United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 22-1875

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

MICHEL D'ANGELO, a/k/a Karma,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. Nancy Torresen, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Kayatta, Thompson, and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

Kevin E. Lerman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Rachel Brill, Federal Public Defender, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were on brief, for appellant.

Jeanne D. Semivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

July 30, 2024 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Michel D'Angelo ("D'Angelo")

appeals the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate

release. He argues that the district court erred in evaluating

whether extraordinary and compelling reasons and the factors in

(a) favored reducing his sentence. At bottom, he

contends that the district court overprioritized his potential for

dangerousness when it denied his motion under § 3553(a). We

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Original Offense Conduct and Proceedings

D'Angelo robbed Kennebunk Savings Bank in Berwick, Maine

on September 21, 2012. His girlfriend, Jennica, had dropped him

off at the bank that morning. Disguised in a long brown wig,

sunglasses, a purse, red sweatshirt, pink sweatpants, and with a

screwdriver in his pocket, D'Angelo approached the counter. He

told the bank teller that he had a bomb in his purse, warned that

he would detonate it if the teller set off the alarm, and demanded

money. Terrified, the teller complied. D'Angelo stole $1,298 and

fled. To divert law enforcement, Jennica twice called 911 during

the robbery and lied about being stabbed across town.

D'Angelo and Jennica were arrested and then indicted in

the District of Maine. On February 13, 2014, D'Angelo pleaded

guilty to one count of bank robbery,

(a).

- 3 - Before D'Angelo's sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office

prepared a presentence investigation report ("PSR"). The PSR

listed his criminal history, beginning at age seventeen. He

committed burglary, theft, disorderly conduct, criminal

threatening, multiple assaults, and trafficking in prison

contraband, among other crimes. The PSR assigned him criminal

history points for two particular offenses: assaulting a police

officer and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon. Because

the PSR treated these offenses as "crimes of violence," it

designated D'Angelo a "career offender" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

This designation raised his offense level from twenty-nine to

thirty-two, his criminal history category from V to VI, and his

suggested imprisonment range to 210 to 240 months.1

The PSR described D'Angelo's medical and mental health

history in detail. When D'Angelo was four years old, he fell from

a second-level porch and fractured his skull. This "annihilated"

his brain's impulse control center. D'Angelo's injury caused

seizures, and he suffered more head injuries throughout his

life -- including being hit in the head with a pipe and colliding

with a tree in a car traveling over eighty miles per hour -- which

aggravated his seizures. D'Angelo also struggled with significant

1Although the high end of D'Angelo's advisory Guidelines range was 262 months, bank robbery carries a 240-month maximum term of imprisonment.

(a).

- 4 - mental health disorders and substance abuse. Throughout his life,

D'Angelo often attempted suicide, was admitted to psychiatric

hospitals, and engaged in severe self-harm.

The district court sentenced D'Angelo on June 20, 2014.

The bank tellers testified, describing how D'Angelo shattered

their sense of security. Afterwards, the district court calculated

D'Angelo's advisory Guidelines range as we described above and

noted that he "qualified as a career offender." The government

pushed for a 240-month sentence, predicated mostly on "the need to

protect the public from [D'Angelo's] further crimes" due to his

offense conduct, lengthy criminal history, and alcohol and drug

abuse, which the government argued made him unpredictable.

D'Angelo's counsel sought a downward variance to 144 months'

imprisonment, citing D'Angelo's brain injury.

The district court varied downward to 180 months'

imprisonment. To reach this figure, the district court first

accounted for, among D'Angelo's life's many difficulties, his

brain injury and mental health. But the district court also

described the "absolute terror" that his "serious offense" caused

the victims and how his "criminal history [was] really longer than

[the judge's] arm." The district court again described D'Angelo

as a "career offender" under the Guidelines and mentioned that his

"life from age [sixteen] to today has just been one scrape with

the law after another." It also factored in his drug abuse with

- 5 - his medical and mental health history, describing this combination

as a "perfect storm." To achieve "balance" between D'Angelo's

"struggles" and the need "to protect the public," the district

court varied downward by two points to account for, among other

things, D'Angelo's guilty plea and "serious

psychological . . . problems." It thus arrived at an imprisonment

range between 168 to 210 months and imposed 180 months'

imprisonment followed by five years' supervised release.

B. Post-Sentencing Proceedings

D'Angelo appealed his sentence unsuccessfully. United

States v. D'Angelo,

(1st Cir. 2015). He filed

equally unsuccessful post-conviction motions, including a motion

to vacate his sentence under

. D'Angelo v. United

States, No. 19-2091,

, at *1 (1st Cir. May 10,

2021); D'Angelo v. United States, No. 2:13-cr-00114,

, at *1 (D. Me. Nov. 16, 2021).

D'Angelo applied for a second or successive § 2255

motion on October 25, 2021, based on the Supreme Court's decision

in Borden v. United States,

(2021). See Motion for

Second or Successive 2255, D'Angelo v. United States, No. 21-1870,

at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2021). In Borden, the Supreme Court held

that "violent felon[ies]" under the "elements" clause of the Armed

Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"),

(e)(2)(B)(i), do not

include offenses criminalizing reckless conduct.

.

- 6 - Because decisions interpreting "violent felonies" under the ACCA

inform how we construe "crimes of violence" under the Guidelines

and vice versa, see United States v. Faust,

(1st

Cir. 2017), D'Angelo argued that Borden, if it applied

retroactively, affected his career offender-predicate convictions.

Motion, D'Angelo, at *1. We denied his application because

D'Angelo did not show that the Supreme Court in Borden declared a

"new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court." D'Angelo v. United

States, No. 21-1870, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2021) (emphases

added) (quoting

(h)(2)).

D'Angelo then moved for compassionate release in the

district court on February 28, 2022, amending that motion on

April 27, 2022. He argued again that, if he were sentenced after

Borden, then one of his predicate offenses would not have been a

"crime of violence" and he would have faced a different advisory

Guidelines calculation. He contended that "[h]is offense level

would have been [twenty-nine]," "his criminal history level would

have been V," and, in 2013, his range of imprisonment would have

been "140-174 months" before the district court's two-point

downward variance. With that variance, his range would have been

120-150 months.

D'Angelo also claimed that his mental health, brain

injuries, history of seizures, and poor medical treatment in the

- 7 - Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") were extraordinary and compelling

reasons for release. He contended that the BOP ignored his mental

health issues and failed to prevent him from harming himself or

attempting suicide several times. Further, he argued that he would

not pose a danger to the community if released, pointed to his

lack of recent disciplinary history and taking classes in BOP

custody, and stressed that his reduced remaining term of

imprisonment -- only 30% of 180 months -- favored a sentence

reduction.

The government opposed. Besides disputing D'Angelo's

proposed extraordinary and compelling reasons, the government

advanced D'Angelo's risk of dangerousness to the community and the

§ 3553(a) factors as reasons to deny his motion. Pointing to

D'Angelo's violent criminal conduct and lengthy criminal history,

the government urged the district court to deny a sentence

reduction based on his potential dangerousness. And, under

§ 3553(a), the government noted D'Angelo's serious offense, high

risk of recidivism, and lengthy disciplinary history from 2014 to

2020 while incarcerated. The government claimed that several

§ 3553(a) factors -- the seriousness of the offense, promoting

respect for the law, providing just punishment, and affording

adequate deterrence -- weighed against granting the motion.

The district court denied the motion. It first analyzed

D'Angelo's proposed extraordinary and compelling reasons in

- 8 - isolation. As relevant to our analysis, the district court

acknowledged that D'Angelo would not be a career offender

post-Borden and agreed with his proposed lower Guidelines

calculation. Yet it concluded that this "classic post-conviction

argument[], without more," was neither extraordinary nor

compelling. That said, weighing his reasons holistically, the

district court found that D'Angelo came much "closer to presenting

extraordinary and compelling circumstances."

But, without deciding whether he met this threshold, the

district court concluded that D'Angelo "stumble[d] at the

[§] 3553(a) factors." It then listed these factors before

signaling that it was most concerned with § 3553(a)(2)(C), "the

need 'to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.'"

To assuage this concern, the district court sought "reasonable

assurance that . . . D'Angelo would not pose a danger to the

community if released." To that end, D'Angelo's "violent" offense

conduct -- robbing a bank while carrying a screwdriver,

threatening to set off a bomb, and relying on his girlfriend to

divert law enforcement -- and significant criminal history did not

favor a sentence reduction. And the district court further noted

D'Angelo had "been punished for at least eighteen infractions"

while incarcerated, some of which were seriously violent. Although

it recognized that D'Angelo improved his behavior over the past

two years, the district court remained concerned because the BOP

- 9 - sanctioned him for possessing an unauthorized item a few months

before his motion. Lastly, the district court empathized with

D'Angelo's mental health struggles and brain injuries, reasoning

that these likely spurred his "crimes and prison infractions."

Yet "those very conditions impact[ed] [D'Angelo's] dangerousness,"

so the district court "simply [could not] conclude that, if

released, . . . D'Angelo would no longer pose a danger to the

community."

This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

"We review a district court's denial or grant of a

compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion. Questions

of law are reviewed de novo and findings of fact are reviewed for

clear error." United States v. Gonzalez,

(1st

Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Trenkler,

(1st Cir. 2022)).

A. Legal Framework

The First Step Act of 2018,

Stat. 5194, modified

, the compassionate release

statute. Now, district courts may grant prisoner-initiated

compassionate release motions once movants "fully exhaust[]" their

administrative remedies with the BOP.

(c)(1)(A).

The compassionate release statute outlines three steps:

(1) there are "extraordinary and compelling reasons" that warrant

- 10 - a sentence reduction; (2) "such a reduction is consistent with

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission";

and (3) "after considering the factors set forth in [§] 3553(a) to

the extent that they are applicable," the court finds, in its

discretion, that the particular circumstances of the case justify

reducing the defendant's sentence. Id. A district court may grant

a compassionate release motion only if it finds that the movant

satisfies each step. See United States v. Ruvalcaba,

,

18-19 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Saccoccia,

(1st Cir. 2021). And it must deny the motion if that movant fails

at any step. See United States v. Texeira-Nieves,

(1st Cir. 2022); United States v. Wright,

(9th

Cir. 2022). It need not address the other steps if one is not

met, but we encourage district courts to go the extra mile. See

Texeira-Nieves,

.

One wrinkle is worth explaining. Step two requires that

a sentence reduction be consistent with "applicable policy

statements" from the Sentencing Commission.

(c)(1)(A). We held in Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 19-24, that

the relevant policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 -- as it existed

at the time of D'Angelo's motion -- is not "applicable" and thus

does not constrain a district court when it rules on

prisoner-initiated motions. For this appeal, that holding means

that the three-step test stated above is really two steps: A

- 11 - district court must find that (1) extraordinary and compelling

reasons and (2) the applicable factors under § 3553(a), on balance

and applied to the defendant, warrant a sentence reduction.

Even so, this "policy statement -- though not

'applicable' -- nonetheless may serve as a non-binding reference."

Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 23 (collecting cases). This non-binding

policy statement required the district court here to determine,

among other things, that "the defendant is not a danger to the

safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in

(g)."2 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2) (2018).

A district court faced with a compassionate release

motion has ample, yet not boundless, discretion at both steps.

District courts "may consider any complex of circumstances raised

by a defendant as forming an extraordinary and compelling reason

warranting relief." Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 28. Because "the whole

may be greater than the sum of its parts," district courts must

"be mindful of the holistic context of a defendant's individual

case when deciding whether the defendant's circumstances satisfy

the 'extraordinary and compelling' standard." Trenkler,

. Yet this standard is "narrow" and "stringent,"

at

2 The 2023 Guidelines, effective November 1, 2023, amended § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023). Now, § 1B1.13 applies to prisoner-initiated compassionate release motions and expands what can qualify as an extraordinary and compelling circumstance for release. See id. D'Angelo moved for compassionate release before this amendment, so it did not apply below.

- 12 - 48 n.14, because whether a reason is "extraordinary and compelling"

"is logically guided by the plain meaning of those terms,"

Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 23 (quoting United States v. Canales Ramos,

(1st Cir. 2021)).

As we previewed, even if a defendant shows "that there

are extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting a

reduced sentence," that motion "may still be denied . . . 'solely

on the basis of [the district court's] supportable determination

that the [§] 3553(a) factors weigh against the granting of such

relief.'" United States v. Ayala-Vázquez,

(1st

Cir. 2024) (quoting Texeira-Nieves,

). Generally,

the same ground rules we apply for a sentencing appeal premised on

§ 3553(a) apply when we review a compassionate release appeal under

§ 3553(a). See Saccoccia,

; Texeira-Nieves,

. How a district court weighs the § 3553(a) factors is a

"traditional exercise of [its] discretion" -- discretion that

springs from its "vantage point and day-to-day experience in

criminal sentencing." United States v. De La Cruz,

(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Koon v. United States,

(1996)). The district court "has access to, and greater

familiarity with, the individual case and the individual

defendant" than we do, so it possesses "an institutional advantage

over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations"

- 13 - that deserves some deference. Gall v. United States,

(2007) (internal quotations omitted).

Our review is not "overly searching." Concepcion v.

United States,

(2022). We ask whether we can

"discern to some extent a district court's reasoning" for why it

ruled as it did under § 3553(a), Texeira-Nieves,

,

and if that ruling had "a reasoned basis," Chavez-Meza v. United

States,

(2018) (quoting Rita v. United States,

(2007)). We are mindful in this review that

"the 'law leaves much' to 'the [district court's] own professional

judgment'" on how much to say. Chavez-Meza,

(quoting Rita,

). "[A] district court is not

required to be persuaded by every argument parties make, and it

may, in its discretion, dismiss arguments that it does not find

compelling without a detailed explanation. Nor is a district court

required to articulate anything more than a brief statement of

reasons." Concepcion,

. Even where the district

court's explanation leaves much to the imagination, "we consider

the entire context and record," and can often infer the district

court's reasoning "by comparing what was argued by the

parties . . . with what" the district court decided.

Texeira-Nieves,

.

Section 3553(a) commands broadly that a district court's

ruling on a compassionate release motion should reflect that the

- 14 - sentence remains "sufficient, but not greater than necessary."

(a). Following that principle requires the district

court to weigh several enumerated factors, not all of which carry

weight in every case. See

§ 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v.

Flores-Machicote,

(1st Cir. 2013). Accordingly,

"'[m]erely raising potentially mitigating factors does not

guarantee' a favorable decision." Saccoccia,

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Dávila-González,

(1st Cir. 2010)). A district

court does not have to "tick off each and every factor in a

mechanical sequence," Saccoccia,

, nor must it craft

an explanation that is "precise to the point of pedantry," United

States v. Merced-García,

(1st Cir. 2022) (quoting

United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez,

(1st Cir.

2014)). Rather, "the sentencing court need only identify the main

factors behind its decision," Merced-García,

, and

"we presume -- absent some contrary indication -- that a

sentencing court considered all the mitigating factors and that

those not specifically mentioned were simply unpersuasive,"

Saccoccia,

.

- 15 - B. D'Angelo's Arguments

The district court denied D'Angelo's motion under

§ 3553(a). We thus focus on D'Angelo's arguments related to the

district court's § 3553(a)-based ruling.

1. Dangerousness

D'Angelo centers his argument on the district court's

discussion of his potential dangerousness. He seizes on its

statement that it needed "reasonable assurance" that he "would not

pose a danger to the community if released." D'Angelo argues that

this statement shows that the district court believed that he

carried the burden "to [prove] that he [was] no longer a danger to

the community" before proving why he was entitled to a sentence

reduction under § 3553(a). He thus contends that the district

court erred because it "conduct[ed] a single-factor

analysis . . . far stricter" than § 3553(a), and that "focused

exclusively on danger."

We rejected a similar argument in United States v.

Ayala-Vázquez.

. There, the defendant argued that

the district court erred because he contended that it denied his

motion "solely on the requirement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2) that

a defendant not be a 'danger to the safety of any other person or

the community'" rather than § 3553(a). Id. We disagreed. Id.

"While the District Court did refer to § 1B1.13 in its discussion

of Ayala's medical conditions," it "cited to § 3553(a) in its

- 16 - subsequent conclusion as to Ayala's dangerousness." Id. Its

"express[] cit[ation] to § 3553(a)" permitted us to conclude that,

absent some contrary indication, it independently relied on

§ 3553(a) to conclude that Ayala posed a danger to the community.

Id.

So too here. In reaching its conclusion, the district

court noted that D'Angelo faltered at the § 3553(a) factors and

singled out § 3553(a)(2)(C) before denying the motion. Its

statements invoking § 3553(a) are "entitled to some weight."

United States v. Clogston,

(1st Cir. 2011)

(quoting Dávila-González,

). And while D'Angelo

makes much of the district court's "reasonable assurance"

language, the district court "expressly cited to § 3553(a)" in the

same passage before discussing D'Angelo's violent offense conduct,

criminal history, and personal circumstances. Ayala-Vázquez,

. We gather that it meant what it said: It denied the

motion under § 3553(a) because D'Angelo posed a danger to the

community if released. See, e.g., Saccoccia,

(rejecting the defendant's argument that the district court

ignored many § 3553(a) factors when it stated that compassionate

release "would send the wrong message both to [Saccoccia] and to

society" because it stated that it denied the motion on "the

'balance' of the factors").

- 17 - Tying D'Angelo's potential dangerousness to

§ 3553(a)(2)(C) was reasonable. That factor concerns public

protection, a concept that necessarily entails the danger that a

defendant poses to the community. Cf. United States v. Avalos

Banderas,

(8th Cir. 2022) ("That the inmate

presented a potential danger to the public if released is also a

permissible consideration." (citing

(a)(2)(C)));

United States v. Sherwood,

(6th Cir. 2021)

(recognizing that a district court may consider a defendant's

"propensity to be a danger to the community upon release" under

§ 3553(a)(2)); United States v. Townsend,

(7th

Cir. 2024) (describing § 3553(a)(2)(C) as concerning "public

protection" or "[d]anger to the public"). A district court

therefore does not err when it considers a compassionate release

movant's potential dangerousness under § 3553(a).

Accordingly, the district court did not err here.

D'Angelo committed a frightening and life-endangering offense, had

a significant criminal history, and accumulated a tumultuous

disciplinary record while incarcerated. So, the district court

could reasonably conclude that, if released, he posed a danger to

the community per § 3553(a)(2)(C). Its denial premised on this

point fell within its discretion. See Ayala-Vázquez,

(affirming where the district court concluded that, based on

the defendant's criminal record, he remained a danger to the

- 18 - community and thus denied his compassionate release motion);

Texeira-Nieves,

.

To the extent D'Angelo believes that the district

court's focus on dangerousness suggests that it overlooked the

remaining § 3553(a) factors and his arguments for release (such as

his mental health and BOP treatment), we disagree. "Merely raising

potentially mitigating factors" will not guarantee a sentence

reduction, and D'Angelo cannot assume that his "failure to persuade

the court . . . implies that the mitigating factors he cites were

overlooked." United States v. Santa-Soler,

(1st

Cir. 2021). Rather, the record shows us that the district court

considered his arguments and § 3553(a) as a whole yet identified

public protection as the "main factor[] behind its decision."

Merced-García,

(quoting United States v.

Vargas-García,

(1st Cir. 2015)).

The district court discussed, in thorough detail, the

factors that D'Angelo raised for release throughout its order. In

doing so, it also acknowledged that D'Angelo's mental health

struggles and brain injury likely led him to commit crime because

they affected his impulse control. Still, "those very conditions

impact[ed] his dangerousness," so the district court was

unconvinced that reducing D'Angelo's sentence was appropriate

under § 3553(a). Even if the district court did not reiterate

which factors and evidence favored D'Angelo precisely before its

- 19 - conclusion under § 3553(a), the compassionate release statute does

not require district courts to be "precise to the point of

pedantry." Merced-García,

; see Concepcion,

. We discern from its order that the district court

implicitly weighed all the relevant factors and evidence, yet

reasonably concluded that D'Angelo's potential dangerousness under

§ 3553(a) outweighed all else.3

Were we to need more (we do not), we could consider that

the district judge who presided below originally sentenced

D'Angelo. Her "intimate knowledge of the offense of conviction

and [D'Angelo's] history and characteristics" informed how she

carefully balanced his offense conduct, lengthy criminal history,

record while incarcerated, and tragic mental health and medical

history. Texeira-Nieves,

. We afford a

"considerable measure of respect" to her decision to conclude that

the same balance at sentencing -- between D'Angelo's life's

"struggles" and the need "to protect the public" -- favored

3D'Angelo contends that because the government "argued for a binary dangerousness test aside from [the] § 3553(a) factors," we should intuit its reasoning into the district court's order. But the government also argued that a sentence reduction would undermine the seriousness of the offense and not promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or afford adequate deterrence. See

(a)(2)(A)-(B). Comparing this § 3553(a)-based argument with the district court's § 3553(a)-based conclusion further proves that the district court based its denial on § 3553(a). See, e.g., Texeira-Nieves,

.

- 20 - denying D'Angelo's motion.

(quoting United States v.

Aponte-Guzmán,

(1st Cir. 2012)).

D'Angelo's next argument is equally unpersuasive. He

believes that the district court's citation to United States v.

West, No. 2:15-cr-00168,

, at *1 (D. Me. Mar. 29,

2022), proves reversible error. He contends that West is one of

many orders from the district court "adopting a heightened

dangerousness test" rooted in § 1B1.13 that made potential

dangerousness its own threshold. His argument misapprehends how

we review compassionate release appeals.

Like a sentencing appeal, we look at the context and the

record to determine whether the district court "adequately

explain[ed]" its decision "to allow for meaningful appellate

review." Chavez-Meza,

(quoting Gall,

). The district court made clear that it was concerned with

D'Angelo's risk of danger to the community as it pertained to

§ 3553(a)(2)(C) -- the factor it cited. Indeed, it referenced

D'Angelo's violent offense conduct, lengthy criminal history,

disciplinary record in prison, and mental health issues after

citing § 3553(a)(2)(C). We discern that it grounded its ruling in

§ 3553(a) notwithstanding its citation to West.

But if we dig as deep as D'Angelo demands, the district

court's order survives scrutiny. West (written by the same

district judge) also relied on §§ 3553(a) and 3553(a)(2)(C) to

- 21 - deny a motion for a sentence reduction. See West,

,

at *1 ("I must also consider whether a sentencing modification

accords with the § 3553(a) factors, and as a part of that analysis,

I must evaluate whether Mr. West would pose a danger to the

community were he released."). By drawing attention to West,

D'Angelo only highlights that the district court here denied his

motion under § 3553(a) based on his potential dangerousness if

released (as it said).

Resisting this conclusion, D'Angelo urges us to

recognize that West also quoted United States v. Whindleton, No.

2:13-cr-00064,

, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 10, 2020).

West's quotation from Whindleton stated that "because [the

district court found] that Mr. West does 'remain[] a danger to the

community, and thus that compassionate release is not warranted,'"

then it did not need to "conduct the remainder of the analysis."

West,

, at *1 (quoting Whindleton,

,

at *3). D'Angelo cites this as proof that the district court

analyzed "dangerousness" separate from § 3553(a).

But this argument places more weight on the district

court's citation to West than it can bear. D'Angelo does not

meaningfully address how the district court's order undermines his

reading: citing to § 3553(a)(2)(C), stating that it denied his

motion under § 3553(a), and considering his mental health history,

criminal record, and offense conduct specifically under § 3553(a).

- 22 - Nor does he address West's reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(C). We refuse

to ignore this context and place the emphasis on West's stray

quotation as D'Angelo demands.

Relatedly, we reject as significant D'Angelo's

assumption that the district court viewed itself as

"constrain[ed]" by § 1B1.13 because it denied his motion based on

his potential dangerousness if released. We explained why, like

Ayala-Vázquez, the record contradicts D'Angelo's premise.

. But even accepting his premise for argument's sake,

he does not show reversible error. A district court's independent

conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors favor denying a

compassionate release motion insulates its error in treating the

policy statement as binding. See id.; Texeira-Nieves,

. That principle follows from the compassionate release

statute's conjunctive structure.

(c)(1)(A); see

Wright,

; United States v. Elias,

(6th Cir. 2021). The record reveals that the district court denied

D'Angelo's motion under § 3553(a). Even if the district court

believed the applicable policy statement to be binding, its

independent, § 3553(a)-based denial made that belief harmless.

See, e.g., Texeira-Nieves,

; Wright,

(finding that the district court's conclusion that § 1B1.13 was

binding harmless because it "properly relied" on § 3553(a) "as an

alternative basis").

- 23 - 2. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Because the district court properly denied D'Angelo's

motion under § 3553(a), we ordinarily would not need to discuss

its extraordinary-and-compelling analysis. See Texeira-Nieves,

. That said, D'Angelo alleges that the district court's

alleged analytical errors at that step tainted its § 3553(a)

rationale.4 He analogizes "an incorrect extraordinary and

compelling classification" to "a court's erroneous [G]uideline

calculation." An erroneous Guideline calculation is a significant

procedural error warranting remand unless the district court or

the record make clear that the court found the sentence appropriate

despite the Guidelines range. See United States v. Monson,

(1st Cir. 2023). D'Angelo thus argues that we should

remand due to the district court's alleged errors at the

extraordinary-and-compelling-reasons step.

We are unpersuaded. The compassionate release statute

and relevant case law are abundantly clear: A district court may

deny a compassionate release motion if a defendant fails at any

step, notwithstanding that court's analytical mistake at another

step. See

(c)(1)(A); Ayala-Vázquez,

; Texeira-Nieves,

; Wright,

; United

4 Those alleged errors consisted of assuming that extraordinary and compelling circumstances excluded circumstances known at sentencing, and failing to treat Borden's change of law as such a circumstance.

- 24 - States v. Tomes,

(6th Cir. 2021). The

district court denied the motion under § 3553(a) alone -- as its

decision and the record reflect. Cf. Monson,

(affirming where the district court "explicitly stated its intent

to uncouple the sentence from the Guidelines"). Because we find

no error in its § 3553(a) analysis, then the particular errors

D'Angelo alleges in the court's failure to find extraordinary and

compelling circumstances are of no moment.

D'Angelo presses a related point worth mentioning. If

he were sentenced after Borden, then he would have faced a lower

Guidelines range. Thus, he claims that "the district court had no

occasion to consider the newly applicable range" when it denied

his motion under § 3553(a). And, according to him, this was error

because a district court operating under § 3553(a) must first

calculate the revised Guidelines range before conducting "an

individualized assessment based on the facts presented." Gall,

.

The record belies his argument. The district court

recognized that had it sentenced D'Angelo at the time of his

motion, "he would not have qualified as a career offender, and he

would have been sentenced under a lower [G]uideline range." It

then correctly calculated this lower Guidelines range before

explaining why § 3553(a) did not favor reducing D'Angelo's

sentence. Because the district court performed its § 3553(a)

- 25 - analysis after assuming that the career-offender enhancement would

not apply, we gather from context that it implicitly considered

that Guidelines range as part of its analysis. See, e.g., United

States v. Warren,

(10th Cir. 2022)

(affirming denial of the defendant's First Step Act motion where

the district court assumed that the career-offender designation

would not apply if the defendant were resentenced but found that

the § 3553(a) factors did not favor a sentence reduction). It

thus did not make the mistake that D'Angelo accuses it of making.5

III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm.

5 D'Angelo implies that the district court needed to restate his Guidelines recalculation in its § 3553(a) analysis to prove that it really considered it under § 3553(a). "Judges are not required to repeat themselves." United States v. Miedzianowski,

(7th Cir. 2023). The district court acknowledged D'Angelo's revised Guidelines range before explaining, in adequate detail, why the § 3553(a) factors did not favor reducing his sentence. That was enough here. See, e.g., id. (rejecting a similar argument concerning the defendant's First Step Act motion where "[t]he court's order show[ed] that the judge considered the current statutory ranges" before it denied a sentence reduction under § 3553(a)); cf. United States v. Akridge,

(6th Cir. 2023) (district court was not required to expressly consider non-retroactive changes affecting the defendant's career-offender designation under § 3553(a) because it declined to reduce the defendant's sentence based on his criminal history, serious offense conduct, and post-sentencing disciplinary record).

- 26 -