United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-2031

DIANA FERNANDA MEDINA-SUGUILANDA; S.N.C.M.,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Kayatta, Selya, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.

Kristian Robson Meyer, with whom Kevin P. MacMurray and MacMurray & Associates were on brief, for petitioners. Robert Michael Stalzer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, and Julie M. Iversen, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent. SangYeob Kim, with whom Gilles Bissonnette and American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire were on brief, for American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, amicus curiae.

November 14, 2024 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. Diana Fernanda Medina-Suguilanda

is an Ecuadorian woman who suffered domestic abuse in her home

country. She has brought a petition for review challenging the

administrative denial of her asylum application, which was based

primarily on the contention that the Ecuadorian authorities would

not, or could not, protect her from her abusive former partner.1

The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed the finding of

the immigration judge ("IJ") that the petitioner had failed to

show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution

if she were to return to Ecuador. Because we conclude that those

determinations are supported by substantial evidence, we deny the

petition.2

I.

A.

The petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador. In

June 2021, she entered the United States through Texas with her

former partner, Fausto David Cartuche Saraguro ("Fausto"), and

their minor daughter. Two months later, the Department of Homeland

1 The petitioner's daughter was listed as a derivative beneficiary of her asylum application. See Cabrera v. Garland,

, 315 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024). Because our disposition of the lead application necessarily resolves the derivative application, see

we do not separately discuss it. 2 In the administrative proceedings, the petitioner pressed additional claims that she does not pursue here. We therefore confine our focus to her asylum claim based on her status as an Ecuadorian woman.

- 2 - Security began removal proceedings against the petitioner and her

daughter.3 At a hearing in May 2022, the petitioner conceded

inadmissibility to the United States. Shortly thereafter, she

applied for asylum. On November 23, 2022, an IJ held a hearing on

her application at which the petitioner testified. The facts found

by the IJ are as follows.

The petitioner grew up in an indigenous community in

Saraguro, Ecuador. Her father left for the United States when she

was seven years old. When the petitioner was thirteen years old,

she began a relationship with Fausto, who was eighteen years old.

Two years later, the petitioner gave birth to their daughter.

Three months after their daughter was born, the petitioner's mother

left Ecuador for the United States, and the petitioner moved in

with Fausto.

The petitioner testified that, following the move, her

relationship with Fausto turned "toxic." There was substantial

"conflict and constant fighting," which included Fausto punching

and slapping the petitioner and using abusive language, such as

calling her a "bitch" and a "whore." Fausto also prevented the

petitioner from leaving the house when she wanted and limited with

whom she could speak.

3 Separate removal proceedings are also apparently pending against Fausto, who remains in the United States.

- 3 - The petitioner described one occasion when Fausto shoved

her to the ground while she was pushing their daughter in a

stroller. Fausto's shove caused the stroller to tip over. The

fall awakened their daughter, who started to cry. Neighbors

observed the incident and called the police. The police responded

and indicated that they wanted to arrest Fausto and take him away.

The petitioner, however, asked the police not to do so because she

was "afraid of retaliation" and did not want her daughter "to see

her father being taken away by police officers."

The petitioner never reported Fausto to Ecuadorian

authorities. Eventually, however, she was able to separate from

Fausto and move with her daughter to the house where her mother

had lived before departing for the United States.

In early 2021, someone tried to break into the house

while the petitioner was recovering from surgery. Neighbors scared

away the intruder. The petitioner believed that she was targeted

because she was a woman living alone who was weak from surgery.

After the attempted break-in, the petitioner decided to

leave with her daughter for the United States. She believed that

she needed Fausto's permission to bring their daughter out of the

country. She said that Fausto would only give permission if they

all traveled together. Thus, in June 2021, the petitioner, Fausto,

and their daughter left Ecuador for the United States.

- 4 - During their travels to their eventual destination in

Framingham, Massachusetts, the petitioner and Fausto shared a

hotel room and a ride from New York to Massachusetts. In

Framingham, the petitioner and Fausto lived at different

addresses. Fausto saw his daughter occasionally but did not

provide financial support. He did not attend any of his daughter's

school events, although he was listed on school forms as one of

her "parental point[s] of contact." The petitioner never contacted

any federal or Massachusetts authorities about Fausto, and the

record contains no evidence or allegations of abuse during the

period that the petitioner and Fausto have lived in Framingham.

When the petitioner was asked by counsel for the Department of

Homeland Security who in Ecuador would harm her if she were to

return, she answered "nobody."

B.

In a written decision, the IJ concluded that the

petitioner did not qualify for asylum. The IJ began by determining

that the petitioner had not suffered past persecution because the

violence she suffered was not connected to government action or

inaction. The IJ found that Fausto had persecuted the petitioner

on account of her status as an Ecuadorian woman. He recognized

that, in Ecuador, there is "a culture of machismo and misogyny

. . . [that gives] rise to high levels of violence against women,

- 5 - including . . . widespread domestic abuse," and that Fausto's

abusive conduct was fueled by these societal conditions.

The IJ concluded, nevertheless, that the petitioner had

failed to prove that the abuse she suffered was sufficiently

connected to the Ecuadorian government's unwillingness or

inability to protect her. The IJ noted that the petitioner had

never reported Fausto to the police because she feared what would

happen if Fausto were arrested and released. The IJ declined,

however, to excuse the failure to report because reporting Fausto

would not have been futile.

In reaching this conclusion, the IJ relied, in part, on

the police's willingness to arrest Fausto when the neighbors

reported Fausto's violent conduct. He also relied on a report

from the U.S. Department of State explaining that Ecuadorian law

provides for prison time and fines for perpetrators of domestic

abuse and that the law also "entitles victims [of gender-based

violence] to immediate protective measures designed to prevent or

cease violence, such as police surveillance, placement in

shelters, and awareness programs." The report further indicates

that the Ecuadorian authorities generally enforce the criminal

penalties and protective measures provided by law.

The IJ also rejected the petitioner's contention that,

even if she had not suffered past persecution, she still had a

well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ concluded that

- 6 - the petitioner had not shown that she possessed an objectively

reasonable fear of Fausto or any other person. Regarding Fausto,

the IJ noted that it was speculative whether Fausto would even

return to Ecuador from the United States. He also highlighted

other facts suggesting that the petitioner did not have a

reasonable fear of future persecution by Fausto. These facts

included the petitioner's travel with Fausto to the United States;

their sharing a hotel room and ride on their journey; Fausto's

occasional visits with his daughter and his being listed as one of

her parental points of contact; and the lack of police contact

initiated by the petitioner related to Fausto since coming to the

United States. The IJ also noted the petitioner's testimony that

there was no one else in Ecuador who would harm her.

Additionally, the IJ found that the petitioner did not

have a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a pattern

or practice in Ecuador of persecution against women. He determined

that, while there was evidence that violence against women "is a

serious problem" in Ecuador, the evidence did not show it to be

"systematic or pervasive."

The BIA affirmed. It concluded that the IJ did not

clearly err in rejecting the petitioner's claim that the Ecuadorian

police were unwilling or unable to control Fausto's abusive

conduct. It noted that, while an asylum applicant may be excused

from reporting an abuser when reporting to authorities would be

- 7 - futile, the IJ appropriately rejected the petitioner's futility

claim based on the State Department report and evidence showing

the police's willingness to arrest Fausto when called. While

acknowledging the petitioner's concern that she could face

retaliation if Fausto were released, it concluded that an asylum

applicant cannot show that the police are unable or unwilling to

act merely because they "cannot guarantee . . . perpetual safety

from crime."

The BIA also affirmed the IJ's determination that the

facts did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution

based on Fausto's previous conduct, given that Fausto's return to

Ecuador was speculative. And it summarily affirmed the IJ's

conclusion that the petitioner had failed to show a "pattern or

practice of persecution" against Ecuadorian women.

II.

A.

When considering a petition for review in an immigration

matter, we "typically focus[] on the final decision of the BIA."

Ferreira v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting

Loja-Tene v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020)). "'[T]o the

extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning, we

review those portions of the IJ's decision' as well."

at 46

(quoting Chavez v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2022)).

When discussing such a joint decision, we refer to the BIA and IJ

- 8 - collectively as "the agency."

(citing Pineda-Maldonado v.

Garland,

(1st Cir. 2024)).

To qualify for asylum, an applicant must show previous

persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in his or

her home country on account of, inter alia, membership in a

particular social group.4

(a)(42)(A). Here, the

petitioner identified the relevant social group as Ecuadorian

women. See

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Past persecution requires

evidence that the asylum applicant suffered "discriminatory

experiences" that "reached a fairly high threshold of seriousness"

and occurred with "some regularity and frequency." Vasili v.

Holder,

(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Alibeaj v.

Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2006)). Thus, persecution

requires "more than mere discomfiture, unpleasantness, harassment,

or unfair treatment." Sosa-Perez v. Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Nikijuluw v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2005)).

Serious abuse inflicted by a private actor based on a

protected ground is not itself sufficient to establish past

4 A showing of past persecution establishes a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution that the government can rebut by presenting evidence that there was "a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution."

(b)(1)(i) (2024). In this case, the government did not attempt to show such a fundamental change in circumstances for Ecuadorian women after the petitioner arrived in the United States.

- 9 - persecution. For abusive, discriminatory treatment to suffice, it

must also have a government nexus. Vila-Castro v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023) (citing Orelien v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2006)). An asylum applicant may establish a

government nexus by showing relevant government action or

inaction. Harutyunyan v. Gonzales,

(1st Cir.

2005). "This means . . . that one who seeks asylum must show

mistreatment that is the 'direct result of government action,

government-supported action, or government's unwillingness or

inability to control private conduct.'" Orelien,

(quoting Nikijuluw,

).

The government-nexus requirement is at the center of the

pending petition. The petitioner challenges the BIA's affirmance

of the IJ's conclusion that she failed to demonstrate past

persecution insofar as she did not show the Ecuadorian government's

unwillingness or inability to protect her from Fausto's abuse.

The petitioner, supported by amicus curiae the American

Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire ("ACLU"), begins by arguing

that the BIA wrongly employed a clear-error standard when reviewing

the IJ's unwilling-or-unable determinations.5 The petitioner and

5 We write in the plural because unwillingness and inability are separate ways for an applicant to establish the required government nexus. Rosales Justo v. Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2018) (citing Khattak v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2013)).

- 10 - the ACLU assert that the unwilling-or-unable inquiries present

mixed questions of law and fact -- that is, questions that ask

"whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or

is not violated." Pullman-Standard v. Swint,

, 289

n.19 (1982); see also U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CWCapital Asset

Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,

(2018)

(citing Pullman-Standard,

n.19). As such, they

contend that, while the IJ's factual findings were reviewable for

clear error, the BIA was required to review de novo the IJ's

ultimate determination of whether those facts amounted to an

inability or unwillingness to protect the petitioner. They assert

that the BIA must engage in this bifurcated review for all mixed

questions. In support of that contention, the ACLU cites a

regulation applicable to the BIA,

(d)(3), which

provides that "[f]acts determined by the immigration judge, . . .

shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the

immigration judge are clearly erroneous" while "questions of law,

discretion, and judgment" may be reviewed de novo.

This argument fails because it is predicated upon the

assumption that the unwilling and unable determinations are mixed

questions of law and fact. We have never characterized those

determinations as presenting mixed questions. Instead, we have

repeatedly called them questions of fact. Vila-Castro,

(describing the unwilling and unable inquiries as "one[s]

- 11 - 'of fact'" (quoting Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler,

(1st

Cir. 2007))); Rosales Justo v. Sessions,

, 161 n.6

(1st Cir. 2018) ("Whether a government is unwilling or unable to

protect an asylum applicant from persecution 'is a question of

fact.'" (quoting Ortiz-Araniba,

)); Ortiz-Araniba,

("The question whether the government of El Salvador

is unwilling or unable to control [the applicant's] potential

persecutors is a question of fact . . . ."). Following our lead,

the BIA has relied on Ortiz-Araniba to conclude that "[w]hether a

government is unable or unwilling to protect an individual from

persecution is a question of fact" reviewed for clear error.

Matter of C-G-T-,

(2023) (citing

Ortiz-Araniba,

).

Our description of the unwilling-or-unable

determinations as questions of fact, rather than mixed questions,

is consistent with the common characterization of mixed questions

as inquiries that require the application of legal standards, set

forth in statutes, treaties, regulations, or certain

constitutional or judge-made doctrines, to factual findings. See,

e.g., Wilkinson v. Garland,

(2024) (statute);

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,

(2020) (equitable

tolling); Monasky v. Taglieri,

(2020) (treaty);

Maggio v. Fulford,

(1983) (White, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (collecting constitutional doctrines

- 12 - presenting mixed questions); Alzaben v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023) (statute); DeCarvalho v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2021) (regulation). Governmental unwillingness or

inability to protect an asylum applicant is not "a requirement

. . . 'circumscribed by a legal standard.'" Alzaben,

(quoting Cho v. Gonzalez,

, 100 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Unwillingness and inability are, rather, ordinary, everyday terms

that describe possible factual predicates for the satisfaction of

the government-nexus element of an applicant's persecution claim.

See Sanchez-Vasquez v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2021)

(describing the "nexus between" persecutory harm "and government

action or inaction" as a "discrete element[]" of persecution

(citing Carvalho-Frois v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2012)).

This explains why we have described the unwilling and unable

determinations as "question[s] of fact." Rosales Justo,

n.6 (quoting Ortiz-Araniba,

). And, because

the unwilling and unable determinations are fact questions, the

BIA appropriately reviewed them for clear error. Barros v.

Garland,

(1st Cir. 2022) (stating that the BIA

reviews an IJ's factual determinations for clear error (citing

(d)(3)(i) (2020))).

We turn now to the remainder of the petitioner's

challenge to the agency's unwilling and unable determinations.

Consistent with our description of the unwilling and unable

- 13 - determinations as questions of fact, we review them "under the

highly deferential substantial evidence standard." Vila-Castro,

(quoting Ortiz-Araniba,

); see, e.g.,

Singh v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023); Gómez-Medina v.

Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020); Ortiz-Araniba,

; Harutyunyan,

. That standard requires

upholding the agency's findings of fact "so long as they are

'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on

the record considered as a whole.'" Murillo Morocho v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Sanabria Morales v. Barr,

(1st Cir. 2020)). Otherwise stated, we should

only disturb the agency's factual findings if a "reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled" to make a contrary finding. Singh,

(quoting Orelien,

).

The agency's conclusion that the petitioner failed to

show that the Ecuadorian government was unwilling or unable to

protect her from Fausto was based primarily on the petitioner not

reporting Fausto to the police. The agency concluded that the

authorities were willing and able to offer the petitioner

protection and, thus, reporting Fausto to the police would not

have been futile. The petitioner's primary contention is that

these determinations were "made against the weight of the

evidence."

- 14 - To establish the requisite government nexus, an asylum

applicant who argues that the government was unwilling or unable

to protect her usually must demonstrate that she reported the abuse

to the authorities. See Morales-Morales v. Sessions,

(1st Cir. 2017). The failure to report, however, may be

excused if an applicant "can demonstrate that reporting private

abuse to government authorities would have been futile."

(citing Pavlova v. INS,

(2d Cir. 2006) and

Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales,

(9th Cir. 2006));

see also Rosales Justo,

(citing Morales-Morales,

).

It is undisputed that the petitioner did not report

Fausto to the police. The petitioner argues that she should be

excused from that failure because she feared retaliation if the

authorities released Fausto. The BIA concluded, conversely, that

the evidence supported the conclusion that the police were willing

and able to arrest Fausto, and thus the petitioner "did not give

the Ecuadorian government a meaningful opportunity to protect

. . . her."

Substantial evidence supports this conclusion. In

response to a question from her lawyer about the "first time . . .

Fausto was violent towards" her, the petitioner related the

incident when Fausto shoved her while she was walking with the

stroller and the neighbors called the police. On that occasion,

- 15 - the police wanted to arrest Fausto and "take [him] away," but the

petitioner requested that the police not do so "because [she] was

afraid of retaliation" and did not want her daughter "to see her

father being taken away by police officers."

"[T]he most telling datum" in determining whether the

government was willing and able to protect the petitioner is

whether "the local authorities responded immediately to each

incident." Gómez-Medina, 975 F.3d at 32 (quoting Harutyunyan,

); see also Ortiz-Araniba,

(citing

Harutyunyan,

). Here, the Ecuadorian authorities

received a single report about Fausto's violent conduct toward the

petitioner, which occurred after Fausto's first violent act. The

police responded and sought to arrest Fausto. The police's

response is a strong indicium that they were willing to protect

the petitioner.

The IJ also highlighted evidence suggesting that the

Ecuadorian authorities would have been able to help the petitioner

if she had reported Fausto. In this regard, the IJ relied on a

U.S. State Department report describing the criminal penalties

available under Ecuadorian law to punish perpetrators of domestic

violence and the services available to protect victims from their

abusers. Importantly, the State Department report indicates that

the Ecuadorian authorities generally enforce these criminal

penalties and provide protective measures. Thus, the record before

- 16 - the agency permitted the findings that the police would and could

have protected the petitioner from Fausto's abuse.

The petitioner resists this conclusion by asserting that

the agency wrongly focused only on futility in determining whether

the petitioner should have been excused from failing to report

Fausto to the authorities. The petitioner says that, regardless

of whether reporting Fausto would have been futile, she should

have been excused from reporting him because doing so would have

placed her in danger.

Assuming danger can, in some circumstances, excuse an

applicant from reporting a persecutor to the authorities, see

Matter of C-G-T-,

(citing Rosales Justo,

), those circumstances are not present here. As

already discussed, the agency permissibly found that the police

were willing to arrest Fausto for his abusive conduct and

Ecuadorian law would have offered the petitioner protection.

Moreover, the petitioner successfully extricated herself from her

relationship with Fausto, later traveled cooperatively with him to

the United States, and lived near him without incident in the same

Massachusetts community. And, on the one occasion when Fausto's

conduct was reported to the police, there is no evidence that he

retaliated against anyone in the aftermath. The agency thus

permissibly found that there was no adequate excuse for the

petitioner's failure to report.

- 17 - The petitioner's final argument is that the agency did

not take adequate account of country-condition reports showing the

extent of domestic violence in Ecuador, including insufficient

judicial resources to handle the domestic-violence caseload. The

petitioner emphasizes that the information she presented to the

agency shows that, in Ecuador, "[c]rime continues to present a

severe problem [because there are v]ery low rates of apprehension

and conviction of criminals . . . due to limited police and

judicial resources."

Country-condition reports are relevant in evaluating the

willingness and ability of the government to offer protection.

See Rosales Justo,

. But such "reports do not

necessarily override petitioner-specific facts." Amouri v.

Holder,

(1st Cir. 2009) (citing Zarouite v.

Gonzales,

(1st Cir. 2005)).

Here, the record presents a mixed picture. The

particularized facts about the petitioner demonstrate that on the

one occasion when the police were alerted to Fausto's abuse, they

sought to arrest him. That evidence is consistent with country-

condition information showing that the Ecuadorian government

enforces laws that punish perpetrators of domestic violence and

offers restorative services for victims. We also recognize,

however, that the petitioner presented reports showing that there

is a substantial amount of domestic violence in Ecuador and that

- 18 - the government's resources are stretched thin in its efforts to

deal with the problem.

Where, as here, the record contains evidence supporting

conflicting conclusions about the government's ability to respond

to the domestic-violence problem, the substantial evidence

standard does the work. Under that standard, the country-condition

evidence highlighted by the petitioner is not so compelling that

it requires the conclusion that the government was unable to

protect her. See Guaman-Loja v. Holder,

(1st

Cir. 2013) ("Merely identifying alternative findings that could be

supported by substantial evidence is insufficient to supplant the

[IJ's] findings." (quoting Albathani v. INS,

(1st Cir. 2003))). That is especially so where the only

petitioner-specific evidence points in the opposite direction.

See Singh,

; Ortiz-Araniba,

. Thus,

while the agency might have reached a different conclusion about

the government's ability to protect the petitioner, the finding

that the petitioner failed to show a government nexus based on

inaction is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the

agency permissibly concluded that the petitioner had failed to

demonstrate past persecution.

B.

Where there has been no showing of past persecution, an

applicant may still qualify for asylum by demonstrating "a

- 19 - well-founded fear of future persecution that is 'both subjectively

genuine and objectively reasonable.'" Esteban-Garcia v. Garland,

(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Sunarto Ang v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2013)). The petitioner contends that,

even assuming no past persecution, the agency should have concluded

that she demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution

based on (1) abuse she claims Fausto will inflict on her if he

returns to Ecuador, and (2) the widespread and serious violence

faced by Ecuadorian women generally. Our review is again for

substantial evidence. Sunarto Ang,

.

The agency concluded that the petitioner did not have an

objectively reasonable future fear of Fausto. In support of this

conclusion, the agency observed that Fausto was now in the United

States and that his return to Ecuador was speculative. The

petitioner says that Fausto is in removal proceedings in the United

States, so his return to Ecuador is probable. Even if his return

is probable (and we have no information to know whether it is),

the IJ, without criticism from the BIA, discussed other evidence

undermining the objective reasonableness of the petitioner's

alleged fear of Fausto. This evidence included that Fausto and

the petitioner shared a hotel room and ride on their journey to

Massachusetts; Fausto continues to visit with his daughter and is

a parental point of contact on her school forms; and the petitioner

has not reported any violent incidents by Fausto since coming to

- 20 - the United States. These facts, taken together, provide

substantial evidence to support the agency's determination that,

at present, the petitioner does not have an objectively reasonable

fear that Fausto will harm her if she returns to Ecuador.

In addition to showing that an asylum applicant has a

well-founded fear of future persecution because he or she would be

singled out individually for persecution, an applicant may show

that his or her social group is subject to a "pattern or practice"

of persecution in the home country.

(b)(2)(iii)

(2024); see Sunarto Ang,

(citing

(b)(2)(iii)). "An applicant who seeks asylum based on a

pattern-or-practice claim must show 'systematic or pervasive

persecution of a particular group based on a protected ground,

rather than generalized civil conflict or a pattern of

discrimination.'" Khattak,

(quoting Díaz-García

v. Holder,

(1st Cir. 2010)).

The IJ recognized that Ecuadorian women face potential

violence but concluded that this evidence was not sufficient to

support a finding of pattern-or-practice persecution. As already

discussed, the agency reached a supportable determination that the

Ecuadorian government is willing and able to protect women from

domestic violence, thus undercutting the notion that violence

against Ecuadorian women results from systemic persecution

spearheaded or acquiesced in by the government. Cf. Guaman-Loja,

- 21 -

(concluding that the BIA had substantial evidence

to reject claim that discrimination in Ecuador "rose to the level

of systemic persecution" where evidence did not compel the

conclusion that the government was unwilling or unable to control

the conduct of private actors). The agency's rejection of the

petitioner's pattern-or-practice claim is supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, there is no ground for granting the

petition based on the agency's conclusion that the petitioner

failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.

III.

For the reasons discussed, we deny the petition for

review.

- 22 -