United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1959

JOSE VICENTE PENAFIEL-PERALTA; MONICA LOURDES CASTRO-PINDA; G.E.P.C.,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Gelpí, Thompson, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

Kristian R. Meyer, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and MacMurray and Associates were on brief, for petitioners. Allison Frayer, Senior Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Jennifer Khouri, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent.

August 12, 2024 THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. A land dispute between Jose

Vicente Penafiel-Peralta ("Penafiel-Peralta") and his sister

Sandra Penafiel ("Sandra") ended with Penafiel-Peralta, his wife

Monica Lourdes Castro-Pineda ("Castro-Pineda"),1 and their minor

son G.E.P.C. being forced from their home in El Triunfo, Ecuador.

Certain they had nowhere else to go in Ecuador, Penafiel-Peralta,

Castro-Pineda, and G.E.P.C. fled to the United States, where

Penafiel-Peralta applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), listing

Castro-Pineda and G.E.P.C. as derivatives of his asylum

application.2 An Immigration Judge ("IJ"), though, denied those

applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" and,

collectively with the IJ, "the agency") then affirmed that denial

1 For consistency with the spelling included on the cover pages of the parties' briefing, we use "Castro-Pinda" in this opinion's cover page as well. That said, it appears the correct spelling is "Castro-Pineda" so that's what we'll use throughout the body of today's opinion. 2 To break down that legalese, when we say "derivative," we are referring to the fact that "[w]hen a noncitizen has been granted asylum, immigration law allows their spouse and children (who meet certain statutory criteria) to be granted asylum as derivatives." Cabrera v. Garland,

, 315 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024). So here, Castro-Pineda and G.E.P.C. sought asylum as derivative beneficiaries of Penafiel-Peralta's asylum application. However, because immigration law does not provide for derivative withholding of removal or derivative CAT protection, and because Castro-Pineda and G.E.P.C. did not file their own separate applications for immigration relief, "any decision on [Penafiel-Peralta's] applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection (either a grant or a denial) do not apply to them."

- 2 - on appeal. A petition for review with this court followed, with

Penafiel-Peralta, Castro-Pineda, and G.E.P.C. (collectively,

"Petitioners") asking us to reverse the agency's determinations

and grant them immigration relief. For reasons we'll explain

shortly, that's a request we cannot grant, so we deny the petition.

HOW THE CASE GOT TO US

Drawing the facts from the administrative record,3 Caz

v. Garland,

, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2023), here's the

complete picture of how Petitioners' case made its way to us.

Life and Land Dispute in Ecuador

Penafiel-Peralta grew up in El Triunfo, Ecuador, farming

land that his family owned. When he was about twenty-five years

old, he met Castro-Pineda and they quickly became serious. They

married each other on December 29, 2010 and moved in together,

"first living in a room." After a few years of marriage,

Castro-Pineda became pregnant and gave birth to their son,

G.E.P.C., in December 2016. With a newborn now in the mix,

Penafiel-Peralta and Castro-Pineda knew they needed a place to

raise G.E.P.C. and began looking for a home.

3 The administrative record includes Penafiel-Peralta's "immigration-court testimony (which the IJ found credible), the record before the BIA and IJ, and their decisions." Paye v. Garland, No. 23-1426,

, at *1 n.1 (1st Cir. July 17, 2024). Neither Castro-Pineda nor G.E.P.C. testified, so the IJ made a credibility determination only as to Penafiel-Peralta.

- 3 - Knowing that they were looking for a place to raise

G.E.P.C., Sandra, who (to remind) is Penafiel-Peralta's sister,

offered to sell them a piece of land she and her husband Luis

Guzman ("Guzman") owned in El Triunfo. In early 2017,

Penafiel-Peralta and Castro-Pineda took that offer, sold a few of

their animals, "and gave all of the money [they] had" to purchase

the land for about $4,500. At this time, neither Sandra nor Guzman

gave Penafiel-Peralta and Castro-Pineda the deed to the land, but

Penafiel-Peralta didn't think much of it because, after all, "this

was [his] sister." Undeterred, Penafiel-Peralta built a home on

the land for his family over the span of three months, where

Petitioners lived peacefully for several years.

Things changed for Petitioners in 2021, when Sandra told

them that they needed to leave the land. She informed them that

they had not paid enough for the land and that one of Guzman's

male cousins -- a former member of the Ecuadorian Army known as

Borroso4 -- was interested in buying the land. Penafiel-Peralta

and Castro-Pineda tried to reason with Sandra and Guzman and even

asked them to return the money they had given them for the land,

but Sandra and Guzman did not budge (or return the money). The

situation gradually worsened. For a few weeks, Petitioners refused

to vacate the land. In response, Sandra became more "aggressive"

4 The record reflects several spellings of Borroso's name, so we use what appears to be the most common spelling, Borroso.

- 4 - and began "spreading rumors to those in [their] town, trying to

exile [Petitioners]." Sandra went as far as calling Castro-Pineda

"a bitch, a whore, a motherfucker, and would say other nasty things

about her" such as "call[ing] her poor, hungry, lazy for not

working, and that she was dependent on [Penafiel-Peralta]." To

make matters worse, Sandra began "showing up in public wherever

[Castro-Pineda] was . . . to intimidate her." "It was as if,"

Castro-Pineda herself described in a sworn, written statement, she

"was being stalked."

Around June 2021, Borroso came to Petitioners' home,

showed them the deed to the property (which was now in his name),

and demanded that they leave "or else." Penafiel-Peralta stood

his ground and told Borroso that they would not leave -- to which

Borroso responded that they could "either leave on good terms, or

[o]n . . . bad terms." Petitioners considered Borroso "very

intimidating" and "extremely threatening" because he was

"ex-military" and they "knew he had connections with the police

and the government."5 As a result, they understood Borroso's words

5 The evidence in the record as to the extent of Borroso's military service and alleged connections to the police and Ecuadorian government is sparse (to say the least). On cross-examination, when Penafiel-Peralta was asked how he knew Borroso was ex-military, he simply responded that he knew this through Borroso's Facebook profile, which included photos of Borroso in military uniform. Other than that tidbit of information, there's nothing else in the record to corroborate Borroso's time in the military or supposed connections with the police and the Ecuadorian government.

- 5 - to mean "that he would kill [them] or severely harm [them] if

[they] were to remain on [their] property."

Worried about what might happen to them, Petitioners

went to stay with Penafiel-Peralta's mother, who reminded them

that they had family in Massachusetts and would be safe there.

While at Penafiel-Peralta's mother's house, Petitioners did not

hear from Sandra, Guzman, or Borroso again. Petitioners ultimately

decided to leave Ecuador and flee to the United States because

they had "nowhere else to go in Ecuador" as "[a]ll of

[Penafiel-Peralta's] family lived in [El Triunfo] and Borroso

would be able to find [them]." For a few reasons, they never went

to the police. With the deed now in Borroso's name and hand, he

would be considered the owner of the land. And, "the police and

the military army . . . [are] the same thing." In total,

Penafiel-Peralta estimated that this whole ordeal with Sandra,

Guzman, and Borroso lasted "[a]bout a month."

Petitioners arrived to the United States on or about

July 26, 2021. Several months later, on January 11, 2022, the

Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") initiated removal

proceedings against them.

The IJ's Decision

Petitioners' removal proceedings got underway later that

year, with their merits hearing before the IJ taking place on

October 31, 2022. At that hearing, Penafiel-Peralta sought to

- 6 - avoid removal through applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT protection, and Castro-Pineda and G.E.P.C. sought

to avoid removal through applications for just derivative asylum.

To back up their claims and applications, Petitioners filed a legal

memorandum, a report regarding the effects of trauma, many country

conditions reports, sworn, written statements from

Penafiel-Peralta and Castro-Pineda, and three letters of support

from individuals familiar with what had happened to them in

Ecuador, including one from Penafiel-Peralta's mother.

Once Penafiel-Peralta was done testifying (and, per the

IJ, testifying credibly), the IJ issued an oral decision that very

same day, denying Petitioners' applications for immigration relief

across the board and ordering their removal to Ecuador.

Petitioners' asylum application, according to the IJ, failed for

three reasons. First, he explained that the harm that the

Petitioners endured in Ecuador did not rise to the level of

"persecution." In his view of the evidence, Petitioners were

threatened twice (once by Sandra and once by Borroso) over a

one-month period, during which no one was harmed or injured and no

weapons were brandished. To the IJ, this didn't make the cut for

persecution.

Second, the IJ didn't think Petitioners sufficiently

established a connection (a/k/a "nexus" in immigration legalese)

between the threats and any of Petitioners' four particular social

- 7 - groups ("PSG"): (1) "Penafiel[-]Peralta Nuclear Family"; (2)

"Ecuadorian Family Dispossessed of their Livelihood";6 (3)

"Ecuadorian Females"; and (4) "Ecuadorian Male Children." Rather,

the IJ thought the record reflected that Sandra and Borroso

threatened Petitioners because they wanted them off the land, not

because of their membership in any of those PSGs. Third, the IJ

reasoned that there was insufficient evidence in the record to

suggest that the Ecuadorian government was unable or unwilling to

protect Petitioners. He explained that Borroso, while

ex-military, was never associated with the Ecuadorian government

nor was he acting on behalf of the Ecuadorian government.

Moreover, Petitioners never reported the threats to the police,

which also cut against them on the unable-or-unwilling front.

Comparatively speaking, the IJ made much quicker work of

Penafiel-Peralta's withholding of removal and CAT protection

applications. Withholding of removal was quickly denied because

it requires the same elements as asylum that the IJ found lacking

but has a higher burden of proof. CAT protection was denied

because there wasn't enough evidence in the record to show

6Just as an FYI because it's not actually relevant to our ultimate analysis, the IJ also determined that Petitioners' PSG of "Ecuadorian Family Dispossessed of their Livelihood" was not a valid PSG under immigration law because it was "too amorphous" and "lack[ed] social distinction."

- 8 - Penafiel-Peralta would be tortured in Ecuador, either by a

government official or with their acquiescence.

Petitioners then appealed to the BIA.

The BIA's Decision

That appeal, however, was to no avail, as the BIA

dismissed the appeal on October 18, 2023. Right out of the gate,

the BIA noted that Penafiel-Peralta had not challenged the IJ's

denial of CAT protection and deemed any argument regarding that

form of relief waived.7 With CAT protection crossed off the list,

the BIA turned its attention to the merits of Petitioners' asylum

application and Penafiel-Peralta's withholding of removal

application. It first affirmed the IJ's nexus determination,

agreeing with the IJ that Petitioners were "threatened because of

a personal dispute over land ownership and not on account of any

of [their] four proposed [PSGs]." Responding to Petitioners'

argument that they were targeted because of their family

7 Besides a one-off, introductory sentence in Petitioners' briefing to us that Penafiel-Peralta has "established that [he is] . . . eligible for . . . CAT," nothing in their briefing either addresses the merits of Penafiel-Peralta's claim for CAT protection or challenges the BIA's determination that he waived any argument as to that form of relief. Such a failure to develop any argumentation means his claim for CAT protection is waived. See Sok v. Mukasey,

(1st Cir. 2008) (deeming CAT claim waived where petitioner made "no argument with respect to the . . . claim beyond an introductory assertion that '[t]he record establishes the merits of [her] claim[] for . . . protection pursuant to the [CAT]'" (first, second, and fourth brackets in original)).

- 9 - membership, the BIA noted that Petitioners did "not point to any

record evidence to establish that [their] family membership was or

would be any more than a tangential reason for the harm." The BIA

then affirmed the IJ's unable-or-unwilling determination because

Petitioners never reported the threats to the police and had not

offered any support for their subjective belief that Borroso had

government connections that would shield him in the event he harmed

them. In light of those two conclusions, the BIA affirmed the

IJ's denial of asylum and withholding of removal.8

This timely petition for review followed.

OUR THOUGHTS ON WHAT HAPPENED

It's time now for us to dig into the merits of the

petition, which asks us to review the agency's decisions. Our

review is usually focused on only the BIA's decision, as that "is

the final agency decision on the books." Cabrera, 100 F.4th at

319. However, where the BIA adopts and affirms the IJ's decision

but still analyzes some of the IJ's conclusions and adds its own

touch, we review both the BIA's and IJ's opinions as one.

Pineda-Maldonado v. Garland,

, 80 (1st Cir. 2024);

Espinoza-Ochoa v. Garland,

, 230 (1st Cir. 2023). Such

As the nexus and unable-or-unwilling determinations were 8

dispositive of Petitioners' claims, the BIA explicitly did not reach their other arguments regarding whether the harm they suffered amounted to persecution or whether their "Ecuadorian Family Dispossessed of their Livelihood" PSG was legally cognizable.

- 10 - is the case here, so we employ that standard of review as we tick

through Petitioners' applications for asylum and withholding of

removal.

Asylum

On appeal to us, Petitioners offer only two complaints

regarding the agency's denial of asylum: (1) the agency erred in

determining that Petitioners had not established a nexus to a

statutorily protected ground, and (2) the agency erred in

determining that Petitioners had not established the Ecuadorian

government was unable or unwilling to protect them from harm. Some

asylum-law basics will help place those alleged agency blunders in

context.

To be asylum-eligible, a noncitizen must meet the

statutory definition of a "refugee," defined, in pertinent part,

as a person who can't or won't return to their native country

"because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future]

persecution on account of" at least one of the five statutorily

protected grounds: "race, religion, nationality, membership in a

[PSG], or political opinion."

(a)(42)(A);

(b)(1)(B)(i). Persecution in this context requires three

elements: (1) the noncitizen suffered or will suffer harm that

meets a certain level of severity; (2) there is a causal connection

or nexus between the harm and one of the statutorily protected

grounds; and (3) the harm must be a result of government action,

- 11 - inaction, or inability or unwillingness to control the conduct of

private parties. Martínez-Pérez v. Sessions,

(1st

Cir. 2018); Guaman-Loja v. Holder,

(1st Cir.

2013).

So, in essence, Petitioners argue that they satisfied

their burden as to the latter two elements -- the nexus and

unable-or-unwilling elements -- notwithstanding the agency's views

to the contrary. But, a failure to establish any of the three

elements dooms an asylum application. Aguilar-De Guillen v.

Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2018). To simplify matters,

then, our analysis will begin and end -- it turns out -- with

Petitioners' nexus argument because, concluding as we do, it

doesn't persuade. See, e.g., Cabrera, 100 F.4th at 319 (addressing

only outcome-determinative issue in asylum analysis); Caz, 84

F.4th at 27 (ditto).

With that, we turn to Petitioners' nexus argument, which

is actually two-fold. First, they argue that the agency erred by

failing to engage in a mixed-motive analysis. Second, they argue

that the agency erred in finding that the record did not compel

the conclusion that a statutorily protected ground was one central

reason for the harm they suffered. We'll tackle each facet of

their argument in turn, but first we lay out some helpful

background on the nexus requirement.

- 12 - A.

Recall that the definition of "refugee" requires past or

anticipated persecution "on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a [PSG], or political opinion."

(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The "on account of"

language included in the "refugee" definition encompasses what is

known as asylum law's "nexus" requirement. See Urgilez Mendez v.

Whitaker,

(1st Cir. 2018). That requirement is

satisfied where the noncitizen provides sufficient evidence that

a statutorily protected ground was or will be "at least one central

reason" for the harm they suffered or fear suffering in the future.

(b)(1)(B)(i). This "at least one central reason"

language by definition "contemplates the possibility that multiple

motivations can exist," so the existence of a

non-statutorily-protected motivation does not necessarily cut off

a noncitizen's asylum eligibility. Aldana-Ramos v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2014). Indeed, as long as a statutorily

protected ground is "at least one central reason" for the

persecution, it need not be the sole, exclusive, or even primary

reason for the persecution. Espinoza-Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 235;

Loja-Tene v. Barr,

, 61 (1st Cir. 2020). That said,

while mixed motives do not run afoul of the nexus requirement, the

statutorily protected motive "cannot be incidental, tangential,

superficial, or subordinate to another reason for [the] harm."

- 13 - Barnica-Lopez v. Garland,

, 528 (1st Cir. 2023)

(alteration in original) (quoting Sánchez-Vásquez v. Garland,

, 47 (1st Cir. 2021)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As you might imagine, then, personal disputes, such as

those motivated by revenge, money, or land, must be analyzed under

this mixed-motive standard. See, e.g., Khalil v. Garland,

, 62 (1st Cir. 2024); Pineda-Maldonado, 91 F.4th at 85;

Espinoza-Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 236-37; Ruiz-Escobar v. Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2018). Along these lines, while our

precedent has long held that events arising "from personal disputes

are generally not enough to show the required nexus," Sompotan v.

Mukasey,

(1st Cir. 2008), we've also been careful

to explain that, "if a personal dispute partially motivates a

persecutor's mistreatment of an applicant, record evidence can

nonetheless indicate that the applicant's protected status may be

another central reason for the persecution," Khalil, 97 F.4th at

62-63 (cleaned up) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Against this legal backdrop, we march onwards to our

take on Petitioners' nexus arguments.

B.

First up, we have Petitioners' argument that the agency

applied the wrong legal standard by failing to account for the

possibility of mixed motives. Such a claim triggers de novo

- 14 - review, Jimenez-Portillo v. Garland,

, 166 (1st Cir.

2022), which just means we review without any deference to the

agency's reasoning. And under that standard of review,

Petitioners' argument doesn't withstand scrutiny.

It is true that both the BIA and the IJ determined that

Petitioners were threatened because of a "personal dispute over

land ownership." It is also true that "the words 'mixed motive'

and 'one central reason' do not appear at all in" either the BIA's

or the IJ's decision. Espinoza-Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 236 (noting

that the absence of such words suggests the agency did not engage

in mixed-motive analysis). Be that as it may, the agency's

decisions readily reflect that it engaged in the proper

mixed-motive analysis.

Take the BIA's decision. In its analysis, it explained

that Petitioners had "not point[ed] to any record evidence to

establish that [their] family membership was or would be any more

than a tangential reason for the harm." The use of "any more than

a tangential reason" necessarily shows that the BIA considered the

possibility of mixed motives. And if there were any doubt (there

isn't), it specifically cited for that proposition the exact page

number of our decision in Barnica-Lopez discussing the

mixed-motive analysis. 59 F.4th at 528. Citations to the accurate

legal standard is some (though not slam-dunk) evidence that the

agency did what it was supposed to. See id. at 529. And

- 15 - significantly, that's not all the BIA did. It also applied that

standard to the record, citing specific facts to support its

conclusion. See id.

Take next the IJ's decision. "Specifically, the IJ found

that there was 'insufficient evidence' to conclude that"

Petitioners were targeted because of a statutorily protected

ground. Ferreira v. Garland,

, 49 (1st Cir. 2024).

"Instead, the IJ found [the threats were] on account of other

factors,"

as they were "forc[ing] [Petitioners] to vacate the

land in an effort to evict them because the owners of the land,

[Sandra] and then subsequently Mr. [Borroso], had legal title to

the land and they wanted the land vacated."

Accordingly, in our view, the agency engaged in a

mixed-motive analysis and, "based on the evidence presented, made

a fact-specific determination that [Petitioners] had not shown

that the persecution was motivated by a" statutorily protected

ground. Barnica-Lopez, 59 F.4th at 529-30.

C.

Moving along, Petitioners next argue that, even if the

agency engaged in the proper mixed-motive analysis, it

nevertheless erred in concluding that Petitioners' membership in

the "Penafiel-Peralta Nuclear Family" PSG9 was not "at least one

While Petitioners purportedly argue that their persecution 9

was on account of their membership in the four aforementioned PSGs,

- 16 - central reason" for the harm they suffered. "Whether a protected

ground is one central reason for an asylum-seeker's persecution is

ordinarily a question of fact," which we review under our

substantial evidence standard.10 Jimenez-Portillo, 56 F.4th at

167.

A few words on the substantial evidence standard. Put

simply, it's no walk in the park because, "[t]o reverse under the

substantial evidence standard," "the evidence must not only

support the contrary finding, but compel it." Caz, 84 F.4th at 28

(quoting Mahmoud v. Barr,

, 126 (1st Cir. 2020)). As

such, it is insufficient for the record to support a contrary

conclusion to that drawn by the agency. Jimenez-Portillo, 56 F.4th

at 167. Rather, the record must point decidedly "in the opposite

direction." Caz, 84 F.4th at 28 (quoting López-Pérez v. Garland,

the substance of their argumentation addresses only the "Penafiel[-]Peralta Nuclear Family" PSG. Without any actual developed argumentation regarding nexus to the other three PSGs, we deem those claims waived, see Martínez-Pérez,

n.5, and address only Petitioners' family-based PSG. Time for a brief aside on nexus and substantial evidence. 10

We've previously recognized that there's "tension inherent in applying the substantial evidence standard, a mode of review 'reserved for factual findings,'" to "the agency's nexus conclusion" because that conclusion "involves factual determinations by the IJ but a de novo review by the BIA as to whether those facts taken together are sufficient to meet the legal standard." Ferreira, 97 F.4th at 46 n.4 (quoting Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland,

, 519-20 (1st Cir. 2023)). But, as in Ferreira, neither party highlights that tension or asks us to resolve it, so we'll leave that for another day.

- 17 -

, 111 (1st Cir. 2022)). Under this lens of review,

therefore, Petitioners have the burden of demonstrating that the

record compels the conclusion that their family membership was at

least one central reason for their persecution.

In Petitioners' view, the record does just that. While

they readily (and repeatedly) admit that Sandra and Borroso

targeted them because of a personal land-related dispute, they

contend that their family membership was "at least one central

reason" for their persecution because it cannot be "disentangled"

from the non-statutorily-protected motivation (i.e., the land

dispute). Because their family owned and bought the land, they

built a house on it and the El Triunfo community recognized them

as the owners of the land, Petitioners argue, Sandra and Borroso

necessarily targeted them also because of their family membership.

These arguments, unfortunately for Petitioners, don't

get them very far. To explain, we've recognized "that the mere

fact that a family received threats as a family unit, without more,

does not convert a non-protected criminal motivation into

persecution on the basis of family connections."

Pineda-Maldonado, 91 F.4th at 85 (cleaned up) (quoting

Barnica-Lopez, 59 F.4th at 531-32). As such, for family membership

to serve as the required statutorily protected ground, it "must be

at the root of the persecution, so that family membership itself

brings about the persecutorial conduct." Ruiz v. Mukasey, 526

- 18 - F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2008). That analysis requires consideration

as to "whether it is possible to disentangle the applicant's family

status from the persecutor's other motives, or if they are two

sides of the same coin." Ferreira, 97 F.4th at 47 (quoting

Pineda-Maldonado, 91 F.4th at 88-89) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Applying that mode of analysis here, we conclude that it

is possible to disentangle Petitioners' family membership from the

land dispute, such that the record doesn't compel the conclusion

that family membership was one central reason for Petitioners'

persecution. Look first to Petitioners' acquisition of the land.

They bought the land from Sandra; they did not inherit it through

their familial connection and there's nothing in the record to

suggest Sandra would not have sold them the land had they been

mere acquaintances or friends from the broader El Triunfo

community. Cf. id. at 49 ("[T]here is record support for the IJ's

finding that the uncle targeted Ferreira because she was present

in his home, regardless of their relationship."). Look next to

the timing and content of the threats. The threats began when

Borroso expressed interest in buying the land from Sandra for more

money than Petitioners had paid and ended when Petitioners moved

to Penafiel-Peralta's mother's home. See Ramos-Gutierrez v.

Garland, No. 23-1885,

, at *4 (1st Cir. July 18,

2024) ("[T]he petitioner testified that the harassment began after

- 19 - the petitioner refused to join the gang."). The threats themselves

all centered, as Petitioners acknowledged in their sworn, written

statements, on "exil[ing]" them and getting them off the land.

Significantly, there's also nothing in the record to

suggest that either Sandra or Borroso would have treated

Petitioners any better (or any worse) had they been members of

another family who had bought the land and refused to leave. To

the contrary, the record supportably shows that Sandra was

motivated by her desire for more money for her land (regardless of

whom she previously might have sold the land to) and Borroso was

motivated by his desire to have his newly bought land tenant-free

(regardless of whom those tenants were or which family they

belonged to). In this way, then, Petitioners' family membership

was simply "incidental" and -- as the BIA noted -- "tangential."11

Barnica-Lopez, 59 F.4th at 528 (quoting Sánchez-Vásquez, 994 F.3d

at 47).

11For these same reasons, Petitioners' invocation of our decision in Pineda-Maldonado does little to help their cause. There, a group of cattle thieves targeted the petitioner because the petitioner's father owed the cattle thieves a gambling debt. Pineda-Maldonado, 91 F.4th at 79. We reversed the agency's nexus determination because, although the cattle thieves targeted the petitioner out of a pecuniary motive to have him pay off his father's debt, the only reason they viewed the petitioner as indebted to them was petitioner's familial connection to his father. Id. at 86-87. We, therefore, concluded it was impossible to "disentangle" the statutorily protected motive from the non-statutorily-protected motive. Id. at 89. As explained at length above, though, no such entanglement exists here.

- 20 - In sum, the agency determined that there was no nexus

between Petitioners' family membership and the persecution they

suffered -- a determination which is supported by substantial

evidence. Consequently, the denial of asylum was proper.

Withholding of Removal

The demise of Petitioners' asylum claim necessarily

requires the same result for Penafiel-Peralta's withholding of

removal claim. That is so because withholding of removal, like

asylum, requires a showing of persecution, including the nexus

requirement. Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2007). Withholding of removal, however, has a higher

standard of proof, so a failure to satisfy the asylum standard

also means a failure to satisfy the withholding standard. Cabrera,

100 F.4th at 324. All in all, then, the agency committed no error

in denying withholding of removal.

WHAT THIS ALL MEANS

To recap, with no nexus to a statutorily protected

ground, we must deny the petition.

- 21 -