United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit


No. 23-2000

                      US GHOST ADVENTURES, LLC,

                        Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                  v.

   MISS LIZZIE'S COFFEE LLC and JOSEPH PEREIRA, Individually,

                        Defendants, Appellees.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

              [Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge]


                                Before

                        Barron, Chief Judge,
                  Selya and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.


     Christoper D. Strang, Strang, Scott & Giroux, LLP, Pietro
Sanitate, Timothy Bechen, Woods Rogers Vandeventer Black PLC,
Genesis Guzman, Michael P. Mullins, and Day Pitney LLP on brief
for appellant.
     Joseph Pereira, pro se, on brief for appellee Joseph Pereira.
     Matthew J. Ginsburg, Ascendant Law Group LLC, Daniel J.
Larson, and Larson Law LLC for appellee Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC.


                          November 15, 2024
            SELYA, Circuit Judge. The Lizzie Borden House is located

in Fall River, Massachusetts.      It bears a storied history that

originates with the still-unsolved murders — in 1892 — of Lizzie

Borden's father and stepmother.       Prosecutors alleged that Borden

hacked her parents to death with a hatchet in their family home.1

But these allegations were never proven:     in the ensuing "trial of

the century," a jury acquitted Lizzie of all charges. This macabre

tale not only has permeated the national consciousness but also

has turned Borden's ancestral home into a destination for those

with a taste for the supernatural.        It is against this grizzly

backdrop that the case at hand arises.

                                  I

            We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the

case.     We glean the facts from the district court's findings and

the record below.    See Waldron v. George Weston Bakeries Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2009).

                                  A

            US Ghost Adventures, LLC (Ghost Adventures) provides

ghost tours and related hospitality services across the United

States.    The firm owns a bed and breakfast that is operated out of


     1 These allegations gave rise to a bloody bit of doggerel that
has gained increasing notoriety with the passage of time: "Lizzie
Borden took an axe / And gave her mother forty whacks; / And when
she saw what she had done / She gave her father forty-one." Lizzie
Borden, Britannica (Sept. 20, 2024), https://www.britannica.com/
biography/Lizzie-Borden-American-murder-suspect.


                                - 2 -
the Lizzie Borden House in Fall River.           This venue features a

museum, so-called "ghost tours," and kindred activities.                The

commercial success of the business depends in large part on the

Lizzie Borden name and lore.      To this end, Ghost Adventures owns

an incontestable federal trademark on both the name "Lizzie Borden"

as used in hotel and restaurant services and on a realistic hatchet

logo displaying a notched blade, which hearkens back to the

implement that allegedly killed Borden's parents.2

          Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC (Miss Lizzie's) recently opened

a coffee shop next door to the Lizzie Borden House.3               It, too,

markets itself by reference to the Lizzie Borden saga.                  Its

storefront   signage   displays   the   words   "Miss   Lizzie's    Coffee"

between a cup of coffee and a stylized hatchet spewing blood.             A

second sign, with similar accoutrements, advertises Miss Lizzie's

as "The Most Haunted Coffee Shop in the World!"          The hatchets on

both signs include handles and dramatic blood splatters.




     2 If a registered trademark has been consistently used for
five consecutive years from the date of federal registration and
complies    with   other  statutory   formalities,   it   becomes
"incontestable" (that is, impervious to certain challenges to its
use).    See 

; Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V.
Trading Corp., 

, 117 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2006). It is
undisputed that Ghost Adventures' trademarks satisfy this
definition.
     3  The other named defendant, Joseph Pereira, owns Miss
Lizzie's.    For ease in exposition, we refer to the defendants
collectively as "Miss Lizzie's."


                                  - 3 -
          Since       Miss   Lizzie's       opened,   some     visitors    have

incorrectly assumed that the Lizzie Borden House and Miss Lizzie's

are affiliated.        Seven Ghost Adventures employees attested by

declaration    that   various   customers      have   either   expressed    the

belief that the establishments were related or inquired whether

such a relationship existed.       One tour guide explained that guests

were frustrated to learn that they could not bring Miss Lizzie's

coffee on their tours of the Lizzie Borden House, having bought

the coffee under the erroneous impression that the coffee shop was

affiliated with the historical site.            Another visitor separately

attested to his belief that the businesses were affiliated.                 And

Ghost Adventures' director of operations recounted that a Fall

River city official had telephoned the company to discuss its "new

business in the building next door named Miss Lizzie's."

                                        B

          On    September    18,   2023,     Ghost    Adventures   sued    Miss

Lizzie's in the federal district court for, inter alia, trademark

infringement and unfair competition.          See US Ghost Adventures, LLC

v. Miss Lizzie's Coffee LLC, No. 23-12116, 

, at *1

(D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2023).       Hot on the heels of the commencement of

suit, Ghost Adventures moved for a temporary restraining order

and/or preliminary injunction based on its trademark infringement

claim.   See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a), (b).              It sought

to enjoin Miss Lizzie's from using either the "Lizzie Borden"


                                   - 4 -
trademark or the hatchet logo in the coffee shop's trade names,

trade dress, and marketing materials.    See Ghost Adventures, 

, at *1.   Miss Lizzie's objected, asserting that it had

not infringed either trademark.

          The district court heard Ghost Adventures' motion for

preliminary injunction on the papers.       See 

   Applying the

customary four-part test, the court held that Ghost Adventures had

failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits.       See 

The court explained that "the key element in any infringement

action is likelihood of confusion."      Id.; see Pignons S. A. de

Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 

(1st Cir. 1981).     Specifically, "the alleged infringement must

create 'a likelihood of confounding an appreciable number of

reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care.'"     Ghost

Adventures, 

, at *1 (quoting Bos. Duck Tours, LP v.

Super Duck Tours, LLC, 

 (1st Cir. 2008)).   The court

further explained that "Ghost Adventures must demonstrate that

Miss Lizzie's 'used an imitation of its protected mark in commerce

in a way that is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,

or to deceive.'"     

 (quoting Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v.

Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

          The court concluded that Ghost Adventures had failed to

demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.    

   To begin, the court


                               - 5 -
found that the hatchet displayed on Miss Lizzie's signage was "not

at all the hatchet trademarked by Ghost Adventures" nor even "a

colorable imitation of it."   Id. at *2.   Miss Lizzie's hatchet has

a handle and smooth axe blade that spews blood.         See id.   Ghost

Adventures' hatchet   is bereft of either      handle or blood and

features a notch halfway along the blade.     See id.

           Next, the district court found that "Miss Lizzie's mark

associates its business with the historical story of Lizzie Borden,

not the mark 'Lizzie Borden'" that Ghost Adventures owns.          Id.

Although "Ghost Adventures has an 'incontestable' trademark in

'Lizzie Borden' and its hatchet, Miss Lizzie's is using neither

the mark 'Lizzie Borden' nor the Ghost Adventures hatchet."        Id.

In any event, "Ghost Adventures has not demonstrated that its mark

bears the strength which might give it the 'secondary meaning'

reach that, for example, 'Sam Adams Beer' might claim regarding

the historical figure Sam Adams."      Id. (citing Peoples Fed. Sav.

Bank v. People's United Bank, 

 (1st Cir. 2012)).

           Importantly, the court ranked Ghost Adventures' evidence

of customer confusion as "limited" and "contradicted to some extent

by the evidence from Miss Lizzie's of the absence of confusion."

   It found that any customer confusion was caused by three

factors:   the proximity of the establishments, their common but

independent reliance on the Lizzie Borden tale, and the tendency

to associate services related to a historical site with the site


                               - 6 -
itself.   See 

    The court did not credit any claim that confusion

was caused by the similarity of the businesses' marks.                 

 at *2

n.3.   After all, "the same issues would arise if Miss Lizzie's

called its cafe 'Forty Whacks Coffee' and used a different image

as its logo."    Id. at *2.

            There was more.       The district court noted that although

both   businesses    provide      hospitality      services,    the    two     sell

different    goods    to    different      customers:          "on    one     hand,

sophisticated    buyers     who    come    from     afar    with     tickets    or

reservations to experience the Lizzie Borden House; and the other,

buyers seeking food or coffee."              Id.     The absence of direct

competition weakened the claim of confusion.               See id.

            The court made two additional points.              First, it noted

the fact that the parties rely on different forms of advertising.

See id. at *3.       Second, it noted that a sign on Miss Lizzie's

storefront    explicitly     disclaimed      any    relationship       with     the

neighboring Lizzie Borden House.          See id. at *4.      Such a disclaimer

can "tip the scales to a finding of no likelihood of confusion and

no infringement" where, as here, "the multi-factor analysis points

to a low likelihood of confusion."                 Id. (citing 4 J. Thomas

McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:51

(4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter McCarthy on Trademarks]).

            Consistent     with    this   analysis,     the    district       court

concluded that Ghost Adventures was unlikely to succeed on the


                                     - 7 -
merits of its claims and denied the preliminary injunction.           See

id.   at   *4.   This   timely   appeal    followed.   See    

(a)(1).

                                   II

            We turn first to the standard of review applicable to

the disposition of motions for preliminary injunctive relief.          We

apply this standard with the understanding that "[a] preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy that is never

awarded as of right."     Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank, 

-9

(quoting Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc.,

 (1st Cir. 2011)).

            We have constructed a four-part framework to determine

whether preliminary injunctive relief is warranted.          See Ryan v.

U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't, 

, 18 (1st Cir. 2020).

The district court must consider "the movant's likelihood of

success on the merits; whether and to what extent the movant will

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive

relief; the balance of relative hardships . . . ; and the effect,

if any, that either a preliminary injunction or the absence of one

will have on the public interest."        

            Our review of a district court's decision to grant or

deny a preliminary injunction is for abuse of discretion.          See 

Under this rubric, we examine answers to abstract legal questions

de novo, findings of fact for clear error, and judgment calls with


                                 - 8 -
significant deference to the trial court.               See 

     A district

court abuses its discretion, for example, by committing material

legal error, "ignor[ing] pertinent elements deserving significant

weight, consider[ing] improper criteria, or, though assessing all

appropriate and no inappropriate factors, plainly err[ing] in

balancing them."        Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc.,

 (1st Cir. 1996).

                                        III

            Likelihood of success on the merits is the sine qua non

of the preliminary injunction analysis.           See Ryan, 974 F.3d at 18.

"This emphasis on likelihood of success is fully consistent with

the tenet that, as a matter of public policy, trademarks should be

protected against infringing uses."            Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v.

M.V. Trading Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 2006).                  "If the

movant 'cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed in his

quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.'"

Ryan, 974 F.3d at 18 (quoting New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v.

SprintCom, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2002)).

            To   show    trademark      infringement,    a   plaintiff     "must

demonstrate both that its mark merits protection and that the

allegedly     infringing     use   is    likely   to    result     in   consumer

confusion."      Borinquen Biscuit, 

.             Here, there is

no dispute that Ghost Adventures' registered marks are entitled to

protection.      Accordingly, we train the lens of our inquiry on


                                     - 9 -
whether the allegedly infringing marks are likely to cause consumer

confusion.

           The   prevention    of    confusion    is    "the   touchstone   of

trademark protection."        Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Melia, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2013).          "Where there is no likelihood of

confusion by the alleged infringer 'there is no impairment of the

interest that the trademark statute protects.'"                 

 (quoting

Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 

 (7th Cir.

1995)).   Moreover, trademark infringement requires "more than the

theoretical possibility of confusion"; there must be "a likelihood

of   confounding   an   appreciable     number     of   reasonably   prudent

purchasers exercising ordinary care."            Bos. Duck Tours, 

 (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.

Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 

 (1st Cir. 1996)).

           Eight factors combine to determine the likelihood of

confusion:

           (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the
           similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship
           between the parties' channels of trade; (4)
           the   relationship   between   the   parties'
           advertising; (5) the classes of prospective
           purchasers; (6) evidence of actual confusion;
           (7) the defendant's intent in adopting its
           mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff's
           mark.

Borinquen Biscuit, 

; see Pignons, 

.

Although an inquiring court ordinarily should examine each factor,

no single factor will carry the day.         See Borinquen Biscuit, 443


                                    - 10 -
F.3d at 120.   Finally, where there is a low likelihood of consumer

confusion, a disclaimer of connection between marks may "tip the

scales" towards a finding of no likelihood of confusion.         3

McCarthy on Trademarks § 23:51 (5th ed. 2024).

          Ghost Adventures gives just short of forty whacks to the

district court's finding that Miss Lizzie's moniker and hatchet

posed a low risk of confusing consumers.     Because likelihood of

confusion is fact-specific and situation-specific, our review of

the district court's finding is for clear error.     See Borinquen

Biscuit, 

.     With the stage set, we turn to the

compendium of facts cited by Ghost Adventures.

                                 A

          For starters,   Ghost Adventures decries the    district

court's comparison of the two protagonists' marks, complaining

that the court improperly elevated a side-by-side comparison of

the parties' hatchet logos over their shared use of the dominant

word "Lizzie."    We do not agree.

          Similarity between marks is determined by analyzing

their sight, sound, and meaning and requires consideration of "the

total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of

individual features."    Bos. Duck Tours, 

 (quoting

Pignons, 

); see Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft

v. Wheeler, 

 (1st Cir. 1987).   "Even if elements

of each party's mark overlap, or are visually similar, the marks


                               - 11 -
as a whole may still create a distinct commercial impression,

especially       if   the   similarities   are    limited    to    generic    or

descriptive elements."        Bos. Duck Tours, 

.

             The district court supportably found that "Miss Lizzie's

hatchet     is   neither    the   trademarked    hatchet    nor   a   colorable

imitation of it."       Ghost Adventures, 

, at *1.            This

finding rested on several differences between the images.                     The

trademarked hatchet features only a notched blade, whereas Miss

Lizzie's bears a handle and a smooth blade.          See 

      Miss Lizzie's

hatchet spews blood, whereas Ghost Adventures' is spotless.                   See

       Indeed, it appears that the only similarity between the

hatchet logos is that they both depict hatchets.            The court, then,

did not clearly err in finding that the hatchet logos are facially

dissimilar. See 

         With respect to the name itself, the district

court supportably found that Miss Lizzie's reference to "Lizzie"

was to the lore of Lizzie Borden — which Ghost Adventures does not

own — rather than to the mark "Lizzie Borden."4                See 

.

Thus, the meaning associated with the name "Miss Lizzie's Coffee"

is only incidentally similar to that of the "Lizzie Borden House."


      4Ghost Adventures attempts to minimize this distinction by
suggesting that consumers may associate "Lizzie Borden" with its
services rather than with Lizzie Borden herself. But the district
court rejected this suggestion, finding that Ghost Adventures had
not shown that its mark has displaced the story of Lizzie Borden
in the minds of consumers. See Ghost Adventures, 

,
at *2.   Ghost Adventures does not offer even the specter of a
reason to disturb this finding.


                                     - 12 -
Viewed against this background, Ghost Adventures' assertion that

the district court improperly failed to consider the overall

commercial impression of the two marks comes up empty.

                                    B

           This brings the question of market similarity front and

center.   A court must assess likelihood of confusion due to           market

similarity by comparing the similarity of the parties' goods, the

relationship between their channels of trade, the relationship

between   their   advertising,     and     the   classes    of    prospective

purchasers.    See Pignons, 

; see also Beacon Mut.

Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 

 (1st Cir. 2004)

(considering   channels    of   trade,     advertising,    and    prospective

purchasers "together because they tend to be interrelated"). Ghost

Adventures assigns error to the district court's finding that the

parties' markets differ, arguing that both businesses provide

"hospitality services," stand in physical proximity, and trade on

the Lizzie Borden tale.     This argument is unconvincing.

           As the district court conceded, both establishments do

offer hospitality services. See Ghost Adventures, 

,

at *2.    The fact that the businesses operate in the same broad

economic sector, however, proves very little.              See Astra Pharm.

Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 

(1st Cir. 1983) (concluding that the "broad inference" that both

parties   operated   in   the   "medical    or   health    care   field"   was


                                  - 13 -
insufficient to support likelihood of confusion).         The district

court supportably found that the parties sell and market different

goods and services to different consumers:            Ghost Adventures

attracts sophisticated tourists who purchase tickets in advance

and travel to Fall River to visit the historical site of the Lizzie

Borden House, whereas Miss Lizzie's attracts passersby hoping for

a caffeine kick or a bite to eat.        See Ghost Adventures, 

, at *2.    That Ghost Adventures would prefer the court to

view the two businesses through the wider lens of "hospitality

services" does not cast doubt on the appropriateness of the court's

distinction.

           In a related vein, Ghost Adventures contends that the

parties' proximity and common reliance on the Lizzie Borden story

heralds similarity in their channels of trade and advertising

methods.   Because other museums run affiliated on-premises food

establishments, Ghost Adventures reasons, visitors are apt to

think that Miss Lizzie's is associated with the Lizzie Borden

House.

           The   district   court   rejected   this   reasoning.     It

supportably found that any confusion due to proximity or common

reference to historical lore is not the type of confusion that

trademark owners may prevent.       See 

.    Ghost Adventures'

registration of the mark "Lizzie Borden" did not prohibit other

businesses in the hospitality industry from setting up shop in the


                                - 14 -
vicinity of the Lizzie Borden House.           Nor did it prohibit such

businesses from marketing themselves by the use of Lizzie Borden's

story.

                                      C

           This leaves Ghost Adventures' assault on the district

court's treatment of its evidence of actual consumer confusion.

Ghost    Adventures   says   that    even    though   this    evidence   was

"admissible and largely uncontradicted," the court ignored it.            We

are not persuaded.

           To be sure, "[e]vidence of actual confusion is often

considered the most persuasive evidence of likelihood of confusion

because past confusion is frequently a strong indicator of future

confusion."   Beacon Mut. Ins. Co., 

.           Here, however,

the district court did not ignore the evidence of actual confusion

but, rather, interpreted that evidence differently than Ghost

Adventures would have liked.         The court found that the confusion

about Miss Lizzie's relationship to the Lizzie Borden House arose

from "three sources: both businesses operate in close physical

proximity; both trade off the Lizzie Borden story; and many

customers generally associate services related to a historical

site, such as gift shops and cafes, with the nearby historical

site itself."    Ghost Adventures, 

, at *2.           In the

district court's view, then, any confusion did not "aris[e] from

infringement of Ghost Adventures' trademarks."          

                                    - 15 -
           This finding was not clearly erroneous.               The relevant

consumer confusion in a trademark infringement action is confusion

caused by an infringing mark.               Consumer confusion due to non-

trademarked similarities between businesses or products does not

indicate infringement.         For example, if two outdoor Saturday

farmers' markets opened on the same block, causing wandering

shoppers to think that they were affiliated, their proximity and

similar business models, without more, would not be suggestive of

trademark infringement. This basic principle tracks a core purpose

of trademark law: to prevent a copycat from appropriating the

goodwill of a brand by wrongly copying the brand's mark.                See Bos.

Duck Tours, 

. Because the district court supportably

found that the source of consumer confusion was not the similarity

of their marks, but something else altogether, the evidence of

confusion relied upon by Ghost Adventures is of no consequence.

                                        D

           Ghost Adventures hints in this court — as it did in the

court   below   —   that    Miss   Lizzie's     intended    to   infringe     its

trademarks.     Ghost      Adventures   hinges    this     suggestion    on   its

allegations that the coffee shop "opened a location in immediate

proximity to [Ghost Adventures'] business" and "intentionally used

the word 'Lizzie' and a hatchet in [its] name and signage."

Because this argument was neither developed nor supported by on-

point authority, we deem it waived.           See United States v. Zannino,


                                    - 16 -


 (1st Cir. 1990).                  And at any rate, the district

court supportably found that Miss Lizzie's sought to benefit from

the Lizzie Borden story in its own right, not from the manner in

which Ghost Adventures used that story.                 Moreover, the district

court    did    not    clearly   err    in      determining    that,   "given     the

historical significance of the location," neither Miss Lizzie's

acts alone nor those acts "considered in light of the entire

record"    evince      an    intent    to       appropriate    Ghost   Adventures'

trademark.      Ghost Adventures, 

, at *2.

                                            E

               Ghost Adventures'       challenge      to the district        court's

assessment of the strength of its marks is haunted by legal

confusion.      It submits that the court underestimated the strength

of its marks by failing to give appropriate weight to their

incontestability and secondary meaning.                     Incontestability and

secondary meaning are distinct from a mark's strength.

               To assess the strength of a mark, "[w]e look to 'the

length    of    time   the    mark    has    been   used,     its   renown   in   the

plaintiff's field of business, and the plaintiff's actions to

promote the mark.'"          Beacon Mut. Ins. Co., 

 (quoting

Star Fin. Servs. v. Aastar Mortg. Corp., 

, 11 (1st Cir.

1996)).    In the case at hand, the district court found that Ghost

Adventures' mark was not strong enough to displace consumers'

association with the real Lizzie Borden.                 See Ghost Adventures,


                                       - 17 -


, at *2.     Ghost Adventures' assertions that its

predecessors relied on the mark for many years and that it has a

"long history of investing" in the mark fail to illuminate any

clear error.

           We turn next to Ghost Adventures' arguments about its

marks' incontestability and secondary meaning.    These concepts are

related to strength only in a limited way.       We explain briefly.

An incontestable mark is presumed to have acquired secondary

meaning.   See 2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 15:35 (5th ed. 2024);

Borinquen Biscuit, 

.     In turn, secondary meaning

refers to the acquired distinctiveness of a mark in the minds of

the public, such that "consumers associate it with a particular

producer or source."   Bos. Beer Co. P'ship v. Slesar Bros. Brewing

Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1993).        The determination of

secondary meaning "is a threshold issue of trademark validity"

that we need not tackle because Miss Lizzie's concedes that Ghost

Adventures' marks are valid.     2 McCarthy on Trademarks § 15:25

(5th ed. 2024).

           Secondary meaning relates to the strength of a mark only

to the extent that it is "a label given to that quantum of

'strength' sufficient to activate some terms into life as a valid

trademark."    Id.   Seen in this light, "[t]he difference between

commercial strength and secondary meaning is that the former is a

range, while the latter is a threshold: a mark may enjoy anything


                               - 18 -
from a high degree of commercial strength to a low degree, but

either it has secondary meaning or it does not."            Water Pik, Inc.

v. Med-Sys., Inc., 

 (10th Cir. 2013).               Once a

mark has more than the minimum amount of strength required to

create secondary meaning, the existence of secondary meaning does

not affect the degree of strength.           So viewed, Ghost Adventures'

insistence that its marks are incontestable and have secondary

meaning does little to advance its claim that its marks are strong.5

                                       F

            Ghost Adventures complains that the court's reliance on

a disclaimer on Miss Lizzie’s website was problematic.                   That

disclaimer reads: "Our GHOSTS are totally independent and not to

be confused with any other Ghosts!"            But the district court did

not mention, much less rely on, this spooky phrase.             Instead, the

court discussed a sign taped to Miss Lizzie's storefront that

conspicuously reads:   "Miss Lizzie's Coffee is NOT ASSOCIATED, NOR

AFFILIATED in any way with the Lizzie Borden Museum or Bed and

Breakfast   next   door,   nor   any       other   business."    The    court

supportably found that this clarification "further distinguish[ed]



     5 We agree that the district court confusingly used the term
"secondary meaning" in making its finding about the strength of
the mark. See Ghost Adventures, 

, at *2. Even so,
we think that the court's rescript read as a whole makes
sufficiently clear the supportability of its findings about the
strength of the mark.



                                 - 19 -
the businesses," noting that effective disclaimers can "tip the

scales   to    a   finding   of   no    likelihood      of    confusion   and   no

infringement."       Ghost Adventures, 

, at *4 (quoting

4 McCarthy on Trademarks § 23:51 (4th ed. 2002)).

                                         IV

              In a last-ditch effort to turn the tide, Ghost Adventures

challenges     the   district     court's     failure    to    "find   the   facts

specially and state its conclusions of law separately."                   Fed. R.

Civ. P. 52(a); see TEC Eng'g Corp. v. Budget Molders Supply, Inc.,

 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that district court's

"decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction must be

supported by adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law").

This challenge has no more force than an apparition.

              Rule 52(a) is "intended to assure that the district court

gives appropriate consideration to all essential relevant factors

and provides an adequate basis for meaningful appellate review of

its decision."       TEC Eng'g, 

; see 9C Charles Alan

Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571

(3d ed. 2024).        A reviewing court need not insist upon literal

compliance with the rule if its "review of the record substantially

eliminates all reasonable doubt as to the basis of the district

court's decision."       TEC Eng'g, 

.              This is such a

case.




                                       - 20 -
            In this instance, substance prevails over form.     The

district court's rescript — though not specifically divided into

findings of fact and conclusions of law — serves the core purpose

of Rule 52(a).     The district court's rescript is thorough.    It

makes pellucid the court's findings and reasoning on each disputed

issue.    We have no difficulty in identifying the relevant factual

findings and the reasons why the district court concluded that the

facts as found did not support Ghost Adventures' bid for injunctive

relief.     No more was exigible to achieve substantial compliance

with the requirements of Rule 52(a).    See, e.g., id.; Conservation

L. Found., Inc. v. Busey, 

, 1271 (1st Cir. 1996);

Applewood Landscape & Nursery Co. v. Hollingsworth, 

 (1st Cir. 1989).

                                  V

            We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the judgment of the district court is



Affirmed.




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