United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 21-1363



                     ROSA LÓPEZ-HERNÁNDEZ,

                     Plaintiff, Appellant,

                               v.

                    TERUMO PUERTO RICO LLC,

                      Defendant, Appellee,

                TERUMO MEDICAL DEVICES COMPANY,

                           Defendant.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

       [Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                   Kayatta, Howard and Gelpí,
                         Circuit Judges.


     Juan M. Frontera-Suau, with whom Frontera Suau Law Offices,
PSC, was on brief, for appellant.
     Mariana Muñiz Lara, with whom Janine Guzmán and DLA Piper
(Puerto Rico) LLC, were on brief, for appellee.
March 30, 2023
               GELPÍ,     Circuit       Judge.         This      is     an    employment

discrimination          case    brought    by     an    employee        who    displayed

disruptive behavior in the workplace, was denied a promotion for

not meeting the qualifications for the job position, and ultimately

was     dismissed,       with     the    employer      citing         her    pattern    of

malperformance.                Plaintiff-Appellant          Rosa        López-Hernández

("López-Hernández" or "Appellant") sued Defendant-Appellee Terumo

Puerto Rico LLC ("Terumo") alleging gender discrimination and

retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and related claims

under Puerto Rico law.           The district court granted Terumo's motion

for summary judgment, López-Hernández appealed.                        We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

      López-Hernández brought this action in the District of Puerto

Rico.     Upon conclusion of discovery,                Terumo moved for summary

judgment.        The district court determined that López-Hernández

failed to put forth evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find

that Terumo's reasons for not selecting López-Hernández for a

promotion and for terminating her employment were pretextual and

that those actions were really motivated by gender discrimination

or retaliatory motives.             Rather, the district court found that

there    was    sufficient       unrefuted       evidence     demonstrating         López-

Hernández's        poor        performance,       deficient           supervisory      and

interpersonal        skills,      and     violations        of     company      policies


                                          - 3 -
justifying the failure to promote and the eventual termination.

Further, the district court found that López-Hernández did not

show that Terumo's reasons were implausible or inconsistent, that

she   was     treated      differently   than     similarly   situated   male

employees,     or   that    decisionmakers      made   gender-based   comments

related to the termination decision.             The district court lastly

found that the only alleged comment related to gender was not

related to the employment decision in question and was not made by

a decisionmaker.

             The district court granted Terumo's motion for summary

judgment and dismissed López-Hernández's claims with prejudice,

finding that she failed to show that Terumo's decisions not to

promote her, and later to terminate her employment, were motivated

by discriminatory animus.         This appeal followed.

II.   DISCUSSION

      A. LOCAL RULE 56

             Before delving into the merits of this appeal we find it

instructive to first address López-Hernández's failure to comply

with District of Puerto Rico's Local Rule 56.                 Local Rule 56

requires that a motion for summary judgment "be supported by a

separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth

in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there

is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried."            D.P.R. Civ. R.

56(b).      The party opposing the motion for summary judgment must


                                     - 4 -
then "submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise

statement of material facts.       The opposing statement shall admit,

deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary

judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving

party's statement of material facts."          Id. 56(c).        The facts

themselves must be supported by "a citation to the specific page

or   paragraph   of   identified    record   material    supporting    the

assertion." Id. 56(e). Importantly, the court may disregard facts

if they are not supported by such a citation.       Id.       Lastly, facts

contained either in the "supporting or opposing statement of

material facts, if supported by record citations . . . shall be

deemed admitted unless properly controverted."          Id.

          "Local Rule 56 is in service to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56."   Tropigas de P.R., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd's of London, 

 (1st Cir. 2011).           Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a "party cannot successfully oppose a

motion for summary judgment by resting 'upon mere allegations or

denials of [her] pleading.'" Garmon v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

 (1st Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pina v. Child.'s Place, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)).

"[M]ere allegations are not entitled to weight in the summary

judgment calculus."    Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 

 (1st Cir. 2010).          The nonmoving party must instead

marshal sufficient evidence to show that a genuine issue of


                                   - 5 -
material fact exists.      Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy, 

 (1st Cir. 2017).      "Like [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56

itself, [Local Rule 56] makes clear that its focus is on facts,

not speculation or argumentation."            Tropigas, 

.

"Moreover, these facts must be material."             

.

            Under Local Rule 56, "a district court is free, in the

exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's

facts as stated" D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e) when the statements contained

in the movant's Statement of Uncontested Facts ("SUF") are not

properly    controverted."      Advanced    Flexible     Cirs.,    Inc.   v.   GE

Sensing & Inspection Techs. GmbH, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)

(quoting Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2007)).      Said anti-ferret rule is intended to protect

the district court from perusing through the summary judgment

record in search of disputed material facts and prevent litigants

from shifting that burden onto the court.             See CMI Cap. Mkt. Inv.,

LLC v. González–Toro, 

 (1st Cir. 2008); P.R. Am.

Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 

, 131–32 (1st Cir. 2010).

We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of complying with

said local rule and have implored litigants to comply or ignore it

"at their peril."    Mariani-Colón v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. ex rel.

Chertoff,   

   (1st    Cir.    2007)   (quoting   Cabán

Hernández, 

); see also Rodríguez-Severino v. UTC

Aerospace Sys., 

 (1st Cir. 2022).


                                    - 6 -
             Before us now is yet another example of the consequence

to a litigant who fails to comply with the District of Puerto

Rico's Local Rules on summary judgment.                 See Sánchez-Figueroa v.

Banco Popular de P.R., 

 (1st Cir. 2008).

Violations     of    this    local     rule    are     astoundingly     common     and

constitute an unnecessary burden to the trial court's docket and

time, and frequently make their way before us for review.

             López-Hernández responded to Terumo's motion for summary

judgment, denying fifty-nine and qualifying seven of Terumo's SUF.

These failed to adhere to Local Rule 56(c) & (e)'s record citation

requirement.        Numerous "facts" memorialized in her opposition

statement     were     supported        only     by     general      references     to

López-Hernández's        SUF     yet     those     citations -- to       deposition

transcripts -- collectively comprised hundreds of pages.                      First,

many   of   López-Hernández's          responses      failed   to    contradict    the

proffered facts because they included extraneous and irrelevant

details, consisting of speculation and conclusory assertions.

Additionally, many of the qualifications and denials were not

properly supported by a citation.                     Many of López-Hernández's

factual     assertions      do   not   actually       oppose   the    truth   of   the

statements Terumo offered, were unaccompanied by "a citation to

the specific page or paragraph of identified record material

supporting the assertion," D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e), or cited to

lengthy deposition testimony without providing a more specific


                                        - 7 -
location.   See Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 

 (1st Cir.

2000) (abrogated on other grounds by Casanova v. Dubois, 

 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[F]ailure to present a statement of disputed

facts,   embroidered   with   specific   citations     to   the   record,

justifies the court's deeming the facts presented in the movant's

statement of undisputed facts admitted.").           Appellant's record

citations, rather than cite a "specific page or paragraph" as Rule

56(e) requires, often cite generally to multiple exhibits which

are themselves voluminous.1    "This is far removed from compliance

with the requirement that '[a]n assertion of fact . . . shall be

followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of



     1
       For example, at paragraph 20 of its SUF, Terumo states that
since López-Hernández started working at the Caguas worksite, she
had communication and interpersonal problems because she was not
receptive to others' suggestions and made decisions without the
required consultation.      López-Hernández denies this fact by
referencing twenty-one proposed facts from her own statement of
additional facts. At paragraph 21 of its SUF, Terumo states that
between 2016 and early 2017, López-Hernández showed a lack of
supervisory skills because she was the first supervisor that the
worksite's management team ever received continuous complaints
about from the people that she supervised, as well as her peers
and support personnel. López-Hernández denies this fact citing to
twenty-nine proposed facts from her own additional statement of
facts that do not refute Terumo's paragraph 21. At paragraph 30
of its SUF, Terumo states that Abigail Rodríguez -- Human
Resources    Generalist  -- received   and   investigated   several
complaints against López-Hernández in 2016 that ended in
López-Hernández receiving feedback on how to improve how she
managed    situations   and   completed    quality   documentation.
López-Hernández denies this fact, citing to nine proposed facts
from her additional statement of facts that do not refute the fact
included in Terumo's SUF or the supporting documents which
substantiate it.


                                - 8 -
identified record material supporting the assertion.'"                          Cabán

Hernández, 486 F.3d at 7–8 (quoting D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e)).

           Because     of     López-Hernández's         failure     to     properly

controvert   Terumo's       statement    of    uncontested       facts,    we   deem

Terumo's statement of uncontested facts admitted under Local Rule

56.   With this backdrop we next address our review of the district

court's entry of summary judgment.

      B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

           López-Hernández       claims       that    she   was     discriminated

against on the basis of sex in two contexts.                First, she was not

selected for a promotion and, close in time,                      Rafael Benítez

("Benítez"),      Operations    Director        at   Terumo,      allegedly     made

comments about not liking her and about not being used to working

with women. Second, she was terminated from her employment several

months    after      complaining        about        Benítez's     alleged       sex

discrimination.      We address each in turn.


      1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

           Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).               At summary

judgment, "the judge's function is not himself [or herself] to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."                     Anderson




                                    - 9 -
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

 (1986); see also Dusel

v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 

 (1st Cir. 2022).

             We review a district court's grant or denial of summary

judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant and drawing all reasonable inferences in that

party's favor.       Murray v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC, 

 (1st Cir. 2015).          "The party moving for summary judgment

must show that 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact' and that it 'is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"

Rodríguez-Severino, 52 F.4th at 461 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a)).

      2. Title VII: SEX DISCRIMINATION

             Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids a

covered employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual

with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex."

42    U.S.C.       § 2000e–2(a)(1).            A     plaintiff     alleging      sex

discrimination must establish that the adverse employment action

was motivated by the employer's discriminatory animus.                   Lockridge

v.   Univ.   of    Me.   Sys.,   

   (1st   Cir.   2010).

López-Hernández seeks to make that showing in this case only by

applying     the     McDonnell    Douglas          burden-shifting      framework.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

 (1973).                    In

the failure-to-promote context, we have previously said that:                    "[A


                                       - 10 -
plaintiff] must show that (1) [s]he is a member of a protected

class, (2) [s]he was qualified for the position to which [s]he

applied, (3) [s]he was not hired, and (4) an applicant with similar

qualifications received the position."                  Henderson v. Mass. Bay

Transp. Auth., 

, 29 (1st Cir. 2020).

              Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate "a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment

action.       Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 

 (1st Cir.

2003).          After     the     employer        presents      evidence     of     a

non-discriminatory        reason,      the    plaintiff      must   show   that   the

proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a pretext for unlawful

discrimination.        Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc., 

, 673

(1st Cir. 1996).         At all times the burden of persuasion remains

with the plaintiff.        Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 

 (1981); Mariani-Colón, 

.

              Although    we    draw   all     reasonable     inferences    in    the

nonmovant's favor, we will not "draw unreasonable inferences or

credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, rank conjecture, or

vitriolic invective."           Cabán-Hernández, 

.            It bears

repeating that genuine issues of material fact are "not the stuff

of an opposing party's dreams," Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1991), and "a party cannot successfully

oppose    a   motion     for    summary      judgment   by    resting   'upon     mere


                                       - 11 -
allegations or denials of his pleading,'" Pina, 

(quoting LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins., 

 (1st Cir.

1993)).

          López-Hernández places great weight on her deposition

testimony that, when reviewing her 2016 performance evaluation,

during the selection process for the Senior Production Manager,

Benítez told her that he treated her differently because of her

gender, because she was commanding, and he did not think that women

could have backbone and character.     In her deposition, López-

Hernández also testified that Benítez told her that he would decide

who held the Senior Production Supervisor role.

          Notwithstanding, if the record shows as a matter of law

that López-Hernández was not qualified for the position of Senior

Production Supervisor, her discrimination claim must fail.    See,

e.g., Goncalves v. Plymouth Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 

 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment for the

employer because the plaintiff "failed to show that she was . . .

qualified" and thus could not "meet her burden of showing a prima

facie case of discrimination");   Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that a plaintiff must show

that she "was qualified for an open position for which she applied"

as a prima facie element of a failure-to-promote claim).   That is

the case here, as evidenced by the facts deemed admitted under

Local Rule 56.


                              - 12 -
           The Senior Production Supervisor job required:

           Excellent    communication,    interpersonal,
           supervisory and teamwork skills, including
           abilities for people management, motivating
           the personnel to obtain top performance,
           handling personnel scheduling, evaluating
           discipline,   providing  coaching,   ensuring
           adequate communication with staff, serving as
           liaison with other production supervisors for
           efficient transitions, ensuring compliance
           with all procedures, and communicating in
           English and Spanish.

Under Terumo's Employee Manual, an internal candidate seeking a

promotion must have satisfactorily performed in his/her current

role for a minimum of one year and must meet the qualifications

for the new position in order to be considered.

           In the three and a half years in which López-Hernández

worked for Terumo and its predecessor, the company received a

steady    stream    of     complaints       from      López-Hernández's          peers,

subordinates,      and    support     personnel     about      her    interpersonal,

supervisory, and communication skills.                These complaints included

reports    that      López-Hernández          was      disrespectful        to     her

subordinates, that she showed favoritism to some employees and

retaliated   against        others,    that     she     gave    her    subordinates

incorrect or conflicting instructions about procedures, that the

team she supervised did not complete pending tasks and required

documentation, and that she did not verify that operators under

her   supervision        were   following     quality     procedures.            Terumo

produced exhibits from twenty different individuals (including


                                       - 13 -
human resources professionals, López-Hernández's supervisors, and

employees who had submitted complaints regarding López-Hernández

to the company) to evidence these complaints.         López-Hernández was

given feedback, repeatedly, for failing to adequately perform her

duties as a supervisor, including for her mistreatment of employees

and failure to maintain quality controls.

             López-Hernández did not communicate effectively and was

often hostile and disrespectful to other employees in documented

incidents.      She    rejected   feedback   and   coaching    opportunities

despite being offered multiple opportunities to improve.                     The

Senior Production Supervisor position required the ability to

energize and motivate subordinates; López-Hernández, however, had

created such a hostile work environment among her group that

several of her subordinates sought psychiatric services, several

asked to have their shifts changed so that they no longer had to

work with her, and her team reported feeling tense and unmotivated.

Moreover,     the     Senior   Production    Supervisor       role    required

leadership in achieving quality and safety goals, and here too

López-Hernández fell short.          She had not mastered fundamental

information about the production process and quality requirements

and   had,   instead,    implemented   changes     that   would      have   been

detrimental to the production process and allowed subordinate

employees to work in areas for which they were not certified or

perform tasks they were not prepared to complete.          López-Hernández


                                   - 14 -
and her subordinates had also consistently failed to complete

required documentation about the production process as required

for    quality     procedures,           and    when      she    did      complete    the

documentation,      she     did    so    incorrectly,       which      required      other

employees to revise or re-do the documentation.                        This pattern of

behavior persisted throughout                  López-Hernández's tenure at two

different sites and while she was supervised by three different

supervisors, and her 2014, 2015, and 2016 evaluations identified

her interpersonal, supervisory, and communication skills as "areas

of     opportunity"         requiring           improvement.               Because      of

López-Hernández's deficiencies in her Production Supervisor role -

- specifically, the performance issues and multiple complaints

made   by   so    many    different        individuals          against    her -- Human

Resources did not recommend that she be promoted to the Senior

Production       Supervisor       job.         Finally,    the    Senior     Production

Supervisor needed to be bilingual in English and Spanish, and

López-Hernández was not a fluent English-speaker.                          Terumo fully

supported this litany of shortcomings in its statement of material

facts, which were in turn supported by citations to the record.

Appellant,   in     turn,     failed      to    properly    controvert       the     same,

disregarding Local Rule 56.

            López-Hernández also contends that if her performance

issues were "as ample and as ongoing" as Terumo asserted, then she

should have been terminated.                   This does not actually deny the


                                          - 15 -
complaints   made     against   her    or    the    performance     deficiencies

identified by Terumo, and the company made clear that it raised

these deficiencies with López-Hernández in repeated attempts to

help her improve her job performance, thus explaining why she was

not previously terminated.

            López-Hernández asks us to disregard Terumo's evidence,

arguing that it comes from interested witnesses and therefore may

not be considered under Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

 (2000).      In Reeves, the Supreme Court explained that,

at summary judgment, a court:

            Must disregard all evidence favorable to the
            moving party that the jury is not required to
            believe.    That is, the court should give
            credence   to   the  evidence   favoring   the
            nonmovant as well as that 'evidence supporting
            the moving party that is uncontradicted and
            unimpeached, at least to the extent that that
            evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'

.     (quoting 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2529, at 300 (2d ed. 1995)).

            In Dennis v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., as here, the appellant

argued that the district court at the summary judgment stage should

not have credited certain declarations because the proponents were

interested parties.       

 (1st Cir. 2008).            We held

that the appellant misread the scope of Reeves and explained that

"[a]t    summary    judgment    we    need    not   exclude   all    interested

testimony, specifically testimony that is uncontradicted by the



                                     - 16 -
nonmovant."   

 (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis,

, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2007)).   Doing so, we acknowledged,

would make it impossible for employers at the summary judgment

stage to defend against retaliation claims, especially at the

second step of the burden-shifting framework described infra.   

And in this case, any argument for ignoring fulsome evidence of

performance deficiencies is undercut by the volume of specific and

similar complaints over time from so many different employees,

documented long before the decision at issue here was made.

          As we concluded previously, López-Hernández failed to

adequately controvert Terumo's statement of uncontested material

facts, and like the appellant in Dennis, she reads Reeves too

narrowly to compel the result she seeks.    We therefore conclude

that López-Hernández has failed to make out a prima facie case of

discrimination on her failure-to-promote claim.

     3. Title VII: Retaliation

          López-Hernández further contends that the district court

erroneously dismissed her retaliation claim under Title VII.    She

posits that, nearly five months after she lodged an internal sex

discrimination complaint against Benítez, Terumo terminated her

employment in retaliation.    She further acknowledges that while

temporal proximity may suggest retaliation, it is not sufficient

in certain cases to sustain a reasonable inference of the but-for

causation required to prevail in a retaliation action.


                              - 17 -
          The district court concluded that "[a]ssuming arguendo

that   [López-Hernández]   could    make    a   prima   facie    case   of

retaliation, [Terumo] has produced substantial evidence of a non-

discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination, namely the

plethora of complaints filed against her for violations of company

policies and mistreatment of her coworkers."            López-Hernández,

, at *4.      The district court also concluded that

the Appellant had simply not shown that Terumo's stated reason was

false and pretextual, nor had she provided sufficient evidence to

even establish the existence of a trial-worthy issue.           Moreover,

it reasoned that Appellant's reliance on temporal proximity was

misplaced.   "[W]hile temporal proximity is one factor from which

an employer's bad motive can be inferred, by itself, it is not

enough -- especially if the surrounding circumstances undermine

any claim of causation." López-Hernández, 

, at *4

(quoting Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)).

          "Title   VII   bars   employers   from   retaliating    against

an . . . employee because she 'has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he

has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.'"   Garayalde-Rijos v. Mun. of Carolina, 

 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)).


                                 - 18 -
              When direct evidence of retaliation is lacking, as it is

here,    we    utilize       a   familiar     burden-shifting          framework.     To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, López-Hernández must

show: "(1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3)                  that a 'causal nexus exists

between       the     protected    [conduct]       and     the       adverse   action.'"

Garayalde-Rijos, 

 (third alteration in original)

(quoting Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 

 (1st Cir.

2014)); see also           Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 

 (2013) ("Title VII retaliation claims must be proved

according      to     traditional       principles    of     but-for      causation.").

"Once the plaintiff makes out this prima facie case, the burden

shifts    to        the    defendant    to      articulate       a   legitimate,    non-

retaliatory explanation for its actions."                    Planadeball v. Wyndham

Vacation Resorts, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2015).                         If the

defendant is able to do so, the burden then returns to the

plaintiff "to show that the defendant's explanation is a pretext

for unlawful retaliation."              

              We     now    turn   to     the     first    requirement:        protected

activity.       Neither party disputes that the internal complaint

constituted protected activity.                    The parties also agree that

Appellant satisfies the second requirement, as termination is an

adverse employment event.              Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d




                                          - 19 -
7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Hernandez-Torres v. Intercontinental

Trading, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1998)).

            Terumo    argues     that     López-Hernández     cannot      show    the

requisite causal connection between the internal complaint and her

termination since its decision to terminate her was based on her

misconduct and Benítez was not involved in said decision.                          We

agree.     The temporal proximity of almost five months between the

internal      complaint      and         the   misconduct         that    led      to

López-Hernández's dismissal does not evidence that there was a

causal     connection     between         Appellant's     complaint       and     her

termination.       Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 

 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Three and four month periods have been held

insufficient to establish a causal connection based on temporal

proximity.").      Besides asserting that she was dismissed four and

a half months after filing an internal complaint, López-Hernández

fails to set forth evidence connecting her protected activity to

the adverse action.       See Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim

Pharms., Inc., 

   (1st   Cir.   2005);      Wright    v.

CompUSA,    Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining

chronological proximity does not establish causality by itself,

especially    if    "[t]he   larger       picture     undercuts    any   claim    of

causation" (quoting Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1997))).




                                     - 20 -
            In view of the uncontested facts, Appellant has not shown

that a reasonable jury could conclude that her internal sex

discrimination complaint was the but-for cause of her termination.

Summary    judgment   was   thus   also     proper   on    López-Hernández’s

retaliation claim.

     4. PUERTO RICO LAW CLAIMS

            López-Hernández also raised claims under Puerto Rico

Laws 100, 69, and 115, the local counterparts to federal anti-sex

discrimination and retaliation statutes.2            These are subject to

the same analysis as their federal counterparts.                Indeed, Title

VII's anti-retaliation law and the anti-retaliation provisions

under Puerto Rico Law 115 largely overlap.                "Law 100, for all

intents and purposes, is . . . the Puerto Rican 'analog[ue] to

Title VII.'"   Rivera-Rivera v. Medina & Medina, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados

del Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 

, 169 n.3 (1st Cir.

2009)).      Similarly,     "Law   69's   prohibitions     on    gender-based

employment discrimination . . . appears to be aligned with Title

VII law; the latter's precedents being used freely to construe the

former."    

 (quoting Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 

(1st Cir. 2013)).


     2 Puerto Rico Law 100 of June 30, 1959, 

 et seq., Puerto Rico Law 115 of December 20, 1991, Laws
Ann. tit. 29, § 194a and Puerto Rico Law 69 of July 6, 1985, P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 1321.


                                   - 21 -
           Given     the     symmetry     between      the   anti-retaliation

provisions under Title VII and Puerto Rico Laws discussed above,

we    affirm   the   dismissal      of    López-Hernández's        Puerto    Rico

anti-discrimination        and   anti-retaliation      claims   for    the   same

reasons that we affirmed the dismissal of her Title VII claims.

See Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM, Inc., 

 (1st Cir.

2018).

           Lastly, López-Hernández also brought a claim under Law

80, which "requires employers to compensate at-will employees who

are discharged without just cause."            Ruiz-Sánchez v. Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co., 

 (1st Cir. 2013).                   While Law 80

does not have a federal equivalent, the record contains ample

evidence   that    López-Hernández       was   terminated    for   just     cause.

Moreover, López-Hernández fails to develop any argument as to her

Law 80 claim and, thus, we deem it waived.             See Rivera-Gomez v. de

Castro, 

 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining that "a

litigant has an obligation 'to spell out its arguments squarely

and   distinctly,'    or    else   forever      hold   its   peace."   (quoting

Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1988))).

           As such, we affirm the dismissal of López-Hernández's

Puerto Rico law claims.3



      Even if López-Hernández's Puerto Rico law claims survived
      3

the dismissal of her Title VII discrimination and retaliation


                                    - 22 -
III.       CONCLUSION

              The judgment of the district court is

              AFFIRMED.4




claims, we consider each waived for lack of any meaningful
development since López-Hernández does not address said claims
apart from one sentence at the conclusion of her brief. See United
States v. Zannino, 

 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.").

       It is also very helpful to this court when the district
       4

court specifies precisely what facts it is deeming admitted due to
the lack of an effective rejoinder compliant with Local Rule 56.
This undoubtedly can involve more work, but it increases the
likelihood of a correct result, saves much time on appeal, and
reduces the likelihood of a do-over. See supra note 1..


                                 - 23 -