United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 22-1643

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

EDGARDO QUIRÓS-MORALES, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 8, a/k/a Quirito,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Selya, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Marie Killmond, with whom Amelia T.R. Starr, Sharon Katz, Kennedi Williams-Libert, and Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP were on brief, for appellant. Sofia M. Vickery, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Appellate Counsel, were on brief, for appellee. October 4, 2023 SELYA, Circuit Judge. As the name implies, courts of

appeals are courts of review. A judicial system — like the federal

judicial system — functions best when the constituent courts within

that system stay in their own lanes. So when a factbound

determination is committed to the discretion of the district court,

the court of appeals ordinarily should stay its hand and refrain

from making that determination in the first instance. Rather, the

court of appeals should allow the district court to exercise its

discretion and then review the resulting determination. Consonant

with this framework, we vacate the district court's denial of a

prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release filed by

Edgardo Quirós-Morales (Quirós) but deny Quirós's request that we

jump the line and order his compassionate release. We remand the

matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

I

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of

the case.

A

Quirós was a member of a gang involved in the

distribution and sale of a broad array of drugs. On April 10,

1997, Quirós was indicted, along with several co-defendants, on a

charge of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of

heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base and 100 kilograms or more of

- 3 - marijuana. See

(a)(1), 846. On July 15, 1998, a

jury found Quirós guilty as charged.

The district court (Casellas, J.) convened the

disposition hearing on December 11, 1998. According to the factual

recitals in the presentence investigation report (PSI Report),

which the district court adopted for purposes of the hearing,

Quirós served as a "triggerman" for the drug-trafficking gang. In

that capacity, he used firearms "to provide protection to the

leaders of the organization . . . and to engage in shootings

against members of rival drug-trafficking organizations pursuant

to the instructions of the leaders." The PSI Report described two

murders that took place in furtherance of the conspiracy, but

Quirós was not among the individuals listed as participating in

the commission of either murder.

The sentencing guidelines then in effect contained a

cross reference instructing that "[i]f a victim was killed under

circumstances that would constitute murder under

," the first-degree-murder guideline should apply. USSG

§2D1.1(d)(1) (Nov. 1998). Employing this cross-reference, the PSI

Report calculated a base offense level of 43. This calculation,

coupled with a criminal history category of I, yielded a guideline

sentencing range of life imprisonment. The district court accepted

these guideline calculations and sentenced Quirós — who was then

twenty-four years of age — to a term of life imprisonment. We

- 4 - affirmed Quirós's conviction and sentence, noting that "a life

sentence was mandated" by the applicable sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Quirós Morales, No. 99-1115, slip op. at 13 (1st

Cir. Feb. 9, 2001) (unpublished opinion).

B

Over time, Quirós made numerous attempts to obtain post-

conviction relief. We offer a representative sampling of those

attempts.

• In 2002, Quirós moved pro se for post-conviction

relief under

, alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel and arguing in part that the

sentencing court's application of the section

2D1.1(d)(1) murder cross-reference violated

Apprendi v. New Jersey,

(2000)

(holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt"). The district court denied the

section 2255 motion in an unpublished decision,

concluding (among other things) that the Apprendi

rationale did not apply because "the statute under

which [Quirós] was convicted [already] exposed him

to life imprisonment." See Quirós-Morales v.

- 5 - United States, No. 02-2019,

, at *2

(D.P.R. May 24, 2004).

• Following the Supreme Court's watershed decision in

United States v. Booker,

(2005),

Quirós petitioned for a certificate of

appealability, see

(c), based in

part on the contention that his sentence violated

both Apprendi and Booker. We denied his petition

in an unpublished judgment, noting that even if

Booker applied retroactively, "there is no

reasonable indication that Quirós would have

received a lesser sentence in a post-Booker regime

of advisory guidelines."

• Six years later, Quirós sought leave to file a

successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

his sentence. See

. This time,

Quirós grounded his motion on "newly discovered

evidence." That evidence consisted of an affidavit

from Daisy Trevino Ortiz, who had been convicted of

shooting a woman named Marlena Gotay. Quirós

alleged that the affidavit contradicted trial

testimony indicating both that he was involved in

Gotay's murder and that the murder was related to

- 6 - drug trafficking. We denied Quirós's motion in an

unpublished judgment.

C

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act (FSA), which

amended the compassionate-release statute, see

(c)(1)(A), to allow prisoners to file their own motions for

compassionate release, see FSA § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239. On

April 5, 2021, Quirós — through counsel — moved for compassionate

release or, in the alternative, a sentence reduction pursuant to

(c)(1)(A).1 Quirós argued that various factors

supported his motion for compassionate release, including his

youth and lack of criminal history at the time of the offense of

conviction, the disparity between his sentence and those of

similarly situated co-defendants, the lack of danger that he posed

to the community, the fact that under current law he would not be

subject to an automatic life sentence for the same crime, the

absence of any factual basis for the section 2D1.1 murder cross-

reference, his rehabilitation and strong support network, and his

risk of contracting COVID-19 while incarcerated. The government

opposed the motion.

1 Although Quirós describes his requested relief as "a sentence reduction or compassionate release," we have referred interchangeably to such motions as "compassionate-release" and "sentence-reduction" motions. See United States v. Saccoccia,

, 3 n.2 (1st Cir. 2021).

- 7 - Because the original sentencing judge had died, Quirós's

motion was referred to a different trier. The district court

(Domínguez, J.) proceeded to deny Quirós's motion. The court

stated in an electronic order that "[Quirós] has failed to

demonstrate that he suffers from a serious medical condition that

would constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for his

release. Without that showing, [Quirós's] request cannot proceed

as a matter of law." The court further stated that "[i]n any

event, the seriousness of the offense makes him illegible [sic]

for compassionate release as this case relates to drug conspiracy

and a related death by cross murder reference."

This timely appeal ensued.

II

Shortly before the district court ruled, the legal

landscape relating to compassionate release became better defined:

this court decided United States v. Ruvalcaba,

(1st

Cir. 2022). Of particular pertinence for present purposes,

Ruvalcaba held that because the Sentencing Commission had not yet

issued any policy statement applicable to prisoner-initiated

motions for compassionate release, district courts reviewing such

motions had discretion to "consider any complex of circumstances

raised by a defendant as forming an extraordinary and compelling

reason warranting relief," including non-retroactive changes to

the law.

. But briefing on Quirós's compassionate-

- 8 - release motion had already been completed, and neither party called

the Ruvalcaba decision to the district court's attention.

The district court denied the motion for compassionate

release. Hot on the heels of its order, we decided United States

v. Trenkler,

(1st Cir. 2022). There, we fleshed out

our holding in Ruvalcaba and made pellucid that district courts

"may conduct a holistic review to determine whether the

[prisoner's] individualized circumstances, taken in the aggregate,

present an 'extraordinary and compelling' reason to grant

compassionate release."

at 47 (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at

27). We added that the types of appropriate circumstances for

district courts to consider may include alleged sentencing errors,

although "classic post-conviction arguments, without more,"

generally will not succeed in this inquiry. Id. at 48.

Another relevant decision, United States v. Gonzalez,

(1st Cir. 2023), came down after Trenkler. In that

decision, we further elaborated on the scope of the holistic review

permitted by Ruvalcaba and Trenkler, explaining that the district

court need not consider every potential configuration of grounds

for compassionate release but, rather, its analysis "should be

shaped by the arguments advanced by defendants."

.

III

On appeal, Quirós argues that the district court's

denial of his compassionate-release motion flouted the teachings

- 9 - of Ruvalcaba and Trenkler. The government does not put up a fight.

Acknowledging that it is at least unclear whether the district

court employed the appropriate legal standard for assessing

whether a prisoner has presented extraordinary and compelling

reasons for compassionate release, the government has conceded

that the order appealed from should be vacated.

But that is not the end of the matter. While the

government seeks to have us remand the compassionate-release

motion for further consideration by the district court, Quirós

does not want to settle for half a loaf. Instead, he entreats us

either to grant outright the motion for compassionate release or

to instruct the district court, on remand, to grant it.2

A

Before we turn to Quirós's entreaty, some background is

useful. "Th[e] compassionate-release statute carved out a narrow

exception to the general rule that '[a] court may not modify a

term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.'" United States v.

Saccoccia,

(1st Cir. 2021) (quoting

(c)). The statute allows a district court to reduce a term

of imprisonment when extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant

a sentence reduction, such a reduction is consistent with any

2 These are two ways of saying the same thing and — for simplicity's sake — we will treat his prayer as a prayer to have this court order compassionate release.

- 10 - applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,

and consideration of the

(a) factors counsels in

favor of a reduction. See

(c)(1)(A)(i); see also

United States v. Texeira-Nieves,

(1st Cir. 2022).3

Whether a defendant's circumstances are "extraordinary and

compelling" is "guided by the plain meaning of those terms," United

States v. Canales-Ramos,

(1st Cir. 2021), and is

subject to relevant legal constraints.

Before proceeding further, we note two preliminary

matters. First, a prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate

release may be made only after the prisoner has exhausted all

administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons

to bring a motion on his behalf or after thirty days have elapsed

from the relevant facility's receipt of such request. See

(c)(1)(A). The government does not gainsay that

Quirós has satisfied this requirement.

Second, we note that there is no applicable policy

statement currently in effect with respect to a prisoner-initiated

motion for compassionate release. See Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 23.

On April 27, 2023, however, the Sentencing Commission submitted to

3 The compassionate-release statute also allows a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment in two other circumstances. See

(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(2). Those provisions are not implicated in this appeal.

- 11 - Congress proposed amendments to its current policy statement on

compassionate-release motions, which would both extend the

applicability of its policy statement to prisoner-initiated

motions and expand the scope of what can be considered an

extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence

reduction. See United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez,

, 18

n.22 (1st Cir. 2023) (referencing proposed amendments). These

proposed amendments will not become effective unless and until

Congress declines to disapprove, revise, or otherwise modify them

within 180 days from the date of their submission. See

(p).

We "review a district court's denial of a compassionate-

release motion for abuse of discretion." Saccoccia,

. Under this standard, "we review the district court's answers

to legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and

judgment calls with some deference to the district court's exercise

of its discretion."

at 5 (quoting Akebia Therapeutics, Inc.

v. Azar,

(1st Cir. 2020)).

B

Before turning to the beating heart of the appeal — the

remedy to which Quirós is entitled — we pause to make brief mention

of the legal error in the district court's order. Most

importantly, the district court erred in determining that Quirós's

motion had to be denied "as a matter of law" because of his failure

- 12 - "to demonstrate that he suffers from a serious medical condition."

(Emphasis supplied). As we held in Ruvalcaba and elaborated in

Gonzalez, "any complex of circumstances" identified by a prisoner,

subject to whatever constraints have been imposed by Congress or

the courts, may be considered by the district court as a basis for

compassionate release. Gonzalez,

; Ruvalcaba, 26

F.4th at 28. "[T]he only exception to what may constitute an

extraordinary and compelling reason, as made explicit by Congress,

is rehabilitation." Trenkler,

& n.11 (footnote

omitted); see

(t). In view of these authorities,

it is apparent that the district court prematurely concluded that

Quirós's compassionate-release motion could not proceed as a

matter of law.

Because "[a] district court by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law," Koon v. United States,

(1996), we agree with the parties that the

decision below cannot stand.4 We must, therefore, vacate the

challenged order.

4 Quirós argues that the district court made a second legal error by stating that "[i]n any event, the seriousness of [Quirós's] offense makes him illegible [sic] for compassionate release as this case relates to drug conspiracy and a related death by cross murder reference." To the extent that this statement could be read to imply that Quirós's particular crime of conviction poses a categorical bar to compassionate release, we agree with Quirós that no such categorical bar currently exists. Reading the statement in context, though, it is unclear whether the district court intended to assert such a categorical bar or merely meant to

- 13 - C

Quirós insists that we should go the extra mile and grant

his motion for compassionate release. We think not. As we explain

below, the district court, not this court, is the appropriate forum

for consideration of such a first-instance determination.

The district court enjoys a "wide compass" of discretion

when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for compassionate

release. Canales-Ramos,

(describing district

court's decision to deny compassionate release as "a judgment

call"); see Texeira-Nieves,

(affording deference to

denial of compassionate-release motion when "district court

weigh[ed] the relevant considerations and ma[de] a reasonable

judgment call"). We believe that it would be both unbecoming and

contrary to the basic principles of appellate review for us to

usurp the district court's prerogative, decide the motion without

the benefit of the district court's insights, and simply substitute

our judgment for that of the district court. Where, as here, a

district court must formulate a sentencing decision that requires

it to "make a refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the

outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience

invoke the seriousness of Quirós's conviction as weighing against compassionate release on these specific facts. Certainly, the gravity of the underlying offense is relevant to a judge's consideration when deciding a compassionate-release motion. See, e.g., Saccoccia,

.

- 14 - in criminal sentencing," it has "an institutional advantage" that

an appellate court cannot match.5 Koon,

; see United

States v. Cruzado-Laureano,

(1st Cir. 2005)

(explaining that for an appellate court to "do[] the sentencing"

in lieu of a district court would not be "an appropriate allocation

of functions").

In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, Quirós

argues that "[t]his is a case where the District Court simply

applied the governing standard incorrectly" so that "remand to the

District Court with instructions to apply that standard again"

would be unlikely to "yield a different result." This argument

fails on at least two levels. For one thing, the record before us

is much more tenebrous than Quirós suggests: for aught that

appears, the district court did not apply the correct standard at

all — and the better practice is to afford it the opportunity to

do so in the first instance. For another thing, even if the

district court had misapplied the correct legal standard, an open-

ended remand would be the preferable course. After all, the

allocation of functions between trial and appellate courts

strongly suggests that the district court ought to be afforded the

5 To be sure, there may be unusual circumstances in which this general rule would not apply. This case, however, fits comfortably within the general rule, not within the long-odds exception to it.

- 15 - opportunity to apply that standard in the first instance, armed

with a clearer understanding of its proper application.

Quirós undervalues both the district court's

institutional competence and the desirability of allowing the

district court to make a first-instance determination. In staking

out his position, he relies heavily on the decision in United

States v. Malone,

(4th Cir. 2023). There, a divided

panel of the Fourth Circuit eschewed any need to obtain the

district court's views and directed the district court to grant

the appellant's motion for compassionate release. See

.

In that case, however, the appellant's compassionate-release

motion was especially urgent because of his advanced age and grave

health conditions. See

. What is more, the appellant

had already been placed in temporary home confinement due to his

special susceptibility to death or serious illness from COVID-19,

and he made a persuasive case that he was unable to receive

government benefits (such as Medicaid) while in temporary home

confinement. See

. To add a further complication, his

health was in steep decline. See

. Recognizing these

"dire circumstances," the majority reversed the denial of

compassionate release and remanded with instructions to grant the

compassionate-release motion.6

.

6Through a letter submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), Quirós has also called our attention to

- 16 - In our view, the Malone decision is a product of unique

circumstances, and Quirós's case is at a far remove from it.

Quirós is in his late forties and appears to be in stable health.

Unlike in Malone, Quirós has neither presented a near-conclusive

case for compassionate release nor made a convincing showing of

special urgency, counselling in favor of immediate action.

Here, Quirós's arguments for compassionate release are

multilayered and require careful parsing of the record. Moreover,

the district court never undertook an evaluation of the

(a) factors. Such an evaluation is an important component

of the compassionate-release process, and the district court is

better positioned than this court to perform that evaluation.

To write at greater length would be to paint the lily.

What Judge Harris wrote in Malone fits this case like a glove:

"There may be cases where, in the end, no analysis or explanation

could persuade us that compassionate relief was appropriately

denied. But before we put this case into that category, [we

should] allow the district court to consider the full record under

the proper framework." Malone,

(Harris, J.,

concurring in part).

the Fourth Circuit's later decision in United States v. Brown,

(4th Cir. 2023). The majority opinion in Brown is of a piece with the majority opinion in Malone, see

(Quattlebaum, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of "usurp[ing] the district court's assigned responsibility"), and does not require any additional analysis.

- 17 - IV

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the district court's order denying the motion for compassionate

release is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and Remanded.

- 18 -