in the apartment all the time with a kid? She's not dealing drugs in the apartment. I mean, that's crazy." • "There's absolutely no evidence that she's dealing drugs . . . ." • "[Brown is] not the one who's dealing drugs. Who's the one who is in and out of that apartment during the time the two of them [are] there? It's not her. It's him, the defendant." • "The evidence shows you beyond any reasonable doubt that he is the one who possessed the stuff in the closet, that he is the one who possessed that firearm in the bag, he is the one who possessed the crack cocaine in the bag, he is the one who possessed the powder cocaine in the bag, he is the one who possessed the crack and powder in that box above the sink, and he is the one who possessed that gun in the bag in furtherance of his drug-trafficking activity, and once again we ask you to find him guilty accordingly."

- 31 - So the government's theory was not just that Norris alone possessed

the contraband--it was also specifically that Brown didn't.13

The government's contrary theory of the case "matters

not" to the Court. Ante at 11. Relying on United States v.

Howard,

(1st Cir. 2012), the Court notes that "[w]hen

crafting jury instructions a judge must consider all of the

evidence introduced at trial, in other words, the government's as

well as the defense's,"

. That's true. We also concluded

in Howard that the defense opened the door to a joint-possession

instruction through his evidence and arguments. The Howard

defendant argued that he didn't possess the contraband--it was

someone else. This is also true.

But, even recognizing those truths, Howard doesn't

stretch as far as the Court tries. In Howard, the government

explicitly argued a joint-possession theory as an alternative. To

be sure, its primary theory of the case was that Howard possessed

the contraband alone. Yet it also expressly told the jury that

"to the extent that Deshawn Howard was working that business with

someone else, listen to the judge's instruction on joint

possession. Mr. Howard doesn't have to be the only person

possessing it." Tr. of Criminal Jury Trial, Day 5 at 21:20–23,

13The government also told the district court that it thought Brown would have no "colorable" Fifth Amendment claim if she were called to testify at trial because it did not "have any reason to believe she possessed that gun or the drugs."

- 32 - United States v. Howard, No. 3:09-cr-30027 (D. Mass. Aug. 23,

2011), ECF No. 90; see also

at 41:23–42:7 ("If Deshawn Howard,

with regard to the possession and distributing the five or more

grams of cocaine, is working with anyone else . . . then he's

culpable just as if he acted alone. But it's his drugs and his

scales and his gun.").

So it's not just that Howard's evidence raised a possible

inference that he was "in cahoots" with the two residents of the

home--the government also picked up on that possible inference as

an alternative theory. See, e.g., United States v. Appolon,

(1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting contention that the

government's argument of actual knowledge forfeits the

government's right to present a willful-blindness instruction).

Which, as I've already explained, is far from what happened here.

Far from lining up with Howard, the joint-possession instruction

here instead gave the jury the opportunity to convict Norris on a

theory the government never proposed--and one it even called

"crazy."

Searching far and wide for evidence that the government

pressed a joint-possession theory here, my colleagues pluck a

singular reference by the government in its closing statement that

possession could be joint. What my colleagues don't note, though,

is that statement came merely in the government's description of

the legal definition of possession, including what it means for

- 33 - possession to be actual or constructive. Nor do they mention the

context of the government's one-sentence remark: It came just

before the government dove into an extended monologue, which we

already reviewed, telling the jury that Brown had nothing to do

with the contraband at issue. On top of that, my colleagues cannot

"retrieve[] and mine[]" a single instance in this record in which

the government attempted, beyond a passing mention to a legal

definition of possession, to present a joint-possession theory.

So the issue is not, as my colleagues attempt to frame it, that

the government took "inconsistent" positions or "abandoned its

fallback position." Ante at 11 n.5. The problem is that the

government simply never presented an alternative theory.

Presumably, the government had good reason to tell the

jury repeatedly that Brown had nothing to do with the gun or drugs

found here. If that was the government's belief, it should not

have had the benefit of giving the jurors an easy out to resolve

the conflict between Norris's allegations against Brown and the

government's clear insistence that Brown was not involved. See

Wolak,

(finding error in joint-possession and

constructive-possession instructions because neither "was an issue

in this case . . . as the government's theory was that Wolak had

actual possession of the firearm at all relevant times, and the

defense theory was that the gun belonged to Pruitt").

- 34 - How the instruction made it to the jury in the first

place also reveals the error of the district court's way. The

government put the instruction on its proposed list months before

trial, without explanation. At trial, Norris objected. Yet the

district court treated the joint-possession instruction as an

almost pro forma matter:

[Norris's counsel]: [T]he one that's more, I guess, pressing would be the one that there could be joint possession. I'd like to argue that some because I don't think that's the government's case, and I don't think -- THE COURT: That's a standard instruction. Do you want it? [Government's counsel]: Yes.

When the district court--not the government--began to explain the

supposed evidentiary basis for the instruction, Norris's counsel

tried to jump in. But the district court again cut him off:

THE COURT: I think that is the case actually. I mean, you've presented an excellent picture, actually, that she was in that bedroom, and she was in there most of the time, so -- [Norris's counsel]: But they haven't argued that she was part -- working with him in any way, and the police chose to truncate their investigation because they said she wasn't -- THE COURT: That's your case. I get it. I will be giving a joint instruction charge if you want, if you're looking for that. [Government's counsel]: Yes.

The district court did not even allow Norris's counsel to finish

his argument about why the instruction was inappropriate. Indeed,

- 35 - the government offered no justification of its own for the charge.14

The district court simply reverted back to the fact that it was a

"standard instruction." Which goes directly against Ramos-

González.15

In sum, rather than tailor the instructions to the facts

and theories of the case, the district court relied on both the

ubiquity of the instruction and its own--not the government's--

explanation of the joint-possession theory. In doing so, the

14 In United States v. Sweeney,

(1st Cir. 2018), we relied on Howard to conclude that the defendant's suggestion that someone else in the residence used the password- protected computer account to share child pornography allowed for an aiding-and-abetting instruction to be delivered. We said so because the evidence could have suggested that the defendant gave the password to someone else to use.

But the government in Sweeney argued this theory to the court in defending the aiding- and-abetting instruction. See Tr. of Jury Trial Day 6 at 6-102:14– 6-103:2, United States v. Sweeney, No. 4:15-cr-40033 (D. Mass. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 188. The government made no such argument here, at least in part because the district court speculated on the government's behalf. 15 I am also dubious about the district court's suggestion that the mere fact that someone else used the bedroom where the contraband was found would be, alone, sufficient to justify a joint-possession instruction where the government never argued it. Though I acknowledge that some of our sister circuits have set such a low bar. See, e.g., United States v. Driggers,

, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Indeed, we have gone so far as to say that 'a joint possession instruction is "necessary" when contraband is recovered from a jointly-occupied residence.'" (quoting United States v. Rainone,

(7th Cir. 2016))); Johnson v. United States,

, 643–44 (8th Cir. 1974) (approving of joint-possession instruction where "the events took place in an apartment which Johnson shared with his sister as well as because Jones was present and had access to the drugs"). Indeed, in justifying the instruction on appeal, my colleagues look to a slew of other evidence. Ante at 10.

- 36 - district court offered the government a helping hand to conviction,

permitting the government a jury instruction on a theory it never

presented. And that, on a general level, creates too great a

danger of confusing the jury or sandbagging the defense. I see no

good reason to open the door to conviction based on a theory the

government expressly disavowed.

B.

The instructional error notwithstanding, I would still

affirm the conviction because the error was harmless. See United

States v. McLellan,

(1st Cir. 2020) (noting that

improper jury instructions "would not warrant overturning the

conviction if the potential error in the jury instruction were

harmless"). Our harmless-error analysis in criminal cases

proceeds at one of two levels. "The stricter standard, applicable

mainly to issues of constitutional dimension, requires the

government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did

not influence the verdict." United States v. Sasso,

(1st Cir. 2012). "The less stringent standard, applicable

mainly to trial errors that are not of constitutional dimension,

allows a conviction to stand, error notwithstanding, as long as it

can be said 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened

without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.'"

(quoting

Kotteakos v. United States,

(1946)). Neither

- 37 - party argues what harmless-error standard applies. I will assume,

favorably to Norris, that the more-stringent standard applies.

"Where a potentially erroneous instruction deals with an

essential element of the crime, it is harmless if it appears beyond

a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute

to the verdict obtained." McLellan,

(cleaned up).

"A jury instruction error is not harmless if 'the record contains

evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding' in the

absence of the error." United States v. Ford,

(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Godin,

(1st Cir. 2008)). Thus, an instructional error "on an element of

the offense can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, if, given

the factual circumstances of the case, the jury could not have

found the defendant guilty without making the proper factual

finding as to that element." McLellan,

(quoting

United States v. Doherty,

(1st Cir. 1989)).

Though the government does not argue that the error was

harmless, we have exercised our discretion to overlook the

government's failure to do so in the past. See, e.g., United

States v. Rose,

(1st Cir. 1997). We have

reasoned that "[i]n a case of clearly harmless error it would be

a waste of judicial resources to require a new trial where the

result is likely to be the same." United States v. Rodriguez

Cortes,

(1st Cir. 1991). Figuring out whether

- 38 - we should overlook the error "involves the balancing of many

elements," including "the state of the record and whether the

arguments that the government does make provide assistance to the

court on the harmlessness issue." Rose,

.

I think we can overlook the waiver here because, though

the jury should not have received a joint-possession instruction,

its potential reliance on that instruction clearly did not make

the conviction infirm. The court instructed the jury on both

actual and constructive possession. (Constructive possession was

the government's theory.) The court went on: "Possession also

includes both sole possession and joint possession. If one person

alone has actual or constructive possession, the possession is

sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive

possession, possession is joint." Thus, even if the jury found

that Norris jointly possessed the contraband with another person,

it still would have concluded that he actually or constructively

possessed the contraband. Which, alone, is sufficient to convict

him of the counts in the indictment.16 See

(g)(1);

16For that reason, Norris's contention that the late-breaking joint-possession instruction deprived him of the ability to "question witnesses in a way that undermined the theory of liability" and "the opportunity to mount his own arguments and defenses against it" does not convince me. His defense of pointing the finger at Brown would have knocked out two birds with one stone, since it tried to get the jury to find that Norris neither actually nor constructively possessed the contraband. If Norris proved he had nothing to do with the contraband, then the jury could not have found that he was in cahoots with Brown.

- 39 -

(a)(1); United States v. Tanco-Baez,

(1st Cir. 2019) (noting that possession for § 922(g) can be sole

or joint); United States v. Maldonado,

, 6–7 (1st Cir.

1994) (same for § 841). And, as the Court thoughtfully explains,

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Norris of

possessing the contraband at issue.

* * *

The district court erred in delivering a jury

instruction on a theory of the case the government not only did

not argue, but expressly denied. Though it turned out harmless

here, there will certainly be some cases where such instructions

launch the jury into a pit of confusion, risk convictions by

speculation, and potentially sandbag the defense after it has no

more opportunity to pursue a different strategy. For that reason,

I respectfully concur only in the judgment.

- 40 -