United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


Nos. 23-1848
     23-1849
                   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                           Appellee,

                               v.

                         DONALD TURNER,

                     Defendant, Appellant.


         APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                   FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

          [Hon. Lance E. Walker, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                  Rikelman, Lynch, and Aframe,
                        Circuit Judges.


    Vivian Shevitz for appellant.
     Lindsay B. Feinberg, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, and Benjamin M.
Block, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.


                       December 27, 2024
            AFRAME,     Circuit      Judge.      Defendant-appellant               Donald

Turner pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 

(a), and

unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 

(g)(1).      Turner, who was on supervised release when he

committed    those    crimes,       also   admitted    to    related       supervised-

release violations.

            Turner previously had been convicted of numerous violent

felonies and was consequently designated an armed career criminal.

See 

(e).           That designation resulted in an advisory

sentencing guideline range of 180 to 210 months of imprisonment.

In a combined sentencing and revocation hearing, the district court

imposed     210-month     concurrent         sentences       on     the     counts     of

conviction, revoked Turner's supervised release, and imposed a

24-month     consecutive          sentence     for    the         supervised-release

violations.

            On appeal, Turner argues that his felon-in-possession

conviction should be reversed because prosecuting him on this count

violated his Second Amendment right "to keep and bear Arms."                         U.S.

Const. amend. II.            He also contends that the district court

committed    procedural       and    substantive      errors       in     imposing   his

sentence.      Finally,      Turner    claims    that       the    court     imposed   a

consecutive      supervised-release             sentence           based      on      its

misapprehension       that    a     policy    statement       to     the    sentencing

guidelines required a consecutive sentence.


                                       - 2 -
            We reject these arguments.             Turner waived his as-applied

Second Amendment claim by failing to move timely for dismissal of

the felon-in-possession count as required by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 12.      The district court imposed a procedurally

sound sentence, which was substantively reasonable.                And, finally,

the record does not support Turner's claim that the district court

believed    it   was   required    to    impose      a   consecutive     revocation

sentence.

                              I.    BACKGROUND

            We draw the facts underlying Turner's convictions from

the   government's     recitation       of   the    offense    conduct    filed   in

connection with the change-of-plea hearing and the undisputed

portions of the presentence investigative report.                        See United

States v. Kitts, 

 (1st Cir. 2022).                       We recite

them in brief here, providing further elaboration as necessary for

our discussion of Turner's claims.

            Turner is a serial bank robber.                   On March 18, 2006,

Turner entered a Gorham Savings Bank in Portland, Maine, and showed

the teller a note stating that he was armed and demanding $8,000

in cash.    The teller gave Turner approximately $1,800, and he left

without being apprehended.          Two days later, Turner entered a TD

Bank North in South Portland, Maine.               He handed the teller a note

stating that he had a bomb and told her to give him money.                        The

teller gave Turner $4,000. Turner was later arrested and convicted


                                        - 3 -
of two counts of bank robbery, 

(a), for which he

was sentenced to sixty months' imprisonment.

             On June 24, 2011, while on supervised release for his

2006 bank robbery convictions, Turner entered a Bangor Savings

Bank in Bangor, Maine.      He handed the teller a note claiming that

he had a bomb and demanding money.          Turner was arrested and again

convicted    of   bank   robbery.    This    time,   he   was   sentenced   to

seventy-two months' imprisonment for the robbery, followed by

twenty-four months' imprisonment for violating the terms of his

supervised release.

             During the afternoon of September 10, 2020, while on

supervised release for his 2011 robbery conviction, Turner entered

a Bangor Savings Bank in Bangor, Maine.              Turner approached the

teller and showed her a note that was not recovered but which

essentially stated that he was conducting a robbery and possessed

a gun.   Turner did not display a firearm.            The teller initially

provided Turner with money from her cash drawer, much of it in

one-dollar     denominations.        After     Turner     demanded    larger

denominations, the teller provided him with just over $1,300 in

cash.    Turner then placed the robbery note and money in his

backpack and left though the bank's back door.

             After publishing bank video surveillance footage, the

police received several reports identifying Turner as the robber.

The police eventually found Turner at an apartment in Bangor and


                                    - 4 -
arrested him.    When the police arrested Turner, they found, among

other items, $200 in United States currency and, in his waistband,

a .25-caliber Titan-brand firearm.

            Following Turner's arrest, he made a statement to the

police.    He said that he had robbed the bank to obtain money so

that he could leave Maine before the United States Marshals

arrested him for supervised-release violations.          He also admitted

to possessing the seized firearm on the day of the robbery but

denied bringing it into the bank, stating that it was missing a

firing pin (a fact later confirmed through forensic examination).

            On March 10, 2021, a grand jury indicted Turner for bank

robbery and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. On November

2, 2022, Turner pleaded guilty to both counts.             Following his

guilty plea, the probation office brought an additional supervised

release    violation   for   committing   criminal    offenses     while   on

release.   On October 6, 2023, the district court held a hearing at

which it sentenced Turner to 210-month concurrent sentences on the

counts of conviction, revoked his supervised release, and imposed

a   24-month   consecutive    sentence    for   the   supervised    release

violations.     Turner timely appealed from the judgments entered in

the criminal case and the revocation proceeding.




                                  - 5 -
                                  II.    DISCUSSION

             A.    Second Amendment Claim

             We   begin    with    Turner's      as-applied   Second   Amendment

claim.     Although the argument on appeal is terse, Turner appears

to contend that the district court should have dismissed the

felon-in-possession count because § 922(g)(1), as applied to him,

violates his rights under the Second Amendment.                He asserts that

he "never used the weapon" during the robbery; "[i]t is not clear

that he owned [the firearm]"; and "the weapon found when he was

arrested lacked a firing pin and was inoperable."                  In support of

his argument, Turner cites a single out-of-circuit district court

decision that he "adopts . . . by reference" without elaboration.1

             We conclude that Turner waived his Second Amendment

argument     because      he   did      not   timely   move   to   dismiss   the

felon-in-possession count as required by Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure Rule 12 and has not demonstrated good cause for failing

to do so.2    To place this conclusion in context, we first describe



     1    The decision, United States v. Bullock, 

 (S.D. Miss. 2023), has since been reversed. See United States
v. Bullock, No. 23-60408, 

 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2024).
     2    The government submits that we may find Turner's Second
Amendment claim waived for other reasons, including the waiver of
appellate rights in his plea agreement. Because the district court
did not specifically inquire about that waiver at Turner's
change-of-plea   hearing -- one    of   the  considerations    for
determining whether such a waiver should be enforced, see United
States v. Edelen, 

 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United



                                         - 6 -
how Turner put his Second Amendment claim before the district

court.     We then explain why that presentation did not comply with

Rule 12.

            The district court established October 11, 2021, as the

deadline for filing pretrial motions.          Turner did not file any

motions aside from a motion to suppress his post-arrest statements.

In June 2022, the United States Supreme Court decided New York

State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, in which the Court explained

that, to overcome a properly preserved Second Amendment challenge

to a restriction on firearm possession, the government bears the

burden     of   demonstrating   that   the   restriction   at   issue   is

"consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm

regulation."     

 (2022).

            Turner pleaded guilty on November 2, 2022.          Turner did

not mention the Second Amendment until May 19, 2023, when he filed

his sentencing memorandum.      In a section entitled, "The nature and

circumstances of the offense, 

(a)(1): [Turner] did

not possess a weapon inside the bank and the weapon he did possess

was inoperable," Turner argued that his conduct was mitigated by

the fact that he did not bring a gun into the bank; he then observed

that "[t]he constitutionality of 

(g)(1) has come

under increasing scrutiny after" Bruen.        In a single sentence, he


States v. Teeter, 

 (1st Cir. 2001)) -- we choose to
resolve Turner's Second Amendment claim on Rule 12 grounds.


                                  - 7 -
suggested that "th[e] Court may and should declare 

(g)(1)   unconstitutional."       Thereafter,   he     concluded   by

asserting that "[t]he salient point, and the one that matters for

purposes of § 3553(a), is that although [Turner] did possess a

weapon and weapons possession by a prohibited person is concerning,

the gun that [Turner] had lacked a firing pin and was therefore

incapable of firing a bullet."     The government, which had already

filed its sentencing memorandum, did not respond to Turner's

memorandum.

          At the sentencing hearing, the district court resolved

Turner's sentencing objections.       The final objection was Turner's

Second Amendment claim as just described.        The court noted that,

although the objection was "not insubstantial," the parties "ha[d]

not briefed" it.    The court then invited the government to address

the issue.

          The government argued that Turner's previous violent

felonies were sufficiently dangerous that he lawfully could be

prohibited from possessing firearms.        Turner responded that the

government    had    not   "carried      [its]   burden,"     citing    an

out-of-circuit district court decision.      The government then added

that it "could be wrong" but thought that Turner's Second Amendment

claim "may be waived" because the time for filing motions under

Rule 12 had passed "by quite a significant time."         Turner did not

claim to have filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss the indictment but


                                 - 8 -
responded that   Class    v. United States, 

 (2018),

permitted him to raise a Second Amendment claim at any time.

           Having heard the parties' arguments, the district court

stated that the objection did not "fail[] for being untimely."

Rather, the court explained that, because of Turner's record of

violent felonies, the case was not "anywhere near the . . . line"

where sentencing him under § 922(g) might pose a "close call" or

a constitutional concern.       The court then overruled the objection.

           Several pertinent facts are apparent.               Turner never

moved to dismiss the felon-in-possession count of the indictment.

He raised the Second Amendment issue as part of an argument for

sentencing leniency only after he had pleaded guilty to the

felon-in-possession offense.       The district court called the Second

Amendment argument a sentencing "objection," a label consistent

with Turner's first presentation of the issue in his sentencing

memorandum and one to which Turner did not object.                  The court

further   recognized    that    Turner's     argument    was   a    sentencing

objection when it declined to find the argument untimely.                  And,

when it ultimately rejected Turner's argument, it did so by

overruling his "objection."

           Because     Turner    did   not     seek     dismissal     of    the

felon-in-possession count in the district court as required by

Rule 12 and has not demonstrated good cause for failing to do so,




                                   - 9 -
we do not consider his Second Amendment argument on the merits.3

Rule 12 serves an important purpose: it eliminates "needless

inefficiency in the trial process" by requiring parties to timely

raise certain defenses, objections, and requests that rest on a

reasonably available basis and can be resolved without a trial on

the merits.    United States v. Crooker, 

 (1st Cir.

2012); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3).     As pertinent here,

Rule 12(b)(3) requires that a party raise by pretrial motion "a

defect in the indictment . . . including . . . [a] failure to state

an offense."   Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3).4




     3    On appeal, Turner does not assert his Second Amendment
argument as part of a challenge to his sentence. Rather, Turner
has turned that argument into an attack on his conviction: namely,
that   the    district   court    should   have    dismissed   the
felon-in-possession count on Second Amendment grounds.        Such
sleight of hand does not avoid his Rule 12 problem.
     4    Although Rule 12(b)(3) does not cover motions asserting
"that the court lacks jurisdiction," which "may be made at any
time while the case is pending," Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), that
is of no help to Turner because a challenge to a statute of
conviction on constitutional grounds is not jurisdictional, see
United States v. Carrasquillo-Peñaloza, 

, 592–93 (1st
Cir. 2016); United States v. Nueci-Peña, 

, 196–97 (1st
Cir. 2013); United States v. Cardales–Luna, 

(1st Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Curry, No. 23-1047,

, at *4 n.6 (10th Cir. June 28, 2024) (observing
that facial challenges to a statute's constitutionality constitute
defective-indictment claims that defendants generally must raise
"before trial or show good cause for their failure" to do so);
United States v. Herrera, 

, 1282–85 (10th Cir. 2022)
(applying Rule 12(b)(3) to facial and as-applied challenges
alleging that 

's "position clause" exceeded
Congress's lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause).


                              - 10 -
          The start of trial is the default deadline for filing

Rule 12(b)(3) motions, but the district court may set an earlier

deadline or reset an existing deadline.     See Fed. R. Crim. P.

12(c)(1)–(2).   Here, the court, after several resets, established

October 11, 2021, as the deadline for filing pretrial motions.

That deadline was over a year and a half before Turner first

mentioned the Second Amendment in his sentencing memorandum.

          A late-filed Rule 12(b)(3) motion may not be considered

unless "the party shows good cause" for the belated filing.    Fed.

R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).   When a party misses a Rule 12 deadline and

does not demonstrate good cause for doing so, the consequence is

that the matter is waived on appeal.   See United States v. Reyes,

, 16 n.8 (1st Cir. 2022) (explaining that unpreserved

Rule 12(b)(3) and (c)(3) arguments are not subject to review on

appeal, even for plain error, absent good cause); United States v.

Lindsey, 

, 40–42, 41 n.6 (1st Cir. 2021) (declining to

apply plain error review and finding waived a claim covered by

Rule 12 that was not raised below, and as to which good cause did

not exist to excuse the failure).      Turner does not attempt to

demonstrate good cause for having failed to file a Rule 12 motion




                              - 11 -
to dismiss the indictment.5      See United States v. Bailey, 

, 959–60 (1st Cir. 2024)

             Turner also does not claim that an as-applied Second

Amendment argument for dismissal of a count of an indictment falls

outside of Rule 12(b)(3)'s scope.          See United States v. Cardona,

, 77–78 (1st Cir. 2023) (assuming that constitutional

vagueness challenge to an indictment fell within the scope of Rule

12   where    the    defendant   did   not    dispute   Rule   12(b)(3)'s

application).       Nor does he argue that his Second Amendment claim

required "a trial on the merits" to resolve.       See Bailey, 

 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)).

             Rather, Turner's only response is that the district

court must have implicitly excused his noncompliance with Rule

12(b)(3) because it chose to address the Second Amendment claim on

the merits during the sentencing hearing.               We disagree with

Turner's characterization of the court's action.

             The district court's statement that Turner's Second

Amendment argument did not "fail[] for being untimely" does not

mean that the court determined that Turner complied with Rule 12


     5    That Bruen was decided after Turner was indicted does
not establish good cause. Turner pleaded guilty several months
after Bruen, and our pre-Bruen caselaw did not foreclose as-applied
Second Amendment challenges. See United States v. Torres-Rosario,

 (1st Cir. 2011) (contemplating the possibility
of a successful as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) in light of
District of Columbia v. Heller, 

 (2008) and McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 

 (2010)).


                                  - 12 -
or demonstrated good cause for failing to do so.                As explained

already, the court did not rule that Turner could proceed with a

belated motion covered by Rule 12(b)(3); rather, Turner raised the

Second Amendment issue in a sentencing objection, and the court

rejected the argument on those terms.

           Turner's     citation   to   Class,   made    at   the   sentencing

hearing and again here, is also unavailing.             Class holds that "a

guilty plea by itself does not bar" a defendant from arguing on

appeal that "the statute of conviction violates the Constitution."

.    Class does not, however, hold as a general matter

that defendants are entitled to appellate review of constitutional

claims, no matter their procedural missteps.            See id.; cf. United

States v. Ríos-Rivera, 

, 41–43 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding

that Class does not preclude application of plain-error review to

forfeited constitutional claim).        Nor does Class address Rule 12;

indeed, post-Class, we found waiver under Rule 12(b)(3) where a

defendant argued on appeal that the statute of conviction was

unconstitutionally vague but had failed to move for dismissal of

the indictment on that ground in the district court.            See Cardona,

88 F.4th at 77–78.      Turner's mention of Class does not afford him

a free pass from Rule 12(b)(3)'s requirement.

           In sum, because Turner did not move in the district court

for   dismissal    of   the   felon-in-possession       count   and   has   not




                                   - 13 -
demonstrated good cause for failing to do so, we do not consider

the argument on appeal.      See Cardona, 88 F.4th at 77–78.

           We add a concluding observation.           This case demonstrates

the   importance    of   compliance    with    Rule     12    to   the    orderly

consideration of covered claims, including motions to dismiss

based on the Second Amendment. By raising a Second Amendment claim

as part of a post-plea sentencing argument, Turner caused a

situation in which the district court faced what it viewed as a

"not insubstantial" question without briefing from the parties.

Mandating compliance with Rule 12 spares district courts from

having to resolve claims on inadequate records and argument caused

by belated and haphazard party presentation. See Cardona, 

 (observing that compliance with Rule 12 requires "timely

presentation of . . . claims to the district court" to "allow[]

full development of the factual record" (quoting Crooker, 

)).

           B.      Sentencing Claims

           Following the district court's resolution of Turner's

sentencing objections -- including an objection to the presentence

report's   application     of   a    threat-of-death         adjustment     under

U.S.S.G.   § 2B1.3(b)(2)(f)     that    we    discuss    at    greater     length

below -- the government argued for a 180–month sentence, the low

end of the guideline range and the mandatory minimum sentence under

(e).      The government emphasized Turner's pattern of


                                    - 14 -
committing bank robberies and the fact that his actions "placed

the   tellers    in     fear   for    their   lives."      The   government     also

recognized      that    Turner's      criminal   actions   were    influenced     by

"childhood trauma, mental health issues, and significant substance

abuse struggles."

            Turner joined the government's request for a 180–month

sentence.    Turner's counsel emphasized that, when Turner committed

the bank robbery, he "was in the middle of a mental health crisis

. . . was ostensibly homeless, and . . . was suicidal."                    Turner's

counsel noted also that Turner had "asked for help from his

probation    officer,        and,    unfortunately,     . . .    didn't   get   it."

Finally, Turner's counsel highlighted that Turner had demonstrated

contrition      to     the   district    court    by,    among    other    actions,

withdrawing his motion to suppress and pleading guilty.

            Turner then provided a lengthy allocution.                    He stated

that he was high on drugs when he robbed the bank and that his

relapse was a response to stress from having to work during the

COVID-19 pandemic in a job that exposed him to the virus.                        He

further explained that, in his view, he unsuccessfully sought help

from his probation officer in the period before the robbery.                     As

he explained it, the probation officer "could have set [him] up so

simply," by calling Turner's girlfriend and asking her to give

Turner money that he "so desperate[ly]" needed, "yet [the officer]

chose not to do it."           In the same vein, Turner stated that he was


                                        - 15 -
"dumbfounded[] that the people that were supposed to be advocating

for [him] would allow [him] to hang" himself.

            Turner acknowledged that he felt "terrible" for scaring

the teller and that he "own[ed] what [he] did."         He also stated

that he needed drug and mental-health treatment but that the Bureau

of Prisons offered inadequate treatment options.       After describing

himself as "not a violent person," "the hardest worker," and "the

smartest guy nine times out of ten," Turner concluded by admitting

that he had "done horrible things while on drugs," which he had to

"live with . . . every day."

            Following the argument, the district court determined,

without objection, that Turner faced an advisory guideline range

of 180 to 210 months.    The court then explained its rationale for

imposing a sentence at the top of that range.            It noted the

aggravated nature of the offense, stating that bank robbery was a

serious   "societal   violation"   that   terrorizes   the   teller   and

instills fear in the community.     It also observed that Turner was

"a thrice-convicted bank robber [who had] threatened people with

violence."

            The district court then accounted for various mitigating

factors, including that Turner had experienced trauma from a young

age and suffered from mental-health issues and substance abuse

disorder.    The court did not, however, accept Turner's suggestion




                               - 16 -
that the alleged failings by the probation department "resulted in

[him] committing another bank robbery."

            Ultimately, the district court explained that:

            [T]he criteria [it] find[s] most important to
            account for is the seriousness of the offense,
            which can hardly be overstated, particularly
            in light of remarkably similar criminal
            history, to provide just punishment and to
            afford adequate deterrence. And . . . in this
            case, to protect the public from further crimes
            of the defendant.

Given these considerations, the court concluded that a 210-month

sentence    was    "sufficient       but     not    greater     than   necessary   to

correspond to the need for the sentence."

            Here, Turner contests the district court's sentencing

determination           on      procedural         and   substantive        grounds.

Procedurally, he contends that the court erred by (1) declining to

rule   on   the    applicability      of     the    threat-of-death     adjustment;

(2) failing       to    consider    certain        mitigating    factors;   (3) not

adequately explaining the chosen sentence; and (4) mistaking his

statements about his probation officer's conduct as indicating a

lack of remorse.             Substantively, Turner contends that the court

overvalued his criticisms of the probation officer and criminal

justice system in determining the sentence.

                       1. Procedural Reasonableness

            We begin with Turner's procedural claims.                   Ordinarily,

we review such claims for abuse of discretion.                   See United States



                                       - 17 -
v. Bruno-Campos, 

 (1st Cir. 2020). When, however,

a defendant pursues on appeal a procedural claim that was not

raised in the district court, we review for plain error.        See 

That standard requires the defendant to show a clear or obvious

error that affected his substantial rights and seriously impaired

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

process.   See 

      Here, Turner preserved only an argument about

the threat-of-death adjustment.        We therefore review that claim

for abuse of discretion and the other claims for plain error.

                        a.   Threat-of-Death Adjustment

           Turner argues that, in determining the guideline offense

level for his bank robbery conviction, the district court should

have   rejected   the    presentence   report's   application   of   the

threat-of-death      adjustment    under   § 2B1.3(b)(2)(F)     of   the

sentencing guidelines.       He contends that merely informing the

teller he had a gun while committing the robbery does not qualify

for the adjustment.

           Turner pays little regard, however, to the district

court's actual ruling: that it would bypass the threat-of-death

issue because doing so would not affect the sentencing.         Turner's

only response is that the court had to resolve the point because

a favorable ruling would have reduced his guideline offense level

for the bank robbery count.




                                  - 18 -
            That argument fails.       Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

Rule 32(i)(3)(B) provides that, at sentencing, a court must rule

on "any disputed portion of the presentence report or other

controverted matter" unless the court determines that a ruling is

unnecessary "because the matter will not affect sentencing, or

because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing."

Here, the district court expressly concluded that it "was not going

to rule on the [threat-of-death] objection[] as the matter will

not affect sentencing."

            The     district     court    appropriately       invoked        Rule

32(i)(3)(B).      Turner's sentencing guideline range was determined

by his armed-career-criminal designation under chapter four of the

guidelines.       See U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B)

(U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2021).          Application of the threat-of-death

adjustment, however, would have affected only the offense level

for   the   robbery   count    under   chapters   two   and   three     of   the

sentencing guidelines.         See id. § 2B1.3(b)(2)(F).       Thus, if the

district court had rejected the threat-of-death adjustment -- the

outcome Turner is seeking -- it would have made no difference in

the applicable guideline range.          See United States v. Meredith,

 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining that district

court properly declined to resolve a chapter three guideline issue

where the sentencing range was established by the chapter four




                                   - 19 -
career-offender guideline); United States v. Casamayor, 

, 909–10 (11th Cir. 2016) (similar).

                          b.    Mitigating Factors

              Turner   argues   next    that    the   district    court   ignored

certain      mitigating   factors      in    selecting     the   sentence.      In

particular, Turner alleges that the court overlooked his desire

for drug treatment, his view that the Bureau of Prisons provides

inadequate treatment opportunities, his "hard life," and the fact

that his latest crimes were caused by COVID-related stress.

              When imposing a sentence, a district court must consider

all the relevant sentencing factors under 

(a).

United States v. MacVicar, 

 (1st Cir. 2024).                   It is

not required, however, to "specifically rebut every argument that

a defendant makes, so long as the record makes reasonably clear

that   the    court    considered    the     pertinent    sentencing    factors."

United States v. Burgos-Balbuena, 

 (1st Cir.

2024). Here, the parties' presentations and the court's sentencing

explanation make clear that the court did not ignore pertinent

sentencing      factors   or    fail    to    consider    proposed     mitigating

considerations.

              The   district    court      imposed    a   sentence   within    the

advisory guideline range after a lengthy hearing which focused

primarily on Turner's view of the mitigating factors.                  Turner and

his    lawyer   argued    about     Turner's    desire     for   treatment,    his


                                       - 20 -
displeasure with criminal justice system (including the lack of

treatment options at the Bureau of Prisons), and the challenges he

faced during COVID-19.           The presentence report also described

Turner's upbringing and substance abuse disorder. The court stated

that it had considered all this material.               It expressly mentioned

that Turner "struggled mightily" with a substance abuse disorder

and   mental   health   issues,        factors   that     it   considered   to    be

mitigating.      And     it     also    stated     that    it    understood      the

"vulnerability" Turner experienced because of his relapse during

the COVID-19 pandemic, although this vulnerability did not, in the

court's view, justify robbing a bank.

           On this record, there is no basis for concluding that

the district court overlooked Turner's presentation of mitigating

facts,   which   it     heard    just     before     sentencing      him.        See

Burgos-Balbuena, 

.              It is apparent that the court

considered Turner's substance abuse problems and the circumstances

of his relapse; it simply did not assign those considerations the

weight    that    Turner        wanted.           See      United    States       v.

Rodriguez-Monserrate, 

 (1st Cir. 2021).                 That does

not constitute a procedural error.

                        c.      Explanation of Sentence

           Turner next argues that the court did not provide a

sufficient explanation for choosing a sentence above the bottom of

the advisory guideline range.           We disagree.


                                       - 21 -
           We have described the "fail[ure] to adequately explain

the chosen sentence" as a type of procedural error.6           United States

v. Dávila-González, 

 (1st Cir. 2010).                    But an

adequate explanation does not require a court to articulate "why

it   eschewed   other    suggested   sentences."      United     States     v.

Vega-Salgado, 

 (1st Cir. 2014).               Indeed, even

where, as here, the district court chose a sentence different from

the parties' joint recommendation, it is required only to explain

"the sentence it ultimately selects."        Burgos-Balbuena, 113 F.3d

at 121 (citing United States v. Bermúdez-Meléndez, 

 (1st Cir. 2016)).

           The district court provided a detailed explanation of

the selected sentence.       It focused on the seriousness of the

offense,   emphasizing    that   bank   robberies   are    a   "great    . . .

violation to the sense of community security."            It also mentioned

Turner's "remarkably similar criminal history," which included

three previous bank-robbery convictions.       These considerations led

the court to conclude that a high-end guideline sentence was

necessary to protect the public, afford adequate deterrence, and

impose just punishment, even accounting for Turner's difficult



      6   We have not, however, always described it that way. See,
e.g., United States v. Colón–Cordero, 

, 50 n.4 (1st
Cir. 2024). But even if we were to construe Turner's challenge as
a substantive attack on his sentence, for the same reasons
discussed here, it still would not provide a basis for relief.


                                  - 22 -
upbringing,       mental-health     conditions,        and   substance    abuse

disorder. This was a sufficient explanation for a within-guideline

sentence.

                        d.    Allocution

            Turner's last procedural claim is that the district

court mistook statements he made during his allocution about his

probation officer's failure to help him before the robbery as an

effort to deflect responsibility for his crime.                Turner insists

that he mentioned the probation officer's actions merely to place

his decision to rob the bank in context.

            We disagree with Turner's contention that the district

court misunderstood his allocution.                It is of course true that

"[a] defendant's acceptance of responsibility and his assertion of

mitigating    circumstances       are   not    necessarily   inconsistent    or

incompatible."      United States v. Singh, 

 (2d Cir.

2017).   And it is also true that a defendant may show remorse while

explaining his reason for breaking the law, since "motivation for

engaging     in    criminal   conduct         is   unquestionably   a    proper

consideration at sentencing."           

.     Nevertheless, a court

is not required to accept a defendant's explanation for why he

committed a crime or why certain factors mitigated his criminal

behavior.     See, e.g., United States v. Lozada-Aponte, 

 (1st Cir. 2012).




                                    - 23 -
           The district court's statement that it did not accept

that "probation's failings . . . led ineluctably to yet another

bank robbery" does not suggest that the court did not understand

Turner's   point.     Rather,     the    record     shows   the    court   simply

disagreed with Turner.       The court recognized that Turner may have

felt "a sense of desperation" based on his perception that his

probation officer did not sufficiently help him.                  And the court

did not reject Turner's statements that he felt remorse for

committing the robbery.       But, based on Turner's prior record of

almost           identical              offenses,            the            court

concluded -- reasonably -- that Turner's response to his probation

officer's actions did not justify his conduct, especially where

there were "lower risk . . . ways" for Turner to obtain money.                 As

the court viewed it, robbing a bank "represents something quite

apart from . . . an addict trying to fund his habit."

           In sum, in rejecting Turner's view about the relevance

of the probation officer's actions to his crime, the district court

understood   Turner's    point,    it    simply     disagreed      with    certain

aspects of it.      That is not procedural error, and we thus reject

Turner's allocution-based claims.7


     7    Turner notes in his brief that the district court, at
one point, did "not allow" him to answer a question that the court
posed to counsel about the content of his allocution. Turner does
not, however, make any argument that the court violated his right
to allocute. We deem any such argument undeveloped and therefore



                                   - 24 -
                  2. Substantive Reasonableness

            Turner also argues that the district court imposed a

substantively unreasonable sentence.            "Challenging a sentence as

substantively unreasonable is a burdensome task in any case, and

one that is even more burdensome where, as here, the challenged

sentence"    is   within   the    undisputed    advisory    guideline   range.

United States v. Clogston, 

 (1st Cir. 2011).

"A sentence is substantively reasonable so long as the sentencing

court has provided a 'plausible sentencing rationale' and reached

a 'defensible result.'"          United States v. Sayer, 

(1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Martin, 

(1st Cir. 2008)).

            Turner   claims      that   his    sentence    was   substantively

unreasonable because the district court assigned excessive weight

to his criticisms of the probation officer and the criminal justice

system. We disagree. These considerations were not even mentioned

by the court when it explained its sentencing rationale.                To be

sure, the court commented on Turner's attempt to connect the

probation officer's actions to his decision to rob a bank.               But,

after explaining why it did not accept the proposed connection,

the court proceeded to sentence Turner based on the nature of his




waived.     See United States v. Zannino, 

 (1st Cir.
1990).


                                     - 25 -
offense, his prior record, and the pertinent § 3553(a) sentencing

factors of just punishment, deterrence, and public protection.

              Turner was before the district court for sentencing on

his fourth bank robbery.               Given a record replete with violent

felonies, the district court's decision to sentence Turner at the

top of the advisory guideline range was a reasonable outcome.

              C.        Supervised Release Claim

              Lastly, Turner claims that the district court committed

a procedural error in failing to recognize its discretion to impose

a revocation sentence concurrent with the sentences on the counts

of conviction.           See United States v. Reyes-Torres, 

(1st   Cir.     2020)      (explaining    that      "treating       the     [sentencing

guidelines] as mandatory" is a procedural error (quoting United

States v. Flores-Machicote, 

 (1st Cir. 2013))).

Turner did not raise this argument in the district court.                               We

therefore review it for plain error.

              "[W]hen a supervised releasee 'transgresses the criminal

law as well as the conditions of supervision, there is no legal

impediment     in       sentencing   [him]   both    as    a     criminal    and   as   a

supervised release violator.'"               United States v. Tanco-Pizarro,

 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Coombs,

 (1st Cir. 2017)).              And, in those circumstances,

a chapter seven policy statement of the sentencing guidelines

contemplates        a    consecutive    sentence.         U.S.    Sent'g     Guidelines


                                        - 26 -
Manual § 7B1.3(f) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2021) (stating that a "term

of   imprisonment     imposed    upon   revocation     of   . . .   supervised

release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence

of imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the

sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct

that is the basis of the revocation of . . . supervised release").

Nevertheless,    we    have     recognized    that   chapter     seven     policy

statements,    including      § 7B1.3(f),     are    "advisory    rather    than

mandatory."     United States v. O'Neil, 

, 301 n.11 (1st

Cir. 1993).      Thus, a court may impose a concurrent supervised

release sentence.      See Coombs, 857 F.3d at 450–51; United States

v. Hurtado-Araujo, No. 98–1975, 

, at *1 (1st Cir.

June 8, 1999).

            The record does not demonstrate that the district court

believed that it was required to impose a consecutive revocation

sentence.     Before imposing sentence, the court recognized the

advisory    nature    of   the    guidelines.         In    addition,    Turner

specifically     requested       that   his    revocation        sentence    run

concurrently, and the government noted that "the Court is well

within its discretion to sentence [] Turner to a consecutive term

of two years or run it concurrently."           Further, when imposing the

consecutive revocation sentence, the court stated that it was doing

so to impose additional punishment in recognition that "Turner

committed [the robbery] while on federal supervised release,"


                                    - 27 -
which it recognized as a factor that it "ha[d] to consider."       The

court's   explanation   that    it   was      relying   on   sentencing

considerations to impose the consecutive sentence demonstrates

that the court appreciated its discretion to do otherwise.8

                         III.    CONCLUSION

          For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgments.




     8    Turner also suggests that the revocation sentence was
too harsh because the district court "gave insufficient weight to
the fact that [he] lapsed . . . because of the burden of the
pandemic."   But, as already discussed, the court recognized
Turner's drug addiction and vulnerability during the period just
before his crime.    It just did not consider the relapse and
Turner's associated need to buy drugs as justifying his decision
to rob a bank.


                                - 28 -