United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1726

JULIO ALVARADO-REYES; GLENDA GARMENDIA-ARDONA; J.A.G.,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Kayatta, Thompson, and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

Kristian R. Meyer, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and MacMurray & Associates were on brief, for petitioners. Jesse D. Lorenz, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Holly M. Smith, Assistant Director, were on brief, for respondent.

October 7, 2024 THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. We recognized many years ago

the unfortunate reality that "[g]ang violence apparently is

endemic in El Salvador." Flores-Coreas v. Mukasey,

(1st Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Today's immigration appeal

suggests that that reality may not have changed much since then.

After being threatened by the notorious MS-13 gang, Salvadoran

nationals Julio Alvarado-Reyes ("Alvarado-Reyes"), his wife Glenda

Garmendia-Ardona ("Garmendia-Ardona"), and their minor son J.A.G.

(collectively, "Petitioners") fled to the United States to seek

safety.1 However, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied their

applications for immigration relief. The Board of Immigration

Appeals ("BIA" and, collectively with the IJ, "the agency")

affirmed that denial on appeal. A petition for review with this

court followed, asking us to reverse the agency's denial. For

reasons we'll get to shortly, though, we must deny the petition.

HOW IT ALL STARTED

To kick things off, we lay out how it all started (i.e.,

the odyssey that brought Petitioners to the United States and how

their case made its way to us). In doing so, we pull the facts

and procedural history from the administrative record. Dor v.

Garland,

(1st Cir. 2022).

1 We note that the record inconsistently hyphenates Alvarado-Reyes' and Garmendia-Ardona's surnames. As the cover pages to both parties' briefing include the hyphenated spellings, those are what we use throughout this opinion.

- 2 - Life in El Salvador and Journey to the United States

At about fourteen years old, Alvarado-Reyes moved into

his grandparents' home in El Salvador to care for them because

they had serious health issues. Alvarado-Reyes' now-wife,

Garmendia-Ardona, moved in a few years later and also began caring

for his grandparents, while he supported the family through

agricultural work. These two eventually moved to a home nearby,

had J.A.G., and got married. At some point, Alvarado-Reyes' uncle

bought him a truck so that Alvarado-Reyes could take his

grandparents (the uncle's parents) to their medical appointments.

The purchase of this truck, it turns out, set off a chain of events

which led to Petitioners' departure from El Salvador.

Towards the end of 2020, Alvarado-Reyes' grandmother

died and, about a month later, he "began to have problems with the

gangs." "The first incident" occurred when he was driving the

truck and was stopped by MS-13 gang members, who asked him "to do

a little trip for them." Confused by what "little trip" meant, he

told them that he couldn't because the truck didn't belong to him,

to which the gang members responded "that [he] would regret not

helping them, that they knew where [his] family lived, that [his]

family would pay, that [his] son would pay, that they would rape

[his] wife and that they would kill [him]." Over the next few

months and continuing through Petitioners' departure from El

Salvador, Alvarado-Reyes was stopped (while driving) approximately

- 3 - five more times and told the same things. He also received

threatening phone calls from gang members, and these two types of

threats (the calls and the stops on the street) together would

"happen once or twice a week." Anonymous notes would also be left

at Petitioners' home, "asking [Alvarado-Reyes] to give [the MS-13

gang members] rides."

Garmendia-Ardona, on the other hand, was never

approached in person. That said, she did have some relevant

interactions with MS-13 because gang members frequently called

Petitioners' home and she "picked up the phone on [three]

occasions." During these calls, the gang members asked for

Alvarado-Reyes and "said they were asking him for favors and he

was not cooperating." When Garmendia-Ardona responded that

Alvarado-Reyes was not home, they threatened that "if [Alvarado-

Reyes] kept refusing they would come to the house and kidnap

[J.A.G.]." They also told her that she "was pretty and that '[she]

was going to be one of their women.'" At the end of the calls,

the gang members told her not to go to the police "because it will

be worse for [her]." In light of these threats, Garmendia-Ardona

did not feel safe and "would only leave [her] home to go to [her]

mother's house."

Petitioners never went to the Salvadoran police because

they were "afraid that the gangs would find out and kill [them]"

since they "ha[d] heard and read stories of people reporting the

- 4 - gangs to the police and then being killed by the gangs as revenge."

They eventually fled to the United States in August 2021 because

the threats from MS-13 "intensified." A few months after their

arrival, on November 1, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security

initiated removal proceedings against them.

Removal Proceedings

Exactly thirteen months later, on December 1, 2022,

Petitioners appeared before the IJ for their merits hearing. To

avoid removal back to El Salvador, Alvarado-Reyes applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Garmendia-Ardona and J.A.G.

did not file any applications themselves; rather, they simply

sought asylum as derivatives of Alvarado-Reyes' asylum

application.2 In support of their claims, they offered the

following evidence: in-court testimony and sworn, written

affidavits from Alvarado-Reyes and Garmendia-Ardona, letters of

support from family members and former neighbors in El Salvador,

many country conditions reports, and a legal brief.

2 Immigration law expressly allows for certain relatives of asylees to be granted asylum as "derivatives." Cabrera v. Garland,

, 315 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing

(b)(3)(A)). It doesn't, however, provide for derivative withholding of removal or CAT protection,

(citing

(b), (c)), so by failing to submit any applications in their own names, Garmendia-Ardona and J.A.G. weren't considered for those forms of relief.

- 5 - Once Alvarado-Reyes and Garmendia-Ardona -- the sole

witnesses -- were done testifying, the IJ rendered an oral decision

denying all forms of relief and ordering Petitioners' removal to

El Salvador. As an initial matter, the IJ found both

Alvarado-Reyes and Garmendia-Ardona credible. Turning next to the

merits of the asylum claim,3 he determined that the harm Alvarado-

Reyes endured in El Salvador wasn't sufficiently severe to

constitute "persecution."

The IJ then turned his attention to the three protected

characteristics Alvarado-Reyes proffered -- namely, his membership

in the following three PSGs: "Reyes family," "Salvadoran men,"

and "Salvadoran men who resist gang recruitment."4 While the IJ

3 We'll get more into this in a bit but, for now, just keep in mind that to be asylum-eligible, a noncitizen must demonstrate that they satisfy immigration law's definition of a "refugee." That definition in turn requires a showing that the noncitizen can't or won't return to their home country or country of last habitual residence "because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution on account of" at least one of five statutorily protected characteristics, which include "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group [("PSG")], or political opinion."

(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 4 We interrupt our summary of the IJ's decision for two important clarifications on the protected-characteristics front. First, in Petitioners' briefing before the IJ, Alvarado-Reyes also proffered an anti-gang political opinion as another protected characteristic. At the merits hearing, though, it appears he didn't follow through with this theory of his case and the IJ didn't address it. Petitioners also made no political-opinion- based argument to the BIA or to us on appeal.

- 6 - deemed Alvarado-Reyes' first two PSGs legally cognizable, he took

exception to Alvarado-Reyes' third PSG. According to the IJ,

"Salvadoran men who resist gang recruitment" was not sufficiently

particular or socially distinct -- two indispensable requirements

for a PSG to be cognizable.

Having thrown Alvarado-Reyes' third PSG in the bin, the

IJ then considered whether the harm he suffered or feared suffering

in El Salvador was or would be "on account of" his membership in

the PSGs of "Reyes family" or "Salvadoran men." In the IJ's mind,

Alvarado-Reyes was not targeted either for his family or gender;

instead, MS-13 simply "wanted to use his truck to transport them."

And without that causal connection between the harm and any

protected characteristic, the IJ determined that Alvarado-Reyes

Second, Alvarado-Reyes also proffered three additional PSGs: "Salvadoran women," "Salvadoran female," and "Salvadoran women viewed as property by virtue of their status in society." Because Garmendia-Ardona did not file any application for relief in her own name and was only seeking derivative asylum, the IJ explained that "she was not required to establish that she was a victim of past persecution or [had] a well-founded fear of future persecution." In this way, then, the IJ concluded that these women-based PSGs were not relevant to Alvarado-Reyes' applications for immigration relief because he is a man. Petitioners did not challenge this conclusion in their briefing to the BIA or to us. This is all to say, to the extent Petitioners hoped to move forward with any of these theories now, we deem them unexhausted and waived. See Odei v. Garland,

, 78 n.1 (1st Cir. 2023) (exhaustion); Martínez-Pérez v. Garland,

, 40 n.5 (1st Cir. 2018) (waiver).

- 7 - had not suffered past persecution nor did he have a well-founded

fear of future persecution. The IJ, therefore, denied asylum.

As withholding of removal shares many of asylum's

requirements but has a higher burden of proof, the IJ determined

that Alvarado-Reyes necessarily did not shoulder his burden as to

that form of relief either. CAT protection was also denied

because, to the IJ, there was insufficient evidence in the record

that it was more likely than not that Alvarado-Reyes would be

tortured in El Salvador on behalf of or with the acquiescence of

or willful blindness of a Salvadoran government official.

Petitioners, thereafter, appealed to the BIA, but that

appeal didn't do much for their plight. On August 1, 2023,

pursuant to

(e)(4), the BIA dismissed their appeal

with a proverbial thumbs-up to the IJ's decision, affirming the

denial without opinion and rendering the IJ's decision the final

agency decision on the books.

A timely petition for review with this court followed.

HOW WE RESOLVE TODAY'S CASE

It's now time for our explanation as to how we resolve

Petitioners' case. On appeal, they ask us to reverse the agency's

denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. As

the BIA affirmed without opinion, we focus our review on just the

IJ's decision and consider the IJ's findings and conclusions to be

those of the BIA as well. See Keo v. Ashcroft,

, 60

- 8 - (1st Cir. 2003). In undertaking our review, "[w]e review the

agency's legal conclusions de novo." Espinoza-Ochoa v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023). Meanwhile, factual findings

are scrutinized using the substantial-evidence lens, meaning that

in order for us "[t]o reverse . . . 'the evidence must not only

support the contrary finding, but compel it.'" Caz v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Mahmoud v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020)).

But before getting into the weeds of whether the agency

properly denied immigration relief, we take a brief detour to

discuss an important preliminary issue.

Hearing Transcript

We are dismayed to note -- but feel compelled to mention

-- that the transcript of Petitioners' merits hearing before the

IJ is riddled with so many "indiscernible" notations so as to

render the transcript effectively meaningless and useless to our

review of their petition for review. Unfortunately for both

noncitizens and our broader immigration system, "the problem of

incomplete transcripts in immigration cases" is a recurring one.

See Oroh v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2009) (listing First

Circuit cases dealing with similar issues). We have repeatedly

recognized that due process requires that noncitizens have access

to a reasonably accurate and complete transcript (or, at the bare

minimum, an adequate substitute). See, e.g., Jani v. Garland, 110

- 9 - F.4th 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2024); Oroh,

; Kheireddine v.

Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2005). Be that as it may,

because Petitioners did not present this as an appellate issue, we

leave this topic with our concerns noted and move on to the

arguments before us.

Asylum

Petitioners first challenge the IJ's denial of asylum,

and their challenge has three parts to it. Specifically, they

argue the following: (1) the harm Alvarado-Reyes suffered and

fears suffering in El Salvador amounted and will amount to

"persecution";5 (2) the "Salvadoran men who resist gang

recruitment" PSG is a legally valid PSG; and (3) the harm he

suffered and fears suffering in El Salvador was and will be "on

account of" his PSG memberships. To resolve today's petition,

though, we need only address the second and third of these

arguments. Here's why.

As we alluded to before, an asylum applicant must meet

the definition of a "refugee," which requires a showing of past or

anticipated "persecution" on account of at least one statutorily

protected ground.

(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

5 Petitioners suggest in their briefing that the IJ didn't actually "issue a formal holding on whether the past harm faced by [Alvarado-Reyes] . . . amounted to persecution." Not so. The IJ explicitly "f[ound] that the harm [Alvarado-Reyes] suffered in El Salvador did not rise to the requisite level to constitute past persecution."

- 10 - As used here, "persecution" means harm that surpasses a certain

degree of severity, harm that is causally connected (or has a

"nexus" to) a cognizable statutorily protected characteristic, and

harm that results from governmental action or inaction. Martínez-

Pérez,

. If a noncitizen fails to make a sufficient

showing as to any one of these elements, their asylum claim fails.

Aguilar-De Guillen v. Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2018).

Applying this rubric here, then, and even taking Petitioners at

their word on their first argument (that Alvarado-Reyes suffered

or fears suffering harm that is sufficiently severe so as to

constitute persecution), Petitioners nonetheless cannot prevail

because "Salvadoran men who resist gang recruitment" is not, on

this record, a legally cognizable PSG, and the remainder of their

asylum claim unravels because they have not made a sufficient nexus

showing. We take these in turn.

PSG Cognizability

We start with first principles. "To prove persecution

on account of membership in a [PSG], a[] [noncitizen] must show at

a bare minimum that [he] is a member of a legally cognizable social

group." Mendez–Barrera v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2010).

"For a PSG to be legally cognizable, an asylum applicant must make

a three-part showing: the proposed PSG must (1) bear 'a common

immutable characteristic,' (2) be 'defined with particularity,'

and (3) be considered 'socially distinct within the society in

- 11 - question.'" Cabrera v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2024)

(quoting Hernandez-Martinez v. Garland,

(1st Cir.

2023)). Teasing that out, we have explained that "a characteristic

is considered immutable when 'members of the group either cannot

change [it], or should not be required to change [it], because it

is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.'"

(quoting Montoya-Lopez v. Garland,

(1st Cir.

2023)). And "[a] group is considered particularly defined where

it is 'discrete and ha[s] definable boundaries -- it must not be

amorphous, overbroad, diffuse or subjective.'"

(quoting Paiz-

Morales v. Lynch,

(1st Cir. 2015)); see also

Matter of M–E–V-G–,

(B.I.A. 2014)

(reasoning that "[t]he 'particularity' requirement relates to

. . . the need to put 'outer limits' on the definition of a

'particular social group'"). Finally, a group "is considered

socially distinct where its members 'are set apart, or distinct,

from other persons within the society in some significant way.'"

(quoting Rivas-Durán v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2019)).

Here, we zero in on the particularity requirement and

conclude that, because the proposed "Salvadoran men who resist

gang recruitment" PSG is not sufficiently "particularly defined"

on this record, Petitioners cannot make the necessary three-part

cognizability showing for that proposed PSG. See, e.g., Zhakira

v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020) (concluding that a

- 12 - petitioner's asylum claim failed because the proposed PSG did not

satisfy one of the three PSG requirements); Paiz-Morales,

(taking a similar approach and passing over immutability

and social distinction "because even if the petitioner could show

that he shared an immutable characteristic with a socially distinct

group, he failed to define the purported group with the requisite

particularity").

Petitioners say that the "Salvadoran men who resist gang

recruitment" PSG may be large, but it has "clear benchmarks for

determining membership":

Members of this group must be men who have been targeted by members of a gang in order to join them in their gang related activities and have resisted the recruitment attempts. While resistance may take different forms, it is readily apparent within the context of Salvadoran society what actions constitute resistance to the gangs. As such, this group's definition is sufficiently particular.

This argument does not actually explain to us what "resist[ing]

gang recruitment" means or how it is defined. And we've been clear

that a petitioner must properly explain the outer limits of a

proposed PSG that is "open to varying, subjective

interpretations." See, e.g., Zhakira,

(rejecting

as "too amorphous and overbroad" a proposed PSG of

"westernized/Americanized Christians supporting the international

campaign against Al-Shabab" where a petitioner did "not explain

what attributes make an individual 'westernized' or

- 13 - 'Americanized,'" noting that "[t]he 'westernized/Americanized'

characteristic" was "open to varying, subjective

interpretations"). Petitioners conclusorily urge without

elaboration that "resistance may take different forms, [but] it is

readily apparent within the context of Salvadoran society what

actions constitute resistance to the gangs." But this does not an

outer limit create; instead,

it is virtually impossible to identify who is or is not a member [of this group]. There are, for example, questions about . . . the type of conduct that may be considered "recruit[ment]," and the degree to which a person must display "resist[ance]." These are ambiguous group characteristics, largely subjective, that fail to establish a sufficient level of particularity.

Mendez–Barrera,

(emphases added). Here, Petitioners

have made no attempt to answer these questions or define the terms

used in their largely subjective PSG. Accordingly, we conclude

the IJ did not err in denying Petitioners' claim for asylum based

on Alvarado-Reyes' membership in this "Salvadoran men who resist

gang recruitment" group.

As mentioned several pages back, though, this wasn't the

only PSG on the table. The IJ deemed legally cognizable Alvarado-

Reyes' other two PSGs -- "Reyes family" and "Salvadoran men." So

we proceed to our examination of the IJ's conclusion that any harm

Alvarado-Reyes suffered or feared suffering in El Salvador was not

or would not be "on account of" his membership in those PSGs.

- 14 - Nexus

Recall that, to the IJ's thinking, Alvarado-Reyes was

not targeted for his family or gender, but rather it was because

MS-13 just "wanted to use his truck to transport them." And

remember, because of this, the IJ spotted no causal connection

(nexus) between the harm and any protected characteristic and

therefore determined that Alvarado-Reyes had not suffered past

persecution nor did he have a well-founded fear of future

persecution.

We begin our examination by breaking down what exactly

a sufficient nexus showing looks like. Immigration law provides

that the nexus requirement is satisfied where the asylum applicant

offers sufficient evidence that a statutorily protected ground

"was or will be at least one central reason" for their persecution.

(b)(1)(B)(i). Requiring that the statutorily

protected ground only be "at least one central reason" for the

persecution "clearly contemplates the possibility that multiple

motivations can exist, and that the presence of a non-protected

motivation does not render an applicant ineligible for refugee

status." Aldana-Ramos v. Holder,

(1st Cir.

2014). However, if the statutorily protected ground is simply

"incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another

reason for [the] harm," the applicant cannot be considered a

- 15 - refugee. Singh v. Mukasey,

(1st Cir. 2008) (quoting

In re J-B-N- & S-M-,

(B.I.A. 2007)).

With that, let's zoom in on Petitioners' arguments as

they relate to nexus. Basically, they argue that the IJ didn't

engage in the required mixed-motive analysis and that the record

compelled the conclusion that Alvarado-Reyes' membership in the

PSGs of "Reyes family" and "Salvadoran men" was or will be at least

one central reason for his persecution in El Salvador. Neither

argument stands up.

Consider first the allegation that the IJ didn't engage

in the proper mixed-motive analysis -- an allegation we review de

novo. Jimenez-Portillo v. Garland,

(1st Cir.

2022). But looking at the decision itself, we are persuaded that

the IJ did, in fact, consider such a possibility. To explain,

after reviewing the evidence and referencing portions of Alvarado-

Reyes' and Garmendia-Ardona's testimony, the IJ reasoned that

Alvarado-Reyes "was targeted simply because he owned a truck."

The IJ then proceeded to consider whether Alvarado-Reyes' legally

cognizable PSGs were another reason for his persecution and

determined that they were not. If the IJ had, indeed, failed to

consider the possibility of mixed motives, he would have stopped

his analysis after determining that MS-13 targeted Alvarado-Reyes

for his truck as there would have been no reason to consider any

- 16 - other motivations. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by

Petitioners' first claim of error.

That leaves us with just Petitioners' second claim of

nexus-related error -- that is, the IJ erred in determining that

Alvarado-Reyes' PSG memberships weren't and won't be "at least one

central reason" for his persecution. The determination of whether

a protected characteristic is one central reason for a noncitizen's

persecution is usually a question of fact, and is a question of

fact in this case, so we review this argument for substantial

evidence.

. To win on substantial evidence review,

Petitioners must demonstrate that the IJ's nexus determination was

not "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence

on the record considered as a whole." Loja-Tene v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v.

Elias-Zacarias,

(1992)). In other words, the

evidence must point undoubtedly in favor of and compel Petitioners'

preferred reading of the record, such that no adjudicator could

have reasonably reached the IJ's conclusion. See

Jimenez-Portillo,

. They haven't cleared that

daunting hurdle.

Petitioners' first PSG was "Reyes family," but there's

simply nothing in the record from which we could even infer

Alvarado-Reyes was targeted because he was part of the Reyes

family. There's nothing to suggest that, had Alvarado-Reyes

- 17 - belonged to another family but still owned a truck, the MS-13 gang

members would not have targeted him. While Garmendia-Ardona and

J.A.G. arguably might have been targeted due to their familial

connection to Alvarado-Reyes, that is not the relevant inquiry.

Rather, the relevant inquiry is why Alvarado-Reyes -- as the asylum

applicant -- was targeted, and Petitioners have pointed to no

record evidence compelling the conclusion that he was targeted due

to his membership in the "Reyes family."

Petitioners fare no better with their remaining

"Salvadoran men" PSG. As above, there's nothing in the record to

suggest that, had Alvarado-Reyes been a woman (i.e., a member of

"Salvadoran women"), the MS-13 gang members would not have targeted

him. To the contrary, the extensive country conditions evidence

in the record supportably shows that gang members target both men

and women alike. In this way, then, the record does not compel

the conclusion that Alvarado-Reyes' gender was "at least one

central reason" for his persecution.

As such, we conclude that the IJ's no-nexus

determinations were supported by substantial evidence and affirm

the denial of asylum.

Withholding of Removal and CAT Protection

Having affirmed the denial of asylum, we turn to

withholding of removal and CAT protection. Turning first to

withholding of removal, that form of relief -- similar to asylum

- 18 - -- also requires PSG and nexus showings but has a higher burden of

proof. Cabrera,

; Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2007). The inevitable "corollary" to

this is that, where Alvarado-Reyes failed to carry his asylum

burden, he also failed to carry his withholding burden. Caz,

.

Rounding things out with CAT protection, the only

mention of such relief in Petitioners' opening brief is two

sentences in their introductory summary section, stating that

Alvarado-Reyes "is eligible for . . . protection under the . . .

CAT" and "ask[ing] this court to reverse and remand the BIA's

decision affirming the [IJ's] order denying [Alvarado-Reyes']

application for . . . protection under the CAT." Other than those

two introductory sentences, nothing in their briefing (or at oral

argument, for that matter) addresses the merits of Alvarado-Reyes'

CAT claim, which amounts to waiver, plain and simple. See Sok v.

Mukasey,

(1st Cir. 2008) (deeming CAT claim waived

where "no argument [was made] with respect to the . . . claim

beyond an introductory assertion that '[t]he record establishes

the merits of [petitioner's] claim[] for . . . protection pursuant

to the [CAT]'" (second and fifth brackets in original)).

Affirmance Without Opinion

Before we part, we have one final argument to address.

Petitioners argue that the BIA, in affirming the IJ's decision

- 19 - without opinion, violated its obligation to "give careful,

individualized, rational explanations for its decisions." Haoud

v. Ashcroft,

(1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Mousa v.

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.,

(7th Cir. 2000)).

We think this argument comes up dry.

To begin, "we have held time and time again that the"

BIA's affirmance-without-opinion "procedure constitutes 'a valid

exercise of the Attorney General's discretion to fashion its own

rules of procedure.'" Larios v. Holder,

(1st

Cir. 2010) (quoting Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft,

(1st

Cir. 2004)). We've also recognized that, under certain

circumstances, regulations actually require that the BIA summarily

affirm the IJ's decision without opinion. See Cruz v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2024).

Even taking Petitioners' argument head on, the BIA

enjoys a presumption of regularity when it acts officially, see,

e.g., Domingo-Mendez v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2022);

Enwonwu v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2007) (per

curiam), so an affirmance without opinion does not necessarily

mean the BIA failed to engage in a fulsome review of the record or

offer a rational explanation for its conclusion. Indeed, as the

old saying goes, evidence of absence is not absence of evidence

and Petitioners point to nothing in the record that suggests

anything might have been amiss here. And significantly, as our

- 20 - analysis above shows, we spotted no reversible error in the IJ's

decision so the BIA was not wrong to affirm. See Cruz,

(rejecting challenge to BIA's affirmance-without-opinion

procedure, in part, because "the record provides no basis for

questioning the IJ's factual determination"). In sum,

Petitioners' argument comes up short.

HOW IT ENDS

We recognize -- as demonstrated by Petitioners'

statements and the voluminous country conditions evidence in the

record -- that rampant gang violence leaves Salvadorans in

particularly dire straits with little to no recourse.

Nevertheless, on this specific record, there is nothing we can do

about it for Petitioners. All in all, we must deny the petition.

- 21 -