United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1032

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER N. CONDRON,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Thompson, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Eamonn R. C. Hart, with whom Brann & Isaacson was on brief, for appellant.

Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

March 28, 2024 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. After a fourteen-day trial, a

jury convicted Christopher Condron of wire fraud and conspiracy to

defraud the United States by obtaining payment for false claims.

On appeal, Condron argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion for a judgment of acquittal because: (1) there was

insufficient evidence as to each count to support his conviction;

and (2) the government's argument and evidence at trial

constructively amended, or at least prejudicially varied from, one

of the wire fraud counts. Additionally, he contends that the

district court abused its discretion when it limited his cross-

examination of a key government witness. After careful

consideration of the trial record, we affirm the verdict and

Condron's conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

This case centers on Condron's role in submitting

applications to the United States Department of the Treasury

("Treasury") for grant money in connection with purported

renewable energy projects. The facts here are complicated, and to

put them in context, we begin with an overview of the federal grant

program at issue.

A. The Section 1603 Grant Program

In 2009, Congress enacted section 1603 of the American

Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("Section 1603") to encourage

investments in clean, renewable energy projects. See generally

- 2 -

,

, 364 (2009). Section

1603 provides for cash grants, in lieu of otherwise available tax

credits, to entities that "place[d] in service specified energy

property" within a certain timeframe,

§ 1603(a), including

small wind energy, trash, and open-loop biomass facilities.1

Treasury contracted with the National Renewable Energy

Laboratory ("NREL"), "a government-funded research and development

organization that specializes in renewable energy," to review

Section 1603 grant applications.2 In turn, NREL created and

managed an online portal through which grant-seekers could submit

an application, upload any supporting documents, and respond to

any subsequent requests from NREL seeking additional information.

Under the Section 1603 program, there were two types of

applications: (1) a "placed in service" application; and (2) a

"placeholder" application, also known as a "start of construction"

application. A grant-seeker could submit a placed-in-service

application if the property had been "placed in service" at the

time of the application, meaning it was "ready and available for

1 Open-loop biomass facilities use "cellulosic waste" material

(i.e., plant-derived material like tree bark or sawdust) and/or livestock waste material (e.g., manure) to generate electricity.

2 During all relevant times here, Treasury did not conduct its "own independent review of [an] application aside from NREL's" review.

- 3 - its specific use."3 A placeholder application, by contrast, was

available for a grant-seeker that had begun construction on a

renewable energy project in 2009, 2010, or 2011 that would not "be

placed in service until beyond 2011."

When submitting a placed-in-service application, a

grant-seeker would submit a commissioning report, which was "[a]

report provided by the project engineer, . . . equipment vendor,

or an independent third party that certifie[d] that the equipment

ha[d] been installed, tested, and [was] ready and capable of being

used for its intended purpose." Treasury also required

"documentation to support the cost basis claimed for the property,"

including "a detailed breakdown of all costs included in the

basis." The cost basis was generally the amount that the grant-

seeker spent on the property, including "installation costs and

the cost for freight incurred in construction of

the . . . property." If the grant-seeker claimed a cost basis

that was more than $500,000, Treasury required that it submit "an

independent accountant's certification attesting to the accuracy

of all costs claimed as part of the basis of the property."

After reviewing a placed-in-service application, NREL

would provide Treasury with a report recommending that the

3A grant-seeker could submit a "placed in service" application if its property was placed in service in 2009, 2010, or 2011.

- 4 - application be approved (for a certain amount) or denied. For

those applications that it recommended approval, NREL would assign

a grant award that was up to 30 percent of the cost basis of the

property. For example, if the cost basis was $100,000, NREL would

assign a grant award of up to $30,000. Once NREL recommended that

a particular application be approved, Treasury would then initiate

payment to the grant-seeker via a wire transfer.

Importantly, placeholder applications, or start-of-

construction applications, did not provide an option to request a

grant payment. The purpose of a placeholder application was to

allow a grant-seeker whose property was not yet complete to later

request grant funds once the property was placed in service. A

grant-seeker submitting a placeholder application was required to

demonstrate via "[p]aid invoices and/or other financial

documents . . . that physical work of a significant nature ha[d]

begun on the property." Placeholder applications were required to

be submitted by October 1, 2012, and only after construction began.

NREL assigned a unique number to each application

submitted on its online platform.

B. The Indictment

On August 9, 2017, Condron and Jessica Metivier -- his

then-girlfriend and the mother of his children -- were indicted on

one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect

to claims in violation of 18 U.S.C § 286 (Count One) and three

- 5 - counts of wire fraud in violation of

(Counts Two

- Four).

With respect to the conspiracy charge, the indictment

alleged that Condron and Metivier conspired to defraud the United

States "by obtaining and aiding to obtain the payment and allowance

of false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims for monetary grants

under Section 1603." It further alleged that Condron and Metivier

hired a Massachusetts-based attorney to submit applications "to

Treasury seeking more than $50 million in Section 1603 grants on

behalf of [four] companies that the [a]ttorney created for

M[etivier]:" Acton Bio Energy, LLC ("ABE"); Concord Nurseries,

LLC; Kansas Green Energy, LLC ("KGE"); and Ocean Wave Energy, LLC

("OWE").

To support the wire fraud charges, the indictment

alleged that Condron and Metivier submitted or caused to be

submitted online to Treasury certain fraudulent information. The

alleged wires underlying each count were as follows:

Count Approximate Wire Date/Time 2. September 28, 2012 Section 1603 grant application number 2012E48WE214854 submitted online to Treasury on behalf of OWE for $25,204,770, regarding "small wind energy property." 3. January 11, 2013 Response, submitted online to Treasury, to a January 7, 2013 request for information from NREL about background and qualifications of Person A.

- 6 - 4. April 17, 2013 Response, submitted online to Treasury, to a March 27, 2013 request for information from NREL about Person A's role in the OWE wind farm project.

Condron proceeded to trial in September 2021.4

C. The Evidence5

The trial evidence focused on Condron's role in

submitting Section 1603 applications and related information to

NREL between 2009 and 2013 for ABE, Concord Nurseries, KGE, and

OWE. As we detail below, Condron directed an attorney to create

these entities and then submit applications and other documents on

behalf of the entities to the Section 1603 program, even though

Condron was not listed as the applicant or as a manager or

principal on the entities' formation documents.

1. Acton Bio Energy, LLC

In 2009, Condron approached Richard Colman, a

Massachusetts attorney and financial planner, about applying to

the Section 1603 program. Colman, who had no prior experience

with Section 1603, ultimately agreed to help Condron apply for a

Metivier did not proceed to trial with Condron, as she 4

pleaded guilty to a superseding information that the government filed against her in September 2020. On the government's motion, the district court dismissed all counts of the indictment against her.

We recount the relevant evidence "in the light most 5

favorable to the jury's verdict, consistent with record support." United States v. Katana,

(1st Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).

- 7 - grant in connection with an open-loop biomass gasification

facility.6 Colman understood his role to be limited to "fill[ing]

out the forms" and submitting them online to Treasury on behalf of

the project. He worked on the application (and additional ones

that followed) on a contingency fee basis, such that he would be

paid if and when Treasury approved the grant.

The first application Condron and Colman worked on

together was for a "turnkey operation," which Condron explained to

Colman was a project that was fully ready to operate upon sale to

the buyer. Condron informed Colman that he wanted to arrange a

transaction in which his company, "C2C," would sell and finance a

biomass gasifier to an entity created under Metivier's name. Per

Condron's instructions, Colman filed a certificate of organization

to create ABE and listed Metivier as its manager.

Colman expressed concerns about Metivier "tak[ing] on so

much debt" in the transaction, given her limited resources at the

time and her lack of knowledge about gasification or biomass

technology. He spoke with her about his reservations, but she

decided to move forward with the sale. Under the terms of the

transaction, "C2C Inc." sold the gasification system to ABE for

$2,935,000 and lent approximately $2.7 million to ABE to finance

6 A biomass "gasification system" converts biomass into a synthetical natural gas, cools the gas and cleans it of contaminants, and then uses the resultant gas as fuel to generate electricity or heat.

- 8 - the transaction. Metivier signed a bill of sale (along with

Condron) and a promissory note in connection with the transaction.7

On December 17, 2009, Colman submitted a Section 1603

application for ABE at Condron's direction. He also submitted

several supporting documents, a few of which we describe below.

One document was an independent auditor's report. To

certify the project costs listed in the application, Metivier hired

Diane Lambert, a CPA with Walsh & Associates, to prepare an

independent accountant's report. She supplied Lambert with the

relevant information for the report, including a breakdown of the

cost amounts, the bill of sale, the promissory note, and invoices.

Because Lambert was not conducting a "full-blown audit," she did

not independently verify the costs of the property and relied on

Metivier to provide accurate cost information. Based on the

information Metivier provided, Walsh & Associates concluded in its

final report that "[t]he eligible cost basis for the . . .

[g]asifi[cation] . . . [s]ystem of Acton Bio Energy LLC in the

amount of $2,935,000 ha[d] been determined in accordance with the

general rules for determining the basis of property for federal

income tax purposes and [was] accurate."

7 Colman testified that he prepared the bill of sale and promissory note based on terms and numbers that Condron provided. According to the promissory note, ABE would pay approximately $16,000 a month to C2C to repay the loan.

- 9 - Colman also submitted a power purchase agreement between

ABE and Acton Sand & Gravel, a "gravel pit operation . . . that

crushe[d] stone and other materials for use in construction."

Metivier signed on behalf of ABE as its managing member. Under

the terms of the agreement, ABE would install a biomass

gasification system at Acton Sand & Gravel and then sell and

deliver electricity produced by the system to Acton Sand & Gravel.

Other documentation submitted in support of the ABE

application included: a certification (signed by Condron and

Metivier in July 2009) that the gasification system had been

"successfully tested" and was "ready for and . . . capable of

operation"; a certification from "C2C Solutions,"8 signed by

Condron, that the biomass gasification system had been installed

and re-tested at the operating site (Acton Sand & Gravel) in

September 2009; and a limited power of attorney signed by Metivier,

authorizing Colman to prepare and submit all documents necessary

to prepare and file the Section 1603 application on ABE's behalf.

In the spring of 2010, Treasury granted the ABE

application and awarded approximately $700,000. Colman sent

Metivier an invoice for his work on the application and received

$24,000 as his contingency fee.

8An IRS agent testified at trial that he was never able to locate a company by the name of "C2C Solutions."

- 10 - 2. Concord Nurseries, LLC

In 2010, Condron and Colman began working on a placed-in-

service application for another open-loop biomass facility. This

application was on behalf of Concord Nurseries, which Colman formed

(per Condron's instructions) by filing a certificate of

organization that named Metivier as its only principal. The idea

behind the Concord Nurseries project was to connect a biomass

gasifier to several generators that would power greenhouses at the

company's place of business. As before, Condron provided Colman

with the information necessary to prepare the application and

supporting documents, including a breakdown of the project costs.

And Metivier again signed a limited power of attorney authorizing

Colman to prepare and submit the Section 1603 application on behalf

of Concord Nurseries.

In connection with this project, Condron arranged for

his mother, Shirley Brewer, to purportedly sell the gasification

equipment (another "turnkey operation") to Concord Nurseries for

$26,773,178.55. Under the terms of the transaction, Metivier

ultimately put down only a $26,773.18 deposit and Brewer, doing

business as The Emerald Group (an entity that Colman created at

Condron's behest, listing Brewer as its principal), financed the

remainder. Metivier signed a promissory note obligating her to

make installment payments over a term of 20 years to repay the

loan.

- 11 - Condron told Colman that Brewer "had a background in

solar energy," and Colman's understanding from Condron was that

she "knew about alternat[ive] energy projects." In reality,

however, Brewer never studied "anything related to energy,

including biomass or solar," and had no formal education in energy

or engineering. Instead, she had degrees in human services

management, business administration, and nursing, and she had

worked as a nurse manager for twenty years until 2011. Further,

Brewer's experience with energy equipment prior to her involvement

in The Emerald Group was limited to buying and installing a wood-

burning furnace with her then-husband for their home in the late

1970s and familiarizing herself with a thermal solar system that

he built around the same time; she had no experience testing a

biomass system to determine its operability (aside from "read[ing]

certain articles about it").

As with the ABE project, Metivier worked with Lambert to

prepare an independent auditor's report for the Concord Nurseries

application. Metivier supplied Lambert with a bill of sale that

she signed on behalf of Concord Nurseries (and which Brewer signed

"d/b/a the Emerald Group"),9 the promissory note she signed, and

invoices. Lambert compiled the schedule of costs listed in the

independent auditor's report based on these documents.

9 Colman prepared the bill of sale based on information that Condron provided.

- 12 - Colman filed the application for Concord Nurseries on

April 29, 2011. According to the application, the gasification

system had been placed in service on November 15, 2010, and the

cost basis of the property was $26,787,532. As supporting

documentation, Colman included Lambert's independent auditor's

report; a bill of sale for the transaction between Metivier and

Brewer; and a commissioning report, signed by Brewer and dated

November 15, 2010, certifying that "[t]he biomass energy producing

system purchased by Concord Nurseries ha[d] been installed at [its

operating site] . . . and tested on November 15, 2010 [and] as a

result the equipment [was] ready and capable of operation." The

application for Concord Nurseries requested, and Treasury

ultimately awarded, a grant of $8,036,260. Colman sent Metivier

an invoice for his work and received approximately $360,000 as his

contingency fee.

3. Kansas Green Energy, LLC

Later in 2011, Condron and Colman began work on an

application for KGE, which Colman formed by filing a certificate

of organization that listed Metivier as its principal. In the

underlying transaction that Condron arranged, Industrial Supplies,

LLC -- another entity that Colman formed, listing Brewer as its

principal -- purportedly sold a turnkey operation to KGE for

- 13 - approximately $58 million.10 The operation supposedly involved a

trash facility that would use "municipal solid waste to produce

electricity" that would light, and provide heat for, greenhouses.11

Metivier signed a promissory note in connection with the

transaction. She also signed a limited power of attorney

authorizing Colman to prepare and submit the Section 1603

application on behalf of KGE.

On July 10, 2012, based on information provided by

Condron, Colman filed KGE's placed-in-service application. The

supporting documents that Colman submitted included: an

independent auditor's report that Lambert prepared largely based

on information from Metivier; and a commissioning report from

Industrial Supplies, signed by Brewer, stating that "final testing

and commissioning" indicated that the system was "ready and capable

of being used for its intended purpose." The placed-in-service

date of the trash facility was allegedly December 30, 2011. The

application listed the qualified cost basis as $58,805,237 and

requested a grant between $17 and $18 million.

10Industrial Supplies also financed the transaction, but it is unclear for what amount.

11 The distinction between trash facilities and open-loop biomass facilities is the source of fuel: trash facilities use municipal solid waste, whereas open-loop biomass facilities use cellulosic and/or livestock waste material.

- 14 - In early September 2012, NREL requested additional

information and documentation for the KGE project. Because NREL

did not receive timely answers to its requests, it denied the

application. On September 25, 2012, Colman filed a second

application for KGE with supporting documents. This second

application listed the qualified cost basis as $58,701,305 and

requested a grant of $17,610,392.

Donald Edward Settle, "a senior adviser in project

development finance" who led NREL's due diligence team for the

Section 1603 program, eventually took the lead in reviewing the

KGE applications. On January 7, 2013, Settle asked Colman for

"current contact information" for several individuals, including

Brewer, and for a description of "the relationship, past and

present, between [such] individuals and with the owners of KGE and

Concord Nurseries." On January 11, 2013, Colman submitted through

the NREL online portal a response to this request. Based on

information from Condron, Colman described Brewer as: "Owner of

Industrial Supplies, LLC and is the contractor who sold turnkey

operation to KGE. She also sold [t]urnkey operation to Concord

Nurseries. Ms. Brewer has been [i]nvolved with alternative energy

since the late 70's[,] specializing in thermal solar and

biomass."12

12 This response was the basis for Count Three.

- 15 - Settle ultimately recommended that Treasury reject the

KGE application because he could not determine that it was placed

in service and there was insufficient documentation to support the

claimed cost basis of the project.

4. Ocean Wave Energy, LLC

While Condron and Colman worked on the KGE project, they

also worked on a project that involved "putting wind turbines on

barges" to generate energy. Unlike the prior projects, this one

was not yet completed (but "was started within the time that it

could get funded").

In November 2011, Condron met with Carlos Peña, who

specializes in waterfront engineering and who worked for CLE

Engineering ("CLE"). Condron explained that he wanted "to use

[offshore] barges with mounted turbines . . . moored to the ocean

bottom" to generate energy. The following month, Condron told

Peña "that there were two barges in Hyannis," Massachusetts and

asked CLE to prepare written reports confirming whether the two

barges were actually there. Also around this time, Condron or

Brewer purchased about 32,000 Wi-Fi dongles ("essentially, thumb

drives") for the project and stored them at three of CLE's offices.

Peña ultimately sent Condron three reports on behalf of CLE and

two other engineering firms that accompanied CLE to inspect the

barges.

- 16 - At some point, Industrial Supplies purportedly bought

two wind turbines and a barge and also leased a barge. Condron

arranged for a transaction in which Industrial Supplies then sold

"each of the barges [and turbines] to Ocean Wave[]" Energy.

In late January 2012, Colman filed a certificate of

organization to form OWE in connection with the wind farm project.

As principals of OWE, the certificate listed Metivier and two of

her and Condron's children.13

Over the course of several days in late September and

early October of 2012, Colman submitted more than 550 grant

applications, each seeking approximately the same amount, on

behalf of OWE.14 Colman submitted the first application on

September 28, 478 applications on September 30, and 73 applications

on October 1. All the applications, except the first one, were

placeholder applications.

The first application, submitted on September 28, was a

placed-in-service application numbered 2012E48WE182428 (the "2428

application"). The description of the underlying property in the

application was "a small wind turbine system that charges batteries

13Colman testified that the names of the two children were eventually removed, leaving Metivier as OWE's sole principal.

14It is unclear what exactly prompted this large number of submissions. Colman testified at one point that "[s]ometimes the Internet connection would fail or something would go wrong," prompting him to "redo [an application] a few times."

- 17 - on a barge for engine operation, heat and lighting." According to

the 2428 application, the property had been placed in service on

December 31, 2011. The application listed a cost basis of $31,476

and requested a $9,443 grant. Supporting documents for this

application included a commissioning report from Brewer, on behalf

of Industrial Supplies, stating that Industrial Supplies was the

vendor of the project equipment, that it had "installed two small

wind turbines" in Hyannis, and that "said equipment was tested

and . . . ready and capable of being used for its intended

purpose . . . since December 31, 2011."15

As an example of the other OWE applications, the

government focused at trial on one submitted on September 30, 2012

and numbered "2012E48WE214854" (the "4854 application"). Unlike

the 2428 application, the 4854 application was a placeholder

application and listed Metivier rather than Colman as the

applicant. The 4854 application indicated that the underlying

project was for a "small wind energy-producing property" that would

be placed in service on or by December 31, 2016. The application

also indicated that OWE had begun "significant work of a physical

nature on the property" (as required for placeholder applications)

because it had "started construction on December 29, 2011 on a

15The indictment alleged that this commissioning report was submitted in support of a placeholder application for OWE that requested a grant of $25,204,770 and claimed a cost basis of $84,015,900. This allegation therefore proved to be incorrect.

- 18 - multiple energy-generating turbine project" and "[its] effort[s]

resulted in the purchase and inventory of 32,500 WiFi communication

defices [sic]" that "provide a communication path to each turbine

necessary for installation and setup, process monitoring, and

preventative maintenance." The anticipated cost basis listed was

about $84 million, and the estimated request for payment was

slightly more than $25 million.

Back at NREL, Settle became aware of the more than 500

applications submitted for OWE, all of which listed Brewer of

Industrial Supplies as the vendor. On March 27, 2013, he asked

for additional information with respect to the 2428 application,

the only placed-in-service application submitted for OWE.16 He

focused a few of his requests, such as the following, on Brewer:

"Ms. Shirley Brewer is apparently a key individual in Industrial

Supplies, LLC and Ocean Wave Energy, LLC as her information is

provided on invoices as OWNER. Please provide a complete

description of Ms. Brewer's role in each company . . . ." Condron

prepared for Colman the following response to Settle's question

about Brewer's role: "Ms. Brewer . . . is the owner of Industrial

Supplies, [LLC]. Industrial Supplies[,] LLC purchased the barge

and sold the barge to OWE LLC. Ms. Brewer has no relation to OWE

16 Settle later testified at trial that Brewer's role in Industrial Supplies and OWE was important for all the OWE applications because he was reviewing them all together.

- 19 - LLC at all except as a vendor."17 Colman submitted this response

on April 17, 2013.

Meanwhile, on March 29, 2013, Condron emailed Peña

asking for a "ballpark price range for the steps of construction,"

explaining that he would himself "come up with the costing on the

barge, turbines, etc." Peña responded that same day, attaching "a

preliminary construction estimate," which he noted was "[b]ased on

the limited details [Peña had] of the project." The attached

spreadsheet listed an estimated total project cost of about $1.6

billion based on the assumption that the project would have 500

turbines and 500 barges.18 Condron did not speak with Peña about

how he intended to use the estimate or about revising the estimate.

However, the construction estimate that was submitted to NREL the

following day, in connection with the 4854 application and under

Metivier's name, projected a total cost of about $32 billion.

According to this new estimate, the project would involve 1,500

barges with 1,786 turbines on each barge, for a total of 2,679,600

turbines.19

17 This response formed the basis for Count Four.

18 It is unclear at what point Condron and Peña discussed implementing a wind farm with 500 turbines and 500 barges, but Peña testified that these numbers were consistent with his conversations with Condron.

19 Relying on his training and experience as a marine engineer,

Peña testified at trial that it was not feasible for each barge to

- 20 - 5. The IRS Audit and Criminal Investigation

In 2012, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") initiated

a civil audit of ABE, Concord Nurseries, and KGE to verify that

the entities had "in fact[] purchased equipment, placed it in

service, and that [such equipment] was placed in service within

the required period of time, 2009 to 2011."20 To facilitate this

audit, IRS agents reviewed financial information, transaction

documents, and invoices related to the entities and arranged to

visit the three gasification systems in March 2013. At the ABE

site, Acton Sand & Gravel, agents did not see any type of

gasification equipment. Next, at the Concord Nurseries site,

agents saw "empty greenhouses, . . . a couple of trailers, and a

flatbed of some sort with wrapped items underneath it." There

were "no substantive business operations." Finally, at the KGE

site, agents "saw some greenhouses with some plantings in them,

but no functioning business operations." The following day, agents

made efforts to find an office or manufacturing center related to

Industrial Supplies, but all they found was a small, "largely

abandoned" "storefront office."

In June 2013, IRS agents arranged to meet with Metivier

at Acton Sand & Gravel to view "any and all gasification equipment

have 1,786 turbines and that the largest wind farm he was aware of at the time (worldwide) had several hundred turbines.

20 The IRS did not conduct a civil audit of OWE.

- 21 - relating to th[e] $89 million in gasification equipment placed in

service across" the ABE, Concord Nurseries, and KGE entities.

Condron was not present. Metivier accompanied the agents on a

tour of the Acton Sand & Gravel site and "open[ed] a number of

trailers," but the agents did not see any gasifiers. Nor did

Metivier point the agents to any.

The IRS subsequently initiated a criminal investigation.

Jonathan Wlodyka, a supervisory special agent for the criminal

investigations division of the IRS, served upon Brewer a grand

jury subpoena seeking documents relating to The Emerald Group and

Industrial Supplies. In April 2016, Wlodyka interviewed Brewer

and asked her about bills of sales, commissioning reports, and

promissory notes relating to The Emerald Group and Industrial

Supplies. Brewer stated that she did not sell a $26 million

gasifier and that she did not enter into any loan agreements.

Additionally, "[o]n at least one occasion [during the interview],

she looked at a promissory note, and said it was phony." Wlodyka

provided Christopher McCarten, another IRS agent, with the records

that Brewer turned over.

McCarten then reviewed "Secretary of State

records[,] . . . financial statements, bank account records,

canceled checks, bills of sale, [and] notes on indebtedness"

relating to ABE, Concord Nurseries, KGE, Condron, Metivier, and

- 22 - Brewer.21 He aimed to identify expenses "for the purchase of energy

equipment and trace the receipt of the treasury grant funds through

the bank accounts."

The IRS ultimately made several determinations,

including: for ABE, $16,093 was spent on project-related

equipment, less than one percent of the claimed $2,935,000 cost

basis; for Concord Nurseries, $177,000 was spent on project-

related equipment, less than one percent of the claimed $26,787,532

basis; and, for KGE, approximately $3 million was spent on project-

related equipment, less than five percent of the claimed

approximately $58 million basis. Additionally, although Metivier

had signed a promissory note agreeing to pay approximately $16,000

per month (on behalf of ABE) to "C2C" to pay off C2C's

approximately $2.7 million loan for a gasification system,

McCarten found no records indicating that she had made any such

payments. Nor did he find "anything" that indicated ABE, Concord

Nurseries, or KGE "had the wherewithal to make the payments on the

[promissory] notes" that Metivier signed on behalf of these

entities. In fact, a review of tax returns filed for ABE, Concord

21 McCarten did not review records for OWE.

- 23 - Nurseries, and KGE revealed that "[t]here was little to no income

reported on the returns for 2009, '10, and '11."22

The IRS also determined that from the approximately

$700,000 that Treasury awarded in connection with the ABE project,

$40,000 was deposited in Metivier's personal bank account and

"spent on personal living expenses to pay off credit cards,

restaurants, gas, [and] vehicle payments." Further, from the

approximately $8 million that Treasury awarded in connection with

the Concord Nurseries project, $950,000 was deposited in

Metivier's "personal business" bank account.

Condron and Metivier were ultimately arrested in August

2017.

D. The Government's Motion in Limine Regarding Cross-Examination of Richard Colman

On September 14, 2021, the fifth day of trial, the

government filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent Condron

from "cross-examining Colman about purported ethical breaches or

suggesting that Colman violated any" of the Massachusetts Rules of

Professional Conduct ("MRPC"). The government argued that the

MRPC did "not apply because Colman was not acting as an attorney

and was not providing legal services to" Condron. Even if the

MRPC did apply, the government added, any allegation by Condron

For example, ABE reported income during only one of those 22

years, for approximately $14,000, and Concord Nurseries filed returns in 2010 and 2011 reporting no income.

- 24 - "that Colman violated ethics rules [would] be more prejudicial

than probative," because there was no evidence that Colman engaged

in misconduct or that he charged an illegal or excessive fee.

The following morning, the district court permitted

Condron to respond to the government's motion. Condron disputed

the government's claim that Colman was not acting as a lawyer and

argued that cross-examining Colman about the MRPC, which reflect

the public's "expectations placed upon lawyers," would allow

Condron to demonstrate his own "state of mind" and that he had

relied on such expectations in "good faith." He also explained

that he intended to cross-examine Colman about his contingency

fees and about "Rule 1.4 concerning communication to the client

and candor."

The district court granted the government's motion. It

ruled that allowing Condron to "bring[] in the Rules of

Professional Conduct [would], essentially, creat[e] a mini trial

about whether someone violates the Rules of Professional Conduct,"

which "would be a question for the Bar, not for this case."

However, the court made clear that Condron could question Colman

about: whether he "was serving in his attorney capacity or in his

business-advising capacity"; whether he charged "an appropriate

fee for" the work he performed; and what he thought Condron

"understood about [their] relationship based on their interactions

and their communications."

- 25 - Condron preserved his objection to the court's ruling.

E. The Jury Verdict and Condron's Motions for Acquittal

At the conclusion of the government's case, Condron

filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal on Count Four, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a).23 The district court

took the motion under advisement.

The jury ultimately found Condron guilty on all four

counts of the indictment. Two weeks later, on October 12, 2021,

Condron filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the

alternative, a new trial. He argued that there was insufficient

evidence to support his convictions and that the evidence at trial

"fatally varied" from the alleged facts in the indictment with

respect to Counts Two and Four. In May 2022, after subsequent

briefing by the parties, the court denied both of Condron's motions

for acquittal, including his request for a new trial.

This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Condron presents three main arguments on appeal: (1) the

government presented insufficient evidence at trial to sustain his

conviction as to any of the four counts; (2) the government's

argument and evidence at trial constructively amended, or at least

prejudicially varied from, Count Two of the indictment; and (3)

23Condron also orally moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.

- 26 - the district court's limitation on the cross-examination of Colman

undermined Condron's defense. We address each of these points in

turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review Condron's preserved sufficiency of the

evidence claim de novo. See United States v. Daniells,

(1st Cir. 2023). In evaluating this claim, we review "the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, draw all

reasonable inferences [in the government's favor], and ask whether

a rational jury could find that the government proved all the

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." United States

v. Katana,

(1st Cir. 2024) (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Fuentes-Lopez,

(1st Cir. 2021)). To uphold Condron's conviction, we "need not

believe that no verdict other than a guilty verdict could sensibly

be reached, but must only satisfy [ourselves] that the guilty

verdict finds support in a plausible rendition of the record."

Fuentes-Lopez,

(quoting United States v. Sabean,

(1st Cir. 2018)).

1. The Conspiracy Count

Count One, which charged a violation of

,

alleged that Condron and Metivier conspired to defraud the United

States by "obtain[ing] government funds through false and

fraudulent applications to the Section 1603 grant program" for

- 27 - ABE, Concord Nurseries, KGE, and OWE. Condron's challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence with respect to Count One is narrow.

He argues that the government's evidence failed to prove that

Metivier had the requisite mens rea to defraud the United States

and, therefore, the conspiracy charge against him fails because he

could not conspire with himself. Relatedly, he maintains that the

district court "misstated the law as to the mens rea requirement

for co-conspirators" when it concluded that "[t]he government did

not need to prove Metivier's state of mind."24 The government

acknowledges that a conviction on Count One "required proof that

Metivier shared in [Condron's] criminal objective" but argues that

the evidence was sufficient to show that she did.

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence about

Metivier's state of mind to support the conspiracy charge.25 The

evidence established the following:

• Metivier was the listed principal or manager of each of the companies for which Colman submitted Section 1603 applications;

24In a footnote in his opening brief, Condron also briefly argues that, "[b]ecause of the complete lack of evidence establishing Metivier's role as a co-conspirator," the district court erred in admitting "certain out-of-court statements [by Metivier] on the co-conspirator hearsay exception under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(e)." Condron's failure to develop this argument beyond one sentence waives it. See United States v. Boudreau,

(1st Cir.), cert. denied,

(2023).

25Because Condron does not contest whether the government met its burden with respect to other elements of

, we do not discuss those other elements here.

- 28 - • she signed bills of sale and promissory notes in connection with multi-million-dollar transactions for these companies, despite having limited resources and little (if any) knowledge about gasification or biomass technology at the time;

• she reached out to, and coordinated with, Lambert to obtain independent auditor reports for the ABE, Concord Nurseries, and KGE applications;

• she supplied Lambert with information and documents for the independent auditor reports, including invoices to support the claimed project costs;

• she was regularly copied on e-mail correspondence regarding the projects;

• she signed a certification indicating that the gasification system for ABE had been "successfully tested" and was "ready for and . . . capable of operation";

• despite being the manager of ABE and the sole principal of Concord Nurseries and KGE -- all of which purportedly involved gasification systems -- she could not point IRS agents to a single gasifier during their visits in 2013;

• at least some of the grant funds were deposited into her bank account and used for her personal expenses;

• her name and contact information were listed in the signature block of OWE's 4854 application, suggesting that she might have personally submitted that application; and

• NREL's submission records listed her as the user who submitted the approximately $32 billion cost estimate in March 2013 in connection with the OWE project.

Based on this substantial evidence, a jury could have

reasonably inferred that Metivier participated in the charged

scheme with an intent to defraud the United States. See United

States v. Alfonzo–Reyes,

(1st Cir. 2010) ("Direct

- 29 - evidence is not required to find [a defendant] guilty, and juries

are entitled to draw reasonable inferences at trial based on

circumstantial evidence."). Her romantic relationship with

Condron is yet another fact on which the jury could have relied to

find that she shared Condron's criminal intent. See United States

v. Pena,

(1st Cir. 2018) ("[T]he evidence plainly

sufficed to permit the jury to infer that Rocheford, given her

close ties to her mother and her broader involvement in the

fraudulent scheme, was a knowing and willful participant in the

scheme to defraud . . . ."); United States v. Ritz,

(5th Cir. 1977) ("The fact of the close association of the

several parties and their association with . . . the father who

was the source of four of the [counterfeit] bills is[] one

circumstance from which the jury might infer knowledge.").

For these reasons, we are satisfied that the jury's

verdict with respect to Count One "finds support in a plausible

rendition of the record." Fuentes-Lopez,

(quoting

Sabean,

).

2. The Wire Fraud Counts

Counts Two through Four charged Condron with wire fraud.

There are three elements of wire fraud: "1) a scheme to defraud by

means of false pretenses, 2) the defendant's knowing and willful

participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud, and 3) the

use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of the

- 30 - scheme." United States v. Buoi,

(1st Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted); see

. "False or fraudulent

pretenses" include "any false statements or assertions" that the

defendant made with knowledge of their falsity (or reckless

indifference to their truth) and "with an intent to defraud."

United States v. Correia,

(1st Cir. 2022).

Critically, the wire fraud statute encompasses not only

"actual, direct false statements" but also "half-truths and the

knowing concealment of facts."

(quoting United States v.

Blastos,

(1st Cir. 2001)). And although a false

representation must be material, to establish materiality here,

the government did not need to prove that NREL or Treasury

"actually relied on the falsehood."

at 27 (quoting United

States v. Stepanets,

(1st Cir. 2021)). Rather,

the government needed to demonstrate that Condron's

representations "had a natural tendency to influence, or [were]

capable of influencing [their] target's decision." United States

v. Cadden,

(1st Cir. 2020) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see Neder v. United States,

(1999) ("[A] false statement is material if it has 'a natural

tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision

of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.'" (second

alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

- 31 - We now turn to consider the sufficiency of the evidence

with respect to each of the wire fraud counts.

a. Count Two: The September OWE Placeholder Application

Count Two charged Condron with wire fraud in connection

with an application that was numbered "2012E48WE214854" and

requested a grant of $25,204,770 in relation to a "small wind

energy property." The indictment suggested that the approximate

date of the 4854 application's submission was September 28, 2012.

At trial, the evidence established that the 4854 application was

actually submitted two days later, on September 30, 2012.

Condron argues that the government failed to introduce

"any evidence that the 4854 application itself was fraudulent,"

because the application did not seek any funds and was simply a

"placeholder" application that "described estimated claims[] that

might be made in the future." He also argues that the government

did not introduce any evidence that he "had the requisite mental

state for fraud when [he] submitted the 4854 application." In his

view, the only evidence as to his state of mind at the time of the

application's submission was a construction cost estimate that was

submitted to NREL six months later in March 2013 (the "March cost

estimate").26 "Concluding from that filing that [he] had a

Recall that the March cost estimate projected a total cost 26

of about $32 billion, which was more than $30 billion higher than the estimate Peña had prepared for Condron just one day prior.

- 32 - particular mental state six months earlier," Condron argues, "is

pure speculation and conjecture." Moreover, Condron stresses, the

March cost estimate was not, as the district court concluded,

"grossly inflated." For the reasons we explain below, we find no

merit in these arguments.

First, the government was not required to prove that the

4854 application itself was fraudulent as long as it was submitted

in furtherance of a scheme that relied on false pretenses. See

United States v. Martin,

(1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting

argument that defendant's emails, which did not contain any

misrepresentations, could not provide the basis for a scheme to

defraud because "the e-mails themselves need not be fraudulent" as

long as "the scheme itself . . . rel[ies] on false pretenses");

see also Buoi,

(listing wire fraud elements). Thus,

the fact that the 4854 application did not request grant funds is

of little consequence. As Condron acknowledges, placeholder

applications permitted grant-seekers with properties not placed in

service by the end of 2011 to submit a later request for grant

funds once their properties were placed in service. The deadline

for placeholder applications was October 1, 2012, and the 4854

application was submitted on September 30, 2012. A jury could

have reasonably concluded that Condron intended to meet the October

1 deadline so that he could later submit a request for grant funds

in connection with the OWE project. Thus, a jury also could have

- 33 - reasonably concluded that the submission of the 4854 application

was in furtherance of Condron's fraudulent scheme. See United

States v. Potter,

(1st Cir. 2006) ("[T]he [wire

fraud] statute does not require that the scheme be 'executed' or

that the [wire] be directed to the last step of the scheme.").

Second, a jury could have reasonably concluded that the

4854 application itself contained misrepresentations. The

application indicated that OWE had begun "significant work of a

physical nature on the property." But the only claimed

"construction" OWE had completed at that time was "the purchase

and inventory of 32,500 WiFi" thumb drives. A reasonable jury

could have found that the purchase of such devices did not

constitute "significant work of a physical nature," particularly

for a project claiming an anticipated cost basis of about $84

million.27 Such a finding would not have been "unreasonable,

insupportable, or overly speculative" in light of the evidence.

Daniells,

(citation omitted).

Third, we are not persuaded by Condron's argument that

the March cost estimate was not fraudulent. He acknowledges that

this estimate "contained a significantly higher total cost than

At oral argument, Condron stressed that the government did 27

not argue at trial that the 4854 application was fraudulent for relying on the purchase of 32,500 Wi-Fi devices to claim that OWE had begun construction. But regardless of what the government argued to the jury, the jury was entitled to draw its own inferences and conclusions from the evidence before it.

- 34 - the one Peña provided to Condron" but notes that "this change was

driven not by increasing the unit costs . . ., but by changing the

number of units." But the March cost estimate was a staggering

$30 billion higher than the cost estimate Peña had prepared, and

Peña testified that it was not feasible for each barge to have the

number of turbines that the March cost estimate suggested.

Moreover, the approximately $32 billion estimate varied

significantly from the approximately $84 million cost basis

specified in the 4854 application. And there was no evidence

suggesting that any significant work followed the 4854

application's submission such that it could have accounted for

this major discrepancy.

Finally, the jury was entitled to consider the March

cost estimate when determining whether Condron had an intent to

defraud at the time the 4854 application was submitted. We long

ago established "that subsequent events may shed light upon, and

be relevant in determining, what transpired at an earlier time."

United States v. Sutton,

(1st Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, the jury could have appropriately inferred from the

March cost estimate that Condron's fraudulent intent had developed

by the time the application was submitted.

We therefore reject Condron's sufficiency challenge with

respect to Count Two.

- 35 - b. Counts Three & Four: The January 11 & April 17, 2013 Responses to NREL

The alleged misrepresentations underlying Counts Three

and Four were statements that Condron prepared (and Colman

submitted) in response to requests from NREL seeking additional

information about Brewer. They are, in relevant part, as follows:

Request From NREL Response to NREL Date of Response Describe the relationship, Owner of Industrial January 11, past and present, between Supplies, LLC and is 2013 [Shirley Brewer] and with the contractor who the owners of KGE and sold turnkey operation Concord Nurseries. to KGE. She also sold [t]urnkey operation to Concord Nurseries. Ms. Brewer has been [i]nvolved with alternative energy since the late 70's[,] specializing in thermal solar and biomass. Ms. Shirley Brewer is Ms. Brewer . . . is April 17, apparently a key individual the owner of 2013 in Industrial Supplies, LLC Industrial Supplies, and Ocean Wave Energy, LLC [LLC]. Industrial as her information is Supplies[,] LLC provided on invoices as purchased the barge OWNER. Please provide a and sold the barge to complete description of Ms. OWE LLC. Ms. Brewer Brewer's role in each has no relation to OWE company . . . . LLC at all except as a vendor.

Condron argues that these responses to NREL cannot

support a conviction for wire fraud because they "were literally

true, comported with legal definitions of relevant terms, and were

submitted by an attorney [i.e., Colman] with full knowledge of the

- 36 - personal relationships of the parties." He also contends that his

conviction on Count Four "fails for an independent reason," namely:

"[t]he only 'scheme to defraud' relating to OWE was charged in

relation to the [4854] application," but the response underlying

Count Four was submitted in response to the 2428 application. We

disagree and reject his sufficiency challenge to Counts Three and

Four because we find that the statements underlying those counts

were misleading, material, and in furtherance of the charged scheme

to defraud.28

To begin, Condron's statements fall squarely within the

ambit of the wire fraud statute. With respect to Count Three, a

reasonable jury could have concluded that Condron not only

misrepresented Brewer's experience in alternative energy but also

knowingly omitted reference to her personal ties to Metivier. The

evidence established that Brewer had no formal education or

training related to energy or engineering and that she had worked

as a nurse for 20 years until 2011. Her "involvement" with energy

equipment was limited to buying and installing a wood-burning stove

decades ago with her then-husband and familiarizing herself with

a thermal solar system that he built at their home. And, as was

repeated many times during the trial, her son (Condron) was in a

28 Condron offers no argument as to how the submission of misleading statements by an attorney is relevant to (let alone supports) his sufficiency argument. We therefore do not address that point.

- 37 - romantic relationship with Metivier, and she was the grandmother

to their children. As for Count Four, a jury could have reasonably

concluded that Condron's statement went beyond a "half-truth" or

omission and rose to the level of an "actual, direct false

statement[]." Correia,

(citation omitted). The

evidence was straightforward: Despite the fact that Brewer was the

grandmother to Metivier's children, and Metivier was the principal

of OWE, Condron represented that "Brewer ha[d] no relation to OWE

LLC at all except as a vendor."

Condron's assertion that the responses were literally

truthful because Brewer had only a personal relationship to OWE

and "there was no legal relationship, as defined in the relevant

statutes, . . . to disclose" is not compelling.29 (Citation

omitted.) For the purposes of the wire fraud statute, that Section

1603 or Treasury's program guidance may not explicitly have

required disclosure of the personal relationship between Brewer

and Metivier does not immunize Condron's January 11

representation. See United States v. Lloyd,

, 1153

To support this argument, Condron points to the language 29

of Section 1603, which provides: "Terms used in this section which are also used in section 45 or 48 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall have the same meaning for purposes of this section as when used in such section 45 or 48."

(h),

, 366 (2009). Condron's reasoning is that sections 45 and 48 of the Internal Revenue Code would not classify Brewer (or her entities) as "related" to Metivier (or her entities) and, therefore, neither would Section 1603.

- 38 - (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that fraud charges based on affirmative

misrepresentations, including affirmative "misleading half-

truth[s]," do not require proof of a duty to disclose (citation

omitted)); United States v. Keplinger,

(7th Cir.

1985) ("It requires no extended discussion of authority to

demonstrate that omissions or concealment of material information

can constitute fraud . . . under the mail fraud statute, without

proof of a duty to disclose the information pursuant to a specific

statute or regulation.").

Next, a reasonable jury could have further determined

that Condron's representations in Counts Three and Four were

material, as they "had a natural tendency to influence" NREL's

decision to ultimately grant or reject one or more of the Section

1603 applications. Correia,

. The fact that NREL

"explicitly sought" information about Brewer "indicates that

[Condron]'s response[] [was] capable of influencing its decision."

United States v. Appolon,

(1st Cir. 2013).

Indeed, Settle testified that information about Brewer's

"relationship" with the owner of KGE and Concord Nurseries (i.e.,

Metivier) was important to NREL's determination of the OWE

applications' credibility and claimed cost bases. And McCarten,

an IRS agent, explained that understanding the relationship

between a creditor and debtor (such as Brewer and Metivier) was

- 39 - important to determining the actual value of a property and, in

turn, the eligible cost basis.

Finally, we reject Condron's argument that his

conviction on Count Four cannot stand because the evidence

established that the April 17 statements were submitted in

connection with the 2428 application, which the government

conceded was not fraudulent.30 In Condron's view, the fact that

he did not make such statements in response to the 4854 application

indicates that those statements were not submitted in furtherance

of the scheme charged in the indictment. To be sure, Condron is

correct that the evidence demonstrated his April 17 statements

were technically submitted in response to NREL's questions about

the 2428 application. But that is of little consequence here.

The government's burden was to show that the April 17 response was

submitted in furtherance of Condron's overall scheme to defraud,

not the 4854 application specifically. Each of the more than 500

OWE applications listed Brewer of Industrial Supplies as the

equipment vendor. And NREL reviewed each of those applications.

A jury could have reasonably inferred that Condron anticipated

that NREL's interest in Brewer's role would have extended to the

30 Before the government called its first witness at trial, it acknowledged that "[t]here were more than 500 applications submitted" for OWE and that "[t]he first one" (i.e., the 2428 application) was "not fraudulent because there was equipment bought" and the application claimed "only . . . $7,000."

- 40 - other OWE applications (and even the ABE, Concord Nurseries, and

KGE applications) and that he therefore prepared a response that

would conceal the true nature of Brewer's role to further his

scheme to defraud Treasury.

In sum, Condron's challenge with respect to Counts Three

and Four fails because there was sufficient evidence for the jury

to convict him on each count.

B. Constructive Amendment and Prejudicial Variance

Condron also challenges his conviction with respect to

Count Two on the basis that "the [g]overnment's argument amounted

to a constructive amendment of the indictment, or, at the very

least, a prejudicial variance that requires reversal." This

argument rests on the premise that "[t]he government essentially

invited the jury to view th[e] March 2013 upload" -- i.e., the

approximately $32 billion cost estimate submitted in support of

the 4854 OWE application -- "as the wire [for Count Two], instead

of the" 4854 application itself.31 Because he presented his

prejudicial variance argument before the district court and

therefore properly preserved it, we review that claim de novo.

See Katana,

. We normally would review Condron's

31To the extent Condron also bases his claims about Count Two on a discrepancy in the date the 4854 OWE application was submitted, he conceded at oral argument that such a discrepancy "[is] not itself a problem" and that the core issue was the "completely uncharged" March cost estimate.

- 41 - constructive amendment argument claim, which he did not raise

below, for plain error, but we conclude that it would fail even

under de novo review.

We begin with a brief overview of the distinction between

a constructive amendment and a prejudicial variance. The

government constructively amends an indictment when its evidence

or argument at trial alters the terms of the "indictment such that

the defendant is effectively charged with a different offense than

the one returned by the grand jury."

The prohibition against

constructive amendments serves to safeguard a defendant's Fifth

Amendment right to be indicted only by a grand jury and Sixth

Amendment rights to be informed of those charges and not to be

re-prosecuted for the same offense. See United States v. Akoto,

(1st Cir. 2023); United States v. Taylor,

(1st Cir. 2017). A variance -- which "does not involve

a change in the offense charged" -- "occurs when the government

relies at trial on different facts than those alleged in the

indictment to prove the same offense." Katana,

.

To distinguish between a claim of constructive amendment

and that of a prejudicial variance, we look to the statutory

elements of the offense charged. See

. The government's

introduction of evidence at trial that varies from the factual

allegations of the indictment, but does not alter a statutory

element of the offense charged, does not amount to a constructive

- 42 - amendment. See United States v. López–Díaz,

(1st Cir. 2015). Nor does it amount to a prejudicial variance,

unless it affects a defendant's "right to have knowledge of the

charge sufficient to prepare an effective defense and avoid

surprise at trial, and the right to prevent a second prosecution

for the same offense." United States v. Vega-Martínez,

(1st Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). With this

framework in mind, we turn to Condron's constructive amendment and

prejudicial variance claims, neither of which have merit.

The government's reliance on the March 2013 cost

estimate in support of Count Two did not result in a constructive

amendment or a variance. First, because any emphasis on the March

2013 estimate did not alter any statutory element of the offense

charged in Count Two (i.e., wire fraud), it did not amount to a

constructive amendment. See López–Díaz,

(rejecting

constructive amendment claim because "[t]here was no change to the

statutory elements of the offense"); see also United States v.

Dupre,

(2d Cir. 2006) (finding no constructive

amendment, where the only wire alleged in indictment was not proven

at trial, because "the evidence at trial concerned the same

elaborate scheme to defraud . . . as was described in the

indictment"). Second, there was no variance because the

government's argument at trial was clear that the 4854 OWE

application was the basis for Count Two. In its closing argument,

- 43 - the government explained that the "first" charged wire was a

"placeholder application" submitted on September 30, 2012 for OWE.

The government also acknowledged that the indictment erroneously

specified September 28, 2012 (rather than September 30) as the

submission date of that application.32 As we noted earlier, the

government throughout trial focused on the 4854 application as an

example of the placeholder applications submitted for OWE. We

therefore find no support for Condron's assertion that the

government improperly conflated the March 2013 estimate with the

4854 OWE application.33

Finally, even if the evidence at trial varied from the

facts alleged in the indictment, Condron has failed to demonstrate

that such a variance was prejudicial. Condron's claim of prejudice

is that the government's "blurring [of] the 2428 placed-in-service

and 4854 start-of-construction application[s] . . . invited the

jury to . . . consider statements made only in connection with the

32The government also noted that the court would provide the jury with "an instruction about an on-or-about date" and that the jury would "have to decide whether or not this wire took [place] . . . on or about September 30, 2012."

33Moreover, contrary to Condron's assertions, the government did not rely on the March cost estimate as the only piece of evidence demonstrating his intent to defraud at the time of the 4854 application's submission. As we explained earlier, the 4854 application itself offered insight into Condron's fraudulent intent at the time it was submitted. Additionally, the government reminded the jury that it had provided only "snippets of different exhibits" during its closing argument and that "all the[] exhibits [would] be in the jury room for [the jury] to consider."

- 44 - 2428 application as related to the 4854 application." He suggests

that this "blurring" added to the "heightened risk that the jury

[would] confuse evidence as to each count." But Condron offers no

support for his assertion that the government "blurr[ed]" the two

applications. As we have just explained, the government was clear

that the 4854 OWE application was the basis for Count Two.

Moreover, during its closing argument, the government referenced

only a "placeholder application" submitted for OWE on September

30, 2012 (i.e., the 4854 application) and never mentioned any other

application submitted by OWE (such as the placed-in-service 2428

application).

More importantly, Condron has not established that he

was deprived of the "right to have knowledge of the charge [in

Count Two] sufficient to prepare an effective defense and avoid

surprise at trial" or "the right to prevent a second prosecution

for the same offense." Vega-Martínez,

(cleaned up)

(citation omitted). The fact that the government did not reference

the March cost estimate in the indictment but did introduce the

estimate at trial is insufficient to demonstrate that Condron

lacked notice of the charge against him. After all, "[t]he

government need not recite all of its evidence in the indictment."

United States v. Fornia-Castillo,

(1st Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted). And, notably, the government included "OWE

Barge Cost Estimates," dated March 29, 2013, in its exhibit lists,

- 45 - the first of which it filed in August 2020, more than a year before

trial began. Additionally, when Condron cross-examined Peña, he

largely focused on the March cost estimate. The record therefore

belies any claim of surprise. Finally, Condron fails to establish

how he might have prepared his defense differently had he been

aware that the government would, as he claims, "concede the

legitimate nature of [the] 2428 [application] and rest solely on

claims of implausibility in the [March] cost estimate."

Thus, Condron has failed to demonstrate prejudice and,

consequently, "grounds for reversal." Katana,

(citation omitted); see United States v. Chan,

(1st Cir. 2020) ("[A] variance is grounds for reversal only if it

is prejudicial." (citation omitted)).

C. The Government's Motion in Limine

Condron's final argument is that the district court

erred when it restricted him from cross-examining Colman about the

MRPC. In his view, Colman was "[t]he most critical witness" at

trial, and "[t]he critical issue at trial was whether Condron acted

in good faith." He argues that cross-examination of "Colman on

the [MRPC] . . . would have both shed light on the question of his

role[] and provided a basis for the jury to understand the

expectations placed on attorneys, which in turn would inform the"

jury's analysis as to whether Condron relied on Colman in good

faith. The district court's restriction on such cross-

- 46 - examination, Condron suggests, "undermin[ed] a key defense

strategy" and amounted to an abuse of discretion.

We conclude, however, that the district court was well

within its discretion when it imposed a narrow restriction on

Condron's cross-examination of Colman and that such a restriction

did not undermine his defense. Under Federal Rule of Evidence

403, district courts have broad discretion to "exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a

danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading

the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. We thus review the

district court's decision under Rule 403 to limit the scope of

Colman's cross-examination for abuse of discretion. See Vega-

Martínez,

; see also United States v. Soler-

Montalvo,

, 16 (1st Cir. 2022) (highlighting "our

deference for the district court's battlefield judgment" under

Rule 403).34

Here, the district court properly balanced Condron's

interest in cross-examining Colman about the MRPC against its

concerns that such questioning would confuse the jury and/or elicit

34 In challenging the district court's limitation on his cross-examination of Colman, Condron relies on Rule 403. He makes only a cursory reference to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Cause in one sentence in his reply brief. Accordingly, we focus our analysis here on whether the district court complied with Rule 403 when it limited the cross-examination.

- 47 - testimony that was irrelevant to the issues at hand. As the

district court reasoned, allowing Condron to cross-examine Colman

about the MRPC would have "creat[ed] a mini trial about whether

[Colman] violate[d] the Rules," which "would be a question for the

Bar, not for this case." Because cross-examination of Colman with

respect to the MRPC was likely to "distract the jury in an already

complex case," the court "ha[d] discretion under Rule 403 to

exclude such" questioning. United States v. DeCologero,

(1st Cir. 2008). Moreover, the probative value of the

testimony that Condron sought to elicit regarding the MRPC as to

whether he acted in good faith would have been marginal, at best.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by preventing

Condron from cross-examining Colman about the MRPC.

Finally, even if we were to assume that the district

court's ruling was improper, Condron has not demonstrated that it

undermined his defense. The court's ruling left ample room for

Condron to advance his good faith defense via questioning of

Colman. The court explicitly permitted Condron to cross-examine

Colman about: whether he "was serving in his attorney capacity or

in his business-advising capacity"; whether he charged appropriate

contingency fees; and what he thought Condron "understood about

[their] relationship based on their interactions and their

communications." And defense counsel ably elicited testimony from

Colman establishing that Condron knew Colman was an attorney and

- 48 - that Colman had a "professional relationship" with Condron, was

the "project attorney for all the[] projects in this case," and

listed himself as an attorney in several documents submitted to

NREL in connection with the Section 1603 applications. Defense

counsel also established that Colman never advised Condron against

being a vendor to Metivier's company (ABE) and that, at the time

Colman and Condron were working on the Section 1603 applications,

Colman knew Condron and Metivier were dating but did not believe

they "had a legal relationship to disclose to the [Section] 1603

program." Additionally, Colman confirmed during cross-examination

that clients have "the right to expect that their lawyers are

competent" and will "keep them informed about the matters for which

they [are] represent[ed]." We need not further scrutinize the

trial record to conclude that the district court afforded Condron

plenty of opportunity to effectively cross-examine Colman.

In sum, "[g]iven the undeniable authority of trial

courts to place reasonable limits on cross-examination in order to

cut off protracted discussion of marginally relevant subjects, it

[was] well within the district court's discretion to limit"

Condron's cross-examination of Colman about the MRPC. United

States v. Coplin,

(1st Cir. 2006).

III. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we affirm Condron's conviction on

all four counts.

- 49 -