United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 24-1070

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                           Appellant,

                               v.

                        CARLOS GONZALEZ,

                      Defendant, Appellee.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Mark G. Mastroianni, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

               Gelpí and Rikelman, Circuit Judges,
                      and Katzmann,* Judge.


     Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellant.

     Linda J. Thompson, with whom James R. Goodhines, Goodhines
Law Offices, and Thompson & Thompson, P.C. were on brief, for
appellee.


                         August 26, 2024



     * Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting
by designation.
           RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge.    After the government searched

the house where Carlos Gonzalez lived for evidence of an illegal

pill-making operation, Gonzalez moved to suppress the evidence

found during the search.   The district court granted his motion,

concluding that the critical facts supporting the search warrant

application were too "stale" and that the affidavit was otherwise

so bare bones that no reasonable officer could have relied on the

warrant.   The court pointed out that according to the affidavit,

the mastermind of the pill-making operation had moved out of that

same house four and a half months earlier, there was little (if

any) suspicious activity at the house after his move, and the

pill-making equipment was highly portable.

           The government appeals, arguing that the facts in the

affidavit were enough to justify a finding of probable cause, and,

in any event, they were not so conclusory that a reasonable officer

could not rely on the warrant.     Thus, the government asks us to

reverse the district court's ruling suppressing the evidence from

the search.

           We agree with the government.      Although we elect to

bypass the district court's probable-cause determination, which we

view as a close call, we find that a reasonable officer could have

relied on the warrant in good faith.      As the government argues,

based on the facts in the affidavit, a reasonable officer could

have concluded that the leader of the pill-making operation had


                                 -2-
every reason to keep the operation where it had been successful

for years -- the house where Gonzalez continued to live.          Thus, we

vacate the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress and

remand for further proceedings.

                            I. BACKGROUND

          Before diving into the details of the lengthy search

warrant affidavit, we summarize the key facts.         On January 20,

2022, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Scott

Smith applied for a warrant to search a three-story, two-family

house at 8 Mereline Avenue in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts.            In

his affidavit supporting the warrant application, he described the

DEA's four-year investigation into a pill-making operation that

distributed counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl and

heroin.   According   to   Smith,   the   operation   ran   out    of   two

locations: the 8 Mereline Avenue house, owned by Michael Matos and

his wife Neysha, and an auto-repair shop in nearby Agawam, owned

by Hector Ramos.

          Smith went on to describe how Michael Matos oversaw the

production of the counterfeit pills in the basement of 8 Mereline

Avenue.   According to Smith, Matos used tableting machines and

binding agents to process heroin and fentanyl into pills.         To make

the pills resemble oxycodone tablets, Matos used dyes and imprinted

the pills with letters and numbers that typically signify certain

dosages of oxycodone.      Smith explained that Gonzalez and Matos


                                  -3-
then supplied the fentanyl and heroin pills to Ramos, who stored

the pills and sold them from his auto-repair shop.

            Critically for this case, Matos and his wife lived on

the second floor of 8 Mereline Avenue until September 2021, when

they moved to a new home about fifteen minutes away in Somers,

Connecticut.      The Matos family continued to own 8 Mereline Avenue

and visit the house after they relocated, and no one else moved

into the second-floor unit.       Meanwhile, Gonzalez, who had lived on

the first floor of 8 Mereline Avenue since at least June 2020,

continued   to    reside   in   the   house    with   his   girlfriend   Kiara

Rodriguez-Santiago, including on the date of the search in late

January 2022.

            In his warrant application to the magistrate judge,

Smith sought to search both 8 Mereline Avenue and Ramos's auto-body

shop.   He stated that there was probable cause to believe that

both locations were being used in connection with a drug operation

and that drugs, paraphernalia for processing and distributing

drugs, and cash proceeds would be found in both places.

            DEA agents executed the search warrant for 8 Mereline

Avenue on January 25, 2022.           They seized, among other things,

5,000-6,000 counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl, two

firearms, two magazines with several rounds of ammunition, and

equipment   and    supplies     for   making   counterfeit     pills.    This




                                      -4-
equipment included pill-press parts, dye molds for stamping pills,

and counterfeit oxycodone labels.

             With this factual overview in place, we proceed to

discuss the details of the DEA investigation as described in

Smith's affidavit, citing "only those facts necessary to put the

probable-cause [and good-faith] issue into workable perspective."

United States v. Rivera, 

 (1st Cir. 2016).

                           A. The DEA Investigation

             Federal agents began to investigate Matos's pill-making

operation in early 2018, four years before the warrant was issued,

when pills containing heroin were discovered inside a toolbox

repossessed from Matos.           Those pills were marked with "M" on one

side   and   "30"   on    the   other -- the        same    markings      used    by   an

FDA-registered      drug     manufacturer       for        its     thirty   milligram

oxycodone tablets.         A few months later, officers with the East

Longmeadow Police Department, who were helping with the federal

investigation, conducted two traffic stops near "the area" of 8

Mereline     Avenue.      During     the    first    stop,       officers   recovered

counterfeit oxycodone tablets.             During the second stop, an officer

discovered about twelve grams of heroin in the possession of a

driver who had links to Matos.

             Smith's     affidavit    in    support    of        the   search    warrant

features     accounts      from    two     confidential           informants     (CIs),

including one who saw Matos's operation in action in the basement


                                         -5-
of 8 Mereline Avenue.   The two CIs cooperated with law enforcement

after they were arrested on April 5, 2021, in connection with a

separate   fentanyl-pill-processing   operation   in   Springfield,

Massachusetts.   One of the informants (CI-2) explained that, in

early 2020, he and his partner (CI-1) learned that a person named

"Mikey" was making a significant profit from manufacturing and

selling counterfeit oxycodone tablets -- an operation that they

decided to replicate.   CI-2 first met Mikey at Ramos's auto-repair

shop, where Mikey brought out a tableting machine and showed CI-2

how it worked.      CI-2 stated that Mikey carried the tableting

machine in a large suitcase wrapped in a comforter and that he had

a second suitcase that contained "all of the other processing

equipment."   CI-2 then explained how he met with Mikey three times

at Mikey's residence.    Each time he went to Mikey's residence,

CI-2 brought ten to twenty grams of heroin, which Mikey would mix

and process into counterfeit oxycodone tablets using a pill-press

machine in the basement, charging CI-2 between eight and nine

dollars per pill.     Using a map on an agent's cell phone, CI-2

showed agents that Mikey's residence was on Mereline Avenue.

According to CI-2, the last time he met with Mikey on Mereline

Avenue was in April or May of 2020, about one year and nine months

before the search warrant here was issued.

           CI-1 corroborated CI-2's account.   He told agents that

he and CI-2 had been manufacturing counterfeit oxycodone tablets


                                -6-
for about one year -- so, since around April 2020.                He explained

that they learned how to make fake pills on the internet and with

the help of a person named Mikey, who met with CI-2, owned a BMW

and a Tesla, and lived "in the area of" the Friendly's Restaurant

in East Longmeadow.       To put CI-1's information in context, Smith

explained in his affidavit that 8 Mereline Avenue is located about

0.3 miles from the Friendly's Restaurant in East Longmeadow and

that Neysha Matos owns a 2014 BMW and a 2015 Tesla.               Based on the

accounts of CI-1 and CI-2, Smith believed that "Mikey" referred to

Michael   Matos   and   that     the   residence   where   CI-2     observed   a

pill-making operation was 8 Mereline Avenue.

            In addition to detailing the accounts by CI-1 and CI-2,

Smith described how pill-making equipment was ordered or sent to

8 Mereline Avenue in 2020 and 2021.           In December 2020, Customs and

Border Patrol officers seized a pill-press machine that was en

route to Neysha Matos at 8 Mereline Avenue.                In February 2021,

Kiara Rodriguez-Santiago ordered a pill-press punch set to be

shipped to 8 Mereline Avenue, and in May 2021, Gonzalez ordered

two pill-press punch sets to be shipped there.

            Importantly    for    our    purposes,   Matos    and    his   wife

purchased a new home in Somers, Connecticut in July 2021.               And on

September 6, 2021, about four and a half months before the search

warrant was issued, they moved from 8 Mereline Avenue into this

new home.


                                        -7-
           Agents continued to surveil 8 Mereline Avenue after

Matos and his wife moved out, but the activity they saw at the

house in the next several months was much more limited, especially

after mid-September.     On September 13, 2021, agents observed Matos

and Gonzalez leave the home in a blue pickup truck registered to

Gonzalez and drive to Ramos's shop.       There, Matos and Gonzalez met

with Ramos and went inside his office.           About fifteen minutes

later, Gonzalez and an unidentified man wearing a fanny pack across

his chest drove back to 8 Mereline Avenue in a truck registered to

Neysha Matos.     Three days later, on September 16, Gonzalez and

three others drove from Ramos's shop to a Walmart in Westfield,

Massachusetts, where Gonzalez paid about $460 in cash for items

that   Smith   stated   were   commonly   used   to   process   narcotics.

Gonzalez and the others then drove to a home on Norman Street in

Springfield, Massachusetts, at which point the truck backed into

the driveway, close to an open garage door, and everyone exited.

Three minutes later, they all got back into the truck and drove to

8 Mereline Avenue.

           After these two events in mid-September 2021, Smith's

affidavit documents less frequent activity at 8 Mereline Avenue.

Much of the activity that is described is not obviously related to

illegal pill making.     Smith relayed that in November 2021, about

two and a half months before the search warrant was issued, Matos

spent about six hours at 8 Mereline Avenue.           Matos then left the


                                   -8-
house with another individual, who was never identified, each

carrying an Amazon box.        About forty minutes after Matos left, a

car drove up and parked in front of 8 Mereline Avenue.              That car

was registered at the same address provided by the driver who was

stopped by the police near the house in 2018 with heroin in his

car.     An unidentified man got out of the car and walked down the

driveway, though the affidavit contains no other details about the

visit.     Then, on January 6, 2022, agents observed Matos drive a

pickup truck registered to Gonzalez to a hardware store and return

to 8 Mereline Avenue.     Although Smith obtained a copy of Matos's

receipt, the affidavit does not specify what Matos bought at the

store.     Also on January 6 (and at other times over the "several

weeks" preceding the search), agents saw a Tesla parked on the

street; that car was purchased by Matos and another person who

lived on 49 Norman Street in Springfield -- the home where Gonzalez

had stopped after he purchased alleged drug-processing supplies in

September.    But again, Smith did not describe in his affidavit any

interactions between the occupants of the Tesla and anyone at 8

Mereline Avenue.

            Finally,   Smith    discussed   controlled        purchases   that

another    confidential   informant    (CI-3)   made     at    Ramos's    shop

throughout the investigation.       The purchase closest in time to the

search warrant application occurred during the week of December 6,

2021, when CI-3 purchased counterfeit oxycodone pills stamped with


                                    -9-
"M" on one side and "30" on the other -- like the pills found in

the toolbox repossessed from Matos in 2018.

              Smith concluded his affidavit with information about

Michael and Neysha Matos's bank accounts.            According to Smith, the

account records revealed large cash deposits throughout 2020 and

2021 -- money that could not be traced to a legitimate source of

income.

            B. Gonzalez's Indictment and Motion to Suppress

              After the search and seizure of pills and firearms from

8 Mereline Avenue on January 25, 2022, a grand jury indicted

Gonzalez on (1) one count of possession with intent to distribute

400   grams    or   more   of    fentanyl,   in    violation   of   

(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vi), and (2) one count of possession of

a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation

of 

(c)(1)(A).

              Gonzalez then moved to suppress the evidence seized

during the search.         He argued that Smith's affidavit relied on

stale information and failed to show a sufficient nexus between 8

Mereline Avenue and evidence of drug activity.

              The   district     court   granted     Gonzalez's     motion   to

suppress.      In a detailed opinion, it held that the affidavit did

not demonstrate probable cause to believe that evidence of an

illegal pill-making operation would be found at 8 Mereline Avenue

in late January 2022.           United States v. Gonzalez, No. 22-30027,


                                      -10-


, at *6 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2023).                      The court

determined that "[a]lthough the affidavit provided some connection

between the residence and suspected criminal activity in 2020 and

mid-2021, this information was too stale by the time the government

applied for the search warrant."          

           The district court found no probable cause for three

main reasons.     First, it focused on the Matos family's move from

Mereline Avenue to Connecticut in September 2021.              

    The court

acknowledged that the affidavit "intricately and amply link[ed]

Michael and Neysha Matos to 8 Mereline Avenue and suspicious

activity   indicative     of     an   illegal    drug   operation,"        but   it

determined that the events creating that link occurred before the

move.   

   The court found that this time gap, combined with the

move,   was   "critical     and . . . fatal       to    the   probable      cause

determination."     

     In its view, the affidavit lacked facts

suggesting that evidence of pill making would still be kept at 8

Mereline Avenue in late January 2022, months after the move and

years after CI-2 saw the operation in action in the basement.                    

Second, the court explained that the affidavit indicated that the

pill-press punches and tableting machines were highly portable.

 According to CI-2, Matos could transport the tableting machine

and the other processing equipment in two suitcases.                 

    Third,

the court noted that the affidavit identified other places where

Matos   easily   could    have   relocated      the   pill-making     equipment:


                                      -11-
Ramos's auto-body shop and his new Connecticut home.               

.

The court further determined that the events recounted in the

affidavit that occurred in the four and a half months before the

search -- such as Gonzalez's trip to Walmart in September 2021 and

Matos's visit to Mereline Avenue in January 2022 -- did not revive

the out-of-date information or establish a tangible link between

the drug operation and 8 Mereline Avenue.          

.

           Although    deeming    it   a   "much   closer    question,"   the

district court also concluded that the good-faith exception set

out in United States v. Leon, 

 (1984), could not save

the search.     Id. at *9.   In its view, "the affidavit represent[ed]

the type of 'bare bones' or conclusory showing which does not

satisfy   the    good[-]faith    exception"    because      "the   connection

between 8 Mereline Avenue and any recent criminal activity was

extremely thin, bordering on non-existent."            Id. (quoting Leon,

).       Because staleness is a fundamental defect,

the court explained, an objectively reasonable officer would have

realized that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause.

Id. at *9-10.     It thus held that suppression of the evidence was

the appropriate remedy.       Id. at *10.

           The government's timely appeal followed.

                        II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

           We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion

about whether a given set of facts amounts to probable cause.


                                    -12-
United States v. Perez Soto, 

 (1st Cir. 2023).

Similarly, we review de novo the applicability of the Leon good-

faith exception.         United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 

 (1st Cir. 2015).

                               III. DISCUSSION

            The government argues that the district court legally

erred in concluding that the facts in Smith's affidavit were stale

and thus could not support a finding of probable cause.                 It also

contends that even if the affidavit failed to establish probable

cause, it was not so bare bones or conclusory that no objectively

reasonable officer could have relied on the search warrant.                  For

that reason, the government urges us to exercise our discretion to

bypass the probable-cause issue and reverse on the ground that the

officers' conduct in this case is covered by the Leon good-faith

exception.

            We agree with the government that we can bypass the

probable-cause finding and proceed straight to the Leon good-faith

issue here.    Thus, we assume arguendo that the affidavit failed to

establish     probable     cause     that     evidence   of   the   pill-making

operation would be found at 8 Mereline Avenue in late January 2022.

And   we   focus   our    analysis    instead     on   "consideration   of   the

officers' good faith."         Leon, 

 (recognizing the

appropriateness of such an approach in some cases and reversing

based on application of the good-faith test, without disturbing


                                       -13-
the district court's finding of no probable cause); see also United

States v. Robinson, 

 (1st Cir. 2004) (declining to

decide whether warrant was supported by probable cause and instead

affirming on the ground that affiant acted in objective good faith

in applying for warrant); United States v. Beckett, 

,

32-33 & n.4 (1st Cir. 2003) (taking same approach); United States

v. Owens, 

 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing that,

under Leon, "courts have discretion to consider the issue of

officers' good faith without first addressing Fourth Amendment

issues" and assuming in defendant's favor that probable cause did

not support search before turning to good faith).

          Before   diving   into    the   Leon   analysis,   however,    we

briefly address a threshold issue.          Gonzalez claims that the

government waived its probable-cause-bypass argument because it

did not mention this possible approach to the district court.           But

the government argued to the district court, as it does on appeal,

that the good-faith exception applies and the evidence need not be

suppressed, even if the affidavit lacked probable cause.         And its

argument that we can reverse on good-faith grounds is one it could

make only on appeal.   So, there was no waiver by the government

here.

          We turn now to the good-faith analysis.        Ultimately, we

conclude that the Leon good-faith exception applies.         We part ways

with the district court's careful opinion because we conclude that


                                   -14-
it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that

Matos's   pill-making    operation    was   still   underway    at     its

longstanding home base in early 2022.       We reach this conclusion

based on several key facts in the affidavit: Matos still owned 8

Mereline Avenue     and continued to live nearby      and visit;       the

remaining occupants of 8 Mereline Avenue were Gonzalez and his

girlfriend, who also appeared to be involved in the operation; and

the   pill-making   operation   had   operated   successfully   from    8

Mereline Avenue for years, and thus, an objectively reasonable

officer could have concluded that Matos had little reason to move

it.

                    A. The Probable-Cause Standard

           To explain why an objectively reasonable officer could

have believed that probable cause supported the warrant, we lay

out the relevant standard.      "An application for a warrant must

demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been

committed -- the 'commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence

of the offense will be found at the place searched -- the so-called

'nexus' element."     United States v. Roman, 

 (1st

Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Dixon, 

 (1st

Cir. 2015)).   As to the nexus element, the magistrate judge must

"make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found


                                 -15-
in a particular place."         Illinois v. Gates, 

(1983); see also Rivera, 

 (explaining that "'fair

probability' is another way of saying 'reasonable likelihood'").

Fair probability is less than a more-likely-than not standard.

United States v. Feliz, 

 (1st Cir. 1999).

               Importantly, the "commission" and "nexus" elements of

the probable-cause inquiry "each include a temporal component."

United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 

 (1st Cir. 1996).

Thus,    the    magistrate   judge   must   "consider   the   accuracy   and

reliability of the historical facts related in the affidavits."

     But the magistrate judge also must determine "whether the

totality    of    the   circumstances   reasonably   inferable    from   the

affidavit[]" establishes a fair probability that evidence of the

crime will be found in the place to be searched "at about the time

the search warrant would issue, rather than at some remote time."

     Information in an affidavit is stale if it "establishe[s]

probable cause at some point in the past but does not support

probable cause at the time of the warrant's issuance."              United

States v. McLellan, 

 (1st Cir. 2015).

               Under the exclusionary rule, when a magistrate judge

issues a warrant that is not supported by probable cause, the

evidence obtained from the search is usually suppressed.            United

States v. Sheehan, 

 (1st Cir. 2023).               That is,

unless the Leon good-faith exception applies.


                                     -16-
        B. The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

           Suppression      of    evidence      from    an    illegal   search       is

"inappropriate . . . if the officer who conducted the search acted

in reliance upon the defective warrant and that reliance was

objectively   reasonable."             

     This    rule     is   known   as     the

"good-faith exception."          

    It is based on the principle that,

"[t]o   trigger   the    exclusionary        rule,     police    conduct     must   be

sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it,

and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price

paid by the justice system."            Herring v. United States, 

 (2009).    As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]hen the

police exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent'

disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of

exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs."

Davis v. United States, 

 (2011) (quoting Herring,

).       On the other hand, "when the police act with an

objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is

lawful . . . or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated

negligence[,] . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its

force, and exclusion cannot pay its way."               

 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

           The government bears the "heavy burden" of showing that

its officers acted with objective good faith.                    United States v.

Wurie, 

 (1st Cir. 2013).                 In assessing whether the


                                        -17-
government has met this burden, "we evaluate all of the attendant

circumstances at the time of the warrant application and its

execution."     United States v. Brunette, 

 (1st Cir.

2001).

             With this background in place, we turn to Smith's search

warrant affidavit.

         1. Was Smith's Affidavit Conclusory or Bare Bones?

             We start with the issue on which the parties focus most

of their attention: whether the affidavit here was "so lacking in

indicia of probable cause" that an officer's belief that probable

cause existed was "entirely unreasonable."        Leon, 

(citation omitted); see also United States v. Capozzi, 

 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining that a "bare bones affidavit"

on which it is objectively unreasonable for an officer to rely is

one   that    "provide[s]   the   magistrate   [judge]   with   only   the

suspicions and conclusions of the officer" without underlying

factual information in support).          The government argues that an

objectively reasonable officer could have believed the search

warrant was valid because, even accounting for Matos's move, the

affidavit contained detailed information linking the pill-making

operation to 8 Mereline Avenue about four and a half months before

the search.     According to the government, given the long-running

nature of the operation and the lack of facts suggesting that Matos

had moved it to his new Connecticut home, it was logical for an


                                   -18-
officer to believe that there was a fair probability evidence of

pill making would still be found at Mereline Avenue as of late

January 2022.    Gonzalez, by contrast, contends that Matos's move

to a new residence, together with the passage of four and a half

months with no significant criminal activity at 8 Mereline Avenue,

were "obvious and fatal" to probable cause, such that no reasonable

officer could have relied on the warrant.

          We    hold   that the government   has met its burden to

demonstrate that the good-faith exception applies.      See Beckett,

 (recognizing that an affidavit could be insufficient

for the purpose of probable cause but sufficient for an officer to

rely on in objective good faith).       We reach this conclusion for

two main reasons.      First, a reasonable officer could infer from

facts in the affidavit that Matos had little incentive to move his

successful, ongoing operation from Mereline Avenue to his new

family home in Connecticut.     Second, the staleness issue in this

case is at least a close call, and, as such, we cannot say that it

would be objectively unreasonable for an officer to rely on this

warrant after it was approved by the magistrate judge.     Thus, the

affidavit was not so bare bones or conclusory such that it fails

under Leon.

          As the district court found, and the parties do not

appear to dispute, ample facts suggested an illegal drug operation

at 8 Mereline Avenue from 2020 until mid-2021, before the Matos


                                 -19-
family moved.   For example, CI-2 stated that he learned how to

produce counterfeit oxycodone pills in part through visits to

"Mikey's" residence on Mereline Avenue, with the most recent visit

in April or May of 2020.    There, he watched "Mikey" mix and process

the heroin CI-2 brought into counterfeit oxycodone tablets using

a pill-press machine and dyes in the basement, charging CI-2 for

each pill produced.   Along with relaying CI-2's eyewitness account

of the operation at work, the affidavit stated that one pill-press

punch set was shipped to Rodriguez-Santiago at 8 Mereline Avenue

in February 2021, and two pill-press punch sets were shipped to

Gonzalez there in May 2021.

          The district court concluded, however, that these facts

were stale by early 2022.    It found that no probable cause existed

to search 8 Mereline Avenue in late January 2022 because Matos had

moved out of the house, there was very little (if any) suspicious

activity at the location after his move, and the pill-making

equipment was highly portable.     Gonzalez, 

, at *7.

And we agree with the district court that, after mid-September and

until the government applied for the search warrant in January,

the affidavit shows a drop-off in activity indicative of a drug

operation at 8 Mereline Avenue.         As the court observed, the

affidavit contains fewer facts identifying 8 Mereline Avenue as a

probable hub for a pill-making operation after the move compared

to 2020 through mid-2021.


                                 -20-
            But    the    government         persuasively        argues    that     the

magistrate      judge    was    required       to   evaluate     the    facts     in   a

common-sense manner.           And reviewing the affidavit's facts through

that lens, a reasonable officer could have concluded that the

warrant was valid because it was unlikely that the head of a drug

operation would move it to his new family home, instead of keeping

it at its existing location where it had functioned for years

without   detection       (as    far    as     Matos   seemingly       knew).       See

Zayas-Diaz, 

 (examining the inferences an officer

could draw from the totality of circumstances in the affidavit to

determine    whether,      at    the    time    the    warrant    was     issued,      an

objectively reasonable officer would believe that the defendant's

residence was still serving as the site of his drug operations).

            Five key facts in the affidavit made it reasonable for

an officer to believe that Matos had every incentive to keep his

drug operation in its long-standing location.                     First, the Matos

family continued to own the house on Mereline Avenue after they

moved to their new home, only about fifteen minutes away.                           See

United States v. Schaefer, 

 (1st Cir. 1996)

(explaining that "[t]he target's ownership of the real estate to

be   searched     influences      the   staleness      calculus").         Second,     8

Mereline Avenue is located close to Ramos's shop, the other

operational     hub     identified      in   the    affidavit.         Third,     Matos

continued to spend time at Mereline Avenue up until the month of


                                        -21-
the search, and it did not appear that anyone moved into the second

floor of the house after he and his wife moved out.                        Fourth,

Gonzalez       and    Rodriguez-Santiago         were   connected   to   the   drug

enterprise, and they still lived at 8 Mereline Avenue when the

warrant       was    issued.      Smith's   affidavit      described     Gonzalez's

involvement in the pill-making operation in 2021, including his

purchase of pill-press punch sets in May to be sent to Mereline

Avenue, his multiple trips to Ramos's shop, and his September trip

from       Ramos's    shop   to   Walmart   to    buy   alleged   drug-processing

supplies.           Smith also stated that pill-making equipment under

Rodriguez-Santiago's name was shipped to Mereline Avenue in late

February 2021.

               Finally, the affidavit described an ongoing, successful

drug operation that was active one month before the search.                    See

United States v. Encarnacion, 

 (1st Cir. 2022)

(explaining that the timeliness of probable cause varies "with the

nature of the suspected offense"); United States v. Nocella, 

 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing that drug conspiracies

are ongoing operations that "[b]y [their] very nature [and] if

unchecked, [are] apt to persist over relatively long periods of

time").1      For example, in December 2021, CI-3 went to Ramos's shop


       1The existence of circuit precedent on this probable
cause-related issue is relevant to our assessment of whether it
was reasonable for an officer to believe that the warrant was



                                        -22-
and   purchased     counterfeit    oxycodone   pills   that    had   the     same

markings as those found in Matos's toolbox that was repossessed

from him in 2018, when he was living at Mereline Avenue.               And bank

records for the Matos family showed hundreds of thousands of

dollars in cash deposits in 2020 and 2021 that could not be traced

to a legitimate source of income.

               From the totality of these facts, a reasonable officer

could have believed that Matos would have chosen to keep his

operation at 8 Mereline Avenue, where it had been prosperous for

many years, and that there was a fair probability that evidence of

pill making would be found there at the time of the search.                   See

United States v. Bucuvalas, 

 (1st Cir. 1992),

abrogated on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 

    (2000)    (crediting   the   "net   'common   sense'    import    of    the

information" in an affidavit when determining whether the place to

be searched was a "secure operational base" where evidence would

be stored); Beckett, 

 (agreeing with the district

court that facts showing a nexus between evidence of criminal

activity and the defendant's home were "less than overwhelming"

but finding that inferences about where the defendant would store


lawfully issued. See United States v. Grupee, 

(1st Cir. 2012) ("With [United States v. Meyer, 

(1st Cir. 1976)] on the books and the account of the evidence found
in the house, the Task Force officers acted in what the preceding
discussion shows was objectively reasonable reliance on the search
warrant." (cleaned up)).


                                     -23-
items of enduring utility were objectively reasonable).               Thus, a

reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant.              See Zayas-

Diaz, 

; see also United States v. Floyd, 

 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that the probable-cause

inquiry does not involve "merely counting the number of days

elapsed"    between   events    described    in   the   affidavit    and    the

warrant's issuance, but, rather, "[e]verything depends on context"

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

            The fact that, as the district court observed, Matos's

pill-making equipment was portable did not render an officer's

reliance on the warrant objectively unreasonable.              Even if the

equipment itself could be moved, it was still reasonable to believe

that Matos had little incentive to set up a new hub for the

conspiracy.

            At the very least, the key facts amount to "evidence

sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent

judges as to the existence of probable cause."            Leon, 

; see United States v. Ricciardelli, 

 (1st Cir.

1993), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Grubbs, 

   (2006)    (explaining    that    exclusion    of   evidence     is

inappropriate   in    cases    involving    "borderline   calls     about   the

existence of probable cause"); United States v. Scroggins, 

 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that the exclusionary

rule's deterrent purpose is not served when "the police take a


                                    -24-
close call to a judge before searching").               In such circumstances,

we cannot say that no reasonable officer could have relied on the

warrant.

               Having determined that a reasonable officer could have

believed that the affidavit established probable cause for the

search, we turn to two additional arguments Gonzalez makes as to

why the good-faith exception should not apply.

  2. Did the Magistrate Judge Wholly Abandon Her Judicial Role?

               Gonzalez suggests that the good-faith exception does not

apply    for    a   separate   reason -- the       magistrate    judge   "wholly

abandoned [her] judicial role."              See Leon, 

.       We

determine, however, that Gonzalez has failed to support this

contention.

               Gonzalez    notes     that    the     warrant   application   and

sixty-four-page affidavit were filed on January 20, 2022, and the

magistrate judge issued the warrant at 9:30 am that same day.                From

this    timeline,     he   asserts    that    "the    record . . . raises    the

specter that the magistrate [judge] might not have thoroughly

considered Smith's affidavit" and instead served as a "rubber stamp

for the police."       See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914–15.

               The government points out that it is standard practice

for the affidavit and warrant to have the same date, and Gonzalez

offers no information to undermine the government's account.                  As

the government explains, it typically submits a search warrant


                                       -25-
affidavit to the magistrate judge in advance, at which point the

judge may ask the government to address areas of concern.           Then,

assuming the magistrate judge approves the warrant, final versions

of the warrant application, affidavit, and warrant are filed on

the docket with identical dates.2          Therefore, the government

maintains, the fact that the affidavit and warrant have the same

date does not indicate how much time the magistrate judge may have

spent reviewing the affidavit.          We also note that Gonzalez's

contention overlooks the fact that the magistrate judge issued a

search warrant for 8 Mereline Avenue on December 10, 2021, but

when that warrant was not executed within fourteen days, Smith

filed another affidavit -- the one at issue here.       That affidavit

was largely identical to the first; the only difference was that

it   contained   about   three   additional    pages   describing     the

surveillance of Mereline Avenue in January 2022.        Thus, the fact

that the affidavit and warrant bear the same date is not enough to

suggest that no reasonable officer could rely on the warrant.

                          3. Franks Issues

          Gonzalez also contends that the good-faith exception

should not apply because of "lurking Franks problems," but this



     2 We further note that the process of obtaining a search
warrant involves an ex parte proceeding in which the government
asks the magistrate judge to find probable cause to conduct a
search. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d). The record does not suggest
any judicial impropriety in that process.


                                 -26-
issue is one for the district court to consider in the first

instance.    Before the district court, Gonzalez moved to continue

the suppression hearing so that he could file a motion for a

hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 

 (1978).3         The

district court denied his request but informed Gonzalez that, if

it ruled in the government's favor on the suppression motion, "the

door is still open for there to be a supplement, if there's a

showing for a Franks issue to be raised."   The court then evaluated

the suppression motion -- considering whether the four corners of

the affidavit set forth probable cause and whether a reasonable

officer could have relied on the warrant -- while "making clear

that [Gonzalez was] not waiving [his] right to file a Franks

hearing or a request" later, if his pursuit of the potential Franks

issue he identified was fruitful.

            Now, following our review of the suppression ruling, we

conclude that the affidavit was not so devoid of indicia of

probable cause that no reasonable officer could have relied on it,

and that the record does not suggest the magistrate judge wholly

abandoned her judicial role.    In so concluding, we do not pass on


     3 Under Franks, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to challenge the truthfulness of statements in a search
warrant affidavit if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that: (1) the affidavit contains an intentional or
reckless false statement or omission, and (2) the false statement
or omission was necessary to the finding of probable cause. United
States v. O'Neal, 

 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Franks,

).


                                -27-
any potential argument by Gonzalez that, under Franks, the warrant

is nevertheless invalid and the evidence should be suppressed

because the affidavit contains intentional or reckless material

misrepresentations     or omissions.           See Leon, 

(explaining that the good-faith exception does not apply when the

affiant   misleads    the   magistrate        judge   with     information     that

violates Franks); United States v. Vigeant, 

(1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that the government failed to show

objective good faith and that excluding evidence would have a

substantial deterrent effect on the police because the affidavit

made    material    omissions    and     included      false    and   misleading

statements).       And because we now vacate the district court's

suppression order and remand for further proceedings, Gonzalez can

make such an argument and challenge statements in the affidavit on

remand.

                                IV. CONCLUSION

           For all these reasons, we vacate the district court's

order   granting    Gonzalez's     suppression        motion    and   remand    for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.




                                       -28-