United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 21-1749

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                  MAXIMILIANO FÍGARO-BENJAMÍN,

                      Defendant, Appellant.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                  Kayatta, Lipez, and Thompson,
                         Circuit Judges.


    Edgar L. Sánchez-Mercado for appellant.

     Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E.
Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, were on brief, for appellee.


                         April 30, 2024
          THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.       Before this court is another

installment in the multi-defendant drug conspiracy case involving

the Black Wolfpack, a vessel that transported cocaine smugglers

and their product between Puerto Rico and St. Thomas until federal

agents intercepted the boat and its trafficking crew off the coast

of St. Thomas in January 2018.    Since then, the indictees (charged

with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled

substances in violation of 

 and 846 and conspiracy

to import controlled substances into the U.S. in violation of 

, 960, and 963) have brought assorted challenges to

sundry aspects of the criminal proceedings that followed.

          Today, the Black Wolfpack sails again, this time in an

appeal brought by Maximiliano Fígaro-Benjamín (Fígaro-Benjamín),

a coconspirator and one-time captain of the boat, who raises a

series of challenges to the 292-month sentence the district court

imposed in the wake of Fígaro-Benjamín's straight guilty plea.

Fígaro-Benjamín filed this timely appeal, in which he takes issue

with what evidence the court relied upon at sentencing and with

how it calculated and explained the sentence it meted out.         In

fielding the appeal, we write primarily for the parties, who well

know the facts, travel, and issues presented to us.      Accordingly,

we endeavor to be efficient with the background information we do




                                 - 2 -
include here,1 directing readers to our earlier cases chronicling

the conspiracy narrative in considerable detail so we can move

directly to our analysis of the various appellate issues Fígaro-

Benjamín presents.2

          As our examination will reveal, we must affirm.

                                I.

          Having studied Fígaro-Benjamín's papers carefully, we

think his arguments can be best distilled as follows:       (a) the

sentencing court committed error when it considered testimony

elicited at the trial of Fígaro-Benjamín's coconspirators; (b) the

court improperly calculated his guidelines sentencing range (GSR)



     1 Since Fígaro-Benjamín appeals from a guilty plea, the facts
we mention are drawn from "his plea agreement, the undisputed
sections of the presentence investigation report ('PSR'), and the
transcripts of his change-of-plea and sentencing hearings."
United States v. González, 

 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing
United States v. Rivera-González, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)).
     2 Our earlier opinions about the conspiracy and its various
participants -- like Bernardo Coplin-Benjamín (Coplin), Katerin
Martínez-Alberto (Martínez), and Alexandria Andino-Rodríguez
(Andino) -- paint a comprehensive picture of the trafficking
enterprise.   See United States v. Coplin-Benjamín, 

(1st Cir. 2023) (affirming Coplin's sentence after dispatching his
sentencing arguments challenging an enhancement for being an
organizer or leader of the conspiracy, the consideration of his
cooperation, and    the substantive     unreasonableness  of his
sentence); United States v. Andino-Rodríguez, 

 (1st Cir.
2023) (affirming as to codefendants Martínez and Andino -- who
exercised their trial rights and were convicted for their roles in
the conspiracy after an eight-day trial -- by rejecting the trial-
error challenges raised by Martínez and rejecting the sentencing
challenge advanced by Andino), cert. denied sub nom. Martínez-
Alberto v. United States, 

 (2023) (mem.).


                              - 3 -
because the court relied on an unsupported-by-the-record drug

quantity and, in addition, erroneously found Fígaro-Benjamín was

a supervisor in the trafficking operation; and (c) the court

committed procedural error when it inadequately explained its

pronounced sentence.     We take these in turn.

           (a)   Reliance on Trial Testimony at Sentencing

           Fígaro-Benjamín submits the sentencing court erred and

infringed on his Sixth Amendment rights when, without notice, it

considered what he says is unreliable testimony offered by José

Javier Resto Miranda (Resto),3 not at Fígaro-Benjamín's sentencing

hearing, but     at   the trial of   his   codefendants,   Martínez and

Andino.4




     3 A fellow Black Wolfpack coconspirator, Resto was recruited
by Coplin to participate in the venture. Because of the degree of
his involvement (a purchaser of the vessel, planner of trips,
recruiter of various participants (including Fígaro-Benjamín),
crew member, and general drug runner, to name a few ways he
participated), he was eminently familiar with the inner workings
of the conspiracy, the roles played by his cohorts, and the amount
of product they transported.        When Resto testified at his
codefendants' trial, he did so pursuant to a cooperation agreement.
See Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 15 n.8.
     4 To be clear, the next section of analysis will tackle Fígaro-

Benjamín's complaints that the sentencing court erred in relying
on Resto's testimony to find, for purposes of sentencing, that
Fígaro-Benjamín was responsible for possessing and importing a
grand total of at least 267 kilos of cocaine over the course of
the conspiracy. This section solely takes aim at Fígaro-Benjamín's
argument that the district court should not have considered Resto's
testimony at all.


                                 - 4 -
           For its part, the government disagrees and says the

district   court      offended   no    constitutional       right    afforded    to

Fígaro-Benjamín when it considered Resto's testimony.

           And this is our take, offered (favorably to Fígaro-

Benjamín) under the most appellant-friendly lens of review this

type of claim could garner.         See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval,

, 86 (1st Cir. 2021) (assuming a confrontation-based

argument was preserved "because, even on the understanding that

our review is de novo, [that] challenge still fails").

           It    is     axiomatic     that,    as   here,   when    fashioning    a

sentence, a court must take into account the 

(a)

factors (like the nature and circumstances of the offense, the

defendant's history and characteristics, the need for the sentence

to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for

the law, to provide deterrence, to protect the public, to provide

the defendant with needed training and care, and so on).                  When a

sentencing court does this, in general there is "[n]o limitation

. . .   placed     on    the   information      concerning    the    background,

character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which

a court of the United States may receive and consider."                

.

           Just as axiomatic is the principle that defendants do

not ordinarily enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to confrontation at

sentencing.      United States v. Rondón-García, 

 (1st


                                       - 5 -
Cir. 2018) (providing that, at "a sentencing hearing, neither the

Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Sixth Amendment's confrontation

clause applies"); see also United States v. Berrios-Miranda, 

 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Bramley, 

 (1st Cir. 2017).    As a result, "sentencing judges may consider

any evidence with 'sufficient indicia of reliability to support

its probable accuracy.'"    Berrios-Miranda, 

 (quoting

United States v. Cintrón–Echautegui, 

 (1st Cir.

2010)).   "Under this approach, the court has considerable leeway

to rely upon 'virtually any dependable information.'" 

 (quoting

United States v. Doe, 

 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also

Cintrón–Echautegui,   

   ("These   tenets   are   fully

applicable to drug quantity determinations.").

          But the court's discretion to do so "is not boundless

and must comply with due process considerations and the parameters

of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32."5              Rondón-García, 

 (citing Bramley, 

); see also Betterman v.

Montana, 

, 448 (2016) ("After conviction, a defendant's

due process right . . . is still present.          He retains an interest

in a sentencing proceeding that is fundamentally fair.").                 And




     5 Rule 32 provides, in relevant part, that the court must
provide defendants "any information excluded from the presentence
report . . . on which the court will rely in sentencing, and give
them a reasonable opportunity to comment on that information."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(B).


                                   - 6 -
"[d]ue   process   requires   that   the    defendant    be   sentenced   on

information that is not false or materially inaccurate."           Rondón-

García, 

 (citing United States v. Curran, 

 (1st Cir. 1991)).      In addition, "[t]he defendant must be

given adequate notice of those facts [the court will consider]

prior to sentencing and the court must 'timely advise the defendant

. . . that it heard or read, and was taking into account [those

facts].'"    

 (quoting United States v. Acevedo-López, 

 (1st Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up).            "'[A] defendant must be

provided with a meaningful opportunity to comment on the factual

information on which his or her sentence is based,' unless that

information 'fall[s] within the garden variety considerations

which should not generally come as a surprise to trial lawyers who

have prepared for sentencing.'"        

 (alterations in original)

(first quoting United States v. Berzon, 

 (1st Cir.

1991), then quoting United States v. Pantojas-Cruz, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)).

            Here, the district court, in fashioning a sentence,

considered    evidence   from    the       trial    of   Fígaro-Benjamín's

codefendants, accepting as reliable Resto's testimony regarding

the amount of cocaine being ferried between Caribbean islands and

Fígaro-Benjamín's role in that scheme.        Our inquiry is whether, in

doing so, the court ran afoul of any of the just-recounted legal




                                 - 7 -
foundational principles as Fígaro-Benjamín suggests it did.                     We

conclude it did not, and here's why.

          The    first    of    our    conclusions    here   rests     upon   our

application of straightforward, well-settled case law:               As earlier

noted and as the government correctly points out, defendants do

not enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to confrontation at sentencing,

meaning the fact that Resto did not personally testify at Fígaro-

Benjamín's     sentencing      hearing,    in   and   of     itself,    is     not

determinative.       See, e.g., 

       Fígaro-Benjamín's opening brief

cites no law to suggest otherwise, and indeed he acknowledges this

controlling precedent in his reply papers.

          We    do    agree    with    Fígaro-Benjamín's     contention       that

information provided by Resto and considered by the court needed

to have the necessary indicia of reliability and trustworthiness,

but after our review of the record, we reject his assertion that

the information here was wanting. For one thing, Fígaro-Benjamín's

sentencer had presided over the codefendants' trial, and because

of that, he was well-acquainted with the Black Wolfpack, its crew,

its methods, and the crimes committed.           Additionally, the judge's

front row seat at trial allowed him to witness and assess Resto's

credibility and testimony.            See Berrios-Miranda, 

("Plus,   the     resentencing         judge    presided     over      Berrios's

codefendant's trial, so she was already familiar with the issues

and had been there to observe the victim's testimony and assess


                                       - 8 -
credibility firsthand.").     And, critically, Resto's testimony was

offered under oath, corroborated by other evidence,6 see, e.g.,

 (reasoning that the court's reliance on trial testimony was

within its discretion when the testimony was given under oath and

corroborated   by   other   evidence),   and   put    through   the   cross-

examination gauntlet by defense attorneys at trial, cf. 

 at 80-

81 (reasoning that "even . . . 'statements which have not been

subjected to the crucible of cross-examination'" can be relied

upon in the court's considerable discretion (quoting Acevedo-

López, 

)).

          Our final resolution of this aspect of Fígaro-Benjamín's

sentencing challenge centers on whether we conclude he received

adequate notice that Resto's prior testimony would be used at his

sentencing hearing.     He says he did not.          Yet in his briefing,

Fígaro-Benjamín fails to elucidate why he believes that to be so.



     6 The sentencing judge, as mentioned, presided over the trial
at which the government presented Resto as a cooperating,
coconspirator witness, and at which Resto's testimony was
corroborated by other evidence, thus underscoring its reliability
for our purposes today. As one example, consider Resto's prior
testimony about how he and the crew cleaned the drug kilos, vacuum
sealed them, greased them, and then sealed them up again -- some
of these bundles had stickers or logos affixed to them, he said.
He explained that he and Fígaro-Benjamín, our appellant, hid the
kilos under a table near some water pumps.      That testimony was
corroborated by the government's witnesses describing where the
bundles had been stashed on the Black Wolfpack (under a table,
near a bathroom) and by trial exhibits showing the seized kilos,
which were packaged in a manner consistent with Resto's description
(including stickers and logos).


                                 - 9 -
And after our perusal of the record, we find he got what notice

due process demands, as we explain.

             In September 2019, two years before his sentence was

imposed, Fígaro-Benjamín himself requested (and got a same-day

order granting him) access to his codefendants' trial transcripts

(to remind, Martínez and Andino were the only coconspirators who

chose to proceed to a trial).            In that request, he described the

testimony    generated     in   that    proceeding      as    "implicat[ing]    Mr.

Fígaro-Benjamín" and as "pertinent and especially relevant to his

sentencing."    That description makes sense -- when it comes to a

trafficking conspiracy, it is hardly a hot take that testimony

elicited at the trial of a coconspirator would be relevant at the

sentencing proceeding of another conspiracy member.                   Because he

had access to that transcript, Fígaro-Benjamín would have been

pellucidly aware of Resto's accusations well in advance.                          A

sentencing    court   is   permitted      to    "rely    on    testimony   from   a

codefendant's trial where" -- as here -- "the information elicited

at   trial   concerning     drug   quantity      and    the    duration    of   the

conspiracy was 'hardly new to [the defendant] and his counsel'"

and it could not have "taken [him] by surprise at his sentencing."

United States v. Kenney, 

 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting

United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 

 (1st Cir.

2007)).   Additionally, Fígaro-Benjamín received probation's timely

filed PSR, which specifically cited to portions of Resto's trial


                                       - 10 -
testimony.      Consequently, ahead of his sentencing, he knew that

probation had flagged Resto's testimony in support of its reasoning

and recommendations about the quantity of drugs for which Fígaro-

Benjamín could be held responsible.            See, e.g., Rivera-Rodríguez,

 (reasoning that information could not be considered

"new" or absent from the record when it had been set forth in,

among   other    documents,     the    PSR).        All    told,     Fígaro-Benjamín

incontrovertibly knew about Resto's prior testimony and the role

it    could   play   at   his   sentencing      in        advance,    and   just   as

importantly, he had meaningful opportunities to comment on that

testimony (in his sentencing memorandum, through objections to the

PSR, and in his arguments at the sentencing hearing). See Berrios-

Miranda, 

 ("And Berrios had advance access to the

PSR and transcripts of trial testimony (none of which were 'new'

or unknown to him by that point), as well as his 'meaningful

opportunity to comment on the factual information on which his

. . . sentence is based' at the resentencing hearing, and that's

all the due process required here." (quoting Bramley, 

)); Cintrón-Echautegui, 

 ("Here, the challenged

evidence came from witnesses who testified at the trial, and the

[PSR] gave ample notice to the appellant of both the existence and

the potential utility of this evidence. Under these circumstances,

the   district    court   did    not    err    in    using     this     evidence   at




                                      - 11 -
sentencing.").     Overall, we conclude all of due process' demands

were met here.

                  (b) Guidelines Range Calculation:
               Drug Quantity and Supervisor Enhancement

           Next up is Fígaro-Benjamín's contention that the court

procedurally    erred   when    it    incorrectly      calculated   his    GSR.

Specifically, he argues (1) there was insufficient evidence that

he was responsible for trafficking 267 kilos of cocaine, and (2)

the court erred when it found he played a supervisory role in the

trafficking scheme, prompting the court to tack on (erroneously)

a supervisor sentencing enhancement.            Accordingly, he says, the

resulting range of 292-365 months' imprisonment was imbued with

error.

           The government flatly takes issue with all of this,

urging no procedural error lies here with the court's calculations.

           We turn to these arguments mindful that, "when assessing

procedural reasonableness, this [c]ourt engages in a multifaceted

abuse-of-discretion standard whereby 'we afford de novo review to

the   sentencing   court's     interpretation    and    application   of    the

sentencing guidelines, [examine] the court's factfinding for clear

error, and evaluate its judgment calls for abuse of discretion.'"

United States v. Maldonado-Peña, 

, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2021)

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Arsenault, 

 (1st Cir. 2016)).             "[W]e will find an abuse of



                                     - 12 -
discretion only when left with a definite conviction that 'no

reasonable person could agree with the judge's decision.'"             

 at

56 (quoting United States v. McCullock, 

, 317 (1st

Cir. 2021)).

                                    (1)

           "Sentences in drug cases are largely driven by the amount

and type of drugs involved."       Cintrón-Echautegui, 

.

And   "[w]hen   sentencing   a    participant      in   a   drug-trafficking

conspiracy, the district court must make an individualized finding

concerning the quantity of drugs attributable to, or reasonably

foreseeable by, the offender."       

   Sentencing courts are tasked

with making these reasonable estimates of drug quantities based on

a preponderance of evidence, and, for our part, those fact-based

drug quantity determinations get clear error review.               See, e.g.,

Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 57; see also Cintrón-Echautegui, 

 (reminding that "[t]he evidentiary requirements that

obtain at sentencing are considerably less rigorous than those

that obtain in criminal trials").          And "[c]lear-error review is

demanding: this standard will be satisfied only if, upon whole-

record-review,   an   inquiring    court   forms    a   strong,    unyielding

belief that a mistake has been made."           United States v. Colón-

Cordero, 

, 57 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v.

Rivera-Nazario, 

, 658 (1st Cir. 2023)).               "As long as

the district court's decision is based on reasonable inferences


                                  - 13 -
drawn from adequately supported facts, we will not find clear

error."    

 (quoting Rivera-Nazario, 68 F.4th at 658).

            Getting   down   to   the   nitty-gritty,   this   is   how   the

district court, which adopted the PSR's recommendation, arrived at

its drug quantity finding that Fígaro-Benjamín participated in

trafficking at least 267 kilograms of cocaine.            First, the 132

kilos seized on the day of the arrest is not in dispute.            And then

there's the PSR's description of the trial evidence as to three

pre-arrest trips (per Resto's testimony about Fígaro-Benjamín's

personal involvement) that cover the 135-kilo balance needed to

reach 267:

     •    The first trip (June 2017), aboard another vessel, was
          undertaken in an attempt to traffic 10 kilos;
     •    The second trip (summer 2017), now on the Black Wolfpack,
          resulted in the successful importation of at least 65 kilos
          (Resto explained the original plan was to traffic 45-60
          kilos, but Fígaro-Benjamín snagged another 20 or 25);
     •    The third trip (fall 2017), also on the Black Wolfpack,
          led to 60 kilograms being imported into Puerto Rico.

Assuming the reliability of the information, the math checks out

(132 + 10 + 65 + 60 = 267).

            But to Fígaro-Benjamín's thinking, it does not.         Fígaro-

Benjamín's overall beef with the drug calculus continues the theme

that the sentencing court wrongly based its finding on Resto's

testimony, and that, in turn, led to the 267-kilos determination

and the ramping up of the base offense level, which tainted the




                                   - 14 -
GSR calculation, thus poisoning his resulting sentence.   But these

arguments do not persuade.

          Fígaro-Benjamín asserts that the "real evidence," as he

puts it, demonstrated he should be held responsible only for those

132 kilos actually seized on the day the Black Wolfpack was

interdicted and its crew arrested.     By focusing on "physical or

real evidence" -- all the government would have been able to prove

at trial, Fígaro-Benjamín says -- he seems to be suggesting the

sentencing court could not take Resto's drug quantity testimony

into account because, in his telling, there is no physical evidence

to support Resto's assertions about the quantity of drug product

the conspiracy moved (he seems to operate from a belief that

production of physical drug evidence would be the only way to

corroborate a coconspirator's testimonial evidence).   But he does

not point to -- nor are we aware of -- any case law that supports

this contention.7   Quite the opposite, our case law tells us that


     7 Fígaro-Benjamín points to United States v. Taveras, 

 (1st Cir. 2004), but it does not help him. There,
a panel of this court affirmed a sentencing court's drug quantity
determination when the court had -- cautiously and in its
discretion -- "credit[ed] some portions of a witness's testimony,
but not others," "limit[ing] its reliance upon [the] testimony" to
ascertain the necessary preponderance of quantity-related evidence
without reliance on what had been deemed "weaker or otherwise
uncorroborated testimony." 

 But just because a court in one
case had reason to discredit and limit its reliance on some portion
of testimony does not undercut what occurred here. Drug quantity
assessments are case- and fact-dependent.        Fígaro-Benjamín's
reliance on Taveras assumes the unreliability of Resto's
testimony, but unlike the situation in Taveras, the sentencing


                              - 15 -
testimony about the conspiratorial operations of the plotters is

evidence and drug quantity determinations at sentencing aren't

limited, as Fígaro-Benjamín contends, to the amount of drugs

physically seized.        See, e.g., Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 58

(finding    supportable     a     sentencing   court's   drug   quantity

determination when it was based on witness testimony).

            And here, for the reasons we've already delineated,

Resto's testimony about the quantity of drugs being smuggled was

reliable, and accordingly, the district court's acceptance of that

testimony was not clearly erroneous.           See Berrios-Miranda, 

 (explaining that "the court has considerable leeway to

rely upon 'virtually any dependable information'" (quoting Doe,

)); see also Cintrón–Echautegui, 

("These tenets" -- that a sentencer can rely on nearly anything,

including    testimony    (even    non-cross-examined    testimony)   and

information in the PSR -- "are fully applicable to drug quantity

determinations.").

            Before we move on, we pause to address a couple other

purported flaws Fígaro-Benjamín raises about the court's drug

calculus, none of which move the needle. Fígaro-Benjamín, pointing

to the trial of coconspirators Martínez and Andino, observes that




court here did not voice any concern about the reliability of
Resto's testimony.    And, as we've explained, it was indeed
supportably reliable for purposes of sentencing.


                                   - 16 -
the jury there found them responsible for only five or more kilos,

meaning (he says) the jury didn't believe Resto's drug quantity

testimony in concluding the conspiracy only "was for more than

five kilograms . . . , nothing more and nothing less."          But the

jury's drug quantity finding at the trial of his codefendants (even

if we take Fígaro-Benjamín's characterization of it at face value)

does not control sentencing-phase drug quantity determinations for

Fígaro-Benjamín, who opted not to go to trial.           Rather, as the

government rightly notes, following Fígaro-Benjamín's guilty plea,

the sentence within the statutorily-prescribed range of ten years'

to life imprisonment was properly established here not through a

jury finding, but through the district court's consideration of

sufficient,   reliable   evidence   to   support   its   drug   quantity

determination.8   See United States v. Soto-Villar, 

, 33

(1st Cir. 2022) (noting that, at sentencing, when "a drug quantity

finding is used to develop a defendant's guideline range, the

government has the burden of proving the drug quantity by a

preponderance of the evidence").




     8 As the PSR noted, according to the 2018 Guideline Manual
probation used to craft the recommended sentence, "[t]he guideline
for a violation of 

, 846, 952 and 960" -- the
charges to which Fígaro-Benjamín pled -- "is found in USSG §2D1.1,"
and "[b]ecause Mr. Fígaro is accountable for importing and/or
possessing with intent to distribute 267 kilograms of cocaine, the
base offense level is 36" pursuant to § 2D1.1(c)(2).


                               - 17 -
          Finally, we mention but won't dwell on Fígaro-Benjamín's

accusation that, during the change of plea hearing, the government

agreed to limit the drug quantity for Fígaro-Benjamín to the

actually-seized 132 kilograms.     We've looked at the record, and

this is not what it reflects.      True, the government stated 132

kilos were seized on the day Fígaro-Benjamín and his coconspirators

were arrested, but the government also accurately represented that

Fígaro-Benjamín participated in other trafficking trips in 2017,

importing additional kilos as part of those journeys.

          No more need be said other than, to reiterate, we find

no clear error in the 267-kilos finding.          So we soldier on to

Fígaro-Benjamín's remaining claim of procedural error as to the

GSR:   the sentencing enhancement.

                                 (2)

          Fígaro-Benjamín's    next    attack    on   the   GSR   is   his

assertion that the court erred when it determined Fígaro-Benjamín

was a supervisor within the conspiracy and, thus, subject to the

applicable   sentencing   enhancement.     See   U.S.S.G.    §    3B1.1(b)

(explaining that a defendant may receive a three-level increase in

their guideline calculation if they were "a manager or supervisor

. . . and the criminal activity involved five or more participants




                               - 18 -
or was otherwise extensive").9        Before we go further though, first

principles will help frame the coming discussion of this argument.

            "The government has the burden of proving the propriety

of an upward role-in-the-offense adjustment," and "[i]t must meet

this burden by a preponderance of the evidence."              United States v.

McKinney, 

, 107 (1st Cir. 2021).              "On appeal, we review

the district court's underlying factual findings for clear error

and legal questions (including the interpretation and application

of the sentencing guidelines) de novo."            

    Critically, "[w]here

the   raw   facts   are    susceptible     to    competing    inferences,      the

sentencing   court's      choice   between      those    inferences   cannot    be

clearly erroneous."       

 (quoting United States v. McCormick, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)).

            As far as the mechanics of applying this supervisor

enhancement go, "[t]he plain language of the Guidelines requires

that a two-step process be employed . . . : (1) scope -- that

criminal    activity   involved     five   or    more    participants   or     was

otherwise extensive, (2) status -- that the defendant was a manager

or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)."                  Id. at 108.



      9The guidelines set out that when a defendant gets an
adjustment for having played an aggravating role in the offense
pursuant to § 3B1.1, two additional levels should be added if the
offense conduct involved the importation of controlled substances.
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16).    That's what happened here, so in
challenging the application of the former, Fígaro-Benjamín also
challenges by extension the resulting application of the latter.


                                    - 19 -
Fígaro-Benjamín does not contest any aspect of the first step

application, rather his focus (and thus ours) is on step two.

               The guidelines don't provide a definition of what it

means to be a supervisor as challenged here, but we've explained

that "[e]vidence of the defendant's role . . . need only show that

he exercised authority or control over another participant on one

occasion" in the conspiracy, and that evidence "may be wholly

circumstantial."          Id. (quoting United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 

 (1st Cir. 2012)); see also 

 (observing

that     U.S.S.G.     §    3B1.1(c)'s      analogous     enhancement   based   on

"organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor" will apply when "the

defendant, in committing the offense, exercised control over,

organized, or was otherwise responsible for superintending the

activities of, at least one of those other persons" (quoting United

States v. Cruz, 

 (1st Cir. 1997))).

               Now some parameters for what it means to have authority

or control over another criminal actor.              "[F]or the enhancement to

apply,    it    is   not   enough   to    show    that   'the   defendant   merely

controlled, organized, or managed criminal activities; rather, he

must instead control, organize, or manage criminal actors.'"                   

at 109 (quoting Cortés-Cabán, 

).                    "[A] defendant

need not possess a formal, coercive and hierarchal relationship

with a subordinate in order to qualify for the enhancement" --

rather, "[t]he key inquiry is whether the defendant 'exercised


                                         - 20 -
control over, managed, organized, or superintended the activities'

of 'another criminal actor.'"              

 (quoting United States v.

Ilarraza,   

,    13   (1st   Cir.    2020)).    Indeed,   "[t]he

authority possessed by the defendant may be fairly minimal; 'a

defendant need not be at the top of a criminal scheme to be a

manager or supervisor.'"        United States v. García-Sierra, 

, 37 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 

 (1st Cir. 1997)).                We've explained "[t]his is a

relatively low bar, and the fact that control may be exhibited on

a single occasion reinforces the notion that a formal chain of

command is not necessary for the enhancement to apply."            McKinney,

5 F.4th at 109.

            In our clear-error review of the "district court's fact-

bound determination of a defendant's role in the offense," id. at

108,   we   are   acutely     aware   that     "[t]he   determination   of   an

individual's role in committing an offense is necessarily fact-

specific," meaning our "review must be conducted with considerable

deference," id. (quoting United States v. Soto-Peguero, 

 (1st Cir. 2020)).

            Back to Fígaro-Benjamín, who argues he was no more than

a mere employee within the Black Wolfpack criminal enterprise.               He

says there is no evidence he issued orders, made decisions, or had

any control over what his coconspirators did. And indeed he wasn't

even trusted to handle cash flow in any way because (as he


                                      - 21 -
stresses) he wasn't the manager; Coplin and Resto were the leaders

and Fígaro-Benjamín was only ever following orders.10        A conclusion

to the contrary, Fígaro-Benjamín says, ignores other relevant

evidence from the codefendants' trial.

          The government pushes back, submitting that the evidence

fully supports the court's findings.       Much like it did below, the

government leans on a variety of examples of            Fígaro-Benjamín

demonstrating the control necessary to satisfy the low bar our

precedent sets for the supervisor enhancement.

          For our part, we agree with the government, and we home

in on two examples to show why.

          Traveling   back   to   the   Black   Wolfpack's   summer   2017

journey to St. Thomas, the record reflects that, upon arrival,

Fígaro-Benjamín left the Black Wolfpack and the marina where it

was docked to meet with the cocaine supplier while Resto and Andino

stayed behind.   Fígaro-Benjamín then sent a taxi to the marina to

retrieve Resto and Andino to bring them to the apartment where

Fígaro-Benjamín was holed up so that Resto and Andino could help

him get the kilos ready for transport. Once there (because Fígaro-

Benjamín had sent for them), the three coconspirators did just

that, vacuum sealing the bundles of coke.         The idea that Fígaro-



     10 Because we've already explained why Resto's testimony is
reliable and was properly considered at sentencing, we set aside
the aspects of Fígaro-Benjamín's argument that contend otherwise.


                                  - 22 -
Benjamín   was   summoning   his    coconspirators,   i.e.,   exercising

control over another actor in the operation, is thus reasonably

supported here.

           On top of this, Fígaro-Benjamín text messaged with both

Martínez and Andino in a way that supported a supervisory-role

finding.   As the PSR explains11 and as the government argued at

sentencing (showing the sentencing court exhibits from trial in

support), when the crew was getting ready for its January 2018

voyage -- one that would be undertaken without Resto and for which

Fígaro-Benjamín served as captain -- Fígaro-Benjamín texted Andino

that he'd decided the departure date and instructed her about the

necessary preparations that she and others needed to undertake so

they could sail on that date.        And texts from Fígaro-Benjamín to



     11 In support of its recommendation that the supervisor
enhancement be added to the GSR calculations, the PSR stated:
     Trial testimony revealed Mr. Fígaro would be the one to
     meet with the contact person in Saint Thomas . . . for
     collection of the kilograms of cocaine and supervised
     and participated, along with others, in the preparation
     and   packaging   of   the    cocaine   for   transport.
     Additionally, as provided by the Government in evidence,
     text messages between Mr. Fígaro and Martinez shows Mr.
     Fígaro's control and authority over her when he
     disciplines the co-defendant for not answering the
     phone.   The text message between Mr. Fígaro and co-
     defendant Coplin shows his participation and planning or
     organizing the offense in their coordination discussions
     about obtaining the cocaine; as well as . . . text
     messages with co-defendant Andino where Mr. Fígaro is
     organizing his smuggling group. All factors considered
     for role enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2,
     Application 4.


                                   - 23 -
Martínez showed Fígaro-Benjamín scolding Martínez when she didn't

answer his messages quickly enough.12

           The government points to other examples, but as our case

law says, the government's burden is to put forth a preponderance

of evidence as to just one occasion of control over another

criminal   actor.        Even   looking       only   at    the    above-recounted

instances, we conclude the government has done so -- the evidence

before the sentencing court (and as recommended by probation in

the PSR it prepared for Fígaro-Benjamín's sentencing) reasonably

supports the conclusion that Fígaro-Benjamín's role involved at

least a minimal degree of control over others, on at least one

occasion, such that the sentencing court did not err in its

factfinding      on   this   point   or,     it   follows,   in    deploying   the

supervisory enhancement as a result of that finding.                  See, e.g.,

McKinney, 5 F.4th at 109-10; García-Sierra, 994 F.3d at 37-39;

Cortés-Cabán, 

; see also United States v. Hilario-

Hilario,   

,    77–78    (1st     Cir.    2008)   (affirming   the

application of the supervisor enhancement when the defendant was

a captain of the boat "who gave instructions to other participants"

and   "discuss[ed]       logistics      of    the    operation     with   another


      12Not only did Fígaro-Benjamín reprimand Martínez for not
answering her phone, but also he stated she "ha[s] to answer the
phone quickly every time [he] call[s]," just in case "some side
job appears for [her]." In fact, he wrote that two weeks prior,
he'd assigned a job to Andino after Martínez didn't answer her
phone promptly.


                                     - 24 -
participant").       On balance, in view of our precedent and our

demanding lens of review, we spy no clear error in the court's

application of the three-level supervisor enhancement.

             Still   trying   to   fend   off   this   conclusion,   Fígaro-

Benjamín points to United States v. Flores-de-Jesús, 

 (1st Cir. 2009), to support his insistence that "the record is

devoid of any evidence to show that [Fígaro-Benjamín] exercised

control over any individual . . . [or] oversaw their activities."

 (quoting United States v. Ofray–Campos, 

 (1st

Cir. 2008)) (second alteration in original).           Our discussion up to

this point already explains why this is not so.               And we think

Fígaro-Benjamín's reliance on Flores-de-Jesús is misplaced because

the outcome there is so readily distinguishable.             In that case,

the problem was that the record showed a criminal defendant who

"was deeply involved in the operation," but showed absolutely

nothing -- no findings by the court, no findings delineated in or

link asserted by the PSR, no testimonial evidence that could serve

as "a proper basis for the enhancement" -- that supported the

supervisor finding and enhancement that was ultimately applied.

.    Here, as we've said, between Resto's testimony and the

detailed PSR, there was sufficient record support for the court's

finding.

             In urging us to see things his way -- that Resto and

Coplin were the leaders, not him, and he was merely an orders-


                                   - 25 -
obeying employee of the operation -- Fígaro-Benjamín essentially

is beseeching us to "take a different view of the same facts that

were before the district court to reach [his] preferred outcome,"

but this plaint will not carry the day.      United States v. Andino-

Rodríguez, 

, 34 (1st Cir. 2023) (providing and relying

on examples of our rejecting arguments by defendants that are made

on the same facts that were considered by the district court).

Our inquiry is not whether his view of the record would support

his preferred outcome, or even whether we would reach a different

outcome ourselves.    Rather, our inquiry is whether the sentencing

court's conclusion is supported by the record.         "Where the raw

facts are susceptible to competing inferences, the sentencing

court's    choice   between   those   inferences   cannot   be   clearly

erroneous."   McKinney, 5 F.4th at 107 (quoting McCormick, 

).   That is the case here, and so we see no error.13


     13 In a slight offshoot of this argument, Fígaro-Benjamín
suggests that because Resto and Coplin were the actual leaders,
that means Fígaro-Benjamín, an employee simply following orders,
couldn't have been a supervisor. This is not so because (emphasis
ours) "[t]he authority possessed by the defendant may be fairly
minimal; 'a defendant need not be at the top of a criminal scheme
to be a manager or supervisor.'" García-Sierra, 994 F.3d at 37
(quoting Goldberg, 

).
     As we've explained, "all parties engaged in a criminal
enterprise can be 'located on a continuum.'" Andino-Rodríguez, 79
F.4th at 34 (quoting United States v. Arias-Mercedes, 

 (1st Cir. 2018)). "Those who are primarily responsible stand on
one end," and "the least culpable participants . . . stand at the
opposite end." 

 Contrary to Fígaro-Benjamín's suggestion, it
is supportable and not clearly erroneous that, on this graph,
Fígaro-Benjamín stands somewhere in the middle. As a supervisor,


                                 - 26 -
              Like the drug quantity attack on the GSR that came before

this one, we see no clear error in the factfinding that supported

the   application      of   the   supervisory       enhancement      and    thus    no

procedural reasonableness error.                We therefore will not disturb

the sentencing court's GSR calculation on this basis either.

                 (c) Adequacy of Sentencing Explanation

              Having confirmed the GSR was validly calculated, we

confront      Fígaro-Benjamín's         final    appellate       argument:         The

sentencing     court   failed      to   adequately       explain    its    sentence.

Debuting this argument on appeal, and without any acknowledgment

of the daunting plain-error standard his argument thus faces or

any citation to supporting authority, he suggests in his opening

brief that the court's sentencing explanation was faulty in that

it "[m]erely mention[ed] that it 'considered' the PSR and the

sentencing factors," and only ticked the "drug quantity and roles"

box on the Statement of Reasons form, rendering the sentence

procedurally unreasonable.          He also supposes the explanation was

inadequate with respect to the 267-kilos finding -- "the sentencing

Court   did    not   explain      why   or   how    it   found     Fígaro-Benjamín

responsible for 267 kilograms of cocaine."



he   lies   somewhere   between  Andino,   a   lesser-participant
codefendant, who was denied a mitigating role adjustment, see
Andino-Rodríguez, 79 F.4th at 34-36, and Coplin, a leader-
participant, who got a four-level enhancement for his aggravating
role in the enterprise, Coplin-Benjamín, 79 F.4th at 42.


                                        - 27 -
          As   the   government   rightly   notes,   bound    up   in   this

argument are problems of various waiver varieties.             See United

States v. Pabon, 

 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating our

cautionary that when arguments were not raised below, they will be

reviewed for plain error -- but when an appellant does not address

that daunting test, we will deem those arguments waived); Rodríguez

v. Mun. of San Juan, 

 (1st Cir. 2011) (deeming

arguments waived when a party "provide[d] neither the necessary

caselaw nor reasoned analysis" to make the requisite showings);

United States v. Zannino, 

 (1st Cir. 1990) (capturing

our oft-stated warning that "issues adverted to in a perfunctory

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,

are deemed waived").      Each of the problems summed up in our

parentheticals are on display in this argument.

          But in response to the government's points about these

procedural shortcomings, Fígaro-Benjamín's reply brief tries to

course-correct and attempts the plain-error work, so, generously

to him, we will proceed to our plain-error review.14         This approach


     14 In discussing the plain-error standard, the reply also
resists its applicability, urging us to deploy the abuse-of-
discretion lens we'd use to scrutinize preserved challenges
because counsel made certain arguments in Fígaro-Benjamín's
sentencing memo and at the hearing.      But our case law plainly
instructs that, "[w]hen a defendant fails to contemporaneously
object to the procedural reasonableness of a court's sentencing
determination, we review for plain error." United States v. Sayer,

 (1st Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Pupo,

, 29 n.5 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining that "a claim of


                                  - 28 -
is particularly appropriate where, as here, "a defendant's claim

would fail even if reviewed for plain error."               United States v.

Facteau, 

, 44 n.29 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States

v. Grullon, 

, 32 (1st Cir. 2021)) (cleaned up).

                To satisfy our demanding plain-error standard, Fígaro-

Benjamín must demonstrate "(1) that an error occurred (2) which

was clear and obvious and which not only (3) affected his . . .

substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" -- and

that is one "steep climb."             United States v. Morales-Cortijo, 

,    33-34   (1st   Cir.    2023)   (quoting   United   States   v.

Alejandro-Rosado, 

 (1st Cir. 2017)).

                Fígaro-Benjamín   says    the   court   committed   procedural

error in failing to adequately explain the sentence it imposed.

He suggests the court's explanation "fall[s] short of the required

threshold" in that the facts recited (like 267 kilos imported)

weren't enough to explain the hefty sentence that followed,15 and



error for appeal" is "successfully preserve[d]" when an objection
is made that puts the sentencing court on notice of "the claimed
error" in sentencing).
     The record is clear: There was no objection interposed after
the sentencing pronouncement. Our review is for plain error.
     15"Especially," he elaborates, "considering that the sentence
resulted in a 124 months upward variance, given that the USSG were
improperly and incorrectly calculated."     But as we've already
explained, the district court did not err in its GSR tabulations,
meaning the sentence doled out is a low-end guideline sentence,
not the upward variance Fígaro-Benjamín says it is.       The only


                                       - 29 -
the district court didn't articulate any reasons Fígaro-Benjamín's

situation was different than ordinary situations contemplated by

the guidelines.     He then says plain error lies as follows:                (1)

the sentencing court erroneously calculated the GSR; (2) such error

is clear and obvious; (3) Fígaro-Benjamín's substantial rights

were affected because "[d]ue process and fundamental fairness were

not safeguarded as the Court relied on unreliable testimony and

did not give adequate notice about [that] information"; and (4)

this   infringement     on   his      constitutional    rights   impairs     the

fairness, integrity, and reputation of the judiciary.

           Plainly,      these        inadequate-explanation        contentions

harness some arguments we've already rejected.               In any event, as

we'll tease out, a quick primer on relevant case law lays the

groundwork for why his argument fails no matter how you slice it.

           "Federal law requires a sentencer to 'state in open court

the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.'"

Colón-Cordero, 91 F.4th at 50 (quoting 

(c)).                "The

fact that a sentence is consistent with the guideline sentencing

range (properly calculated) correlates to some extent with the

'requisite degree of explanation: a within-the-range sentence

usually   demands   a   less     detailed      explanation   than    a   variant

sentence.'"   United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 

 (1st


question at this point           is   whether    the   low-end   sentence    was
adequately explained.


                                      - 30 -
Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 

 (1st Cir. 2013)).   "A sentencing court 'need not be precise to

the point of pedantry' in its explanation," United States v.

Ubiles-Rosario, 

 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United

States v. González, 

 (1st Cir. 2017)), but rather

"the court's explication of its sentencing calculus need only

'identify the main factors driving its determination,'" United

States v. Daoust, 

 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting United

States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 

 (1st Cir. 2016)).

Indeed, "[w]here, as here, 'the record permits a reviewing court

to identify both a discrete aspect of an offender's conduct and a

connection between that behavior and the aims of sentencing, the

sentence is sufficiently explained to pass muster under section

3553(c).'"   Ubiles-Rosario, 

 (quoting United States

v. Vargas-García, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)).

          In view of all this precedent, and ever mindful that a

within-guidelines term (which, as we've said, this was) may be

presumed reasonable, see United States v. Colcord, 

, 30

(1st Cir. 2024), we see no error, clear or obvious, in the

sentencing court's explanation of its low-end sentence.     At the

hearing, the court said it considered the sentencing factors (and

"[s]uch a statement is entitled to some weight," Colón-Cordero, 91

F.4th at 51 (quoting United States v. Clogston, 

(1st Cir. 2011))), as well as Fígaro-Benjamín's counsel's argument


                              - 31 -
and   sentencing   memo,     the   government's      argument,      and    Fígaro-

Benjamín's allocution.       The court went on to lay out some typical

identifying details (Fígaro-Benjamín's age (37), education (10th

grade),   employment    history     (self-employed        shining    boats     and

cleaning boat carpets), and substance use history (none)) before

considering the nature of Fígaro-Benjamín's offense.                      Then the

court noted Fígaro-Benjamín's boat trips from Puerto Rico to St.

Thomas to transport 267 kilograms of cocaine into Puerto Rico,

highlighting that for at least one trip -- the January 2018 voyage

--    Fígaro-Benjamín        was    the      Black    Wolfpack's          captain.

Notwithstanding Fígaro-Benjamín's 135-month recommendation, the

court levied a sentence of 292 months' imprisonment to "reflect[]

the seriousness of the offenses, promote[] respect for the law,

protect[] the public from additional crimes by [Fígaro-Benjamín]

and address[] the issues of deterrence and punishment."                     On the

Statement   of   Reasons,    the   sentencing     court    submitted       "[d]rug

quantity and roles."

            Like sentences themselves, sentencing explanations live

on a spectrum -- and "[j]ust what kind of explanation is needed

depends on the context of each individual case."               Colón-Cordero,

91 F.4th at 50-51; see also Rita v. United States, 

 (2007) ("The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness

or    detail,    when   to    write,      what   to    say,      depends      upon

circumstances.").       On this record, and particularly viewed under


                                    - 32 -
the exacting plain-error lens, the sentencing court's explanation

here passes muster:       It identified the main factors (the volume of

drugs moved over the course of the crew's multiple trips, plus the

role Fígaro-Benjamín played in the enterprise -- findings of fact

we've deemed supportable) driving its (and to repeat) within-

guidelines sentencing determination, and, on this record, that is

adequate.    See Daoust, 

 (explaining the court must

identify the main factors animating its sentencing determination);

Ubiles-Rosario, 

 (providing that if "the record

permits a reviewing court to identify both a discrete aspect of an

offender's conduct and a connection between that behavior and the

aims of sentencing, the sentence is sufficiently explained to pass

muster under section 3553(c)" (quoting Vargas-García, 

)).16

            Given   our    conclusion   that   Fígaro-Benjamín     has   not

demonstrated    that      the   sentencing     court   committed     error,




     16Now is as good a time as any to note that Fígaro-Benjamín
somewhat blurs the lines between the supervisor enhancement
factfinding and whether the court adequately explained its
decision to apply the enhancement. As to the former, we've already
covered why the court's finding that, as a matter of fact, Fígaro-
Benjamín was a supervisor is reasonably supported by the record.
As to the latter, to the extent that's something he's trying to
argue, we note that the application of the enhancement to the GSR
calculations is the natural result of the record-supported "he's
a supervisor" finding of fact that went into the GSR-calculation
stage of the sentencing proceedings. And, as we've explicated,
the explanation for the sentence levied within that GSR otherwise
clears the plain-error hurdle.


                                   - 33 -
particularly any clear or obvious one, we need not discuss plain

error's remaining prongs.

                              II.

         Our work complete, we affirm the sentence of the district

court.




                             - 34 -