United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit


No. 20-1749

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                      JORGE MUÑOZ-MARTINEZ,

                      Defendant, Appellant.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]


                              Before

                      Barron, Chief Judge,
              Howard and Thompson, Circuit Judges.


     Ramón M. González-Santiago for appellant.
     Tyler Anne Lee, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Kenneth A. Polite,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H. Miller, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, W. Stephen Muldrow, U.S. Attorney, District of
Puerto Rico, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
Appellate Chief, and Robert P. Coleman II, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
were on brief, for appellee.


                         August 22, 2023
            HOWARD, Circuit Judge.               Jorge Muñoz-Martínez ("Muñoz"),

a former narcotics officer with the Puerto Rico Police Department

("PRPD"),      appeals      from     a    single-count        conviction       under     the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 

(c), contending, inter alia, that the jury's guilty

verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.                           The unlawful

RICO enterprise with which Muñoz was found to be associated

consisted      of    a     corrupt       unit    within      the     PRPD   tasked      with

investigating narcotics trafficking and related crimes.                                Among

other abuses, many officers within this unit, including Muñoz,

routinely stole money and other items during residential searches.

            On appeal, Muñoz concedes that the government proved

this corrupt unit was an unlawful enterprise and that he was

associated with it but contends that the government failed to prove

that he participated in the conduct of this enterprise "through a

pattern   of    racketeering         activity,"        as    RICO    requires.       Thus,

Muñoz's appeal requires us to determine whether the government

established         that    he   committed        the       two    predicate     acts     of

racketeering alleged in his indictment, which were charged as

extortion and extortion conspiracy under Puerto Rico law.                                 At

bottom, Muñoz argues that his conduct in these two instances -- in

which he either agreed to or did steal items from homes while

executing      search      warrants      --     did   not    match    the   elements      of

extortion.       Because we agree that no rational jury could have


                                           - 2 -
found Muñoz guilty of extortion and extortion conspiracy, as those

crimes are properly construed under Puerto Rico law, we reverse

Muñoz's RICO conviction without considering his other challenges

on appeal.

                                       I.

           In July 2018, Muñoz and six others were charged with one

substantive     RICO    violation    arising     from      their   activities    as

officers within the Caguas Drug Unit ("CDU") between 2014 and 2018.

In   addition    to    details    about   the    existence     of    an   unlawful

enterprise within the CDU and the methods and means by which it

operated, the indictment alleged that Muñoz participated in the

enterprise's      affairs    by     committing       two    specific      acts   of

racketeering.      These included one act of extortion conspiracy in

May 2015 ("Racketeering Act Two"), and one act of extortion in

June 2015 ("Racketeering Act Three").            The indictment alleges that

both predicate acts occurred during residential search-warrant

executions, in which Muñoz surreptitiously took money or jewelry

for his own personal use, purportedly in violation of Puerto Rico's

extortion statute, 

 (criminalizing

conduct by "[a]ny person who . . . under pretext of rights as a

public official or employee, compels another person to deliver

property").

           In October 2019, Muñoz was convicted of the charged RICO

violation,      following   a     five-day    jury    trial.        The   evidence


                                      - 3 -
established that the CDU was responsible for investigating drug-

trafficking related crimes, which included surveillance, executing

search and arrest warrants, and seizure of drugs, firearms, and

drug-sale proceeds.     It further established that, between 2014 and

2018, Muñoz and other CDU officers engaged in unlawful activities

to personally enrich themselves, including theft of money, drugs,

firearms, and other items from the subjects of residential search-

warrant executions and traffic stops.        Evidence also demonstrated

that CDU officers frequently submitted false statements to obtain

search warrants, conducted unlawful searches, and failed to report

their stolen proceeds in warrant returns.

            The government's evidence as to the scope and methods of

this   corruption    included   testimony   from      several   former   CDU

officers, including two of Muñoz's co-defendants, Eric Velasquez-

Martinez ("Velasquez") and Christian Rodriguez-Cruz ("Rodriguez").

In addition to describing the means and methods by which CDU

officers stole money and other items, Velasquez and Rodriguez

testified   that    about   95-to-99   percent   of   the   search   warrant

applications drafted by CDU officers contained false information.

Velasquez further estimated that about 90 percent of the officers

assigned to the CDU between 2012 and 2018 were generally involved

in the corrupt activities described.

            Both Rodriguez and another former CDU officer and co-

defendant, Eidderf Jhave Ramos-Ortíz ("Ramos"), also testified


                                  - 4 -
that "[e]verybody" in the CDU generally engaged in theft and

extortion.       For example, Ramos explained the typical practice

among CDU officers:       "if we were entering a residence to execute

an arrest . . . , a search and seizure                 warrant or something and

there was money in view, then you would just grab the money and

put it in your pocket and then continue on with the search."                      As

Rodriguez further explained, the officers conducting the search

would assist each other in this endeavor.                In other words, it was

"previously      agreed   on,"    or   generally        understood,      among   the

officers of the CDU that if one of them saw something during a

search, they would take it and the other would either not interfere

or help them conceal the theft.           This would happen even when the

subject of the search was later arrested and/or charged.

              Ramos further explained another way in which officers

would "steal money" from individuals on the street:                   "[w]e would

arrive   in    unmarked   [PRPD]    vehicles      to    [a] . . . drug      selling

point, and catch the people with . . . drugs and money, and turn

them   around,    seize   the    money.        Sometimes    we'd   let    them   go.

Sometimes we didn't."       Both witnesses confirmed that, regardless

of the tact employed or the item stolen -- whether it be money,

drugs, or guns -- officers would divide up the profits among

themselves.

              As to Muñoz's involvement in the unlawful enterprise,

the witnesses provided testimony about specific instances in which


                                       - 5 -
Muñoz personally took money or other items during residential

searches, or accepted proceeds from thefts by other CDU officers

during   the    same.         This   included    evidence   regarding      the   two

predicate racketeering acts attributed to Muñoz in the indictment.

              For Racketeering Act Two, evidence established that, in

May   2015,    Muñoz    and    Ramos    executed    a   search   warrant    at   the

apartment of Michael Santiago Figueroa ("Santiago") and stole a

gold chain from his residence.                  Specifically, Ramos testified

that, upon arriving at Santiago's apartment, Muñoz told Ramos to

help him with the search.            The two officers began by searching the

bedroom, and eventually came upon a storage room in which there

were tools and other items.            Muñoz stood at the door of the storage

room as Ramos searched a red toolbox that held a little black bag.

Ramos discovered a gold chain inside the bag and told Muñoz,

"[T]here's a chain [here]."              Muñoz replied, "[W]ell, take it."

Ramos did so and handed the chain to Muñoz, who then put it into

his pocket.      Ramos described this interaction as "between the two

of [them]," and that no one else was present.               The next day, Muñoz

handed Ramos a sum of money and remarked:                "so you can see how I

do things."      Ramos testified that he understood this money to be

proceeds from Muñoz's sale of the chain and given to him so that

he would reciprocate going forward by sharing any similarly ill-

gotten gains with Muñoz.

              The victim of this theft, Santiago, also testified at


                                        - 6 -
trial.     He explained that he was in the apartment for the duration

of the search and arrested at its conclusion, but ultimately not

criminally charged.     During the search, Santiago did not see Muñoz

do   anything    specific,    other    than     generally    "[s]earching   the

property."      He only later discovered that the chain was missing

when he returned home after being released by authorities.

             For Racketeering Act Three, evidence established that,

in June 2015, Muñoz and Velasquez executed a search warrant at the

residence of Edwin Gonzalez Beltran ("Gonzalez"), during which

Muñoz stole money from Gonzalez's kitchen cabinets.                 Velasquez

testified that he and Muñoz were solely responsible for conducting

this search, although five or six other officers were also present

on the scene.       As Velasquez described, the search began in the

kitchen,    where   Velasquez      discovered    a   plate   containing   crack

cocaine,    field-tested     the    drugs,    and    subsequently   handcuffed

Gonzalez, who had been seated at a table nearby.                Gonzalez also

provided testimony about the circumstances of this search.                   He

explained that, upon being handcuffed, he observed Muñoz searching

his kitchen cabinets.        He further testified that he observed Muñoz

begin to open one cabinet that contained an unspecified amount of

cash and then "signal[] to" Velasquez.                 After this "signal,"

Velasquez moved Gonzalez out of the kitchen and into the bedroom

to continue his own search of the residence.                 Gonzalez further

testified that he objected to this move at the time, saying to


                                      - 7 -
Velasquez "Why are you doing this? . . . I have to be able to see

what you're doing."     Gonzalez further explained that he felt Muñoz

"couldn't take [the money] out right in front of [him]" because it

would be "illegal."       This observation was the extent of the

evidence regarding Gonzalez's interactions with Muñoz during the

search.   Gonzalez was arrested following the search and charged

with drug trafficking.

           Velasquez testified that, after the search, Muñoz told

him to meet him at a bar later that night.       Outside the bar, Muñoz

approached Velasquez and handed him $90.         Upon being handed the

money, Velasquez asked, "[W]hat's this," to which Muñoz replied,

"[T]his   is   your   part. . . . Your    share."     Muñoz   then   said,

"[Y]ou're really blind, you know.        You didn't see this," to which

Vasquez further responded, "[W]here was that?"         Muñoz said, "[I]n

the cabinets."

           At the close of the government's case, Muñoz moved for

a judgement of acquittal under Rule 29, on the ground that the

"government failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain [his]

conviction."    See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.     Specifically, Muñoz argued

that evidence was insufficient to prove "both racketeering acts"

because there was no evidence that he "compelled anyone to deliver

property under the pretext of authority."           After his motion was

denied, Muñoz rested his defense without presenting evidence.          He

was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment


                                 - 8 -
to be followed by 36 months' supervised release.                  This timely

appeal followed.

                                       II.

            In his primary challenge on appeal, Muñoz contends that

the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.              We

review preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de

novo, evaluating the evidence in "the light most favorable to the

verdict"    and    asking   "whether    'that    evidence,   including    all

plausible   inferences      drawn   therefrom,   would    allow   a   rational

factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed the charged crime.'"         United States v. Torres Monje, 

 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Santos-

Rivera, 

 (1st Cir. 2013)).             In so doing, however,

"we must 'reject those evidentiary interpretations and illations

that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative.'"

United States v. Rodríguez-Martinez, 

 (1st Cir.

2015) (quoting United States v. Spinney, 

 (1st

Cir. 1995)).       To the extent that a sufficiency challenge raises

issues of statutory interpretation, our review is plenary.              United

States v. Saccoccia, 

 (1st Cir. 2003).

                                       A.

            To    sustain    a   conviction     for   a   substantive    RICO

violation, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,

"(1) the existence of an enterprise (2) that affected interstate


                                    - 9 -
commerce; and (3) that the defendant was associated with the

enterprise; (4) and conducted or participated in the conduct of

the enterprise; (5) through a pattern of racketeering activity."

United States v. Brandao, 

 (1st Cir. 2008); see

(c).    Here, Muñoz only challenges the government's

proof as to the fifth element.

             A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires proof that

the defendant committed at least two racketeering acts within a

ten-year period, inter alia.          

(5); Brandao, 

.    As relevant here, racketeering activity includes "any

act    or    threat   involving . . . extortion . . . ,        which     is

chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more

than   one   year."    

(1).    "A   substantive   RICO

prosecution requires, in a very practical sense, the full trial of

each of the predicate acts alleged."          United States v. Levasseur,

 (1st Cir. 1988).        In other words, the government

must prove each essential element of the charges encompassed by at

least two predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a

conviction for substantive RICO.         See Levasseur, 

;

United States v. Carrillo, 

 (2d Cir. 2000)

(explaining that, to support a RICO violation, the government must

prove all elements of the predicate offense "as defined by state

law"); see also United States v. Burhoe, 

 (1st Cir.

2017) (reversing RICO conviction where evidence was insufficient


                                     - 10 -
to prove at least two predicate acts).

           As discussed above, the indictment in this case alleged

that Muñoz engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity through

committing two predicate crimes -- (i) extortion conspiracy in May

2015, and (ii) extortion in June 2015 -- both in violation of

Puerto Rico Penal Code Article 191.        In relevant part, Article 191

defines the crime of extortion as "[a]ny person who . . . under

the pretext of rights as a public officer or employee, compels

another person to deliver property."            P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 33,

§ 4828 (official English translation); see id. § 5261 (Spanish).

Conspiracy requires that "two . . . or more persons conspire or

agree to commit a crime and have made specific plans regarding

their participation, the time, the location, or the acts to be

carried out," 

 (official English

translation), as well as an overt act by one or more of the co-

conspirators towards carrying out the object of the unlawful

agreement, 

 §§ 5334, 4878 (official English translation).

           On appeal, Muñoz contends that no rational jury could

have   found   that   he   committed   either   extortion   conspiracy   or

extortion under these definitions, because the evidence failed to

prove the "compel[led] . . . delivery" element in either instance.

In support of this argument, Muñoz points to the undisputed facts

that his first victim, Santiago, was neither aware that the chain

was being taken at the time it was stolen nor in the room when it


                                  - 11 -
happened, and argues that his second victim, Gonzalez, did not

"deliver" the money to Muñoz in the natural sense of the word.              In

other words, he contends that his conduct amounted only to simple

theft or larceny, which are not listed among RICO's enumerated

acts of racketeering, see 

(1).               In response, the

government argues that an "active[]" or "physical[] hand over" (or

agreement to affect the same) is not required to prove extortion

(or extortion conspiracy).         Rather, it contends that "[i]t is

enough if, upon a show of authority -- here a warrant -- the victim

does   not   resist   the    defendant's    obtaining   or    taking   of   the

property," as was purportedly the case with Santiago, or the victim

is "compelled . . . to surrender control of his property," as was

purportedly the case with Gonzalez.

                                     B.

             As both parties seem to agree that Muñoz's challenge

turns on the meaning of the Puerto Rico extortion statute's use of

"compels another person to deliver property," we begin with the

text of the statute.        See United States v. Brown, 

(1st Cir. 2017) ("When interpreting a statute, we begin with its

text." (citing Richardson v. United States, 

(1999))).    "In so doing, we accord the statutory text its ordinary

meaning by reference to the specific context in which that language

is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."

United States v. De la Cruz, 

 (1st Cir. 2021)


                                   - 12 -
(internal quotes and cites omitted); see also 

 (instructing that "words and phrases [of the Penal Code]

shall be construed according to context and the meaning sanctioned

by common and current usage").           "When exhausting those [textual

and structural] clues enables us to resolve the interpretive

question put to us, our 'sole function' is to apply the law as we

find it, not defer to some conflicting reading.'"              De la Cruz, 

   (alteration   in    original)    (quoting    Niz-Chavez   v.

Garland, 

, 1480 (2021)).

                                        1.

             We conclude that the ordinary meaning of the statute's

use of "compels another person to deliver property" necessarily

implies that the accused's taking of property must be accomplished

with the victim's active acquiescence.             Indeed, the word "compel"

is defined as "to force by physical necessity or evidential fact";

"to urge irresistibly by moral or social pressure"; "to force by

personal temperament or other subjective considerations";                    "to

force or cause irresistibly: call upon, require, or command without

possibility of withholding or denying"; "to domineer over so as to

force compliance or submission," or "to obtain (a response) by

force,      violence,    or   coercion."         Compel,     Merriam-Webster's

Unabridged              Dictionary,              https://unabridged.merriam-

webster.com/unabridged/compel            (last     visited   Aug.   6,   2023).

Under any of these alternative definitions, the term necessarily


                                      - 13 -
implies that the subject of the compulsion must at least consent

to the "compliance" or "command" being sought, even if unlawfully

obtained, grudgingly provided, or involuntary, in the legal sense.

Similarly, the transitive verb "deliver" is defined as "give,

transfer: yield possession or control of: make or hand over: make

delivery of."      Deliver, Merriam-Webster's Unabridged Dictionary,

https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/deliver                        (last

visited Aug. 6, 2023); see also Deliver, v.13(a), OED Online,

Oxford                               Univ.                                   Press.,

https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/49470?rskey=3m8R4g&result=2&isAdv

anced=false#eid (last visited Aug. 6, 2023) (defining transitive

verb, "deliver," "[i]n legal contexts," as "[t]o hand over (goods,

notices, etc.) to another person legally or formally; esp. to put

(property) into the legal possession of another person.").                       Thus,

when read in the context of the operative statute -- "compels

another   person     to    deliver    property"      --    the    word     "deliver"

necessarily      implies    that     the    victim      must     consent    to    the

displacement of his property, again, even if grudgingly provided.

Cf.    Ocasio v. United States, 

 (2016) (noting

that   "shakedown"    "payments"      are    necessarily         made    "with   [the

payor's] grudging consent").

            At oral argument, the government conceded that this

reading was correct.        Given this concession and our own textual

analysis,   we     need    not   tarry     with   any     further       confirmatory


                                     - 14 -
examination of the Puerto Rico Penal Code's legislative history or

similar extortion statutes.         Cf. De la Cruz, 

.

Doing so would not cast any doubt on our conclusion that a

consented-to taking is a necessary element of the Puerto Rico

extortion statute.

           Moreover, the government also conceded that, without

this element of induced consent, the Puerto Rico extortion statute

would not constitute a valid RICO predicate.             Indeed, "for a state

offense         to           be      'an           act         or      threat

involving . . . extortion, . . . which is chargeable under State

law,' as RICO requires, see 

(1), the conduct must

be   capable   of    being   generically     classified   as   extortionate."

Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 

 (2003);

accord Wilkie v. Robbins, 

 (2007); see also United

States v. Kirsch, 

, 221 n.9 (2d Cir. 2018) ("[I]n order

for conduct to serve as a state law RICO extortion predicate act,

it must (1) violate a state extortion statute and (2) satisfy the

'generic' definition of extortion.").               The Supreme Court has

defined   "generic     extortion"   for    these   purposes    as   "obtaining

something of value from another with his consent induced by the

wrongful use of force, fear, or threats," Scheidler, 

 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Nardello, 

 (1969)), which is similar to the federal definition of

extortion set forth in the Hobbs Act, see 

(b)(2)


                                    - 15 -
(defining extortion as "the obtaining of property from another,

with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened

force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right").

           In construing the federal definition of extortion, we

have endorsed the view that "[c]onsent is 'the razor's edge that

distinguishes extortion from robbery.'"               Burhoe, 

(quoting United States v. Cain, 

 (2d Cir. 2012));

see also Ocasio, 

 (noting that "consent" as used in

the Hobbs Act extortion provision "is designed to distinguish

extortion from robbery" (internal cites omitted)).                     Thus, "the

essential requirement to establish extortion" under the federal

definition "is [] that the victim retained some degree of choice

in whether to comply with the extortionate threat, however much of

a Hobson's choice that may be."             Burhoe, 

 (cleaned

up,   quoting   Cain,   

).      Because    Puerto   Rico's

definition of extortion is substantially similar to the federal

definition found in the Hobbs Act in relevant part, as it must be

to qualify as a RICO predicate, see Scheidler, 

, we

consider   cases   involving    Hobbs       Act     extortion    "as   persuasive

analogous authority," Saccoccia, 

 n.2 (1st Cir.

2003).

                                       2.

           With this construction in place, we turn to the trial

evidence concerning the two predicate acts of racketeering.                 After


                                     - 16 -
careful review, we conclude that no rational factfinder could find

that Muñoz either agreed to or did obtain his victims' property

with their consent.         Accordingly, his conviction must be reversed.

                                         i.

            As to the May 2015 extortion-conspiracy charge, the

evidence established only that Ramos and Muñoz agreed to take

Santiago's gold chain for their own personal benefit; the evidence

was insufficient, however, to support a finding that they agreed

to take it without Santiago's consent.               As the Supreme Court has

explained, "the fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a

joint commitment to an 'endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy

all of the elements of [the underlying substantive] criminal

offense."     Ocasio, 

 (emphasis added, alteration in

original) (quoting Salinas v. United States, 

(1997)).     "In other words, each conspirator must have specifically

intended    that     some     conspirator      commit     each   element      of    the

substantive       offense."      Id.   at     292.      Puerto   Rico   law    is    no

different.        See 

, 4878 (defining

conspiracy as "[w]hen two . . . or more persons conspire or agree

to commit a . . . first degree or second degree felony"); see also

Town v. Velez Rivera, 

, 652 (P.R. 1966) ("[T]he

[overt]     act    must     be   one   conducive     to    the   object       of    the

conspiracy.").

            Thus, Muñoz's conviction can only be sustained if the


                                       - 17 -
government's evidence sufficiently established that he and Ramos

agreed that at least one of them would "compel[] [Santiago] to

deliver [his] property" to them, i.e., induce his consent to the

displacement of his chain.                 We conclude that this element was not

sufficiently proven.              Rather, Ramos' testimony only established

that Muñoz told him to "take" the chain; Ramos did so; Ramos handed

it to Muñoz; and Muñoz pocketed it, sold it, and split the proceeds

with    Ramos,       which       was    consistent      with     Ramos'     expectations.

Critically,      however,          Ramos       also   testified      that   this   taking

occurred "between the two of [them]."                      Santiago was not present

in the storage room when this taking occurred and he was unaware

that it was happening.                 Rather, Santiago only discovered that the

chain    was    missing          after    he    returned      home   from    the   police

department.          Given that the evidence of this unlawful agreement

encompassed          only    a    surreptitious         taking    without     Santiago's

awareness, no rational jury could have found that Muñoz agreed to

obtain the chain with Santiago's consent.                        Cf. Ocasio, 

 (holding that Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy requires proof

that the defendant "entered into a conspiracy that had as its

objective the obtaining of property from another conspirator with

his consent and under color of official right").

               Nor    can    we    conclude      that   the    evidence      sufficiently

established that such an agreement was implied.                        In an attempt to

persuade us otherwise, the government points to Ramos' description


                                            - 18 -
of how the corrupt CDU officers would generally "steal money"

during executions of residential search warrants and their general

"understanding" or "agreement" as to how this would be done.               The

district court relied on similar evidence in denying Muñoz's Rule

29 motion.    But, even if we assume, arguendo, that this background

understanding can reasonably be imputed to the specific agreement

between Muñoz and Ramos in May 2015, it does not reflect an

accepted practice of consented-to takings.              As Ramos testified,

the typical practice for residential searches was that officers

would simply "grab" or "take" money or items in view, "put it in

[their] pocket and then continue on with the search warrant."               He

further testified that this would happen even where the victims

were arrested and charged.

             Thus,    even   if   this   general   practice    of   unilateral,

secretive takings were relevant to the specific predicate act at

issue, it does not describe conduct that would constitute extortion

without more.        Without any details about the victims' consent to

these thefts -- or at least their contemporaneous awareness from

which consent can reasonably be inferred -- this testimony reflects

a general practice of simple larceny.              See P.R. Laws Ann., tit.

33, § 4820 ("Any person who without violence or intimidation

illegally    takes     personal    property   belonging   to    another   shall

commit the crime of larceny.").          Compare Camelio v. Am. Fed'n, 

, 671 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of


                                     - 19 -
private RICO action predicated on extortion, where defendant's

"unilateral acts," such as adverse union-related conduct, did not

constitute extortion due to the absence of victim's consent), and

Dickey v. Kennedy, 

 (D. Mass. 2010)

(entering summary judgment against private RICO claims predicated

on health-inspector's purported extortion of property owner's

buildings, where evidence established that the health-inspector

"unilaterally       condemned,          renovated        and     then        sold

property . . . against        the     will     of   or   unbeknownst    of   the

'victims'"), with United States v. Watson, 

, 347-

49   (6th    Cir.   2019)    (affirming        federal   extortion-conspiracy

conviction     against      corrupt    police       officers   where    evidence

established that defendants "did not simply steal drugs and money,"

but rather that "victims agreed to give up their property so that

they could escape arrest").

            By contrast, Ramos also described an alternative method

by which officers would steal money directly from victims at drug

selling points, without a warrant, where they would simply show

up, "catch the people with . . . drugs and money, . . . turn them

around, seize the money . . . [and s]ometimes . . . let them go."

Although     conduct     under      these    circumstances     may     plausibly

constitute extortion, see, e.g., Watson, 778 F. App'x at 347

(affirming federal extortion conviction based on evidence that

corrupt police officers "knew their drug-dealing victims would


                                      - 20 -
fear getting arrested or injured, and [] exploited these fears to

take drugs and money [directly] from them"), there is no evidence

that this is what was specifically agreed upon between Ramos and

Muñoz with respect to their theft from Santiago.                      The drug-

selling-point victims' contemporaneous awareness of, or presence

during,   the      respective    takings     illustrates        the    critical

difference.     That is, consent can reasonably be inferred when a

victim is aware of or at least present during the taking, but the

same cannot be said when property is taken unbeknownst to the

victim.   See Burhoe, 

 (describing consent for

federal    extortion      purposes      as     requiring         "voluntar[y]

abandon[ment]" of property); 3 Wharton's Crim L. § 44:2 (16th ed.,

Nov. 2021 Update) (explaining that "[t]he required mental state

for extortion is the intent to compel another individual to commit

an act against their will").

           Thus,    Ramos's     background   testimony     as    to    possible

extortionate methods and practices used by other CDU officers in

other contexts does not sufficiently prove that Muñoz agreed to

obtain Santiago's chain by extortion.         Given the absence of other

evidence from which a rational jury could find that Muñoz conspired

to extort Santiago, we must reverse his conviction on this basis

alone.    See Burhoe, 

 (reversing RICO conviction

where evidence established "at most one racketeering act").




                                   - 21 -
                                          ii.

           We    further       conclude      that    the     evidence    was        also

insufficient to prove the second predicate act of substantive

extortion,    arising     from      the   June    2015     search   of   Gonzales's

residence.      Much like Muñoz's theft from Santiago, the evidence

established that Muñoz took Gonzalez's money from his kitchen

cabinet and outside his presence.                   That is, the testimony of

Velasquez and Gonzalez established that Muñoz must have taken the

money after Gonzalez was moved to another room and out of sight.

But there was no evidence from which a rational jury could infer

that Gonzalez consented to this surreptitious taking.                       To the

contrary, Gonzalez's testimony, if anything, establishes that he

did not consent to what he suspected might occur once he was

removed from the kitchen, as he verbally protested this movement.

Cf.   Burhoe,    

      (reversing    federal     extortion

conviction where victims' contemporaneous protests established

that the takings were not accomplished with their consent).

           Moreover, evidence that Gonzalez was aware, at the time,

that the money in the cabinet would be taken was equivocal.

Although his testimony supported a reasonable inference that he

suspected it might happen, he was only able to confirm that the

money had in fact been stolen upon later learning that it was

missing and not logged in the warrant return.                        Because this

evidence     "permits    two     equally        plausible    inferences"       as    to


                                      - 22 -
Gonzalez's contemporaneous awareness of the taking, "a reasonable

jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt" about whether

he   had    such    knowledge         and   in     fact     consented    to    the   taking,

particularly given his objection to being moved.                                 Rodríguez-

Martinez, 

 (internal quotes and cites omitted) ("We

'must      reverse       a    conviction      on      the    grounds     of    evidentiary

insufficiency where an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and

a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the

light most favorable to the verdict.'" (quoting United States v.

Woodward, 

 (1st Cir. 1998))).

             Nevertheless, the government contends that Gonzalez's

physical           detainment               sufficiently             establishes          the

"compel[led] . . . delivery" by consent, i.e., he was handcuffed

and escorted out of the kitchen "so that Munoz could . . . take

[the] money."        In other words, it argues that it is enough that

Gonzalez could "not resist" Muñoz's taking and that proof of a

"physical[]        hand       over"    is    not    required.           To    support    this

contention,        the       government     cites     two    cases    that     upheld    RICO

convictions        predicated         on    extortionate       acts     even    though    the

extorted property was not physically exchanged hand-to-hand.                              See

United States v. John-Baptiste, 

 (3d Cir. 2014);

United States v. Ivezaj, 

 (2d Cir. 2009).                              But,

even if we were to accept the proposition that requiring a physical

exchange would be an "overly literal" reading of the word "deliver"


                                             - 23 -
where, for example, the extorted property was intangible, see

Ivezaj,      

,    the   government's   alternative

characterizations of Gonzalez's "surrender" or "relinquish[ment]

[of] control over his property" are not supported by evidence of

his consent.

             In both John-Baptiste and Ivezaj, the victims' consent

to the takings at issue was supportably inferred from evidence of

their voluntary abandonment of the extorted property into the

control of their extortionists.           See John-Baptiste, 

 (affirming federal extortion conviction of police officer,

where evidence established that victim placed money for bribe to

retrieve her impounded car on defendant's patrol car dashboard and

circumstantial evidence established that defendant kept a portion

of it for herself); Ivezaj, 

 (affirming RICO

conviction predicated, in part, on New York extortion violation,

which requires "compel[led] . . . deliver[y]," where crime family

"wrested control of certain illegal gambling operations" from

rival family, i.e., the victim "never returned to [the] gambling

clubs . . . following the [defendant's] assault").

             Here, it is far too speculative to infer from Gonzalez's

testimony that he knew the money was being taken at the time it

occurred and that he voluntarily abandoned control of it to Muñoz.

To the contrary, evidence that Gonzalez objected to being removed

from   the     kitchen    can   only     reasonably   be   interpreted   as


                                   - 24 -
demonstrating that he had not consented to the theft that he

suspected might occur.     And, to the extent Gonzalez's will and

ability to prevent the taking was overborne by his detainment at

Muñoz's direction, this conduct could plausibly amount to robbery,

see 33 L.P.R.A. § 4826 ("tak[ing] . . . property [of] another in

the immediate presence of said person and against his/her will by

means of force"), but not extortion,            3 Wharton's Crim L. § 44:2

(explaining that "[t]he required mental state for extortion is the

intent to compel another individual to commit an act against their

will"), cf. Pueblo v. Rodríguez Berdasco, No. A1CR201900465, 

, at *8-9 (P.R. Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) (citing Wharton's in

aid of construing Puerto Rico false imprisonment statute).

                                     3.

           Finally, we address the government's argument that the

search warrants that precipitated and facilitated Muñoz's thefts

provided   sufficient   evidence    of    the    victims'   consent   to   the

displacement of their property.             Specifically, the government

contends that the victims "consented to what appeared to be a

lawful search of [their] residence[s]" and thereby "relinquished

control over [the] property" that was taken.             Muñoz contends that

applying the Puerto Rico extortion statute in this manner would be

too expansive.    We agree that accepting the government's argument

would   render   "extortion"   under      the   Puerto    Rico   statute   too

expansive to qualify as a federal RICO predicate.


                                   - 25 -
           The   government   cites   no   authority   for     this   broad

proposition that, for extortion purposes, the subject of a search

warrant "consents" to the displacement of any of their property

simply by virtue of submitting to the execution of the warrant.

In any event, even if we accepted the argument that a warrant's

execution results in a consented-to taking of sorts, such consent

could only reasonably encompass items within the scope of the

warrant.   Cf. United States v. Stierhoff, 

 (1st

Cir. 2008) ("The scope of a consensual search is generally defined

by its expressed object, and such a search may not exceed the scope

of the consent given.").        Here, the record is bereft of any

evidence that the search warrants Muñoz utilized purported to

authorize the seizure of the specific items that were taken.          Thus,

no rational jury could conclude that the warrants themselves

induced the victims' consent to the displacement of the property

that Muñoz took.       If anything, the warrants could have only

plausibly induced the victims' consent to the searches themselves

and the seizure of the contraband identified in the warrants, not

the theft of any and all property that the searching officers were

to come upon while executing the search.            Thus, we reject the

government's     contention   that   the   search   warrants    themselves

coupled with the victims' acquiescence to that general show of

authority provided sufficient evidence of their consent to the

allegedly extortionate takings, which were unbeknownst to them at


                                 - 26 -
the time they occurred.

                                 III.

          Having   determined   that    Muñoz's   conviction   rests   on

insufficient evidence that he committed at least two predicate

acts of racketeering, we need not reach his other evidentiary and

sentencing challenges on appeal.    For the reasons discussed above,

we reverse his conviction and remand for disposition consistent

with this opinion.




                                - 27 -