United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 22-1215

                ALFONSO ESTUARDO MENDEZ ESTEBAN,

                          Petitioner,

                               v.

                      MERRICK B. GARLAND,
                UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                          Respondent.


                PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
              OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS


                             Before

                Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
                        Circuit Judges.


     Patrick T. Roath, with whom Ropes & Gray LLP, Samuel L.
Brenner, Emma Coreno, and Rachel Scholz-Bright were on brief for
petitioner.
     John F. Stanton, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, with whom Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, and Jessica E. Burns, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on
brief for respondent.



                          May 11, 2023
            MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge.         Alfonso Estuardo Mendez

Esteban ("Mendez") has petitioned for review of a decision from

the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissing his appeal of

an Immigration Judge's ("IJ") decision denying his applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), and ordering his removal to

Guatemala.

            Fleeing death threats and physical violence at the hands

of a rival political party in Guatemala, Mendez came to the United

States in January 2015 seeking protection.        Soon after he arrived

in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")

initiated removal proceedings against him.        Before the IJ, Mendez

applied for asylum and related humanitarian relief.               The IJ

concluded    that   Mendez   had   suffered   political   persecution   in

Guatemala and was therefore presumed to have a well-founded fear

of future persecution.       The IJ went on, however, to find that DHS

had successfully rebutted that presumption based on a showing of

changed country conditions.         The IJ therefore denied Mendez's

claims for asylum and related relief because he found that Mendez

had failed to establish the requisite basis for his fear.         Mendez

appealed to the BIA.    The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, and this

petition followed.

            For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition and

vacate the decisions of the BIA and IJ as to Mendez's political


                                   - 2 -
opinion-based asylum and withholding of removal claims, remand

for further proceedings on those claims, and deny what remains of

the petition.

                       I.     Factual Background1

            Mendez is a Guatemalan citizen of indigenous ancestry.

In 2013, he joined Guatemala's Libertad Democrática Renovada party

("LIDER").          Mendez     believed       LIDER's    community-centric

agenda -- which     advocated      for     greater   investment   in    local

infrastructure and municipal services -- stood in stark contrast

to what he viewed as the corrupt politics of LIDER's political

rival, the National Unity of Hope party ("UNE").              At the time,

UNE controlled the regional government where Mendez lived, but

LIDER was organizing to challenge that control in Guatemala's 2015

elections. By 2014, Mendez was directing LIDER's advertising and,

in furtherance of LIDER's effort to defeat UNE in the 2015

elections, actively campaigning for LIDER throughout the region.

            In November 2014, Mendez, his brother-in-law Armando,

and two other LIDER members traveled to a nearby community to

campaign for LIDER candidates.           During this trip, six UNE members

approached Mendez and his fellow LIDER members and began making

death    threats.     The    UNE   members    also   warned   against   them


     1 We draw the relevant facts from the administrative record.
See Adeyanju v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2022). This
includes Mendez's testimony before the IJ, which the IJ found to
be credible. See 

                                    - 3 -
continuing to campaign for LIDER in the community.              After this

confrontation, Mendez and the other LIDER members left.

            The next month, Mendez and the same three LIDER members

traveled    again -- this   time    to     a    different   community -- to

campaign on behalf of LIDER.             While the LIDER members were

distributing LIDER materials and meeting with potential recruits,

two armed UNE members approached the group and asked what they

were doing there.    When Mendez responded that he was campaigning

for LIDER, one UNE member beat him.            As a result of the beating,

Mendez was hospitalized for one night where he was treated with

pain killers.

            About one week later, on December 23, 2014, Mendez again

traveled out-of-town with the same group of LIDER members.            This

time, they drove to a nearby community to pick up LIDER supporters

for a Christmas celebration. At the prearranged pick-up location,

UNE members were also waiting for a ride from members of their

party.     Recognizing Mendez's car, the UNE members approached it

and confronted Mendez.      The UNE members brandished guns, accused

Mendez of targeting LIDER recruitment at UNE members, and fired

warning shots into the air.        Fearing for his life, Mendez left.

He never returned to that community or the other two communities

where he had been targeted by members of UNE.

            On   December 30, 2014 -- seven          days    after   Mendez

witnessed the UNE members fire warning shots -- his brother-in-law


                                   - 4 -
Armando's body was found with a fatal gunshot wound to his chest.

The    police   were     called,     but     Armando's    death     was     never

investigated.     Mendez believes that Armando, Mendez's only family

member known to publicly support LIDER, was killed by members of

UNE.    It was Armando's death that made Mendez "decide[] to leave

the country."

             Soon after, Mendez fled Guatemala for the United States.

He presented himself at a U.S. port of entry on January 18, 2015,

and during an inspection interview, informed an officer that he

feared for his life in Guatemala.          DHS detained Mendez and placed

him    in   removal    proceedings   where     he   promptly   conceded      his

removability.         While detained, Mendez passed a credible fear

interview and was released on parole to seek asylum.

                          II.   Procedural History

             Having     conceded     removability,       Mendez's         removal

proceedings centered on his eligibility for humanitarian relief.

On     December 11, 2015,       Mendez     timely   applied       for     asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection.              Mendez alleged that

he had been persecuted in Guatemala based on two independently

protected grounds -- his political opinion and his membership in

the particular social group of males of indigenous ancestry who

are politically active in Guatemala -- and argued that he would

be harmed or killed if he were returned to Guatemala.




                                     - 5 -
                       A.    The IJ's Decision

          At the merits hearing before the IJ, Mendez testified

to the scope of his political activity in Guatemala, his work for

LIDER, his encounters with members of UNE, and the circumstances

surrounding Armando's death. Finding Mendez's testimony credible,

the IJ concluded that Mendez had suffered political persecution

in Guatemala, giving rise to a presumption of a well-founded fear

of future persecution.2 Relying on a 2017 State Department country

conditions report and Mendez's own testimony, the IJ further

found, however, that DHS had rebutted that presumption by showing

fundamental changes to the conditions in Guatemala that negated

the objective basis for Mendez's once well-founded fear.         The IJ

therefore found Mendez ineligible for asylum and related relief

because he failed to prove that his asserted fear was -- at a

minimum -- well-founded.      The IJ reasoned that "because the UNE

party is no longer in power, there[] [had] been a change in

circumstances such that [Mendez] no longer has well-founded fear

of the UNE party."

          The   IJ   also   denied   Mendez's   alternative   basis   for

asylum: persecution on account of his membership in a proposed


     2 The IJ concluded that, taken together, the following three
incidents amounted to past persecution on account of Mendez's
political opinion: (1) UNE members threatened "they would kill
[Mendez]"; (2) armed UNE members physically beat Mendez; and
(3) UNE members threatened Mendez by shooting bullets into the
air.


                                 - 6 -
particular   social     group    comprised   of   "[m]ales   of   indigenous

ancestry who are politically active in Guatemala."            The IJ found

insufficient evidence of a nexus between UNE's targeting of Mendez

and his indigenous ancestry to establish the past persecution or

fear of future persecution required for asylum or withholding of

removal.     The   IJ   therefore    concluded    that   Mendez   could   not

establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal on

account of membership in his proposed particular social group.

           Without discussing the merits of his claims, the IJ also

denied Mendez's political violence-based requests for withholding

of removal and CAT protection.         The IJ found that because Mendez

failed to meet asylum's less onerous showing of a "well-founded"

fear of future political persecution, he necessarily failed to

make the heightened showing of likely future harm necessary for

withholding of removal.         The IJ further found that Mendez had not

shown that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured

if returned to Guatemala, as is necessary for protection under

CAT.   Accordingly, the IJ denied all requested relief and ordered

Mendez removed to Guatemala.         Mendez appealed to the BIA.

                         B.     The BIA's Decision

           On appeal to the BIA, Mendez challenged, inter alia,

the IJ's conclusion that changed country conditions in Guatemala

had obviated any need for political asylum.          Specifically, Mendez

argued that the IJ erred in finding that DHS had satisfied its


                                    - 7 -
rebuttal burden where the record lacked evidence that changes in

Guatemala undermined the objective basis for Mendez's particular

substantiated fear.

          The BIA affirmed the IJ's conclusion that DHS had met

its rebuttal burden based on four facts, drawn in part from the

2017 State Department country conditions report and in part from

Mendez's own testimony: (1) that "Guatemala has had a peaceful

transition of power;" (2) "that the rival political party, . . .

[UNE], whom the respondent fears is no longer in power at the

national level"; (3) that "the political party [Mendez] was a

member of, . . . [LIDER], is no longer in existence"; and (4) that

Mendez "has not been threatened since the last election and no

one has contacted or threatened [Mendez's] family in Guatemala on

his behalf since he fled the country in 2015."          Accordingly, the

BIA discerned no error, dismissed Mendez's appeal, and affirmed

the IJ's decision denying all forms of requested relief.            Mendez

petitioned this court for review.3

                        III. Standard of Review

          We   review   the   BIA's   decision   in   this   case   as   the

agency's final decision and look to the IJ's decision only "to

the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning."

Chavez v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2022).


     3Accompanying his petition, Mendez filed an unopposed motion
to stay his removal, which this court granted on April 1, 2022.


                                 - 8 -
            Questions of law are reviewed de novo, "subject to

appropriate           principles         of       administrative       deference."

Larios v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2010).                         Factual

findings are reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence

standard, "meaning we accept the findings 'as long as they are

supported by reasonable, substantial[,] and probative evidence on

the    record    considered         as    a    whole.'"        Aguilar-De    Guillen

v. Sessions, 

 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Singh v.

Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)).

                                   IV.    Discussion

                                         A. Asylum

            To qualify for asylum, an applicant must be a "refugee,"

as    defined    by       the   Immigration     and   Nationality    Act    ("INA").

(b)(1); 

(a).                     Under the INA, a

refugee is a noncitizen who is "unable or unwilling to return to"

his    country       of     nationality       "because    of   persecution    or   a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion."        

(a)(42)(A).               Here,    Mendez    claimed

persecution on account of two independent grounds: political

opinion and membership in a particular social group.

                1.        Past Persecution - Political Opinion

            When an IJ concludes that an asylum seeker experienced

past persecution, that applicant is entitled to a rebuttable


                                          - 9 -
presumption       of     a     well-founded         fear    of    future     persecution.

(b)(1).              To rebut this presumption, DHS must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "[t]here has been

a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no

longer    has   a      well-founded         fear    of     persecution."4       

(b)(1)(i)(A); see Palma-Mazariegos v. Gonzales, 

 (1st Cir. 2005).

            Here,        the    IJ   concluded        that       Mendez    suffered    past

persecution in Guatemala on account of his political opinion and

afforded Mendez the benefit of the presumption.                             DHS does not

challenge that finding.               However, the IJ also concluded -- and

the   BIA   agreed –- that            DHS     had     successfully         rebutted    that

presumption,        rendering        Mendez    ineligible          for    asylum.      This

required    DHS     to       prove   that    the     conditions      in    Guatemala    had

"changed so dramatically" since December 2014 "as to undermine

the well-foundedness of [Mendez's] fear."                          Chreng v. Gonzales,

 (1st Cir. 2006).

            Because the denial of Mendez's asylum claim turned on

reasoning about specific facts, we review the decision below for

substantial evidence.            See Moreno v. Holder, 

 (1st


      4DHS can also rebut the presumption of well-founded fear by
showing that "[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution by
relocating to another part of the applicant's country . . . [and]
it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so." 8 C.F.R
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). Because this avenue is not pursued here,
we need not address it.


                                            - 10 -
Cir. 2014).    On the record before us, we conclude that, even under

the deferential substantial evidence standard, the record fails

to establish changed conditions in Guatemala that have negated

Mendez's already substantiated fear.

                   i.      Country Conditions Report

           In affirming the IJ's conclusion that changed conditions

in Guatemala eliminated Mendez's need for political asylum, the

BIA   relied   primarily      on    information     in   the    United    States

Department of State's 2017 country conditions report on Guatemala

(the "2017 report").         But state department reports, even where

"probative of country conditions," Palma-Mazariegos, 

, seldom can carry DHS's burden alone.            See Quevedo v. Ashcroft,

 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Evidence from the government

about changed country conditions does not automatically rebut the

presumption.").       That    is    so   because    these   reports      are   not

ordinarily tailored to the facts of any particular case.                 See 

("[Country conditions] evidence is often general in nature and

may not be an adequate response to an applicant's showing of

specific   personal     danger.").        Rather,    they      provide   generic

overviews of the geopolitical landscape in the removal country.

See Palma-Mazariegos, 

; Fergiste v. I.N.S., 

 (1st     Cir. 1998)         (country conditions report discussed

"political and social conditions in generalized terms").                       And

"abstract evidence of generalized changes in country conditions,


                                     - 11 -
without more, cannot rebut a presumption of a well-founded fear

of future persecution."              Palma-Mazariegos, 

.

           To rebut this presumption with a country conditions

report alone, DHS must prove that the fundamental change conveyed

in the report "negate[s] [the] petitioner's particular fear." 

So,    while          "account[ing] . . . [for]                   the         individual's

particularized         substantiated            fear"     typically          demands    more

evidence than the state department's country conditions assessment

provides, Chreng, 

, a report that "convincingly

demonstrates         material       changes      in     country     conditions"         that

themselves      directly          undercut      the     objective       basis     for    the

petitioner's presumptive fear "may be sufficient, in and of it

itself,"     to         support          rebuttal         of      the         presumption.

Palma-Mazariegos, 

; see Waweru v. Gonzales, 

        (1st     Cir.      2006)     (finding      generalized        country

conditions      sufficient         to    rebut       petitioner's       presumption       of

well-founded     fear        of   political      persecution       where       persecuting

government      had    been       ousted      from      power   with     no     reasonable

likelihood      of    return).          And     where    rebuttal       is    premised    on

particularized evidence from the report itself, "[s]uch focused

evidence   is    to     be    distinguished           from   cursory     statements      or

broad-brush generalizations about changed country conditions."

Palma-Mazariegos, 

.




                                           - 12 -
            Because Mendez experienced past persecution on account

of his political opposition to UNE,5 the critical question here

is   whether    the    2017    report   demonstrates       that     conditions    in

Guatemala have changed such that expressing one's opposition to

UNE is no longer an objective reason to fear persecution.                      Here,

the BIA upheld the IJ's finding of changed country conditions

based on two facts drawn from the 2017 report (and repeated in

some cases in Mendez's testimony): (1) the diminution of UNE's

power on the national level and (2) a peaceful transition of power

following the 2015 elections.           We review each fact drawn from the

country conditions report in turn.

            We begin with the IJ and BIA's reliance on UNE's changed

political      power   in     Guatemala.      The    BIA     held    that     "[t]he

record . . . establishes         that    Guatemala     has    had     a     peaceful

transition of power and that the rival political party, [UNE],

whom the respondent fears is no longer in power at the national

level."6    We disagree.



      Based on Mendez's credible testimony, the IJ found that
      5

Mendez had suffered past persecution on account of his opposition
to "the corrupt political party in power in his region."
      6The IJ noted -- in a comment adopted by the BIA -- that
Mendez "testified that UNE is no longer in power as the majority
party."    However, the parties agree this statement is not
reflected in the transcript, and we therefore do not credit it
here. See Aguilar-De Guillen, 

. The IJ's statement
likely was drawn from mishearing the following exchange:

            [QUESTION] TO MR. MENDEZ ESTEBAN[:]


                                     - 13 -
           Unlike   the     BIA,   we    view    the   2017    report    to   be

inconclusive   on   UNE's     power     over    political     institutions    in

Guatemala following the 2015 elections.            While the IJ and the BIA

equated UNE's loss of the presidency in 2015 with "no longer

[being] in power at the national level," we find no support for

that inference in the record.              The 2017 report contains no

information about the political composition of the Guatemalan

legislature    or   UNE's     representation      in   regional    and    local

governments.

           Likewise, we find nothing in the record to suggest that

UNE's loss of the presidency prevents UNE from persecuting its

political opponents.        To the contrary, Mendez credibly testified

that UNE is the majority party in the country, is active in the

region where Mendez lived, and is "on the elections" for the year

2020.   Even the IJ recognized UNE's continued political influence

in Guatemala in its analysis of Mendez's past persecution claim,

noting that:




           The UNE party is not the majority party in
           Guatemala, correct?

           MR. MENDEZ ESTEBAN [RESPONSE:]
           I think now it is.


                                   - 14 -
              UNE is a political party who does hold
              representation in the political scheme and
              structure of Guatemala. They have at times
              had majority power in the ruling party, and
              at times have had the leader -- the head of
              state of the country as a member of their
              party. Thus, regardless of the UNE's current
              representation and power structure, they are
              a political party capable of exerting the
              influence of the government. . . .

              Given the record before us, we fail to see how the 2017

report's   reference    to   UNE's     loss   of    the   presidency   in   2015

supports the BIA's finding that political conditions in Guatemala

have "fundamental[ly] change[d]" in a way that prevents UNE from

persecuting its political opponents.

              Nevertheless, even if UNE had become powerless on the

national level, DHS still cannot satisfy its burden with the

general statements about national politics untethered to Mendez's

particular substantiated fear.          Mendez's presumptive fear turns

on UNE's power and influence at the local and regional levels of

government.       It follows that a generic statement about UNE's

national profile, without more, lacks the requisite connection to

Mendez's particular fear.       See Hernandez-Barrera v. Ashcroft, 

 (1st Cir. 2004).       Such attempts at improperly equating

a   party's    diminished    posture    on    the   national   level   to    its

influence on local politics is precisely what the particularized

evidence requirement was intended to prevent.               See Fergiste, 

.



                                     - 15 -
           Finally, in support of its conclusion that Guatemala

had a peaceful transition of power after the 2015 election, the

BIA cited to the 2017 report's statement that "[a]n Organization

of American States international election observation mission

characterized the [2015] elections as generally free and fair."

But Mendez points out that the 2017 report does not define

"generally   free   and    fair,"   and   therefore   does   not   rule   out

occurrences of political violence or particularized persecution

during the 2015 election.

           We need not speculate about the scope of a "generally

free and fair" election where DHS does not contest the IJ's

conclusion that Mendez experienced political persecution while

campaigning for the LIDER party in the lead up to the same

Guatemalan elections described in the 2017 report.            It therefore

cannot be said that the 2017 report's assertion that the 2015

elections were "generally free and fair" evidences a fundamental

change that negates Mendez's fear of political violence given that

Mendez was persecuted for his political opinion around that time.

Accordingly, we find the BIA's interpretation of the 2017 report's

statement unsupported by substantial evidence.

           Seeing no way to read the 2017 report as "convincingly

demonstrat[ing] material changes in [political] conditions that

affect the specific circumstances of [Mendez's] claim," Dahal

v. Barr,     

    (1st   Cir.    2019)     (quoting


                                    - 16 -
Palma-Mazariegos, 

), we find that the 2017 report,

alone, is not substantial evidence that changed country conditions

have    eliminated       the      objective       basis    for    Mendez's     fear.

Accordingly, the BIA's conclusion -- that since Mendez departed

Guatemala in January 2015, fundamental changes to the conditions

there   have     negated    the     objective      basis    for    his    particular

fear -- is not supported by substantial evidence.

                           ii.     Mendez's Testimony

            Apart from the 2017 report, the IJ and BIA also referred

to the disbandment of LIDER and the lack of harm to Mendez's

remaining family to bolster their conclusions that the conditions

in Guatemala no longer support a presumption of fear.                         Mendez

argues that these facts are of no legal significance to his claims

and that the BIA's reliance constitutes legal error.                      We agree.

            We   begin     with    the    disbandment      of    LIDER.     The    BIA

considered LIDER's dissolution to be evidence "that the conditions

in Guatemala [had] changed dramatically since [Mendez] departed

in 2015."      But Mendez presented the persecution he suffered in

terms of his opposition to UNE, not his membership in LIDER.                      This

formulation was adopted by the IJ, who held that Mendez had

suffered    past     persecution          on   account      of    his     "political

opinion . . . against the corrupt political party in power in his

region."    We therefore fail to see how the disbandment of the

LIDER party directly bears on the well-foundedness of Mendez's


                                         - 17 -
fear of persecution at the hands of UNE -- particularly given

Mendez's        credible   testimony    that    he   may    engage     in    public

opposition to UNE if returned.              Considering that DHS bears the

burden     to     prove    how   changed    conditions     undermine        Mendez's

presumptive fear, we find that the fact of LIDER's disbandment is

of insufficient consequence.7

            We turn next to UNE's treatment of Mendez's family.                  The

fact that members of Mendez's immediate family have continued to

reside in Guatemala unharmed is inconsequential unless the record

supports a finding that the lack of harm to Mendez's family in

Guatemala -- either alone or combined with the content of the

country conditions report -- undermines the particular basis for

Mendez's presumptively well-founded fear.                 Having found nothing

in the record to support such an inference, we conclude that the

BIA erred.

            In Mendez's case, the fact that UNE has not persecuted

his   family      in   Guatemala    bears   little   on    whether     UNE     would

persecute Mendez himself if returned.            Assertions about remaining

family members are rarely probative as rebuttal evidence where,

as here, a petitioner's fear is presumptively well-founded and it



      7Mendez also contends that the BIA wrongly assumed the LIDER
party had disbanded due to dwindling support or other internally
driven factors. We need not reach this argument where the factual
record on this question is sparse, and the formal status of LIDER
in Guatemala bears little on our analysis.


                                       - 18 -
is DHS’s burden to prove otherwise.          See Dahal, 

(finding lack of harm to petitioner's family after petitioner fled

to be "of limited significance" to the calculus of whether changed

circumstances had negated petitioner's particular fear).             Because

of this burden shift, it is only when the record shows that a

change in country conditions was accompanied by a corresponding

change to the treatment of family members that this kind of

information can favor rebuttal.         See Yatskin v. I.N.S., 

 (1st Cir. 2001) (considering lack of harm to remaining

family in changed conditions calculus where "[a]fter testifying

that his family had suffered retribution for his [anti-communist]

political    actions,    [petitioner]    admitted    that   they    had   not

experienced any problems" since the fall of the Soviet Union).

Even then, it is "entitled to weight in the decisional calculus

only where the family members are similarly situated" to the

petitioner.       Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 

, 134 n.1

(1st Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); see Nesimi v. Gonzales, 

   (1st   Cir.   2007)   (per   curiam)   (unpublished     decision)

(finding safety of remaining family in Albania supported DHS's

rebuttal burden where "a brother active in the same political

party with which [petitioner] was involved" remained without

persecution).

            In other words, to be probative of whether circumstances

have changed in relation to the petitioner's well-founded fear,


                                   - 19 -
the family members must possess, or be otherwise associated with,

the protected characteristic on account of which the petitioner

was persecuted.8      We see no such overlap here where the record

contains     no   evidence   that   Mendez's   family   in   Guatemala   was

politically active,9 let alone openly expressing opposition to

UNE.       In light of this, the lack of harm to remaining family



       Unlike this case, nearly all the cases that DHS cites to
       8

in an attempt to counter this proposition lack findings of past
persecution and, therefore, are reviewed under a framework where
the noncitizen bore the burden of establishing a well-founded
fear. See Cabas v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2012); Sihombing
v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2009); Rashad v. Mukasey, 

 (1st Cir. 2009); Touch v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir.
2009); Jamal v. Mukasey, 

 (1st Cir. 2008); Guzman
v. I.N.S., 

 (1st Cir. 2003); Chan v. Ashcroft, 

(1st Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision). To the
extent DHS cites to cases where this court -- in considering
whether DHS met its rebuttal burden -- has relied on the safety
of remaining family members without requiring evidence that those
family members shared or were associated with the petitioner's
political views, we do not find them persuasive.
     First, those cases antecede our decision in Dahal, which
clarified that the treatment of remaining family members is
relevant to the rebuttal analysis only where the family members
are similarly situated to the petitioner. 

. Second,
even setting Dahal aside, where we have previously referred to
the safety of remaining family members in this context, it has
been to reinforce an independently supported finding of changed
country conditions. See Hasan v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir.
2012); Nesimi, 

; Yatskin, 

.
Accordingly, the experience of those family members was not given
determinative weight.
       In fact, the only politically active family member Mendez
       9

referenced in his testimony was his brother-in-law, Armando, who
had been campaigning with Mendez during the relevant incidents
with UNE members. Armando's body was found with a gunshot wound
to his chest in December 2014. Mendez testified that he believed
UNE members had killed Armando.


                                    - 20 -
should not have weighed into the BIA's assessment of whether

conditions in Guatemala had changed in relation to Mendez's

particular fear.

              The BIA and IJ also considered that Mendez "has not been

threatened since the last election and no one has contacted or

threatened [his] family in Guatemala on his behalf since he fled

the   country     in   2015"   as   further   evidence   that   conditions

underlying Mendez's fear had changed.          But we find nothing in the

record to suggest that UNE had the desire or ability to either

contact Mendez in the United States or intimidate his family in

Guatemala while he resided in the United States.         And, regardless,

where the burden rests with DHS to establish changed country

conditions, Mendez need not make an affirmative showing that UNE

continues to target him or his family while Mendez is residing in

the United States.      Accordingly, to the extent that the BIA relied

on these facts, it did so in error.

              To summarize, the 2017 report and the testimony from

Mendez   do    not -- together      or   independently -- establish   that

changes in Guatemala have fundamentally altered the specific

conditions that gave rise to Mendez's substantiated claim of

political persecution.         Accordingly, the BIA's conclusion that

DHS rebutted Mendez's presumption of well-founded fear is not

supported by substantial evidence.             We therefore find Mendez

statutorily eligible for asylum.           See Fergiste, 

.


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Because asylum is a discretionary form of relief, we remand to

the agency for further proceedings before the IJ to determine

whether to grant Mendez's qualifying application for asylum.                   See

.

        2.      Past Persecution - Particular Social Group

          In his petition, Mendez also argues that the BIA erred

in affirming the IJ's denial of his independent claim for asylum

based on persecution for his membership in the particular social

group of males of indigenous ancestry who are politically active

in Guatemala. Having found Mendez statutorily eligible for asylum

on political opinion grounds, we need not reach this issue.

                     B.        Withholding of Removal

          Next,    we   turn        to   Mendez's   alternative   request      for

withholding of removal pursuant to 

(b)(3).                    To be

entitled to withholding of removal, Mendez must establish that

his "life or freedom would be threatened in [Guatemala] on account

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion."               

(b).     To meet

this burden, Mendez "must demonstrate a 'clear probability' of

persecution,    which     is    a    more     stringent   standard    than     the

'well-founded fear of persecution' that determines an applicant's

eligibility for asylum."        Dahal, 

 (quoting Fergiste,

).          But if a          petitioner makes   that    showing,

withholding of removal becomes mandatory unless the petitioner is


                                         - 22 -
statutorily barred from the relief.             I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre,

 (1999); 

(b)(3).

            Here, Mendez's withholding claim mirrors his asylum

claim.     As with asylum, a finding of past persecution in the

withholding context triggers a presumption of a clear probability

that the applicant's "life or freedom would be threatened in the

future,"    thereby   entitling   them     to    withholding   of   removal.

(b)(1)(i).       "To rebut that presumption, [DHS]

bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

country conditions have changed such that it is no longer more

likely   than   not   that   [Mendez]'s     life    or   freedom    would    be

threatened if he returned to [Guatemala]."               Dahal, 

.

            Given the IJ's unchallenged finding of past persecution,

we presume that Mendez's life or freedom would be threatened if

he were returned to Guatemala.       And, for the reasons set out in

our discussion of Mendez's asylum claim, DHS failed to meet its

rebuttal burden.      The evidence of changed country conditions put

forth by DHS does not bear on the particular threats to Mendez's

life or freedom that form the basis of his fear of return.

Accordingly, based on the evidence before us, it appears Mendez

has established he is entitled to withholding of removal.                   But

because neither the IJ nor the BIA confronted the merits of

Mendez's withholding claim -- having denied the claim only on the


                                  - 23 -
erroneous conclusion that Mendez failed to make the less onerous

showing required for asylum -- we vacate and remand to the IJ to

assess the evidence in the first instance.

                                   C.     CAT Relief

               Finally, Mendez argues that the BIA's denial of his

application for CAT protection is not supported by substantial

evidence.       To obtain relief under CAT, Mendez "must prove by

objective evidence 'that it is more likely than not that he will

be tortured if he is [removed].'"                     

 at 23 (quoting Martinez

v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2013)).                    Here, the BIA, in

affirming the IJ, concluded that Mendez failed to "establish[]

through record evidence that it is more likely than not that he

would be tortured by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent

or acquiescence . . . of a public official in Guatemala upon his

return."       Mendez maintains that the BIA and IJ erred by finding

his past persecution fell short of torture.                       We disagree with

Mendez.        The   record   shows       that     the   past   persecution   Mendez

suffered       consisted      of        death     threats,      intimidation,       and

non-life-threatening physical violence. The BIA's conclusion that

these harms fell short of torture is supported by substantial

evidence.      We therefore discern no error.

                                   V.     Conclusion

               For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition for

review    as    to   Mendez's      claims       for   asylum    and   withholding    of


                                          - 24 -
removal.   We deny the petition as to Mendez's claim for CAT

protection.   We accordingly affirm the denial of Mendez's CAT

claim, vacate the denials of Mendez's political opinion-based

asylum and withholding of removal claims, and remand to the IJ

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.




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