United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 22-1190

                         UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                         JORDAN WINCZUK,

                      Defendant, Appellant.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                    Gelpí, Lynch, and Howard,
                         Circuit Judges.


     Christine DeMaso, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for
appellant.
     Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.


                           May 2, 2023
            LYNCH, Circuit Judge.   Jordan Winczuk pleaded guilty on

October 27, 2021, to one count of attempted sexual exploitation of

a minor, see 

(a), (e), and one count of committing

a felony involving a minor while required to register as a sex

offender, see 

 § 2260A.   The district court sentenced him to 45

years of imprisonment.    This sentence was composed of a 35-year

mandatory minimum on the § 2251 count based on two prior state

convictions "relating to the sexual exploitation of children," id.

§ 2251(e), and a 10-year consecutive mandatory minimum on the

§ 2260A count.

            On appeal, Winczuk agrees that § 2251(e)'s separate

25-year minimum and § 2260A's 10-year minimum both apply. However,

he argues that the district court erred in imposing § 2251(e)'s

35-year minimum because, he contends, the phrase "relating to the

sexual exploitation of children" refers only to the production of

child pornography.    We reject his arguments and affirm.   In doing

so, we join the views of the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth

Circuits.   See United States v. Pavulak, 

 (3d

Cir. 2012); United States v. Mills, 

 (4th Cir.

2017); United States v. Sanchez, 

 (6th Cir.

2011) (unpublished); United States v. Smith, 

(8th Cir. 2004).




                               - 2 -
                                        I.

                                        A.

             The facts underlying Winczuk's federal guilty plea are

as follows. Because Winczuk pleaded guilty, "we draw the[se] facts

from   the    plea    colloquy,   the        unchallenged    portions    of   the

presentence    investigation      report,      and    the   transcript   of   the

sentencing hearing."        United States v. De la Cruz, 

 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Padilla-Colón, 

 (1st Cir. 2009)).

             In January 2018, Winczuk (then 34) began messaging an

11-year-old boy on Instagram, using the alias "Joey Carson."

Winczuk began by grooming the boy, asking him about school and

complimenting        his   appearance.          Winczuk's     messages    became

progressively more sexually explicit.                He asked the child about

erections and masturbation, then repeatedly requested that the

child send pictures of his genitals.              Winczuk proposed plans for

the child to visit him and described in detail the sex acts he

would perform on the boy.

             About two weeks after Winczuk began messaging the child,

the child's mother became aware of the messages.              She posed as her

son and continued the conversation.                  She elicited identifying

information from Winczuk, including his real name, a picture of

his driver's license, and pictures of his face and tattoos.                   She

then provided this information to the Worcester Police Department,


                                   - 3 -
which was able to identify Winczuk.             On executing a search warrant

at    Winczuk's    New    Jersey   apartment,        officers   found      multiple

internet-capable phones, including one tied to the "Joey Carson"

Instagram account.         A search warrant for the contents of this

account revealed evidence that Winczuk had engaged in similarly

explicit conversations with other social media users who appeared

to be children.

              At the time he was sentenced in this case, Winczuk had

two   prior    state     convictions    in     New   Jersey   for    sex   offenses

involving minors. In 2008, he was charged in a 28-count indictment

with sexually assaulting four minors, several of them during a

sleepover when he was serving as the babysitter. He pleaded guilty

in 2010 to one count of sexual assault on a person between the

ages of 13 and 15 by a defendant at least four years older, in

violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-2c(4) (West 2008).

              In 2009, while Winczuk was on release pending resolution

of the 2008 charges, he was charged with file sharing child

pornography. He pleaded guilty in 2010 to one count of endangering

the welfare of a child by file sharing child pornography, in

violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4b(5)(a) (West 2009).

              A New Jersey state court sentenced Winczuk to concurrent

5-year sentences for these two offenses and to lifetime parole

supervision.      The convictions each triggered a requirement that

Winczuk register as a sex offender in New Jersey.                   As a condition


                                       - 4 -
of his parole, Winczuk was prohibited from possessing internet-

capable devices and from contacting minors.

                                  B.

            On April 4, 2019, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment charging Winczuk with one count of attempted sexual

exploitation of a minor, see 

(a), (e), and one

count of committing a felony involving a minor while required to

register as a sex offender, see 

 § 2260A.            Winczuk pleaded

guilty to both counts on October 27, 2021.1

            At sentencing, Winczuk argued that § 2251(e)'s 35-year

mandatory minimum did not apply on the theory that the phrase

"relating to the sexual exploitation of children" means only the

production of child pornography.       He also cited to a Ninth Circuit

decision, United States v. Schopp, 

 (9th Cir. 2019),

in support of his position.       The district court rejected this

argument and applied the 35-year minimum, for a total sentence of

45 years.

            This timely appeal followed.

                                  II.

            The sole question presented in this appeal concerns the

interpretation of the phrase "relating to the sexual exploitation




     1    Winczuk   did   not   enter    a   plea   agreement   with   the
government.


                                - 5 -
of children" in § 2251(e).   We review this question of law de novo.

See United States v. Blodgett, 

 (1st Cir. 2017).

          Section 2251(e) is § 2251's sentencing provision.      It

states, in relevant part:

          Any individual who violates, or attempts or
          conspires to violate, this section shall be
          fined under this title and imprisoned not less
          than 15 years nor more than 30 years, but if
          such person has one prior conviction under
          this chapter, section 1591, chapter 71,
          chapter 109A, or chapter 117, or under section
          920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform
          Code of Military Justice), or under the laws
          of any State relating to aggravated sexual
          abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact
          involving a minor or ward, or sex trafficking
          of children, or the production, possession,
          receipt,    mailing,    sale,    distribution,
          shipment,    or   transportation    of   child
          pornography, such person shall be fined under
          this title and imprisoned for not less than 25
          years nor more than 50 years, but if such
          person has 2 or more prior convictions under
          this chapter, chapter 71, chapter 109A, or
          chapter 117, or under section 920 of title 10
          (article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military
          Justice), or under the laws of any State
          relating to the sexual exploitation of
          children, such person shall be fined under
          this title and imprisoned not less than 35
          years nor more than life.

(e) (emphasis added).     The provision contains a

baseline 15-year mandatory minimum, a higher 25-year minimum for

recidivists with one federal or state predicate conviction, and a

higher 35-year minimum for recidivists with two or more federal or

state predicate convictions.    See 

                               - 6 -
          As   said,   Winczuk       argues   that    his     two    prior   state

convictions for sexual assault of a minor and file sharing child

pornography do not trigger the 35-year minimum because "relating

to the sexual exploitation of children" means only the production

of child pornography.2 The government's position is that "relating

to the sexual exploitation of children" means any "conduct through

which a person manipulates, or takes advantage of, a child to

sexual ends" and so captures Winczuk's prior convictions.                      We

conclude that the government has the better reading of the statute.

                                       A.

          In order to analyze the issue before us, we set forth

the   amendment     history     of     both   the     substantive        criminal

prohibitions in § 2251 and § 2251(e)'s recidivist sentencing

provision.

          Section    2251     was    originally     enacted    in    1978.     See

Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977,

(a), 

, 7 (1978).                   At that time,

its penalty provision provided for a recidivist enhancement if a

defendant had a prior conviction "under this section."                   

    In



      2   Winczuk implicitly concedes that his case is stronger as
to the sexual assault conviction, presumably because even on his
logic the conviction for file sharing child pornography could
conceivably "relat[e] to" the production of child pornography. He
emphasizes that the 35-year minimum is applicable only if both
prior convictions meet the definition. See 

(e)
(predicating 35-year minimum on "2 or more prior convictions").


                                     - 7 -
1986, Congress amended § 2251 to expand its substantive reach to,

inter alia, advertising related to child pornography.                 See Child

Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, 

 1-3, 

, 3510.          In 1994, Congress amended § 2251's

penalty provision by expanding the predicates for the recidivist

enhancement from prior convictions under "this section" to those

under "this chapter or chapter 109A," the latter of which addresses

sexual abuse.     See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act

of 1994, 

, 

, 2037; 18

U.S.C. ch. 109A.

            In 1996, Congress adopted § 2251's current two-step

structure   of    recidivist    minimums    and    broadened    the    list   of

predicates to include state convictions.             See Child Pornography

Prevention Act of 1996, 

div. A, tit. I,

§ 121(4),   

-26,    3009-30.      The    1996    amendments

introduced the language at issue here: both recidivist minimums

were triggered where a defendant had (either one or two) prior

convictions "under this chapter or chapter 109A, or under the laws

of any State relating to the sexual exploitation of children."

   (emphasis   added).      These    amendments    were    accompanied     by

findings detailing Congress's concern with the close connection

between   child   pornography    and     child    sexual    abuse.     See    

§ 121(1).




                                   - 8 -
            Congress later added even more federal predicates.                   See

Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, 

(c), 

, 2977 (adding convictions

under "chapter 117"); PROTECT Act, 

, 

, 683 (2003) (adding convictions under "chapter 71" and

under "section 920 of title 10 (article 120 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice)").          The 2003 amendments were accompanied by

congressional findings identifying "those who sexually exploit

[children]"    as    "including       both     child    molesters     and    child

pornographers."      PROTECT Act § 501(2).

            While the statute stood in this form, two courts of

appeals    interpreted        the    phrase     "relating     to     the    sexual

exploitation of children."          In United States v. Randolph, 

 (3d Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit rejected the argument that

this was "a term of art relating exclusively to crimes involving

the production of [child pornography]" and held that it encompassed

child molestation.      

 at 122 (citing United States v. Galo, 

 (3d Cir. 2001)).             And in United States v. Smith,

the Eighth Circuit rejected the same argument and held that the

term "unambiguously refers to any criminal sexual conduct with a

child" because "[b]y its very nature, any criminal sexual conduct

with   a   child    takes   advantage    of,     or    exploits,    [the]    child

sexually."    

.       Thus, even before the next amendments

further    broadened    the    substantive      reach    of   §    2251    and   its


                                      - 9 -
sentencing      provisions,    the    phrase   "relating   to    the   sexual

exploitation of children" was understood as not being limited to

the production of child pornography.

           Congress amended the penalty provision to its current

form in the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006

("Adam Walsh Act").        See 

(b)(1), 

, 613-14.     In an amendment titled "[i]ncreased penalties

for   sexual    offenses   against    children,"   Congress     replaced    the

phrase "sexual exploitation of children" "the first place it

appears" (i.e., the 25-year minimum) with the phrase "aggravated

sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact involving a

minor or ward, or sex trafficking of children, or the production,

possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or

transportation of child pornography."3 

 Congress did not amend

the   35-year     minimum,    leaving    the   "relating   to    the   sexual

exploitation of children" language unchanged.              See 

         In a

different section of this Act, Congress authorized additional

funding to prosecute offenses "relating to the sexual exploitation

of children."     

 § 704.    Congress defined that term broadly, for

purposes of the section, as including "any offense" committed in

violation of 18 U.S.C. chs. 109B or 110, or of 18 U.S.C. chs. 71,



      3   The Adam Walsh Act also amended the 25-year minimum by
adding 

, which addresses sex trafficking, as a
federal predicate. § 206(b)(1).


                                     - 10 -
109A, or 117 involving a victim who is a minor, or of 

.     

             Later amendments further expanded § 2251's substantive

scope.      See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007,

,   

,   4002-03   (2008)

(clarifying types of covered transmissions); PROTECT Our Children

Act of 2008, 

, 

, 4242

(prohibiting broadcast of live images of child abuse). The PROTECT

Our Children Act of 2008 also defined "child exploitation," for

purposes of the Act, as "any conduct, attempted conduct, or

conspiracy to engage in conduct involving a minor that violates

section 1591, chapter 109A, chapter 110, and chapter 117 of title

18, United States Code, or any sexual activity involving a minor

for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense."             § 2.

                                         B.

             Section 2251(e) "does not expressly define              ['sexual

exploitation of children,'] so we interpret that phrase using the

normal tools of statutory interpretation."              Esquivel-Quintana v.

Sessions, 

 (2017); see also 

; 

§ 2256 (applicable definitions section).

             We begin, as always, with the text of the statute.             We

interpret the phrase "sexual exploitation of children" according

to its "plain meaning at the time of enactment."           Tanzin v. Tanvir,




                                    - 11 -


 (2020); see also Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,

 (2022).

            At the time this phrase was added to the statute in 1996,

see Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(4), Black's Law

Dictionary did not define "sexual exploitation," much less "sexual

exploitation of children."          Black's Law Dictionary did, however,

define   "exploitation"       in    relevant     part    as     "[t]aking    unjust

advantage    of   another     for    one's    own    advantage      or    benefit."

Exploitation, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).                    Contemporary

non-legal dictionaries reflect a similar understanding of the term

"exploitation."         See        Exploitation,        Webster's        Third     New

International     Dictionary,       Unabridged      (1993)      ("[A]n    unjust   or

improper    use   of   another       person    for      one's     own    profit    or

advantage . . . ."); Exploitation, Oxford English Dictionary (2d

ed. 1989) ("The action of turning to account for selfish purposes,

using for one's own profit.").4               These general definitions of



     4    Black's Law Dictionary also defined "exploitation" as
the: "Act or process of exploiting, making use of, or working up.
Utilization by application of industry, argument, or other means
of turning to account, as the exploitation of a mine or a forest."
Exploitation, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).     Webster's
also noted the use of the term to mean the "utilization of the
labor power of another person without giving a just or equivalent
return."     Exploitation, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged (1993). And the Oxford English Dictionary
also defined the term, in relevant part, as "[t]he action of
exploiting or turning to account; productive working or profitable
management."   Exploitation, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.
1989).


                                     - 12 -
"exploitation" are not specifically geared to the special case of

"sexual exploitation of children."             However, Webster's definition

as the "improper use of another person for one's own profit or

advantage" does encompass children.

            In    a   later   but    roughly    contemporary     definition    of

"sexual exploitation," Black's Law Dictionary defined that term as

"[t]he use of a person, esp. a child, in prostitution, pornography,

or other sexually manipulative activity that has caused or could

cause serious emotional injury."          Sexual Exploitation, Black's Law

Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).           This definition goes well beyond the

mere production of child pornography and specifically references

child prostitution "or other sexually manipulative activity" using

children.    It reflects the special vulnerability of children and

captures additional criminal sexual conduct involving children.

            We reject Winczuk's argument that dictionary definitions

of sexual exploitation "require not only that a sexual act occur,

but that the act enrich or benefit 'the perpetrator beyond sexual

gratification'"       (quoting      Schopp,    

).       The

definitions we have just cited, including those addressed to the

sexual exploitation of children, encompass all sexual uses of

children.        See Mills, 

 (canvassing dictionary

definitions and concluding that this term means "to take advantage

of children for selfish and sexual purposes"); Smith, 

 ("By its very nature, any criminal sexual conduct with a child


                                     - 13 -
takes advantage of, or exploits, [the] child sexually."). We agree

with the government that "[p]rohibitions on sexual acts with

minors, even where purportedly consensual, rest on a recognition

that the potential for manipulation or coercion is always present."

We   conclude     that   the    plain    text    of    "sexual    exploitation     of

children" unambiguously refers to any criminal sexual conduct

involving children.

            The    use   of    the   language         "relating    to     the   sexual

exploitation of children" further expands the breadth of this

phrase.     

(e) (emphasis added).                 "[W]hen asked to

interpret    statutory        language    including      the     phrase     'relating

to,' . . . [the Supreme] Court has typically read the relevant

text expansively."       Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 

       (2018)     (collecting cases);            see also     Silva v.

Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2022).

            Our reading also draws support from statutory context.

It is a "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words

of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their

place in the overall statutory scheme."                King v. Burwell, 

 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. E.P.A., 

, 320 (2014)); see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts              167   (2012).         Here,    the phrase

"relating to the sexual exploitation of children" appears at the

end of a list of federal predicates.                   These federal predicates


                                        - 14 -
criminalize a broad range of sexual conduct related to minors.

See, e.g., 

 (criminalizing the distribution and

possession     of    child    pornography);    

   §   2243   (chapter     109A

provision criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor).5              The breadth of

these neighboring predicates makes Winczuk's narrow interpretation

directly contrary to congressional intent.               See Sanchez, 

 ("It is implausible that Congress intended to include

so many prior federal offenses, but chose to restrict qualifying

state     offenses    to   child   pornography     production.");     see    also

Pavulak, 

 (similar).

              Finally, the amendment history of the statute supports

our reading.         Several points from the above discussion of this

history bear note.         First, the state predicate trigger language in

the 25- and 35-year minimums was not enacted simultaneously.                  The

phrase "relating to the sexual exploitation of children," which is

the phrase at issue, was added to both minimums in 1996.                     That

phrase was judicially construed by every circuit which addressed

the   issue    as    not   being   limited    to   the   production   of    child

pornography.        See Randolph, 

; Smith, 

; see also Ryan v. Gonzales, 

 (2013) ("We


      5   As discussed above, Congress added additional federal
predicates after the "relating to the sexual exploitation of
children" language was enacted in 1996. But the list of federal
predicates was already broad in 1996, encompassing any prior
conviction under Code chapters 110 and 109A. See Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 § 121(4).


                                     - 15 -
normally assume that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware

of relevant judicial precedent." (quoting Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,

 (2010))).       Ten years later, Congress replaced

this phrase in the 25-year minimum but left the 35-year minimum

unchanged.   Second, Congress has repeatedly amended § 2251 both to

expand its substantive reach and to add additional predicates for

the recidivist enhancements.     Congress has broadened the statute,

not narrowed it. Third, Congress has on multiple occasions defined

"exploitation" (albeit not specifically for purposes of § 2251) as

encompassing a broad range of criminal sexual conduct related to

children.    See Adam Walsh Act § 704; PROTECT Our Children Act of

2008 § 2.

            These   additional   indicators     of   statutory     meaning

reinforce our conclusion that the plain text of "relating to the

sexual   exploitation   of   children"    unambiguously   refers   to   any

criminal sexual conduct involving children.          We join four other

circuits in adopting a broad reading of this phrase.          See Mills,

 (interpreting § 2251(e) post-2006 amendment);

Pavulak, 

 (same); Sanchez, 

(interpreting § 2251(e) pre-2006 amendment); Smith, 

 (same).




                                 - 16 -
                                              C.

                Our prior analyses, employing the rules of statutory

interpretation, dispose of Winczuk's arguments.                     But we add the

following points as to why Winczuk's contrary arguments fail.

                Winczuk relies heavily on the notion that the title of

§ 2251 operates to define the phrase "sexual exploitation of

children."         Section 2251 is titled "[s]exual exploitation of

children."       

.        That title has been unchanged since

§ 2251's enactment in 1978.               See Protection of Children Against

Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 § 2(a).                 The offenses criminalized

by this section involve sexually explicit visual depictions of a

minor -- i.e., child pornography.                  See, e.g., 

(a)

(criminalizing use of minor with intent that minor "engage in . . .

any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any

visual     depiction      of    such    conduct");     

   §   2251(b)   (imposing

liability on parent or guardian who knowingly permits minor to

engage     in    same);   id.    §     2251(d)(1)     (criminalizing      advertising

regarding same). Winczuk asserts that the section title is limited

by   the    section's      content       to    mean   the    production    of    child

pornography, and that this also limits the meaning of "sexual

exploitation of children" as that phrase is used in § 2251(e)'s

recidivist penalty provision.

                Winczuk's reliance on § 2251's title is misplaced.                   A

title is not the same as a formal definitional section.                         It has


                                         - 17 -
long been clear that section titles are "tools available" to "shed

light on . . . ambiguous words[s] or phrase[s]," but they "cannot

limit the plain meaning of the text."             Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.

Balt. & O. R. Co., 

 (1947); see also Pa. Dep't

of Corr. v. Yeskey, 

 (1998); Scalia & Garner,

supra,   at      221-24.       "[S]exual    exploitation      of    children"

unambiguously extends beyond the production of child pornography

to encompass other criminal sexual conduct involving children, and

§ 2251's title cannot limit this plain meaning.6

           We also agree with the Fourth Circuit that the definition

of "exploitation" in 

, the very different child

victims' and witnesses' rights statute, does not apply. See Mills,

.         Section 3509 defines "exploitation" as "child

pornography or child prostitution."         

 § 3509(a)(6).       As § 3509

itself   says,    that     definition   applies   only   to   §   3509.   Id.

§ 3509(a). We reject the argument that this separate statute bears

on the meaning of § 2251(e).        Cf. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 

 (1972) (discussing in pari materia canon of

statutory construction). Section 3509 was enacted six years before



     6    Winczuk relies on Esquivel-Quintana, where the Supreme
Court looked to the title of 

 -- "[s]exual abuse
of a minor or ward" -- as a "definition of that phrase." 

. But the Esquivel-Quintana Court looked to this title only
as consistent "further evidence" of the conclusion it had already
reached based on the text. Id.; see 

. Here, Winczuk's
title-based argument contradicts the plain text.


                                   - 18 -
the 1996 amendments to § 2251, see Crime Control Act of 1990, 1

tit. II, § 225(a), 

, 4798; see also

Erlenbaugh, 

, and serves a distinct purpose.      And

Congress has elsewhere defined the term "exploitation" to have a

much broader meaning.    See Adam Walsh Act § 704; PROTECT Our

Children Act of 2008 § 2.

          We further reject Winczuk's argument that the 2006 Adam

Walsh Act, which replaced the phrase "sexual exploitation of

children" in the 25-year minimum with an enumerated list of state

predicates but left the 35-year minimum unchanged, shows that

Congress understood this phrase to have a narrow meaning.

          Winczuk's argument rests on a false premise. He contends

that the phrase "relating to the sexual exploitation of children"

in the 35-year minimum cannot be read broadly, because then it

would have the same meaning as the enumerated list of state

predicates in the 25-year minimum.     See Scalia & Garner, supra, at

170 ("[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in

meaning."); see also Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 

 (2021).   Winczuk is wrong.    A broad reading of "relating

to the sexual exploitation of children" does not render this phrase

coterminous with the enumerated list of state predicates in the

25-year minimum.   To count as a state predicate for the 35-year

minimum, an offense must "relat[e] to the sexual exploitation of

children," whereas the 25-year minimum can also be triggered by


                              - 19 -
sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse offenses generally.        

(e) (emphasis added).        The different phrases have

different meanings.

          If anything, the presumption that different language

indicates a different meaning cuts against Winczuk's position.

Winczuk contends that "sexual exploitation of children" means the

production   of    child   pornography,   but   Congress    explicitly

recognized "the production . . . of child pornography" as a

predicate offense for the 25-year minimum.         

   The fact that

Congress clearly named this offense in the 25-year minimum weighs

against giving different language in the 35-year minimum the same

precise meaning.    See Pavulak, 

.

          Further, the effect of the 2006 Adam Walsh Act amendment

was to broaden and not limit the mandatory minimum triggers. There

was no effort to make the punishment equivalent for one prior

conviction and two prior convictions.      When the enumerated state

predicates were added to the 25-year minimum, Congress at the same

time defined "relating to the sexual exploitation of children"

broadly for appropriations purposes.      See Adam Walsh Act § 704.

Congress is also presumed to know of prior judicial interpretations

of this phrase.    See Gonzales, 

.    Winczuk's argument

that Congress, aware of the broad construction previously given to

this language, meant to narrow the statute while saying it was

trying to expand its reach is simply untenable.


                               - 20 -
            We agree with the Third Circuit that it is "implausible"

that Congress in enacting the 2006 Adam Walsh Act amendment was

materially limiting the state predicates for the 35-year minimum

to   the   narrow   category   of    production   of   child   pornography.

Pavulak, 

 (quoting Sanchez, 

).

The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Mills after

analyzing, as we      have done,      the ordinary     meaning of   "sexual

exploitation of children."      See 

.

            Winczuk is again wrong in his attempt to invoke the rule

of lenity.      That rule applies "only when a criminal statute

contains a 'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty,' and 'only if, after

seizing everything from which aid can be derived,' the [c]ourt

'can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.'"

Ocasio v. United States, 

, 295 n.8 (2016) (quoting

Muscarello v. United States, 

, 138–39 (1998)).             This

statute shows neither grievous ambiguity nor grievous uncertainty.

Congress intended to punish dual recidivists with two prior state

convictions more harshly than those with one prior conviction.

That is what deterrence is about.            And Congress made clear its

concern about the inadequacy of prior law to provide the needed

deterrence.7


      7   Winczuk's reliance on Esquivel-Quintana's reference to
state criminal codes is also misplaced. See 

.
The clear text and the usual rules of statutory interpretation end
the matter here. See 

 at 396 n.3.


                                    - 21 -
                               D.

          Winczuk does not dispute that his prior convictions

count as predicates under the broader reading of "relating to the

sexual exploitation of children" that we adopt today.   Given this

concession, we do not reach the parties' assumption that we should

assess prior convictions for purposes of § 2251(e)'s sentencing

enhancement using the categorical approach.

                              III.

          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.




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