United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 21-1739

  JANET VAZQUEZ-VELAZQUEZ; RAMON A. DEL VALLE-LOPEZ; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP DEL VALLE-VAZQUEZ; CARLOS R. CESPEDES-GOMEZ; JOCELYN
   CALO-BIRRIEL; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CESPEDES-CALO; SAUL O.
ALMEDA-CRUZ; JUDITH NIEVES-RIVERA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ALMEDA-
 NIEVES; FRANCISCO M. ALVARADO-BARRIOS; MARILYN ALVAREZ-RIVERA;
 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ALVARADO-ALVAREZ; JUAN C. ARROYO-RAMIREZ;
  DAMARIS VELEZ-RIOS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ARROYO-VELEZ; JOAN
  ARROYO-TORRES; JOSE R. HUERTAS-DIAZ; MARIA I. AYALA-RIVERA;
   CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP HUERTAS-AYALA; JUAN O. BADILLO-VELEZ;
 AUDREY CHICO-GARCIA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BADILLO-CHICO; JULIO
BAEZ-ROMERO; ISRAEL CANCEL-HIDALGO; YAMELIA M. QUINTANA-LATORRE;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CANCEL-QUINTANA;ANGEL L. CARABALLO-
    IRIZARRY; ALEIDA OQUENDO-HERNANDEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
 CARABALLO-OQUENDO; AXEL CARRASQUILLO-CUEVAS; ANGEL L. CORA-DE-
 JESUS; EILEEN LARRACUENTE-ROSARIO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CORA-
   LARRACUENTE; SAMUEL CORCHADO-RODRIGUEZ; WANDA L. FIGUEROA-
    BARRETO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CORCHADO-FIGUEROA; YARITZA
CORDERO-BONILLA; JOEL BONET-TORRES; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BONET-
 CORDERO; LUIS F. CRUZ-ROSA; YARELIS ESTALA-OLIVERAS; CONJUGAL
 PARTNERSHIP CRUZ-ESTALA; EDUARDO W. DA SILVA-OLIVEROS; CLAUDIA
   L. ANTUNEZ-DE MAYOLO LOJAS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DA-SILVA-
 ANTUNEZ; VIVIAN L. DE JESUS-RIVERA; EDIBERTO RODRIGUEZ-NEGRON;
   CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RODRIGUEZ-DE-JESUS; MORAIMA FIGUEROA-
    MORALES; EDDIE W. PACHECO-SANTIAGO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
  PACHECO-FIGUEROA; JOSE A. GARCIA-MARRERO; JOSE B. GONZALEZ-
  VELEZ; LOURDES SOTO-SANTIAGO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP GONZALEZ-
SOTO; ENRIQUE M. GONZALEZ-VIRUET; KEILA Y. PELLOT-DIAZ; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP GONZALEZ-PELLOT; GILBERTO HERNANDEZ-CAJIGAS; YAZMIN
  MUNOZ-GALLOZA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP HERNANDEZ-MUNOZ; DARYMAR
 HERNANDEZ-GINES; JISELA JIRAU-ADAMES; WILTHER A. AVILES-LOPEZ;
 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AVILES-JIRAU; JESSIE JUSINO-LUGO; MARIBEL
CLASS-DELGADO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP JUSINO-CLASS; SANDRA LISBOA-
 GONZALEZ; DENNISSE LUCIANO-COLLAZO; RICHARD CABAN-RUIZ; NELLY
MALDONADO-RIVERA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CABAN-LUCIANO; VICTOR M.
MEDINA-BADILLO; CORINA NASTASACHE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP MEDINA-
NASTASACHE; ANIBAL MIRANDA-PEREZ; GLADYS MOJICA-ORTIZ; CARLOS E.
   LUGO-QUINONES; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP LUGO-MOJICA; NURYS A.
   MOLINA-PEREZ; RAFAEL J. MORALES-DE JESUS; JULIA V. ALBELO-
  RIVERA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP MORALES-ALBELO; REGINO NAVARRO-
RODRIGUEZ; ADA I. MEDINA-SANCHEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP NAVARRO-
  MEDINA; AMILCAR NIEVES-SANTIAGO; CRISTINE S. HEREDIA-PEREZ;
 CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP NIEVES-HEREDIA; JOSE L. NOVOA-GARCIA; LUZ
  N. BRACERO-LUGO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP NOVOA-BRACERO; ORLANDO
   ORTIZ-BURGOS; CARMEN D. DEL RIO-SOTO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
 ORTIZ-DEL RIO; PAMELA ORTIZ-OLMO; ILEANA OTERO-PADILLA; SHEILA
  PACHECO-SANCHEZ; ASTRID PAGAN-FLORES; LUIS R. PASTOR-REYES;
   LOURDES I. PEREZ-CARRION; NELSON MORALES-SANTANA; CONJUGAL
  PARTNERSHIP MORALES-PEREZ; IVELISSE PEREZ-MARQUEZ; DAYNA D.
   PEREZ-ZAPATA; TOMAS MONTALVO-TORRES; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
MONTALVO-PEREZ; IGNACIO RIOS-RIVAS; LESLIE E. CABALLERO-BELTRAN;
   CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RIOS-CABALLERO; JOSE M. RIVERA-COLON;
   IVETTE M. PEREZ-NIEVES; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RIVERA-PEREZ;
   IVONNE RIVERA-ORSINI; DANIEL O. VALENTIN-ARROYO; CONJUGAL
 PARTNERSHIP VALENTIN-RIVERA; MARILYN RODRIGUEZ-DIAZ; LEONARDO
   RODRIGUEZ-DIEPPA; IDALISE LAZU-LAZU; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
RODRIGUEZ-LAZU; CARLOS J. RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ; BRENDA I. COLON-
ORTIZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RODRIGUEZ-COLON; MARIA D. RODRIGUEZ-
  TOLEDO; LUIS A. TORRES-VAZQUEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP TORRES-
 RODRIGUEZ; GABRIEL ROSADO-DE JESUS; MARGARITA VAZQUEZ-CEDENO;
   CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ROSADO-VAZQUEZ; ONIX ROSARIO-MORALES;
  ANGELA M. GARCIA-MUNOZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ROSARIO-GARCIA;
 MIGUEL J. ROSARIO-RIVERA; AMARYLLIS L. RIVERA-REYES; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP ROSARIO-RIVERA; JOSE M. ROSARIO; EDUARDO RUIZ-VELEZ;
   SAUL J. SANDOVAL-MELENDEZ; AMBAR ROSARIO-LUGARO; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP SANDOVAL-ROSARIO; CARLOS M. SANTANA-VAZQUEZ; MARIBEL
    CRUZ-RIVERA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP SANTANA-CRUZ; ANGEL L.
SANTIAGO-GALARZA; DAMARI M. SANTIAGO-TORRES; EDGAR H. RODRIGUEZ-
  ORENGO; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RODRIGUEZ-SANTIAGO; DAMARIS E.
  SEBASTIAN-LOPEZ; MARVIN SOSA-GONZALEZ; NIDIA I. BETANCOURT-
RIVERA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP SOSA-BETANCOURT; CELIA I. TAMARIZ-
  VARGAS; ALEXIS DELGADO-ACOSTA; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DELGADO-
TAMARIZ; JOSE O. TORO-MARTINEZ; JESSICA APONTE-APONTE; CONJUGAL
 PARTNERSHIP TORO-APONTE; GERARDO TORRES-ORTIZ; NEREIDA TORRES-
  RODRIGUEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP TORRES-TORRES; DIXON VARGAS-
MONTALVO; JOSE A. VELEZ-ZAYAS; ROSA M. VIROLA-FIGUEROA; CONJUGAL
                    PARTNERSHIP VELEZ-VIROLA,

                    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                              v.

  PUERTO RICO HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; FRANCISCO
RODRIGUEZ-DOSAL, in his official capacity as Executive Director,

                     Defendants, Appellees.



                             - 2 -
          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

          [Hon. Marco E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge]


                             Before

                 Kayatta, Lynch, and Thompson,
                        Circuit Judges.


     John E. Mudd, with whom Law Offices of John E. Mudd was on
brief, for appellants.
     Emanuel Rier Soto for appellees.



                         July 12, 2023




                             - 3 -
           LYNCH, Circuit Judge.      Appellants are sixty-nine current

and former employees ("Appellant Employees") of the Puerto Rico

Highways and Transportation Authority ("PRHTA") and their spouses

and conjugal partners (collectively "Appellants").         They appeal

from the district court's entry of judgment in favor of Appellees

PRHTA and its executive director.          Appellants allege that the

PRHTA's decision to no longer give effect to its Regulation 02-017,

which provided Appellant Employees with additional compensation,

was based on a misreading of and contrary to P.R. Act No. 66-2014

and this gave rise to violations of the Contracts Clause and Due

Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1802 of the

Puerto Rico Civil Code.          The district   court granted summary

judgment     for   the   PRHTA   on    Appellant   Employees'   federal

constitutional claims, dismissing those claims with prejudice, and

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants'

claims under Puerto Rico law, dismissing those claims without

prejudice.     Vázquez-Velázquez v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth.,

, at *15 (D.P.R. Aug. 9, 2021).

           We find that the district court correctly concluded that

Appellant Employees cannot establish their federal constitutional

claims and the court acted within its discretion in declining to

exercise jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law

claims.    We affirm.




                                  - 4 -
                                      I.

            Appellant    Employees    served    as   either   PRHTA   project

administrators or project supervisors on top of their regular

duties as engineers in training, engineers I-IV, or chiefs of

brigade.    Project administrators serve as the direct link between

the PRHTA and the private contractors that build PRHTA projects,

and they must inspect construction projects to ensure that private

contractors build them according to plans and specifications in

the construction contract.           Project supervisors may supervise

multiple project administrators.           Appellant Employees received a

regular salary for their work, and, since 2000, they also received

additional compensation for their roles as project administrators

or supervisors.     This additional compensation was most recently

provided for in PRHTA Regulation 02-017, "Program for Construction

Project    Management    Compensation,"      which   the   PRHTA   adopted   on

November 28, 2011, based on the applicable provisions of the Puerto

Rico Highway and Transportation Authority Act, P.R. Act No. 74

(June 23, 1965).        Article I of Regulation 02-017 provides that

"[t]he Construction Project Management Compensation Program . . .

recognizes the difference in tasks, duties, and responsibilities

that exist between the officials assigned to the management of the

construction    projects     and     other     employees    with    the   same

classification who do not work in these types of projects."

Article I further emphasizes that, in the fulfillment of these


                                     - 5 -
responsibilities,      "these      officials          are   obligated    to      make

extraordinary efforts to ensure that the contractors carry out the

projects effectively and efficiently, as agreed in the contract,"

which can "cause[] an adverse effect on their family relationships,

risking their safety and health."               Regulation 02-017 calculates

additional compensation based on a PRHTA official's classification

and the level of complexity of the project, subject to "the result

of the performance and execution evaluation of the participants."

Additional compensation was paid quarterly after the evaluation

was completed.        Compensation amounts could fluctuate based on

evaluation, and the PRHTA maintained the power to remove any

employee from the compensation program if they failed to meet the

minimum evaluation requirements.

           In June 2014, the Puerto Rico Legislature enacted P.R.

Act No. 66-2014, the "Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico Special Fiscal and Operational Sustainability Act," which

applies to the PRHTA as a public corporation of Puerto Rico's

Executive Branch. On October 2, 2014, the PRHTA issued Informative

Bulletin 2015-007, "Expense Reduction Measures in Compliance with

Sections   9,   10,   11,    and   17    of     Law    66-2014,   Special     Fiscal

Sustainability    and       Operations        of      the   Government      of   the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Act," which stated that the PRHTA would

no longer give effect to Regulation 02-017 "during the validity of

Law 66-2014" effective retroactively on July 1, 2014, but left


                                        - 6 -
untouched the Appellant Employees' regular salaries.                          The PRHTA

thus    did   not    pay   Appellant        Employees      additional       compensation

retroactively        for   the     period    of    July    1-October     1,      2014   and

prospectively after the Bulletin was issued on October 2.

              On    August    18,     2015,       Appellants     filed      an     amended

complaint pursuant to 

 alleging that in no longer

giving effect to Regulation 02-017, Appellees violated Appellants’

procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment, as well as their rights under the Takings Clause of the

Fifth    Amendment,        Equal    Protection          Clause   of   the     Fourteenth

Amendment, and the Contracts Clause in Article 1, Section 10,

Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Appellants also alleged certain

Puerto Rico law claims.            Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint

on September 10, 2015.             The district court granted that motion in

part and denied it in part on January 14, 2016, leaving only

Appellant Employees' procedural due process and Contracts Clause

claims, and Appellants' commonwealth law claims under Puerto Rico

Laws 100 and 180, and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.

In   January       and   February     2021,       the    district     court      dismissed

Appellants' claims pursuant to Puerto Rico Laws 100 and 180,

respectively, after they voluntarily desisted any claims under

these laws and consented to dismissal with prejudice.                                After

holding a pretrial and settlement videoconference on February 25,




                                        - 7 -
2021, the district court ordered the parties to file cross motions

for summary judgment on Appellant Employees' remaining claims.

            On   August   9,   2021,   the   district   court   dismissed

Appellant Employees' remaining federal claims with prejudice.         See

Vázquez-Velázquez, 

, at *15.             As to Appellant

Employees' procedural due process claim, the district court held

that they did not have a constitutionally protected property

interest in the additional compensation under Regulation 02-017

because they were not terminated, the additional compensation was

contingent on evaluation, and nothing in the regulation guaranteed

the additional compensation.      As to Appellant Employees' Contracts

Clause claim, the district court held that "no reasonable fact

finder could infer that Informative Bulletin 2015-007 constituted

legislative action that infringed upon [Appellant] Employees'

alleged contractual rights."      Thus, Appellant Employees challenge

"how the law was applied as opposed to the creation of the law

itself."     Because the district court dismissed all federal law

claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Appellants' claims under Puerto Rico law and dismissed them without

prejudice.

            Appellants timely appealed.

                                   II.

            We review de novo a district court's grant of summary

judgment.    See Minturn v. Monrad, 

 (1st Cir. 2023).


                                  - 8 -
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."                 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The court must examine the record in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party and must make all reasonable inferences in

that party's favor.       See Viscito v. Nat'l Planning Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 2022).           Where the parties cross-move for summary

judgment,      "the   court    must    [examine]       each   motion   separately,

drawing inferences against each movant in turn."                 

 (alteration

in   original)        (internal       quotation       marks   omitted)    (quoting

Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 

 (1st Cir.

2018)); see also Perea v. Ed. Cultural, Inc., 

 (1st

Cir. 2021) (noting that cross motions for summary judgment do not

change the standard of review).

            We review for abuse of discretion a district court's

refusal   to    exercise      supplemental       jurisdiction     over   state   or

commonwealth law claims once all federal claims are dismissed.

See Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 

 (1st

Cir. 2011).

                                         III.

            Appellants        argue    that     the   district   court   erred   in

dismissing their claims under the Contracts Clause and Due Process

Clause of the U.S. Constitution and under Puerto Rico state law.

We analyze each provision in turn.


                                        - 9 -
             a. Contracts Clause

             Appellant      Employees      argue     that    PRHTA       Informative

Bulletin 2015-007 was based on a flawed reading of P.R. Law 66-2014

and not required by that law. They allege this misreading impaired

the contractual relationship that Regulation 02-017 created and

thus violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Specifically, Appellant           Employees    argue that the "Informative

Bulletin was not a reasonable, appropriate or necessary way for

[the] PRHTA to implement Law 66-2014" because the Law "did not

require     the   [PR]HTA    to    eliminate       the    'fair    and     reasonable

compensation'      that     the    Regulation       and     years    of     practice

established" for Appellant Employees.

             The Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides

that "[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the

Obligation of Contracts."          U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.                The

Contracts Clause "is aimed at the legislative power of the State,

and   not   at    the   decisions     of    its    courts,    or     the    acts   of

administrative or executive boards or officers, or the doings of

corporations or individuals."           New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. La.

Sugar Refin. Co., 

 (1888). Courts analyze Contracts

Clause claims under a two-prong test, assessing first whether the

state law has operated to substantially impair a contractual

relationship, and then if so, whether the impairment was reasonable

and necessary to serve an important government interest.                           See


                                      - 10 -
United Auto., Aerospace, Agr. Implement Workers of Am. Int'l

Union v. Fortuño, 

 (1st Cir. 2011). Before reaching

the two-prong test, however, a party must first allege a contract

and a state law that impairs it. Assuming arguendo that Regulation

02-017 created a contract between Appellant Employees and the

PRHTA, Appellant Employees have failed to pinpoint a state law

that impairs this contract.

           First, Informative Bulletin 2015-007 is not a "law"

within the meaning of the Contracts Clause.      The Bulletin simply

announces the PRHTA's alleged breach; it is not a legislative act.

See St. Paul Gas Light Co. v. St. Paul, 

 (1901)

(holding that a city ordinance requiring that no further interest

be paid to the plaintiff "was but a denial by the city of its

obligation to pay" and that "[t]his denial, whilst embodied in an

ordinance, was no more efficacious than if it had been expressed

in any other form").

           Second, Appellant Employees have waived any argument

that Law 66-2014, which is a "law" within the meaning of the

Contracts Clause, impairs their contract because they argue the

exact opposite: that Law 66-2014 did "not require" the PRHTA to no

longer give effect to Regulation 02-017. Assuming without deciding

that   Appellant   Employees'   interpretation   of   Law   66-2014   is

correct, there is no legislative act that impairs any contract.

See Izquierdo, 

 (holding that the PRHTA's alleged


                                - 11 -
breach of a settlement agreement "did not violate the Contracts

Clause, even if committed in an attempt to unlawfully enforce" a

Puerto Rico law, because "nothing in [that law] prevent[ed] [the

plaintiff] from obtaining a remedy for a demonstrated breach of

the settlement agreement[]").        Appellant Employees thus do not

have a constitutional claim under the Contracts Clause, but a

garden-variety breach of contract claim.             See 

 ("If a state

breaches a contract but does not impair the counterparty's right

to recover damages for the breach, the state has not impaired the

obligation of the contract.").

          This reasoning applies both to             Appellant   Employees'

claims for retroactive compensation from July-October 2014 and

claims for compensation for future work because in either case --

assuming that Appellant Employees had a contractual right -- the

PRHTA merely breached that contract, providing Appellant Employees

a   commonwealth   law   remedy    for      breach   of   contract,   not   a

constitutional Contracts Clause claim.

          b. Due Process Clause

          Appellant Employees argue that the PRHTA violated their

procedural due process rights because "custom created or could

create a constitutionally protected property interest" in the

additional compensation, and they should have been afforded a

process   to   challenge     the     Bulletin's       "clearly    erroneous




                                   - 12 -
interpretation of Law 66-2014." The district court dismissed these

claims.

            We need not decide whether Appellant Employees had a

constitutionally protected property interest because the requisite

process was provided.       The suspension of the program was generally

applicable and not based on facts specific to any particular

employee, so no pretermination hearing was required.                  Cf., e.g.,

Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Mun. of Santa Isabel, 

 (1st

Cir. 2011) ("We have held that pre-termination hearings are not

required by due process where a bona fide government reorganization

plan   bases      dismissals    on    factors      unrelated     to     personal

performance. . . . Because such a plan is aimed at positions of

employment rather than at individual employees, a pre-termination

hearing would be a futile exercise." (citations omitted)).

            c. Claims Under Puerto Rico Law

            Finally,   we    hold    that   the    district    court    properly

exercised   its    informed    discretion     in    declining    to     exercise

jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law claims

under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, which states

that "[a] person who by an act or omission causes damage to another

through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage

so done."

            The district court dismissed Appellants' Article 1802

claim, reasoning that it "retains the discretion . . . to decline


                                     - 13 -
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where [it] has dismissed all

claims     over        which   it     had     original      jurisdiction."

Vázquez-Velázquez, 

, at *14 (omission in original)

(quoting Marrero–Gutierrez v. Molina, 

 (1st Cir.

2007)). Though the district court is not required to dismiss state

or commonwealth law claims where all federal claims are dismissed

before trial, see Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 

,

350 n.7 (1988), a district court must exercise its "informed

discretion"     when     deciding   whether   to   assert     supplemental

jurisdiction, Izquierdo, 

 (quoting Roche v. John

Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1996)).

This analysis requires the district court to "weigh concerns of

comity, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness."           

   It is

"the usual case [that where] all federal-law claims are eliminated

before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims."      

 (omission in original) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon

Univ., 

 n.7).

           Appellants argue that this is the unusual case where the

district court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction

because the case was "in summary judgment, after pretrial, filing

of jury instructions, voir dire, and jury verdict form" and "[a]ll

that was missing was trial."           Appellants emphasize that "[b]y

dismissing the [Puerto Rico] law claims, the [d]istrict [c]ourt


                                    - 14 -
forces Appellants to trudge again to Judge Swain to seek lifting

of    the    stay,        then     proceeding        in    the      [c]ommonwealth

[c]ourts[, which] is not the best handling of limited resources."

We   find   that    the    district    court       acted   within    its    informed

discretion    in    dismissing      Appellants'       commonwealth     law    claims

without prejudice.         This case is the usual one where a district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after

dismissing all federal claims, and it is distinguishable from

instances where this court has found that unusual circumstances

justify the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.                     See, e.g.,

Izquierdo, 

 (dealing with an "unusual" case where

"[i]nterests       in   judicial     economy,      convenience,     and     fairness

weighed overwhelmingly in favor of the court's exercising its

jurisdiction").           The    gravamen     of    this    case    turns    on   an

interpretation of Puerto Rico law better suited to be resolved by

the Commonwealth's courts, and as such, there is no continuing

federal interest here.           This case was not on the eve of trial, and

further any assertions of obligations owed by the Commonwealth are

within the dischargeability parameters of the PROMESA statute as

we describe in the companion case issued today.

                                        IV.

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of

Appellant Employees' claims under the Contracts Clause and the Due




                                      - 15 -
Process Clause and Appellants' claims under Article 1802 of the

Puerto Rico Civil Code.




                            - 16 -