United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 22-1767

JEAN BAZILE,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges.

William Keefe for petitioner. Spencer Shucard, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, and Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent. SangYeob Kim, with whom Gilles Bissonnette and American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire were on brief, for various First Circuit-based Immigration Law Practitioners, Nonprofit Organizations, Law School Clinics, and a Public Defender Agency, amici curiae.*

* The amici are more fully identified in the Appendix annexed hereto. August 4, 2023 SELYA, Circuit Judge. In this case, we grapple with the

question of how venue is to be determined in removal proceedings.

This is a question of first impression in this circuit — and one

that has divided the courts of appeals elsewhere. After answering

the venue question and confirming that venue is appropriate here,

we turn to the merits and conclude that the agency's rejection of

the petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the

United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) is supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Accordingly, we

deny the petition for judicial review.

I

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the

case. The petitioner, Jean Bazile, is a Haitian national. He

entered the United States in 1997 at age seven after his father —

who had already emigrated to the United States — sponsored an

application for his permanent residence. Since then, the

petitioner has dwelt in Massachusetts as a lawful permanent

resident.

We fast-forward to 2016. Late that year, the petitioner

pleaded guilty in a Massachusetts state court to charges of

carrying a firearm without a license, see

(a); assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, see

ch.

265, § 15A(b); carrying a loaded firearm without a license, see

id. ch. 269, § 10(n); and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of

- 3 - a building, see id. ch. 269, § 12E. The court sentenced him to

thirty months' imprisonment for carrying a firearm without a

license and two years of probation for each of the other offenses

(to run concurrently).

In June of 2019, the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) initiated removal proceedings, serving the petitioner with

a notice to appear (NTA). The NTA charged that the petitioner was

removable due to his conviction for carrying a firearm without a

license, see

(a)(2)(C);

(a), and

directed him to appear at the Boston immigration court (where DHS

had filed the NTA).

The petitioner participated in a number of virtual

hearings between July of 2020 and April of 2022. No single

immigration judge (IJ) presided over these hearings but, rather,

three different IJs presided at various times. The first two IJs

were physically present in Boston, but the third IJ was physically

located in Fort Worth, Texas. At all relevant times, the

petitioner — who was detained — was physically present in

Massachusetts.

In the course of these proceedings, the petitioner

conceded removability but cross-applied for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the CAT. The petitioner also applied

for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal but later

withdrew those applications.

- 4 - The Fort Worth IJ held a hearing on the merits of the

petitioner's claims for relief on April 13, 2022. The petitioner,

still in Massachusetts, participated virtually, as did the

lawyers. The IJ ruled that the petitioner's 2016 conviction for

assault and battery with a dangerous weapon was a "particularly

serious crime" that rendered the petitioner ineligible for asylum

and withholding of removal. See

(b)(2)(A)(ii),

1231(b)(3)(B)(ii);

(d)(2). This left the

petitioner's claim for deferral of removal under the CAT. See

(a).

In support of his remaining claim, the petitioner

presented evidence of current country conditions and historical

political turmoil, his own affidavit, letters from his parents and

his sister, and testimony from his father, his sister, and

himself.1 He argued that, if removed to Haiti, he would be tortured

based on his family's involvement in the 1980s with Lavalas (a

political party whose supporters were at one time targets of

political violence).

In a bench decision, the IJ denied the petitioner's

application for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ found

1The IJ attempted to take testimony from the petitioner's father over the telephone, but the petitioner's father was unable either to hear or to understand the questions. The IJ discontinued the telephonic testimony and opted instead to consider the father's letter. Before us, the petitioner has not challenged that ruling.

- 5 - the witnesses to be generally credible but concluded that the

petitioner had not carried his burden of showing that he would

more likely than not be tortured if returned to Haiti. Even

accepting as true that the petitioner's father had been involved

in the Lavalas party in the 1980s and that supporters of that party

were persecuted then, the IJ reasoned that the witnesses had not

sufficiently connected those historical facts to a present risk of

future harm. Nor had the witnesses explained why the dangers that

the petitioner's father had faced would redound to the petitioner's

detriment some three decades later. For one thing, the testimony

from the petitioner and his sister about potential harm was

comprised primarily of secondhand information, insupportable

inferences, and undue speculation. For another thing, the other

evidence showed no more than widespread political turbulence,

which failed to demonstrate that the petitioner would be

specifically targeted upon his return. The IJ thus concluded that

the petitioner's claim that he would likely be tortured was too

"speculative," denied his CAT application, and ordered him removed

to Haiti.

The petitioner appealed the IJ's decision to the Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On September 9, 2022, the BIA

adopted the IJ's findings and dismissed the appeal in a written

decision. This timely petition for judicial review ensued.

- 6 - II

Before reaching the merits of the petitioner's CAT

claim, an antecedent question looms. A petition for review of a

final order of removal must be "filed with the court of appeals

for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed

the proceedings."

(b)(2). In an era in which many

removal hearings are conducted virtually, more than one judicial

circuit may stake a plausible claim to venue. Consequently, the

question as to where the IJ "completed the proceedings" may be

freighted with uncertainty.

Such a question lurked in the penumbra of this case. On

the one hand, the IJ who presided over the petitioner's merits

hearing was physically located in Fort Worth, Texas. On the other

hand, Boston, Massachusetts, was the designated hearing location

and both the decision of the immigration court and its order of

removal were filed and docketed there. Texas is within the

jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit whereas Massachusetts is within

the jurisdiction of the First Circuit. Arguably, then, either of

those circuits may be the circuit in which the IJ completed the

proceedings.2 Compare Herrera-Alcala v. Garland,

,

2 To add to the uncertainty, the heading on the written version

of the IJ's bench decision reads: United States Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review United States Immigration Court Fort Worth, Texas

- 7 - 241-43 (4th Cir. 2022) with Sarr v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2022).

To avoid uncertainty, we issued an order to show cause

why the case should not be transferred to the Fifth Circuit. After

responses were received, we reserved the resolution of the venue

question to the merits panel. We have had the benefit of helpful

briefing on this question by both the parties and the amici. We

address the question now.

A

Because the mechanics of removal proceedings are central

to resolving the question of venue, a brief description of the

process helps to set the stage. Removal proceedings are commenced

when DHS serves a noncitizen with a charging document (typically

an NTA) and files that document with an administrative control

immigration court. See

(a), 1003.31(f). The

administrative control court is one that "creates and maintains

[r]ecords of [p]roceedings" for immigration courts or hearing

locations within a given geographic area, with the result that all

documents related to a particular case heard in those immigration

But the heading on the subsequent written order reads: United States Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Boston Immigration Court And as a finishing touch, it should be noted that there is no immigration court in Fort Worth; there is only an immigration adjudication center, which is a type of facility at which IJs hold remote hearings for immigration courts across the country.

- 8 - courts or hearing locations must be filed in that administrative

control court.

§ 1003.11; see id. § 1003.31(f).

Many administrative control courts are situated in the

same place as the courts and hearing locations whose records they

are assigned to maintain. For instance, the administrative control

court for the Boston immigration court and most Massachusetts

detention centers is situated in Boston. But an administrative

control court's assigned area may include courts or hearing

locations in other places, in which event all records (including

the charging document) would properly be filed in one place even

though the hearing location is in another place. See

; see, e.g., Sarr,

(noting NTA filed

in administrative control court in New York and designated hearing

location in Louisiana).

An NTA ordinarily includes a designated hearing

location. See

(b). At the outset of the removal

proceedings, the noncitizen attends a master calendar hearing,

see, e.g.,

§ 1240.17(b), (f)(1), either personally or

virtually. That master calendar hearing is followed by an

individualized merits hearing at which both DHS and the noncitizen

may present evidence on contested matters (including applications

for relief from removal). See, e.g., id. § 1240.17(f)(1),(4).

Flexibility is the watchword: hearings may be conducted

in person, by video conference, or (in certain circumstances) by

- 9 - telephone. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2);

(c). In

the interest of efficiency, the Executive Office for Immigration

Review (EOIR), which administers the immigration court system, has

encouraged the use of video conferencing as a more efficacious

alternative to in-person hearings. See Memorandum from James R.

McHenry, Dir., EOIR, to All of EOIR, re: No Dark Courtrooms, at

1-2 (Mar. 29, 2019). When a hearing is held by video conference,

the IJ, the noncitizen, and the lawyers may all be physically

present in different locations — and it may be that none of them

is present at the hearing location designated in the NTA. See

Matter of Garcia,

, 696 (BIA 2023). What is

more, different IJs, physically present in different locations,

may preside over successive hearings in a single case. See

at

697 n.5. The noncitizen and his counsel may not learn the identity

and whereabouts of the presiding IJ until a hearing is about to

commence. See

at 697 & n.5.

At or after the conclusion of the merits hearing, the IJ

— from whatever location — may either render a bench decision or

issue a written decision. See

. The IJ then

files a written order with the immigration court, and the

immigration court dockets it. Once the IJ's decision has been

embodied in the written order and placed on record, either party

may appeal to the BIA. See

§ 1003.38. Thereafter, a

noncitizen who is aggrieved by a decision of the BIA may petition

- 10 - for judicial review of that decision in "the court of appeals for

the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the

proceedings."

(b)(2).

B

Against this backdrop, we turn to the question of where

the IJ "completed the proceedings" for purposes of judicial venue.

Our sister circuits have reached a wide variety of conflicting

conclusions on this question. See, e.g., Sarr,

(holding that judicial venue lies in the court "where — absent

evidence of a change of venue — proceedings commenced," meaning

the immigration court "identifi[ed]" on the charging document);

Herrera-Alcala, 39 F.4th at 240-41 (holding that physical location

of IJ during the hearing determines where IJ "completed the

proceedings"); Ramos v. Ashcroft,

(7th Cir. 2004)

(concluding that IJ "completed the proceedings" where "the court

is located," meaning "where all parties were required to file their

motions and briefs" and "where the orders were prepared and

entered"); Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland,

, 832 (9th

Cir. 2022) (concluding that IJ "completed the proceedings" at

hearing location designated on charging document or initial

hearing notice unless IJ had granted change of venue); Yang You

Lee v. Lynch,

(10th Cir. 2015) (considering

various factors to determine where IJ "completed the

proceedings"). We add our voice to this cacophony of viewpoints.

- 11 - As always, our starting point is the text of the statute.

See Woo v. Spackman,

(1st Cir. 2021). Here,

that text is not a model of clarity. See Georcely v. Ashcroft,

(1st Cir. 2004). In particular, it is unclear

whether an IJ may be said to "complete[] the proceedings" when she

presides over the final session of the merits hearing, when she

renders her decision, when she files the ensuing order, or at some

other juncture.

Even so, the statutory text serves to narrow our inquiry.

The plain meaning of "completed" defenestrates the notion that the

IJ completes the proceedings simply by presiding over the last

phase of the hearing. The proceedings cannot conceivably be

"completed" until the IJ renders a decision.

We add, moreover, that if the IJ does not complete the

proceedings by presiding over the hearing, the physical location

of the IJ during the hearing makes no sense as the basis for

judicial venue. Such an interpretation, in addition to being

foreclosed by the statutory text, would lead to anomalous results.

It would locate judicial venue wherever the IJ happened to be

during the last phase of the hearing which, in a virtual world,

could be almost anywhere. And it would create uncertainty for the

parties, who, as we have said, may only learn the location of the

IJ presiding over a particular hearing shortly before the hearing

takes place, and long after the briefing is finished.

- 12 - The use of the word "proceedings" is also instructive.

That word, as used elsewhere within the statute and regulations,

refers to the broader removal proceedings. See, e.g.,

(a); cf. Matter of Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 698

(discussing location of "proceedings" for choice of law purposes).

The word, therefore, should be accorded the same meaning in

construing section 1252(b)(2). See United States v. Nippon Paper

Indus. Co.,

(1st Cir. 1997). Consequently, it

would be anomalous to say that the IJ "completed the proceedings"

simply by rendering a decision. After all, that action alone has

no formal effect on the broader removal proceedings: it is only

when the removal order is filed that the proceedings may plausibly

be said to have been completed. Cf. Georcely,

(noting general rule that judicial order is effective only after

it is filed and docketed).

This construction aligns with the reality of events: as

noted above, an IJ sometimes renders her decision at the end of

the merits hearing and sometimes renders her decision weeks or

months later. See

. This means that the IJ —

at the moment when she renders the decision — could be at a

different location than she was when the hearing took place. If

her location was the critical factor in the venue calculus, that

factor would import a large dollop of unpredictability into the

venue determination.

- 13 - For the purposes of section 1252(b)(2), then, we

conclude that where the IJ completes the proceedings — that is,

judicial venue — must align with administrative venue.

Administrative venue is defined by regulation as the court where

"proceedings" commenced when the charging document was filed

(unless a formal change of venue has been effected).

§ 1003.14(a); see id. § 1003.20(a). If the proceedings commenced

there, it is logical that they must be completed there. An IJ may

grant a change of venue only upon the motion of a party. See

(b). Given this framework, an IJ necessarily

completes the proceedings for the purposes of section 1252(b)(2)

at the court where the proceedings are commenced, absent a formal

change in administrative venue.

BIA precedent is in lockstep with our interpretation of

section 1252(b)(2). Although we are not obliged to afford any

deference to the BIA when interpretating that statute, see Matter

of Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 702 n.10, an agency's interpretation

may be persuasive in light of the agency's expertise, see Merrimon

v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1st Cir. 2014)

(citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,

(1944)). So it

is here.

In Matter of Garcia, the BIA addressed the question of

which circuit's law applies in removal proceedings before the

immigration courts and BIA. See

. The BIA

- 14 - noted that each circuit court of appeals applies the law of its

circuit to petitions for judicial review of BIA decisions, and the

reasonable expectations of litigants are best served if the choice

of law remains the same as a case moves through the immigration

court, the BIA, and the circuit court. See

, 699

n.8, 702 n.10. The BIA thus concluded that the law applied in

immigration proceedings should derive from the agency's best

interpretation of section 1252(b)(2). See

After surveying the conflicting circuit precedents, the

BIA endorsed an interpretation of section 1252(b)(2) that ties

judicial venue to "the geographic location of the [i]mmigration

[c]ourt where [administrative] venue lies, namely where

jurisdiction vests and proceedings commence upon the filing of a

charging document."3

; see

(a),

1003.20(a). In the process, the BIA explicitly repudiated a rule

3 There is a wrinkle. By regulation, administrative venue lies where proceedings are commenced by the filing of "a charging document . . . with the [i]mmigration [c]ourt."

(a); see

§ 1003.20(a). On its face, this language may seem to link administrative venue to the administrative control court. See

, 1003.31(f). But the BIA recently made pellucid that administrative venue does not "necessarily lie[] at an administrative control court solely because a charging document is filed there." Matter of Garcia, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 704. The BIA implied that the location where proceedings are commenced pursuant to

(a) may be discerned — at least in some circumstances — by reference to the hearing location listed on the charging document, but left the matter unsettled. See

. So do we: because the administrative control court and the designated hearing location are the same in the case at hand, there is no need for us to choose between them.

- 15 - that the physical location of the IJ should control the venue

determination, concluding that such a rule was unworkable. See

.

Matter of Garcia now requires IJs and the BIA to apply

the law of the circuit where administrative venue lies. This fits

seamlessly with our interpretation of section 1252(b)(2), which

ties the determination of judicial venue to the immigration court

in which proceedings are commenced — that is, to the court where

administrative venue lies — unless a motion for change of venue

has been granted.

C

In this case, all roads lead to Rome. The charging

document was filed in the Boston immigration court and the hearing

location designated in the document was the Boston immigration

court. The proceedings clearly commenced there. At no point

thereafter did any party serve a motion to transfer venue. And at

the end of the case, the removal order was filed and docketed in

the Boston immigration court.

The foregoing facts leave no doubt that judicial venue

in this court is proper. That the IJ attended the proceedings

remotely from Fort Worth, Texas, is of no consequence with respect

to the venue determination.

- 16 - III

This brings us to the agency's denial of the petitioner's

application for CAT relief. To prevail on a CAT claim, a

noncitizen must establish — through specific objective evidence —

that "it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured

if removed to" his homeland.

(c)(2); see Bonnet

v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2021). In this context,

torture is defined as "any act by which severe pain or suffering,

whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a

person . . . by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or

acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity

or other person acting in an official capacity."

(a)(1).

In removal proceedings, the focal point of our review is

usually the decision of the BIA. See, e.g., Loja-Tene v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020). But where, as here, "the BIA

embraces the decision of the IJ, 'merely add[ing] its gloss to the

IJ's findings and conclusions, we treat the two decisions as one.'"

(alteration in original) (quoting Murillo-Robles v. Lynch,

(1st Cir. 2016)). In this spirit, we sometimes refer

to the combined decisions of the IJ and the BIA as the decision of

the agency.

Our review of the agency's decisionmaking is two-tiered:

we examine the agency's answers to legal questions de novo and

- 17 - consider whether its factual findings are supported by substantial

evidence. See Ali v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2022).

The latter standard is deferential and, under it, we will uphold

the agency's factual findings as long as they are "supported by

reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole." López-Pérez v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Settenda v. Ashcroft,

(1st Cir. 2004)). Refined to bare essence, this means that we

will not disturb the agency's determination on a fact-based issue

"unless the record evidence 'compel[s] a reasonable factfinder to

make a contrary determination.'"

(alteration in

original) (quoting Romilus v. Ashcroft,

(1st Cir.

2004)); see

(b)(4)(B). For purposes of the

substantial evidence test, predictive findings as to what may or

may not transpire at a future date are regarded as findings of

fact. See DeCarvalho v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2021);

Samayoa Cabrera v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2019).

Here, the petitioner asserted that — if removed to Haiti

— he was likely to be tortured based on his family's (and

particularly his father's) past affiliation with the Lavalas

party. The record reflects that Lavalas was a political party and

that its supporters were targeted by opposition parties during the

political upheaval of the 1980s. The IJ accepted as true that the

petitioner's father was involved with the Lavalas party in the

- 18 - 1980s and that adherents of that party were targeted then. Turning

to the present day, the IJ acknowledged that Haiti is in the midst

of political turmoil. The petitioner, though, had failed to adduce

any probative evidence linking the past targeting of Lavalas

supporters to a threat of present harm. Nor had the petitioner

adduced any probative evidence linking the current political

turmoil to a particularized risk of torture. The IJ thus

determined that the threat of torture was "speculative" and that

the petitioner had not carried his burden of proof.

The BIA adopted the IJ's findings. In addition, it noted

that the petitioner had not claimed to have been threatened in

Haiti. Given the paucity of proof, the BIA concluded that the IJ

had not clearly erred in finding that the petitioner's "fear of

harm based on his father's experiences in Haiti three decades ago

is too speculative to establish that he personally faces a clear

probability of being singled out for torture upon return to Haiti."

In our view, the agency's findings are fully

supportable. Surely, the record does not compel a contrary

conclusion. As the agency found, even if the petitioner's father

was involved with a political party that was a target of violence

in the 1980s and even if Haiti is currently in turmoil, there is

insufficient evidence connecting those two facts to a present risk

of torture that is particular to the petitioner.

- 19 - To be sure, the petitioner vouchsafed during his

testimony that he believed that violence against Lavalas

supporters is "worse now" than it was when his father fled. In

the same vein, he expressed his belief that some family members

had been "harmed" in Haiti in the past ten years. But he neither

provided any first-hand information nor offered any meaningful

details. Such generalized statements of belief, devoid of

specifics, are insufficient to bear the weight of a CAT claim.

See Alvizures-Gomes v. Lynch,

(1st Cir. 2016).

So, too, the petitioner's sister — who echoed his beliefs

— provided only generalized information about possible harm to

family members. She admitted that most of her information was

secondhand. Once again, such evidence falls short.

In an effort to bridge this gap, the petitioner points

to a 2008 article summarizing books about the Lavalas movement.

That article, however, deals with events occurring in the 1990s

and early 2000s. As the agency found, such evidence does not

furnish a plausible basis for concluding that Lavalas supporters

are likely to face torture in Haiti at present.

Nor does the evidence lay any foundation for a finding

that the petitioner's father's political affiliation in the 1980s

would be imputed to the petitioner. Although the petitioner

conclusorily asserted that he would be known immediately to the

police and targeted by gangs working with them as his father's

- 20 - son, he provided no corroborating evidence to support that

assertion. Uncorroborated conjecture, without more, cannot carry

the day on a claim under the CAT. See Sanabria Morales v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020).

Struggling to regain lost ground, the petitioner notes

that credible testimony, without corroboration, may suffice to

satisfy a noncitizen's burden of proof on a claim for CAT

protection. See

(c)(2). That is true as far as

it goes — but it does not take the petitioner very far. A

noncitizen's testimony is only sufficient on its own if the import

of that testimony is probative enough to allow him to carry his

burden of proof. See

To clear that bar, the testimony must

provide specific objective evidence showing that the noncitizen is

more likely than not to be tortured if removed to his homeland.

See Bonnet,

; cf. Garland v. Ming Dai,

, 1680 (2021) (explaining, in asylum context, that "even if

the BIA treats an alien's evidence as credible, the agency need

not find his evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden

of proof"). The BIA upheld the IJ's determination that the

petitioner's evidence did not measure up to this benchmark, and

that determination is supported by substantial evidence.

The petitioner next contends that the agency failed

either to consider or to give appropriate weight to the country

conditions report and the 2008 article. We agree with the BIA

- 21 - that such a contention is belied by the record. To begin, an IJ

"need not discuss ad nauseum every piece of evidence" as long as

she has "given reasoned consideration to the evidence as a whole,

made supportable findings, and adequately explained [her]

reasoning." Alzaben v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023)

(quoting Pan v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2007)). In

the case at hand, the IJ's decision checked each of these boxes.

Here, moreover, the petitioner's complaint, stripped of

rhetorical flourishes, seems to be less about a failure of

consideration and more about the fact that the agency did not treat

his allegedly corroborating evidence as persuasive support for his

CAT claim. That complaint will not wash: general evidence about

country conditions cannot compensate for the lack of specific

evidence showing a particularized risk of torture. See Alvizures-

Gomes,

; see also Mendez-Barrera v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that, "[a]lthough such [country

conditions] reports are sometimes helpful to an alien's claim,

their generic nature is such that they are rarely dispositive").

The petitioner conceded that the country conditions report showed

only generalized political turmoil, with no particular mention of

either the Lavalas party or its adherents. The petitioner

attempted to connect the country conditions report with the

violence against supporters of Lavalas in the 1980s by conclusorily

asserting that "it's the same situation." But political alignments

- 22 - are notoriously fragile and crediting the petitioner's assertion

would require the factfinder to assume — despite the lack of

evidentiary predicate — that the same political actors are being

targeted now as were being targeted then. That is a quantum leap,

which the agency cannot be expected to undertake in the absence of

probative evidence.

The short of it is that the IJ and the BIA addressed all

of the evidence that had been introduced. They found that — on

the entirety of the evidence — the specific risk of torture

asserted by the petitioner was speculative. We conclude that this

finding and, thus, the agency's denial of CAT protection was

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.

IV

We need go no further. The record shows that danger and

violence are endemic in modern Haitian society. But the agency's

finding that this generalized danger and violence will pose no

particularized threat to the petitioner is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. That ends the

matter. For the reasons elucidated above, we hold that judicial

venue is proper in the First Circuit. We further hold that the

agency's denial of CAT protection is supported by substantial

evidence. It follows, then, that the petition for judicial review

must be

Denied.

- 23 - APPENDIX

Roster of Amici Curiae

• American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire • Carlos Estrada • Committee for Public Counsel Services, Immigration Impact Unit • Denise Acevedo Perez • Eloa Celedon • Emily A. White • Greater Boston Legal Services • Harvey Kaplan • Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project • Melanie Shapiro • Katie Horigan • Massachusetts Law Reform Institute • New Hampshire Legal Assistance • Nina J. Froes • Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project • Robert Warren • Ronald L. Abramson • Rubin Pomerleau PC • Stephanie Marzouk • Susan Church • The Boston College Legal Services LAB Immigration Clinic • The Boston University School of Law Immigrants' Rights and Human Trafficking Program • The Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program • The Suffolk University Law School Immigration Clinic • The University of Maine School of Law Refugee and Human Rights Clinic

- 24 -