United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit


Nos. 21-1384, 24-1201

                  CHRISMA FELIN MONDZALI BOPAKA,

                             Petitioner,

                                 v.

              MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

                             Respondent.


                PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF ORDERS OF
                THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS


                               Before

                   Rikelman, Selya, and Lynch,
                         Circuit Judges.


     Stephanie E.Y. Marzouk, with whom Marzouk Law LLC was on
brief, for petitioner.
     SangYeob Kim, with whom Gilles Bissonnette was on brief for
American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, New Hampshire
Legal Assistance, and University of Maine School of Law Refugee
and Human Rights Clinic, amici.
     Jennifer A. Bowen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Anthony C. Payne,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S.
Department of Justice, and Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, were on brief, for
respondent.
December 13, 2024
            LYNCH, Circuit Judge.          This case presents consolidated

petitions for review by Chrisma Felin Mondzali Bopaka of the

Republic of the Congo.            Bopaka petitions for review of a final

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the Immigration

Judge's denials of his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal   ("WOR"),    and    protection      under   the   Convention      Against

Torture ("CAT").      See 

(b)(1)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A); 

(c)(2),        1208.18(a)(1);      see       also    Convention

Against Torture, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20

(1988).     He also petitions for review of the BIA's denials of his

motions to remand and to reopen.

            The IJ found Bopaka not to be credible based on numerous

inconsistencies      and    key   material    omissions     in    his    testimony,

declaration,     applications        for   relief,    and        the    documentary

evidence.     The BIA found no error in the IJ's adverse credibility

determination or in the IJ's finding that Bopaka's corroborating

evidence was insufficient to meet his burden of proof for any of

his claims.

            Substantial evidence supports the IJ's and BIA's denials

of asylum, WOR, and protection under the CAT.                    The BIA did not

abuse its discretion in denying Bopaka's motions to remand and to

reopen.     We deny the petitions for review.




                                      - 3 -
                                                I.

             Bopaka entered the United States on or around August 23,

2018, without valid entry documents, and was served with a Notice

to    Appear    charging       him    with           removability.         See     

(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).               On    July         22,    2019,     Bopaka        conceded

removability.         He sought asylum and WOR, purportedly based on his

political opinion and membership in the particular social group

"direct family members of Mr. Sebastien Mondzali," and relief under

the CAT, and submitted a declaration, sworn before the IJ, in

support of his claims.

             At the May 20, 2020 hearing before the IJ, Bopaka,

represented      by    counsel       and    assisted          by    a    Lingala       language

interpreter, was the sole witness to testify.                               The IJ found

Bopaka's     testimony     to    be       not    credible          for   multiple       reasons

described below.

             "Considering the totality of the circumstances and all

relevant factors," including "multiple inconsistencies" and "[k]ey

omissions," the IJ found that Bopaka "did not testify credibly."

The IJ further found that "[a]lthough [Bopaka] [had] submitted

some documentary evidence in support of his claim, this evidence

[wa]s insufficient to overcome the adverse credibility finding."

             Accordingly, Bopaka's asylum claim failed because he had

not   "met     his    burden    to    prove          that     he   [had]    suffered       past

persecution or ha[d] a well-founded fear of future persecution on


                                           - 4 -
account of a protected ground," and the WOR claim necessarily

failed   under     its   more   stringent    standard   and   "the     objective

documentary evidence [did not otherwise] entitle[] [Bopaka] to

relief."      "[B]ased on the credible objective evidence in the

record, [Bopaka] failed to satisfy th[e] burden for withholding of

removal under the CAT."

             On June 19, 2020, Bopaka filed a notice of appeal with

the BIA, challenging the adverse credibility determination and all

denials of relief.       On August 18, 2020, Bopaka also filed a motion

to remand, asserting that it was "in light of new material and

substantial evidence."

             On April 15, 2021, the BIA ruled on both.          It found that

the adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous and the

IJ's conclusion that Bopaka had not met his burden of proof "to

establish    his    eligibility    for   relief     [wa]s   supported    by   the

record."     As to the motion to remand, the BIA applied 

(c)(1): "where a motion to remand is really in the nature

of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, it must comply

with   the   substantive    requirements      for   such    motions"    (quoting

Matter of Coelho, 

 (BIA 1992)).             The BIA denied

the motion for two independently sufficient reasons: (1) it was

"not persuaded that the issues raised establish that the evidence

was 'not available and could not have been discovered or presented

at the former hearing'" (quoting 

(c)(1)); and (2)


                                     - 5 -
it was "not persuaded that the additional evidence would likely

change the result of the proceedings."1

                 On October 13, 2021, almost six months after the BIA's

denial of his claims for relief, Bopaka filed a motion to reopen

with       the   BIA,    arguing       that    his     "prior   attorneys        [had   been]

ineffective"           and   "[t]heir     errors       affected      the    IJ's   findings,

causing prejudice," and that "[c]hanged country conditions in the

Republic of Congo merit[ed] reopening." The BIA denied the motion,

holding that "even assuming [the motion to reopen] had been timely

filed it would fail on the merits."                           Bopaka had "not shown a

reasonable         probability         that,    but    for    his    attorneys'     alleged

mistakes,         he   would     have    prevailed       on    his   claim."        Further,

"[Bopaka's] new evidence d[id] not overcome the prior credibility

finding,         present     a   new    claim    independent         of    his   discredited

testimony, or otherwise establish that country conditions have

changed in a manner that is material to his eligibility for relief

or protection from removal."                     Bopaka also had "not submitted

evidence establishing his circumstances as exceptional" to warrant

sua sponte reopening.




       1  Before this court, Bopaka does not argue and so has
waived any challenge to the BIA's decisions declining to exercise
its sua sponte authority in its decisions denying his motions to
remand and to reopen. See Morales-Morales v. Sessions, 

 (1st Cir. 2017).


                                               - 6 -
                                       II.

           "Where, as here, the BIA's decision rests primarily on

the IJ's decision, we review the two decisions as a unit."                    Garcia

Oliva v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2024).                      "We review

'factual            findings,                 including               credibility

determinations . . . under       the     familiar        substantial        evidence

standard,'" under which "we must uphold the BIA's decision 'unless

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.'"   Loja-Paguay v. Barr, 

 (1st Cir. 2019)

(emphasis added) (first quoting Rivas-Mira v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2009); then quoting Silva v. Gonzales, 

(1st Cir. 2006)).    For adverse credibility determinations,

           we   narrowly    inquire    whether:    (i) the
           discrepancies articulated by the IJ and/or the
           BIA are actually present in the administrative
           record;   (ii) the    discrepancies    generate
           specific and cogent reasons from which to
           infer that petitioner or his witnesses
           provided   non-creditworthy    testimony;   and
           (iii) petitioner    failed    to   provide    a
           persuasive      explanation      for      these
           discrepancies.

Cuko v. Mukasey, 

 (1st Cir. 2008).

           "The   REAL   ID      Act    permits     the      IJ   to        consider

inconsistencies in an applicant's statements, 'without regard to

whether an inconsistency ... goes to the heart of the applicant's

claim.'"      Loja-Paguay,      

     (quoting     

(b)(1)(B)(iii)).    Under that standard, the IJ considers "the




                                      - 7 -
totality     of     the   circumstances,       and   all    relevant      factors,"

including "the consistency between the applicant's or witness's

written    and     oral   statements"     and    "the      consistency        of   such

statements        with    other     evidence    of      record."          

(b)(1)(B)(iii).

            "To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show

'persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.'"                 Loja-Paguay, 

(quoting 

(a)(42)(A)).                 "Asylum . . . has both a

subjective and an objective component: it requires a showing that

the applicant 'genuinely fears persecution,' in addition to proof

that the 'fear is objectively reasonable.'"                     Aguilar-Escoto v.

Sessions,     

    (1st     Cir.     2017)       (quoting

Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 

 (1st Cir. 2004)).

            "An applicant's testimony alone can meet this burden,

but if the agency finds that the testimony is not truthful, 'that

determination strips the testimony of probative force and permits

the agency to . . . discount it.'"              Loja-Paguay, 

(quoting Segran v. Mukasey, 

 (1st Cir. 2007)).                        "[A]n

adverse credibility determination, appropriately reached, 'may in

itself suffice to defeat an alien's claim for asylum.'" Garcia

Oliva, 

 (quoting Mashilingi v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2021)).               "[A]bsence of easily obtainable


                                       - 8 -
corroborating documentation can be the final straw."   Rivera-Coca

v. Lynch, 

 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Chhay v.

Mukasey, 

 (1st Cir. 2008)).

         The BIA's finding that there was no clear error in the

IJ's adverse credibility determination is well-supported by the

record, which is replete with inconsistencies and omissions.   The

alleged basis of Bopaka's claims for relief is summarized as

follows in his written declaration submitted in support of his

applications:

         I am afraid to return to the Congo because of my
         family's involvement in politics in opposition
         to the current tyrannical leader, President
         Denis Sassou Nguesso.     My entire family was
         murdered for my father's opposition to the
         government and its attempts at amending our
         constitution for the standing regime's benefit.
         My later involvement in protests put me in direct
         danger of kidnapping, harm, torture, and death
         at the hands of authorities working under the
         direction of the Nguesso regime.           I was
         threatened as an opposition member and for being
         the son of Sebastien Mondzali. If I return to
         Congo, I will likely be kidnapped, physically
         and emotionally harmed, tortured, and killed.
         There is no place in the country where I would
         ever be safe.

The BIA expressly discussed four inconsistencies and omissions in

comparing Bopaka's declaration, asylum application, documentary

evidence, and testimony before the IJ.

         The record supports the BIA's and IJ's findings that

"[Bopaka's] testimony that he was arrested in March 2016 [wa]s

inconsistent with his asylum application and [wa]s omitted from


                              - 9 -
his written declaration."         Bopaka's asylum application checked

"no" to the question "[h]ave you . . . ever been accused, charged,

arrested, detained, interrogated, convicted and sentenced, or

imprisoned in any country other than the United States?"                       In

response to a separate question about whether he was afraid that

he would be subjected to torture if returned to the Congo, he

stated: "I was almost arrested and killed during protests for the

release of opponents in jail in April and May 2018" (emphasis

added).   In contrast, Bopaka testified that in March of 2016 --

over two years before the almost-arrest date in his application -

- he "was arrested in the morning, and around noon, [he] was

released" (emphasis added).        When questioned in cross-examination

about this inconsistency, Bopaka stated that "there might be an

error in the document."          When asked about the omission in his

declaration,   Bopaka     said    "[m]aybe    the      person     who   did   the

translation might have omitted it."               That answer itself was

inconsistent with his other statements.           As the BIA noted, Bopaka

had testified that his application had been read to him in Lingala

and that he understood the contents of both the application and

the   declaration.   He    had    also    sworn   to    the   application     and

declaration on the record after conferring with his attorney.

           The BIA next focused on the material "omission regarding

[Bopaka's]   departure    from    the    Republic      of   the   Congo."     The

application and declaration said nothing about how he had left the


                                   - 10 -
Congo. Bopaka testified that he used a passport that his godfather

had helped him acquire in 2017 and left the Congo from its

international airport.   He testified that government agents were

preventing him from leaving the Congo, but his godfather, a former

general, "went and hid[] [him] in a market," where he spent three

to four days before his godfather "picked [him up] from there [at

night], and helped [him] escape."   When cross-examined about this

omission, Bopaka stated: "Yes, I said that my life was in danger,

and therefore, I was supposed to escape the country."

          Third, the BIA noted that "[t]he record further contains

a significant discrepancy between [Bopaka's] testimony and his

corroborating evidence" about his family.   Bopaka testified that

his "father was an attorney, and he owned [a] couple [of] farms."

However, he submitted his father's death certificate from the

Congo, which listed his father's "profession" as "[c]hauffeur."

          Next, the BIA pointed out Bopaka's several contradictory

statements as to "whether he has a son."     Bopaka's application

stated "I do not have any children."    But when questioned under

oath by immigration officials on his entry into the United States,

Bopaka stated that he was traveling with his son Samuel.     Bopaka

admitted that Samuel was not his biological son, but testified

that Samuel was his brother's child and that Bopaka had adopted

Samuel.   But the Congo documents Bopaka had submitted stated that

Bopaka was only "the legal guardian" of Samuel.         When cross-


                              - 11 -
examined about these documents, Bopaka non-responsively stated

that he "was responsible for everything about this child."                 But he

immediately contradicted himself, agreeing that "there was [no]

significant period of time where [he] w[as] the only one with

[Samuel]."     Bopaka had also stated to immigration officials under

oath that Samuel's mother was Nolene Itoue, who was in the Congo.

This statement was contradicted by a motion to sever Samuel's case

from Bopaka's case, in which Samuel had stated that his biological

mother was Sandrine Poaty, with whom he was residing in Louisville,

Kentucky.      When cross-examined about this inconsistency, Bopaka

admitted: "Your honor, for that, I will ask for forgiveness,

because at that time, I did not tell the truth."

             Where, as here, "the IJ specifically identified a number

of inconsistencies" and omissions, "which cumulatively persuaded

[him]   of    the    petitioner's      lack   of   credibility,"    substantial

evidence supports the IJ's adverse credibility determination.

Garcia Oliva, 

; see also Mashilingi, 

("[T]he      inconsistencies      in    the     petitioner's   testimony    were

specifically        identified,   well-documented,      hard   as   a   group   to

reconcile or explain, and cumulatively persuasive of a lack of

credibility."); Legal v. Lynch, 

 (1st Cir. 2016)

("[T]he inconsistencies noted by the IJ are of a type that create

strong doubts about the veracity of [the petitioner's] story.").




                                       - 12 -
            These   numerous       inconsistencies       suffice    to   provide

substantial   evidence     supporting      all   three   denials    of   relief.

Neither Bopaka's testimony nor his other evidence met his burden.

See Garcia Oliva, 

 ("[T]he petitioner's own testimony

is critical to carrying his burden of establishing sufficient proof

of persecution (either past of feared). . . .").                    Substantial

evidence   supports   the    agency's      determination     that    the   other

objective evidence does not meet Bopaka's burden of proof to show

eligibility for asylum.

             The BIA noted that Bopaka did not provide testimony or

a statement from his brother with whom he says he came to the

United States and who Bopaka agreed had "experienced some of the

same harm and had the same fear as [he] d[id]." When asked why,

Bopaka failed to say.       He responded: "I don't know.           I don't know

if my attorney had asked my brother to do so."                      Substantial

evidence supports the agency's determination that this explanation

was not reasonable.

            Though Bopaka provided death certificates of his family

members    that   stated    they    were   "declared      deceased . . . [b]y

assassination at [their] domicile," the agency supportably found

them insufficient due to the inconsistencies in Bopaka's father's

profession described above.

              The country conditions reports regarding general civil

unrest and political turmoil in the Congo were not particular as


                                     - 13 -
to Bopaka or his family.          See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[C]ountry conditions reports, standing

alone, do not carry the day" where they do not "proffer any

particularized    facts    relating      to     [a   petitioner's]    specific

claim.").

            The denial of WOR relief is also supported by the record.

"[W]ithholding    of    removal     requires     a   higher    likelihood    of

persecution    than    asylum."      Aguilar-Escoto,     

.

"Because the factual underpinnings of this claim are inextricably

intertwined with the factual underpinnings of the [asylum] claim,

the IJ's supportable adverse credibility determination dooms both

claims."     Mazariegos-Paiz v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir.

2013).     Nor did Bopaka meet the higher burden for WOR with his

objective    evidence   given     the   major   discrepancy    regarding     his

father's death certificate and the non-particularized nature of

his country conditions reports, as the BIA supportably held.

            Substantial evidence likewise supports the denial of CAT

relief.     A CAT applicant "must establish 'that it is more likely

than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed

country of removal.'"      Ali v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir.

2022) (quoting 

(c)(2)).             To make this showing,

an applicant must

            offer specific objective evidence showing that
            he will be subject to: (1) an act causing
            severe physical or mental pain or suffering;


                                    - 14 -
            (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for a
            proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the
            instigation of or with the consent or
            acquiescence of a public official who has
            custody or physical control of the victim; and
            (5) not arising from lawful sanctions.

 (quoting Mazariegos v. Lynch, 

 (1st Cir.

2015)).

            Substantial evidence supports the BIA's holding that,

"because [Bopaka's] claim under the CAT is based on the same

testimony     that   the     Immigration       Judge    found     not     credible,

and . . . [Bopaka's] corroborating evidence, including the country

conditions evidence, is insufficient to establish his claim, the

record    also    supports     the    conclusion    that       [Bopaka]    has   not

established      eligibility    for    protection      under    the   CAT."      See

Mashilingi, 

 ("Because the petitioner's proof [of

eligibility for protection under the CAT] rested mainly on his own

testimony, the adverse credibility determination sinks that claim

as well.").       As Bopaka's own testimony was not credible, that

testimony did not support his CAT claim.                   The record contains

nothing other than his not-credible testimony that shows Bopaka

suffered any physical harm or torture.             See Loja-Paguay, 

 n. 4.

                                       III.

            "We review for abuse of discretion the BIA's denial of

a motion to reopen," Djokro v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir.




                                      - 15 -
2024), under which "the petitioner must show that the BIA either

'committed    an    error   of    law    or   exercised     its    judgment       in   an

arbitrary,    capricious,         or    irrational     manner,'"         Sihotang       v.

Sessions, 

 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Bbale v. Lynch,

 (1st Cir. 2016)).                  "Motions to reopen removal

proceedings    are     disfavored        because     they    impinge       upon     'the

compelling    public    interests        in   finality      and    the    expeditious

processing of proceedings.'"             

 at 49 (quoting Bbale, 

).    "To succeed on his motion to reopen, the petitioner ha[s]

to . . . 'introduce new, material evidence that was not available

at the original merits hearing.'"                 

 at 50 (quoting Perez v.

Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)).                         "Evidence is not

material unless it has some impact on the outcome of a petitioner's

underlying case."      Perez, 

.

            The BIA's denials of Bopaka's motions to remand and to

reopen were not an abuse of its discretion.                   Bopaka's motion to

remand was purportedly based on "new facts."                      The BIA properly

treated it as a motion to reopen and so do we.                           See Falae v.

Gonzáles, 

 (1st Cir. 2005).

            The motion to remand sought to submit new evidence as to

Bopaka's    three    claims      for    relief,    which    he    alleged    was       not

available at the time of his hearing.                This evidence was: (1) "a

copy of [a] marriage certificate showing that [Bopaka] is married

to Choisie"; (2) "a letter from [Bopaka's] brother, notably about


                                        - 16 -
the profession of [Bopaka's] father, Sebastien Mondzali"; and (3)

"an expert affidavit from Dr. Brett Carter."                  The Carter affidavit

stated that Bopaka's affidavit "is entirely consistent with [his]

knowledge of the country" and concluded from this that, "[a]s a

result of his convictions and his previous activism, Mr. Mondzali

would likely be arrested upon his return to Congo and again

physically assaulted or even killed."

                The BIA gave two different grounds to deny the motion to

remand.         The BIA's second ground            -- that Bopaka's submitted

evidence        would   not   likely     have     changed    the   result    of   the

proceedings -- is independently sufficient to uphold its denial of

Bopaka's motion to remand. 2              The BIA correctly held that "the

credibility concerns identified in the record [we]re significant

and the submitted evidence d[id] not sufficiently address several

of   the   issues       raised   above    related    to     whether    [Bopaka]   was

arrested, how he left his home country, and the inconsistent

information on his father's death certificate."                       The BIA ruling

rested     on    numerous     and   substantial     other     inconsistencies     and

omissions; thus, the reference in the motion to remand to Bopaka's

marriage did not undercut those holdings.                   The short, generalized

letter from Bopaka's brother fails to address why their father's


      2   We need not reach Bopaka's and amici's argument that the
BIA erred in holding that Bopaka had failed to show that his
submitted evidence had been previously unavailable under 

(c)(1).


                                         - 17 -
death certificate listed his profession as chauffer and does not

address the other inconsistencies and omissions noted by the BIA.3

           The testimony from the expert merely suggested that

Bopaka's   account   was   plausible    based    on   general   country

conditions.   But the issue was not whether Bopaka's account was

plausible but rather whether it was credible, and his testimony

was not credible.    See Escobar Larin v. Garland, __F.4th__, 

, at *6 (1st Cir. 2024) (holding that the BIA did not

abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen on

materiality grounds when the motion was based in part on expert

statements that "it [was] entirely possible" petitioner would be

detained in his home country if removed).       And the expert's report

did not undermine the IJ's conclusions that Bopaka's testimony

about his personal experience -- his claimed arrest, his departure

from the Congo, and the alleged status of his family as political

dissenters -- suffered from too many inconsistencies and omissions




     3
          Bopaka argues that "[w]hen one aspect of the evidence
has been discredited, remand is required so that the immigration
judge may make the credibility determination based on all remaining
factors collectively," citing Diaz Ortiz v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2022) (en banc). His argument is simply wrong and
is not supported by Diaz Ortiz. Diaz Ortiz concerned a situation
where evidence considered by the IJ in finding a petitioner not
credible was itself not reliable. 

. None of Bopaka's
submitted evidence in support of his motion to remand undermined
the reliability of the evidence underlying the IJ's credibility
determination. The motion to remand did not undermine the IJ's
adverse credibility holding.


                               - 18 -
to be believable.4      See Mashilingi, 

 ("[T]he quality

of an expert's opinions cannot be better than the quality of the

information supplied to the expert.").

                                      IV.

            The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bopaka's

motion to reopen, which was based on alleged ineffective assistance

of counsel and changed country conditions.             Bopaka's ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was based on the following allegations:

(1) "The I-589's shoddy preparation caused the IJ to find a

discrepancy" on the issue of whether he had been previously

arrested or detained; (2) his attorney "disclosed confidential

information that was detrimental to Mr. Mondzali Bopaka" by stating

in her termination letter that "[y]ou and your family have not

produced any independent and/or objective evidence to corroborate

your claim of fear of return to the Congo"; and (3) his attorney

"filed untranslated documents with the Court," namely an article

that stated "Mr. Mondzali Sebstien, a former member of the MCDDI,

one   of   the   main   opposition    parties   back   then,   was   cowardly




      4   Bopaka argues that the BIA "failed to consider whether
the new evidence could meet the objective burden of proof
sufficient to overcome credibility concerns for withholding of
removal pursuant to 

(b)(3) and the [CAT]." This
argument is unavailing.     Bopaka's claims for asylum, WOR, and
protection under the CAT rested on the same basic facts, and Bopaka
presented the same evidence in support of his motion to remand
each of his claims.   The BIA supportably found that this evidence
would not likely have changed the outcome of any of his claims.


                                     - 19 -
assassinated at his home, together with his wife and children" and

"two survived this killing[,] Mondzali Elobaloba Fridalin Brunel

and Mondzali Bopaka Chrisma."     Bopaka also alleged changed country

conditions on the basis that "the 2020 Human Rights Report for the

Republic of the Congo indicate[d] intensifying retaliation against

political opponents."

             The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bopaka's

motion to reopen on the grounds that "[Bopaka's] new evidence does

not overcome the prior credibility finding, present a new claim

independent of his discredited testimony, or otherwise establish

that country conditions have changed in a manner that is material

to   his   eligibility   for   relief   or   protection   from   removal."

Bopaka's first allegation in support of his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim related only to the discrepancy regarding whether

he had been previously detained or arrested and still failed to

address his material omission regarding how he left the Congo and

the inconsistencies related to his father's death certificate and

whether he had a son.     The untranslated article provided evidence

regarding his father's political participation but still did not

address    the   inconsistency    related     to   his    father's   death

certificate and the other material omissions and inconsistencies.

The allegedly changed country conditions report similarly failed

to address these material omissions and inconsistencies.             As to

the motion's reference to the statement in Bopaka's prior counsel's


                                  - 20 -
withdrawal letter, the agency did consider Bopaka's submitted

objective evidence and there is no basis to think that the agency

gave any weight to this prior counsel's statement in reaching its

decision.

    The petitions for judicial review are denied.




                             - 21 -