United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 22-1944

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO SANTONASTASO,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Timothy S. Hillman, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo, Thompson, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Jin-Ho King, with whom Milligan Rona Duran & King LLC was on brief, for appellant. Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

April 26, 2024 MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Antonio

Santonastaso appeals the judgment following a jury verdict finding

him guilty of making a false statement to federal investigators

and attempted witness tampering. Santonastaso contends that the

government's evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt on these

charges and that the district court erred by declining to give a

materiality instruction based on the Supreme Court's decision in

Maslenjak v. United States,

(2017). For the reasons

explained below, we affirm Santonastaso's convictions.

I. Background

A. The 2000 Helicopter Theft and Revocation of Santonastaso's Airman Certificate

In the summer of 2000, Santonastaso was investigated by

the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") for allegedly stealing

a helicopter and flying the helicopter without appropriate

certifications. The FAA revoked Santonastaso's airman certificate

after finding, in relevant part, that he: (1) lacked a valid

medical certificate while flying the helicopter; (2) failed to

obtain the necessary rotorcraft-helicopter rating on his airman

certificate before flying the helicopter; (3) operated the

helicopter carelessly or recklessly by carrying a passenger when

he lacked proper certifications; and (4) failed to notify the FAA

of his address change.

- 2 - As Santonastaso emphasizes on appeal, the FAA did not

list his alleged involvement in the helicopter theft as a reason

for revoking his airman certificate. But in 2002, Santonastaso

pled guilty in Massachusetts state court to stealing the

helicopter.

B. The FAA's 2018 Investigation

Nearly two decades later, in 2018, Santonastaso's

neighbor reported to local police that he saw Santonastaso flying

a helicopter from his backyard around the area. The police alerted

the FAA, and the FAA assigned Aidan Seltsam-Wilps, an aviation

safety inspector, to investigate Santonastaso. At Seltsam-Wilps's

instruction, Santonastaso's neighbor provided the FAA with written

logs of when he saw Santonastaso flying and photographs of

Santonastaso in the helicopter.

After obtaining the logs and photographs from

Santonastaso's neighbor, Seltsam-Wilps checked FAA records to

assess what certifications Santonastaso possessed and whether the

helicopter he was flying was airworthy (i.e., compliant with

federal regulations and safe to fly). Seltsam-Wilps's research

revealed that Santonastaso previously held an airman certificate,

but the FAA revoked his certificate, meaning that Santonastaso did

not have privileges to fly the helicopter. And by searching for

the helicopter's tail number to obtain its registration

- 3 - information, Seltsam-Wilps found that the helicopter appeared

airworthy.

Based on this preliminary investigation, Seltsam-Wilps

sent Santonastaso a letter requesting that he provide records to

confirm the helicopter's airworthiness. Seltsam-Wilps found

Santonastaso's responses to be inadequate and arranged to visit

Santonastaso to see the helicopter in person.

On April 18, 2018, Seltsam-Wilps -- accompanied by an

FAA maintenance inspector and a local police officer -- met

Santonastaso at his home. At first, Santonastaso denied illegally

flying the helicopter. But after Seltsam-Wilps told him that the

FAA had photographic evidence of him flying, Santonastaso changed

course to assert that he had the requisite certifications to fly.

Similarly, when Seltsam-Wilps summarized the FAA records showing

that his airman certificate had been revoked, Santonastaso "seemed

very confused," but then told Seltsam-Wilps that he had a valid

license to fly. Santonastaso presented Seltsam-Wilps with a

logbook containing an expired temporary airman certificate issued

in 1985 and expired logbook endorsements (statements issued by

certified flight instructors permitting students with specific

training to conduct certain types of flight operations) showing

that he had completed the training requirements for the Robinson

R22 helicopter he had been flying. Santonastaso also showed

- 4 - Seltsam-Wilps what he purported to be a medical certification but

was actually an inapplicable physician's checklist.

When Seltsam-Wilps inquired about Santonastaso's

awareness that his airman certificate had been revoked,

Santonastaso initially stated that he never received notice from

the FAA about the revocation. But he later told Seltsam-Wilps

that the notice must have been sent to him "when [he] was out of

the country working for the State Department." Seltsam-Wilps asked

Santonastaso about this supposed State Department work, to which

Santonastaso responded that he had been "part of a team of

operatives, and it's black ops sort of stuff," involving members

of the CIA and DEA. Santonastaso further explained that the "whole

story about the stolen helicopter and [his] jail time . . . was

all a cover-up; and once he spoke with the remaining members of

his team of operatives, he would be able to clear [the] matter

up," as it was "all a big misunderstanding."

At the end of this meeting, Seltsam-Wilps instructed

Santonastaso to stop flying the helicopter, citing the serious

consequences that could result if the FAA found that he had

violated federal regulations. Later that day, Santonastaso called

Seltsam-Wilps to reiterate that he had an airman certificate and

medical certification, and "indicated that he had no intention of

[refraining from] flying the helicopter."

- 5 - True to his word, Santonastaso continued flying, and the

FAA received documentation from his neighbor of approximately 85

flights that he piloted in the helicopter between April and

November 2018. But in November 2018, the Town of East Brookfield

sued Santonastaso in Massachusetts state court and eventually

obtained a permanent injunction barring him from flying the

helicopter.

C. The U.S. Department of Transportation's 2019 Investigation

While the FAA's investigation of Santonastaso was

administrative in nature, the Office of the Inspector General of

the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT-OIG") later opened a

criminal investigation into Santonastaso's conduct. In the spring

of 2019, the DOT-OIG received a complaint from the U.S. Attorney's

Office regarding Santonastaso's alleged operation of a helicopter

without an airman certificate. DOT-OIG Special Agent Marybeth

Roberts obtained a copy of the FAA's investigation file and started

the DOT-OIG's criminal investigation into Santonastaso's conduct.

On April 17, 2019, Roberts and another DOT-OIG special

agent met with Santonastaso at his home. As part of her

introduction, Roberts identified herself as a federal law

enforcement officer, informed Santonastaso of his right to not

speak with her, and explained that lying to a federal law

enforcement officer is a criminal offense. Roberts also gave

- 6 - Santonastaso her business card, which listed her position as a

DOT-OIG special agent.

Like Seltsam-Wilps, Roberts questioned Santonastaso

about the revocation of his airman certificate. Santonastaso told

Roberts that he found out about the revocation during his 2018

meeting with Seltsam-Wilps and that the revocation was related to

a stolen helicopter. Roberts then showed Santonastaso a copy of

the revocation notice that was sent to him in 2000, and

Santonastaso confirmed that the mailing address was where he lived

at the time. Unlike in his interview with Seltsam-Wilps,

Santonastaso did not mention working for the State Department,

CIA, DEA, or any undercover operation. Santonastaso also clarified

to Roberts that he was not currently flying because his helicopter

needed maintenance. And when Roberts asked for his flight logbook,

he told Roberts that he kept the logbook in Woodstock, Connecticut.

On May 6, 2019, Roberts and DOT-OIG Special Agent Dwight

Schwader went to Woodstock to meet Roland Toutant, the manager of

Toutant Airport, and learned that Toutant was friends with

Santonastaso. Based on information from Toutant, Roberts and

Schwader proceeded to interview Ronald Plouffe, the manager of a

nearby airport in Southbridge, Massachusetts. While being

interviewed by Roberts and Schwader, Plouffe received a call from

Santonastaso. Plouffe clandestinely signaled to the agents that

Santonastaso was on the line, and Schwader leaned in closely to

- 7 - the phone receiver to take notes on the call. Santonastaso told

Plouffe that a woman was "asking questions" about him at "other

airports" because "his neighbor was mad" about him flying his

helicopter. Of particular relevance here, Schwader's notes from

the call indicated that Santonastaso referred to the woman as "a

girl from MA DOT," presumably shorthand for the Massachusetts

Department of Transportation. During the call, Santonastaso

instructed Plouffe to say that he did not know Santonastaso or

anything else in response to the woman's questions. Santonastaso

also referenced the permanent injunction that prohibited him from

flying and the potential consequences of doing so.

D. The Federal Criminal Proceedings Against Santonastaso

On May 30, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted

Santonastaso on four counts:

• Count 1: Serving as an airman without an airman certificate when flying the helicopter in 2018 in violation of

(b)(7); • Count 2: Making false statements to federal investigators by denying culpability in the 2000 helicopter theft during the FAA's 2018 investigation in violation of

(a)(2); • Count 3: Making false statements denying his illegal operation of a helicopter in 2018 and purporting to have medical certification during the DOT-OIG's 2019 investigation in violation of

(a)(2); and • Count 4: Attempted witness tampering involving his call to Plouffe during the DOT-OIG's 2019 investigation in violation of

(b)(3).

- 8 - Before Santonastaso's trial began, and as will be

explained in further detail, Santonastaso's counsel requested a

jury instruction that incorporated the materiality standard

adopted by the Supreme Court in Maslenjak. See 582 U.S. at 338,

350. The district court declined to give Santonastaso's proposed

instruction.

In late March 2022, the government proceeded to try its

case against Santonastaso on the same four counts from the grand

jury indictment. At the close of the government's case-in-chief,

Santonastaso made a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and renewed the motion at the close

of evidence. The court denied the motion. Santonastaso's counsel

noted his objection to the court's denial. After a five-day trial,

the court charged the jury, and Santonastaso's counsel objected to

the court's rejection of his preferred materiality instruction.

The jury found Santonastaso guilty on Counts 1, 2, and

4, and not guilty on Count 3. Santonastaso filed a post-judgment

motion for judgment of acquittal on Counts 2 and 4. On May 25,

2022, the district court entered a one-line text-only order denying

the motion.

On November 30, 2022, after the sentencing hearing, the

district court entered judgment against Santonastaso.

Santonastaso then filed this timely appeal challenging his

conviction on Counts 2 and 4 only.

- 9 - II. Discussion

The parties agree that Santonastaso has preserved his

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts 2 and 4

and to the alleged instructional error.

This court reviews a preserved challenge to the

sufficiency of evidence to sustain a criminal conviction under a

de novo standard. See United States v. Mendoza-Maisonet,

, 11 (1st Cir. 2020). Our de novo review requires us to "examine

the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most

favorable to the prosecution and decide whether that evidence,

including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a

rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant committed the charged count or crime." United

States v. Cruz-Díaz,

, 172 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008). This

approach does not allow us to "view each piece of evidence

separately, re-weigh the evidence, or second-guess the jury's

credibility calls." United States v. Acevedo-Hernández,

(1st Cir. 2018). We will "revers[e] only if the defendant

shows that no rational factfinder could have found him guilty."

United States v. Rodríguez-Torres,

, 23 (1st Cir. 2019).

As for preserved claims of instructional error, we

deploy "a bifurcated framework." United States v. Sasso,

(1st Cir. 2012). "We review de novo questions about whether

the instructions conveyed the essence of the applicable law and

- 10 - review for abuse of discretion questions about whether the court's

choice of language was unfairly prejudicial."

We will not

reverse the district court's decision to reject the defendant's

preferred instruction "unless the proposed instruction is itself

substantively correct, was not covered (at least in substance) in

the charge as given, and touched upon a salient point (such that

the refusal so to instruct seriously undercut the proponent's

ability to mount a particular claim or defense and caused

substantial prejudice)." United States v. Simon,

, 50

(1st Cir. 2021).

We begin with Santonastaso's arguments relative to Count

2 before turning our attention to his protestations about Count 4

and note that "if [Santonastaso] prevails on the insufficiency

argument, then we need not explore any of the other trial errors

raised" because the Double Jeopardy Clause would attach and

preclude a second trial. United States v. Pérez-Greaux,

, 12 (1st Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Orlandella,

, 83 n.19 (1st Cir. 2024).

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count 2 (False Statements Regarding the 2000 Helicopter Theft)

To prove Santonastaso's guilt on Count 2, the government

presented evidence that, during the FAA's 2018 investigation,

Santonastaso told Seltsam-Wilps that he was part of an undercover

team who used the 2000 helicopter theft as a "cover-up" and thus

- 11 - falsely denied culpability for stealing the helicopter. To

establish a violation of

(a), "the government must

prove that the defendant (1) made a material, false statement

(2) in a matter within the jurisdiction of the government

(3) knowing that the statement was false." United States v.

Vázquez-Soto,

, 371 (1st Cir. 2019).

Santonastaso's appeal focuses on challenging the

government's proof on the materiality element. First, and related

to his jury instruction challenge, Santonastaso argues that the

Supreme Court's decision in Maslenjak required the government to

prove a more concrete causal connection between his false statement

denying culpability for the 2000 helicopter theft and the FAA's

2018 investigation. Second, even if this court declines to adopt

Maslenjak in the § 1001(a) context, Santonastaso insists that the

government's materiality evidence was still insufficient under

this Circuit's existing standards because his false statement

"ha[d] no bearing whatsoever" on the FAA's 2018 helicopter

operation investigation.

We take these two sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments

in turn, beginning with a discussion of Maslenjak. Because we

ultimately conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

Santonastaso's conviction on Count 2, we then proceed to address

Santonastaso's instructional error claim, which also centers

around Maslenjak and the § 1001(a) materiality standard.

- 12 - 1. Whether Maslenjak Applies to § 1001(a) Prosecutions

Santonastaso urges us to read Maslenjak's materiality

standard into § 1001(a), enhancing the government's burden to

establish a causal relationship between his false statement

regarding the helicopter theft and the course of the FAA's

investigation. But as will become clear, the law-of-the-circuit

doctrine forecloses such a move.

In Maslenjak, the Supreme Court addressed the standard

for obtaining a conviction premised on false statements to

immigration officials under

(a), the statute

prohibiting the commission of an "illegal act in connection with

naturalization." 582 U.S. at 341. Maslenjak became a naturalized

citizen several years after obtaining refugee status and

immigrating to the United States. Id. at 339. But immigration

officials later discovered that Maslenjak made false statements

when she applied for refugee status. Id.

Maslenjak was then charged with, and convicted of,

violating § 1425(a) based on the government's proof that she lied

on her naturalization questionnaire in attesting that she never

gave false information "to a government official while applying

for an immigration benefit" or to gain entry to the United States.

Id. In vacating Maslenjak's conviction, the Court summarized that

"the District Court told the jury that it could convict based on

any false statement in the naturalization process . . . , no matter

- 13 - how inconsequential to the ultimate decision." Id. at 352. The

Court held that such an instruction was in error because § 1425(a)

requires proving that the false statement had a "causal influence"

on the naturalization decision. Id. at 346–47.

The Maslenjak Court then outlined a "two-part showing"

for materiality under § 1425(a). Id. at 349. The government must

first "prove that the misrepresented fact was sufficiently

relevant to . . . [a] naturalization criterion that it would have

prompted reasonable officials . . . to undertake further

investigation"; and second, the government must demonstrate that

further "investigation 'would predictably have disclosed' some

legal disqualification." Id. at 349–50 (emphases added)

(citations omitted).

As Santonastaso notes, this Circuit has not addressed

whether Maslenjak's materiality holding applies to prosecutions

under § 1001(a). The government points us to the

law-of-the-circuit doctrine because, in two § 1001(a) cases

post-dating Maslenjak (United States v. Rivera-Ortiz,

(1st Cir. 2021), and United States v. Chen,

(1st Cir.

2021)), we adhered to our prior approach to assessing materiality

under § 1001(a) without adopting Maslenjak's more stringent

materiality standard. Santonastaso responds that Rivera-Ortiz and

Chen do not trigger the law-of-the-circuit doctrine at all.

Indeed, the question of whether Maslenjak's materiality holding

- 14 - applies to § 1001(a) was not squarely before the court in either

case nor did we address the issue sua sponte.

But because the law-of-the-circuit doctrine "is rooted

in the need for consistency[,] . . . its force does not depend on

a prior panel's use of talismanic phrases." United States v.

Lewis,

(1st Cir. 2008). In other words, "[s]o

long as a prior panel, in a holding directly or closely on point,

makes clear its choice of a rule of law, that choice is binding on

newly constituted panels within the circuit, subject only to the

isthmian exceptions noted in our earlier decisions."

Here, Santonastaso correctly points out that no

post-Maslenjak cases in this Circuit have directly confronted

Maslenjak's applicability to § 1001(a) prosecutions. Nonetheless,

the panel decisions in Rivera-Ortiz and Chen implicitly made this

court's "choice of a rule of law" clear. By continuing to rely on

the pre-Maslenjak materiality standard in § 1001(a) cases without

any consideration of Maslenjak as new binding authority, we are

bound by our prior panels' interpretations of the § 1001(a)

materiality element.1 See Rivera-Ortiz, 14 F.4th at 100; Chen,

998 F.3d at 10.

1 Aside from stating the obvious that § 1425 is a different statute than § 1001, we note that the two vary significantly in terms of text and structure. In addition, none of our sister circuits have addressed Maslenjak's applicability to the § 1001(a) materiality element. Accordingly, we cannot fault our prior panels

- 15 - Santonastaso makes no attempt to argue that either of

the two exceptions to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine apply, see

United States v. Barbosa,

(1st Cir. 2018)

(describing exceptions), so we will not address them. We are

therefore bound by the law-of-the-circuit doctrine, and we rely on

the materiality standard for § 1001(a) as articulated in our

pre- and post-Maslenjak cases to assess Santonastaso's sufficiency

challenge on Count 2.

2. Whether the Government Presented Sufficient Evidence of Materiality

Under this court's materiality standard for § 1001(a)

prosecutions, a false statement is material where it is "of a type

which would have a 'natural tendency' to influence an investigation

in the 'abstract.'" Chen, 998 F.3d at 10 (quoting United States

v. Phillipos,

(1st Cir. 2017)). Importantly,

"the statement need not actually have influenced the governmental

function." United States v. Mehanna,

(1st Cir.

2013). Instead, "[i]t is enough that the 'statement could have

provoked governmental action.'"

(emphasis added) (quoting

United States v. Sebaggala,

(1st Cir. 2001)).

Accordingly, a statement "is material regardless of whether the

agency actually relied upon it," Sebaggala,

, and

for not identifying and relying upon Maslenjak as on-point binding precedent in this context.

- 16 - "the knowledge of the interrogator is irrelevant to the materiality

of the defendant's false statements," Mehanna,

.

Similarly, "where a defendant's statements are intended to

misdirect government investigators, they may satisfy the

materiality requirement of section 1001 even if they stand no

chance of accomplishing their objective."

.

Santonastaso argues that his statements denying

culpability for the helicopter theft in 2000 were immaterial for

two main reasons. First, he maintains that the FAA's 2018

investigation was solely intended to discern whether he had proper

qualifications to fly the helicopter and whether the helicopter

was airworthy, such that the helicopter theft in 2000 had nothing

to do with either investigatory purpose. Second, he relies on the

fact that in revoking his airman certificate in 2000, the FAA did

not identify helicopter theft as a reason for the revocation. So,

in Santonastaso's view, even to the extent that the 2018

investigation tangentially encompassed his airman certificate

revocation in 2000, any statements he made about the helicopter

theft could not possibly have been material.

The government responds that Santonastaso's statements

were material to the FAA's 2018 investigation because "one of the

purposes of the inspectors' visit with Santonastaso was to

determine if the information in the FAA database might be

erroneous." Furthermore, the government emphasizes that "FAA

- 17 - safety inspectors do not have access to lists of persons who work

for the CIA or other agencies in an undercover capacity," meaning

Seltsam-Wilps had no way to corroborate Santonastaso's story

without deeper investigation.

Although Santonastaso raises valid points about the

facial irrelevance of his involvement in the helicopter theft with

respect to the 2018 investigation, he falls short of the high bar

to show that no reasonable jury could have convicted him under

§ 1001(a). A reasonable jury could have found that Santonastaso's

false statement was material -- even if it was largely unrelated

to the investigation at hand and his story was genuinely

incredible -- by concluding that he intended to misdirect

investigators. See Mehanna,

.

And in Rivera-Ortiz, this court held that a plausible

explanation for how a federal investigation "would be impacted by

the false statements" was "sufficient" to show materiality. 14

F.4th at 100. Here, the government presented testimony from

Seltsam-Wilps that his investigation involved confirming the

accuracy of the FAA's database on revocations and he could not

have readily verified Santonastaso's alleged undercover work. In

the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could

find that, by falsely denying involvement in the 2000 helicopter

theft, Santonastaso could have provoked the FAA to further

investigate his purported undercover work or the accuracy of its

- 18 - database. While the government's evidence for materiality was not

particularly plentiful, it was sufficient for a reasonable jury to

have found Santonastaso's statements to be material. We thus

affirm the jury's guilty verdict on Count 2.

B. Instructional Error on the Materiality Standard

Having found the evidence sufficient to sustain

Santonastaso's conviction on Count 2, we turn to his instructional

error claim. In line with his arguments for applying Maslenjak's

materiality holding to § 1001(a) prosecutions, Santonastaso

requested a jury instruction that incorporated Maslenjak's

formulation of the materiality standard. Santonastaso's proposed

instruction provided, in relevant part: "A statement is not

material if it could have influenced the decisionmaker. The

government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

statement would have influenced the decisionmaker."

The court rejected Santonastaso's proposed instruction.

At the close of evidence, the court gave the following instruction

modeled after First Circuit Pattern Instruction 4.18.1001: "A

statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or

be capable of influencing the decision of the decisionmaker to

which it was addressed, regardless of whether the agency actually

relied upon it. A statement is also material if it provokes

government action."

- 19 - The district court did not err in declining to give

Santonastaso's proposed instruction because, as explained, this

Circuit has not adopted Maslenjak's materiality holding for

§ 1001(a) prosecutions. And as given, the court's instruction

correctly stated the controlling law on materiality. In fact,

aside from urging us to determinatively hold that Maslenjak applies

to § 1001(a) prosecutions, Santonastaso does not point to any other

substantive legal error or prejudice caused by the district court's

chosen instruction. Therefore, his instructional error claim

fails.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count 4 (Attempted Witness Tampering Involving Plouffe)

The government charged Santonastaso with attempted

witness tampering based on his call to Plouffe instructing him not

to speak with a woman who was investigating him, all while DOT-OIG

special agents were incidentally present to interview Plouffe

regarding Santonastaso. A person who "knowingly uses

intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or

attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another

person, with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the

communication to a law enforcement officer . . . of information

relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal

offense," is guilty of witness tampering under

(b)(3).

- 20 - Santonastaso argues that the government failed to prove

the specific intent element of witness tampering because

Santonastaso "acted with state-law matters in mind and without any

intent in connection with any potential federal offense." In

particular, Santonastaso describes that approximately two weeks

after DOT-OIG agents met with him in April 2019, he received notice

of the permanent injunction barring him from flying that was issued

by the Worcester County Superior Court. And just four days after

the permanent injunction was issued, Santonastaso called Plouffe

while DOT-OIG agents were present. Contending that he had

"state-law matters in mind," Santonastaso characterizes his

conversation with Plouffe as centering around the recent state

court proceedings with no mention of the federal investigation.

Additionally, he points out that DOT-OIG Special Agent Schwader's

notes reflect that Santonastaso told Plouffe that "a woman from

the '[MA] DOT'" was investigating him, while DOT-OIG Special Agent

Roberts explicitly introduced herself as a federal agent and gave

Santonastaso a business card identifying her as a federal agent.

In United States v. Baldyga,

(1st Cir.

2000), we "dispel[led] any notion that the defendant's intent to

hinder communication must include an awareness of the possible

involvement of federal officials."

. There, we

explained that "Section 1512 explicitly does not require proof of

the defendant's state of mind with respect to whether the officials

- 21 - involved were federal officers."

As such, "the evidence may

be sufficient to support a conviction under § 1512(b)(3) even if

the defendant had no knowledge that the witness threatened had

even contemplated communicating with a federal official." Id. at

680–81.

Presumably to evade the clear rule we set in Baldyga,

Santonastaso appears to argue that he lacked specific intent to

interfere with an investigation into a "potential federal

offense," rather than knowledge that federal agents were involved

in the investigation. But in Baldyga, we emphasized that "[a]ll

that § 1512(b)(3) requires is that the government establish that

the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that

happened to be federal."

(quoting United States

v. Applewhaite,

(3d Cir. 1999)); see also

Applewhaite,

(summarizing that in a § 1512(b)(3)

prosecution, "[t]he government did not have to establish that the

defendants specifically intended to interfere with a federal

investigation"). Likewise, we held in United States v. Byrne,

(1st Cir. 2006), that "a defendant may be held strictly

liable under [§ 1512(b)(3)] for the happenstance that a federal

law enforcement agent rather than, say, a local police officer or

internal affairs specialist investigated his conduct." Id. at 25.

Consequently, for specific intent purposes under § 1512(b)(3),

there is no meaningful distinction between intent related to the

- 22 - federal status of the investigating agents and the federal nature

of the crime being investigated.

Under the standards we have adopted in Baldyga and Byrne,

we must uphold the jury's guilty verdict on this record. In

addition, we note that the government presented detailed evidence

related to Santonastaso's knowledge of the involvement of federal

officials in a federal investigation. For example, as the

government highlights, Santonastaso did not limit his discussion

with Plouffe to complaining about the state court proceedings.

Instead, Santonastaso told Plouffe that a woman investigating his

helicopter flying was asking questions about him at airports. And

in fact, after interviewing Santonastaso and informing him of her

status as a federal agent, Roberts visited Toutant, Santonastaso's

friend, at an airport just before meeting Plouffe at the

Southbridge Airport. Moreover, Santonastaso instructed Plouffe to

avoid revealing any information if asked by the female

investigator.

Although Santonastaso did not refer to Roberts by name

and Schwader's notes implied that Santonastaso said that the woman

worked for the Massachusetts DOT, a rational jury could have

inferred that Santonastaso had Roberts in mind. And, again,

because Santonastaso had recently been interviewed by Roberts, who

was indeed investigating a federal crime and clearly explained to

Santonastaso that she was a federal agent, the jury could sensibly

- 23 - deduce that he was specifically thinking of the federal

investigation when he called Plouffe. Therefore, the jury

reasonably concluded that Santonastaso knowingly attempted to

influence Plouffe during a federal investigation conducted by

federal law enforcement agents, and we affirm its guilty verdict

on Count 4.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the evidence

was sufficient for the jury to find Santonastaso guilty of making

a false statement to federal investigators and attempted witness

tampering, and the district court did not commit instructional

error in rejecting Santonastaso's proposed materiality

instruction. We therefore affirm the underlying convictions for

those charges against Santonastaso.

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