United States v. Encarnacion-Baez
United States v. Encarnacion-Baez
Opinion
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1203
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LENY ENCARNACIÓN-BÁEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Montecalvo and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Miguel A. Rodríguez-Robles on brief for appellant. Maarja T. Luhtaru, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
September 13, 2024 PER CURIAM. Defendant Leny Encarnación-Báez appeals
from his sentence of 108 months of imprisonment for six drug-
related crimes. We affirm.
We draw the facts from the presentence report and the
transcript of the defendant's sentencing hearing. United States
v. Fuentes-Moreno,
954 F.3d 383, 386 n.1 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Ubiles-Rosario,
867 F.3d 277, 280 n.2 (1st Cir.
2017)). On August 27, 2020, the defendant and three other men
were interdicted off the west coast of Puerto Rico by Puerto Rico
law enforcement. When the agents activated their emergency lights,
the four men did not stop their vessel; instead, they began to
throw overboard packages resembling those used for transporting
drugs. The officers detained the men and recovered nineteen
packages containing, in total, approximately 500 kilograms of
cocaine.
In September 2020, a grand jury indicted the defendant
and his confederates with (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine,
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and
846; (2) aiding and abetting each other's violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a),
18 U.S.C. §§ 2and 841(a); (3) conspiracy to import five
kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of cocaine,
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963; (4) aiding and
abetting each other's violation of
21 U.S.C. § 952(a), 18 U.S.C.
- 2 - § 2 and
21 U.S.C. § 952(a); (5) conspiracy to jettison narcotics
subject to forfeiture under
21 U.S.C. § 881(a),
46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(2); and (6) aiding and abetting each other's violation
of
46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(2),
18 U.S.C. § 2and
46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(2). In due course, the defendant pleaded guilty to all
six counts.
At the defendant's sentencing hearing, defense counsel
related that the defendant was raised in a poor family, worked
since he was a child, and had no prior drug use or criminal history.
In his allocution, the defendant added that he worked previously
as a tour guide to support his family but encountered financial
troubles because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The parties agreed that the defendant met the
requirements of the safety valve,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), rendering
inapplicable the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence that
otherwise applied for counts one through four. See
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 960(b). The defendant, no longer bound by the
mandatory minimum sentence, requested that the district court
impose an 87-month term of imprisonment. The government sought a
sentence of 108 months' imprisonment. Both requests were below
the 135 to 168-month advisory sentencing guidelines range.
Before imposing sentence, the district court stated that
the presentence report "satisfactorily reflects the components of
[the defendant's] offenses by considering their nature and
- 3 - circumstances." The court further stated that it had "considered
the other sentencing factors set forth in Title
18, United States Code Section 3553(a), the presentence investigation report,
arguments by counsel and the prosecutor, and [the defendant's]
allocution." The district court then sentenced the defendant to
108-month concurrent sentences on each count.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the district
court committed procedural error when explaining the sentence by
"not explicitly addressing some mitigating factors" that he had
raised at the sentencing hearing, including "his background, the
way he was raised, . . . the fact that he had to work since he was
a child," and the fact that he was out of work at the time in
question and had a family to support. Based on these alleged
omissions, the defendant says that the court failed to give those
factors adequate weight in the sentencing determination. The
government responds that the defendant forfeited this sentencing
argument by not raising it in the district court and waived it in
this Court by not addressing the plain error factors in his brief.
On the merits, the government says that the sentence imposed was
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
We agree that the defendant failed to raise below the
procedural challenge to his sentence that he pursues here and,
therefore, that argument is forfeited. See United States v.
Ríos-Rivera,
913 F.3d 38, 44(1st Cir. 2019) (holding that
- 4 - defendant, by failing to object below, "forfeited any possible
procedural objection"). While we will consider forfeited
arguments under a plain error standard, the defendant's brief does
not "even attempt to map [his] argument onto plain error's four
prongs." Universitas Educ., LLC v. Granderson,
98 F.4th 357, 373(1st Cir. 2024) (citing Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. The Container
Store, Inc.,
904 F.3d 70, 86(1st Cir. 2018)). Consequently, we
again agree with the government that "in addition to forfeiting
the argument below, [the defendant] has waived it on appeal."
Id.(citing United States v. Colón-De Jesús,
85 F.4th 15, 25 (1st Cir.
2023)).1
In any event, even if the defendant had preserved his
procedural claim, it would make no difference because there was no
error, plain or otherwise. In explaining a sentence, district
judges are not required to undertake "an express weighing of
mitigating and aggravating factors" or "individually mention[]"
each factor. United States v. Lozada-Aponte,
689 F.3d 791, 793
1 The same is true for an additional argument that the defendant makes about the safety valve,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). He says on appeal that the district court, having found that he met the safety-valve requirements, nevertheless "failed to disregard the minimum mandatory sentence of 108 months." But even looking past the forfeiture and waiver, the argument is incorrect. The otherwise mandatory minimum sentence was 120 months, not 108 months. Thus, the defendant did receive the benefit of the safety valve. The defendant also makes a passing objection to an alleged increase to his base offense level that the record reflects did not occur.
- 5 - (1st Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Arango,
508 F.3d 34, 46(1st Cir. 2007)). And we have cautioned against "read[ing] too
much into a district court's failure to respond explicitly to
particular sentencing arguments." United States v. Clogston,
662 F.3d 588, 592(1st Cir. 2011).
Here, the district court stated that it had considered
the remarks by the defendant's counsel and the defendant's
allocution, both of which described the mitigating factors at
issue. The court then imposed a below-guidelines sentence.
"[A]ssay[ed] . . . as a whole," the record reflects that the
mitigating factors identified by the defendant were not overlooked
or ignored.
Id.at 592 (citing United States v. Stone,
575 F.3d 83, 91(1st Cir. 2009) and United States v. DeCologero,
530 F.3d 36, 70(1st Cir. 2008)). The court simply did not give those
factors as much weight as the defendant had hoped. See United
States v. Rodriguez-Monserrate,
22 F.4th 35, 41(1st Cir. 2021)
(citing Lozada-Aponte,
689 F.3d at 793). That the district court
did not share the defendant's "view of the salience" of the
mitigating factors does not amount to procedural error. United
States v. Ruperto-Rivera,
16 F.4th 1, 6(1st Cir. 2021).
To the extent the defendant contests the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence based on its length, this claim is
preserved based on the defendant arguing for a lower sentence than
the district court imposed. See United States v. Rand, 93 F.4th
- 6 - 571, 579 (1st Cir. 2024). We therefore review for abuse of
discretion.
Id.On these facts, which involved significant cocaine
smuggling, the defendant cannot show that his below-guidelines
sentence was substantively unreasonable. See United States v.
King,
741 F.3d 305, 310(1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States v.
Floyd,
740 F.3d 22, 39-40, (1st Cir. 2014)). The court afforded
the defendant some leniency based on the mitigating factors
presented, but, given the circumstances of the offense, the court
was reasonable in imposing a 108-month sentence. There was no
abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
- 7 -
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished