United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-1794

JOHN DEATON,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF BARRINGTON; JAMES CUNHA, Town Manager, Town of Barrington; DAVID WYROSTEK, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; ANTHONY DECRISTOFORO, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; JOHN LACROSS, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Gelpí, Howard, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

John E. Deaton, with whom Deaton Law Firm LLC, was on brief, for appellant. Marc DeSisto, with whom Sarah D. Boucher, Kathleen A. Hilton, and DeSisto Law LLC, were on brief, for appellees. May 3, 2024 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant John Deaton

("Deaton") was arrested and charged with assault, battery, and

disorderly conduct. Although the charges were later dismissed, he

brought state and federal claims against the Town of Barrington

and other individuals in their capacities as police officers and

town manager (the "Defendants"). The Defendants removed the case

from Providence County Superior Court to the United States District

Court for the District of Rhode Island, Deaton's motion for remand

was unsuccessful, and then he added federal claims via an amended

complaint. The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of the Defendants on most counts, and remanded three counts, one

in full and two in part, for the state court to resolve. Deaton

now appeals, arguing that the district court improperly found that

probable cause to arrest him existed, that it improperly denied

his post-judgment motion, and that it should have abstained and

remanded to state court to allow the state claims to be resolved.

We disagree and affirm.

I. Background

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe

the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party, in this case, Deaton. See Mancini v. City of Providence ex

- 3 - rel. Lombardi,

(1st Cir. 2018). The facts below

are undisputed unless noted otherwise.

A. Facts

In September 2017, Deaton and his partner attended a Pop

Warner football game in Barrington, Rhode Island.1 Deaton's

partner's ex-husband, Ronald Warner ("Warner"), and his new

partner were also in attendance. A verbal and physical altercation

occurred between Deaton and Warner, and while the details of the

encounter are disputed, it is undisputed that Deaton said something

to the effect of not wanting to "whip [Warner's] ass." Warner

called 911 and claimed he was assaulted by Deaton. While Warner

claimed that Deaton "put his hands on [Warner's] throat," Deaton

claimed that he pushed Warner away and likely touched his throat

or "neck area." A football coach told the men to "knock it off

and get out of there."

The Barrington Police Department dispatched Officers

David Wyrostek ("Officer Wyrostek") and Anthony DeCristoforo

("Officer DeCristoforo") to Barrington High School where Officer

Wyrostek arrived first and spoke with Warner. Warner claimed

Deaton placed his hands on his throat and choked him. Officer

Wyrostek did not notice any apparent injuries on Warner. As Deaton

drove by, Warner pointed him out to Officer Wyrostek who

1 For those not familiar, Pop Warner football is a youth football program.

- 4 - immediately pulled Deaton over. Officer Wyrostek allowed Deaton

to exit the car and told Deaton that Warner claimed Deaton choked

him, which Deaton denied. Shortly after this exchange, Officer

Wyrostek placed Deaton in handcuffs and told him he was being

arrested for simple assault and battery and disorderly conduct.

Officer DeCristoforo arrived at the field shortly after

Officer Wyrostek pulled over Deaton. Officer DeCristoforo spoke

with Warner and his partner, confirming the account Warner gave to

Officer Wyrostek. Officer DeCristoforo obtained a witness

statement from the football coach who stated that he witnessed

Deaton "put his right hand on [Warner's] throat."2 Officer

DeCristoforo noted that Warner's throat was not red, swollen, or

had any indication of finger marks. After Deaton had been

handcuffed, Officer DeCristoforo told Officer Wyrostek that he had

a witness who confirmed Warner's story. Later that day, Officer

DeCristoforo became aware of an active arrest warrant for Warner

who was then arrested pursuant to that warrant.3 After

approximately two hours at the police station, Deaton was released

on his own recognizance.

2There is a dispute over when this conversation occurred. Deaton claims it was after he was arrested while the Defendants claim it was before Deaton's arrest. 3The warrant for Warner's arrest was for assault and battery in an unrelated incident.

- 5 - B. Procedural History

The Town of Barrington prosecuted the charges against

Deaton. The criminal case was scheduled for trial in state court,

but the town dismissed the charges without prejudice, with Warner's

consent, in exchange for Deaton's completion of thirty hours of

community service. Deaton then filed suit in Providence County

Superior Court. Deaton alleged civil rights violations pursuant

to

(1956) for unlawful arrest (Count

I), civil rights violations for false imprisonment under

(1956) (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count

III), conspiracy to violate his civil rights under

(1956) (Count IV), invasion of privacy (Count V),

assault and battery (Count VI), failure to supervise (Count VII),

and municipal liability (Count VIII). Deaton also alleged

violations of the United States Constitution, including the "right

to be secure in his person [and] to equal protection of the laws

of Due Process in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments."

The Defendants removed the matter to the United States

District Court for the District of Rhode Island on federal question

grounds.

, 1446. Deaton moved to remand, which

the district court denied because the complaint "clearly alleged

violations of state and federal law." Deaton then amended his

complaint, adding claims of unreasonable search and seizure

- 6 - pursuant to

(Count IX), conspiracy to deprive him

of his constitutional rights pursuant to

(Count

X),4 and failure to intervene pursuant to

(Count

XI).

The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts

arguing that Deaton's arrest was justified and that the individual

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court

granted summary judgment, entering judgment on false imprisonment

in violation of

(1956) (Count II),

malicious prosecution (Count III), invasion of privacy (Count V),

assault and battery (Count VI), unreasonable search and seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count IX), conspiracy to violate

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (Counts IV and X) and failure to

intervene (Count XI), and partially granted summary judgment for

failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count

VIII) in relation to those counts. The district court remanded to

the Rhode Island state court claims for unlawful arrest in

violation of

(1956) (Count I) and

failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count

In the district court's order denying remand, it determined 4

that Count IV must be based on

because

(1956) "is Rhode Island's waiver of sovereign immunity and does not create its own cause of action." When Deaton subsequently amended his complaint, adding a specific conspiracy claim, Count X, these two counts were considered "one and the same."

- 7 - VIII) in relation to Count I. Deaton filed a motion to reconsider,

which was denied. Deaton now timely appeals both decisions.

II. Discussion

Deaton argues that summary judgment was not proper

because (1) probable cause to arrest Deaton did not exist at the

time of his arrest, (2) several facts materially undermined the

determination of probable cause, and (3) the district court

improperly made credibility determinations and weighed the

evidence. In addition, Deaton argues that (4) denial of Deaton's

post-judgment motion was plain error, and (5) the district court

should have abstained and remanded to allow full resolution of the

state court claims by the state court. His arguments are

unpersuasive. Therefore, we affirm the district court's judgment.

A. Summary Judgment

1. Standard of Review

We review a district court's determination of a summary

judgment motion de novo. See López-Hernández v. Terumo P.R. LLC,

, 28 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Murray v. Kindred Nursing

Ctrs. W. LLC,

(1st Cir. 2015)). We examine the

record in "the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[]

all reasonable inferences in that party's favor."

Summary

judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A 'genuine'

- 8 - issue is one on which the evidence would enable a reasonable jury

to find the fact in favor of either party," and "[a] 'material'

fact is one that is relevant in the sense that it has the capacity

to change the outcome of the jury's determination." Perez v.

Lorraine Enters., Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2014) (first

citing Vasapolli v. Rostoff,

(1st Cir. 1994); and

then citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern,

(1st Cir. 2010)). When the material facts, "what the police

knew at the moment of the arrest, the source of their knowledge,

and the leads that they pursued or eschewed," are undisputed, as

they are here, "the existence vel non of probable cause ordinarily

is amenable to summary judgment." Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores,

Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2004).

2. Probable Cause5

Deaton asks us to find that probable cause did not exist

at the time of his arrest and therefore the district court's grant

of summary judgment should be vacated. We disagree. Because the

facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Deaton, support

5 RhodeIsland state courts "accord the federal interpretation [deference] when construing" claims brought under article 1, section 6, the state's equivalent to the Fourth Amendment, including probable cause. State v. Sinapi,

, 806 (R.I. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Andujar,

, 1224 n.12 (R.I. 2006)).

- 9 - a finding of probable cause at the time of his arrest, we affirm

the district court.6

Counts II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI hinge

on Deaton's claim of lack of probable cause to arrest.7 Deaton

6 It is disputed when Deaton was actually arrested for purposes of the probable cause analysis. Deaton claims he was arrested the moment he was handcuffed whereas Officer Wyrostek claims the arrest occurred when he told Deaton he was being arrested. The district court addressed this and assumed, without deciding, that the time of arrest was the time Deaton was placed in handcuffs. Deaton takes issue with the district court's assumption of the time of arrest, arguing that this was a dispute of material fact, implying that the assumption improperly altered the probable cause analysis. This argument is irrelevant, however, as the district court chose to use Deaton's version of events, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Deaton. See López-Hernández, 64 F.4th at 28; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 7 Deaton's

claims (Counts IV, IX, X, and XI) are all based on his contention of lack of probable cause because in order to succeed, he must prove that he was deprived by one of the officers of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,

(1978). Deaton alleges that the Defendants violated his rights by arresting him without probable cause, therefore the

claims inherently hinge on the determination of probable cause. Counts II and III for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution also rest entirely on probable cause because it is a "necessary element in . . . false imprisonment[] and malicious prosecution claims." Beaudoin v. Levesque,

(R.I. 1997) (per curiam). As for Count VI for assault and battery, Deaton did not challenge that the existence of probable cause vitiates the claim, instead arguing that probable cause was a disputed fact, therefore it is included in the analysis. Counts VII and VIII for failure to supervise on the alleged constitutional violation and municipal liability also, at least partially, relate to probable cause because if probable cause is found, there is no constitutional violation, negating these claims. See Acosta,

(noting the relation of municipal liability to constitutional rights).

- 10 - was arrested for misdemeanor assault, battery, and disorderly

conduct. Assault is "a physical act of a threatening nature or an

offer of corporal injury which puts an individual in reasonable

fear of imminent bodily harm." Broadley v. State,

(R.I. 2008) (quoting Hennessey v. Pyne,

(R.I. 1997)). Battery is "an act that was intended to cause, and

does cause, an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of

or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in

the consummation of the assault."

at 1021 (quoting Fenwick v.

Oberman,

(R.I. 2004)). "A person commits

disorderly conduct if he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly . . . engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent

or tumultuous behavior."

(a)(1) (1956).

Therefore, we must determine whether there was probable cause to

arrest Deaton for only one, if not all, of the offenses. See

Wilber v. Curtis,

(1st Cir. 2017) (determining

probable cause for one of two offenses). As the district court

properly concluded, there were undisputed facts to support the

conclusion of probable cause to arrest Deaton.

"A warrantless arrest, like the one at issue here, must

be based on probable cause." United States v. Fiasconaro,

(1st Cir. 2002). The probable cause determination

turns on "whether . . . the facts and circumstances within [the

police officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably

- 11 - trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent

[person] in believing that" a crime was committed or was being

committed. Beck v. Ohio,

(1964). "Probable cause

is a 'fluid concept' and 'not a high bar.'" Karamanoglu v. Town

of Yarmouth,

, 87 (1st Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).

The finding of probable cause does not need to be "ironclad, or

even highly probable," as it "need only be reasonable." United

States v. Winchenbach,

(1st Cir. 1999).

"[O]nce police officers are presented with probable cause to

support an arrest, no further investigation is required at that

point." Forest v. Pawtucket Police Dep't,

(1st

Cir. 2004).

For us to determine if an officer had probable cause, we

look to the totality of the circumstances and "examine the events

leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical

facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable

police officer, amount to probable cause." United States v.

Flores,

(1st Cir. 2018) (quoting District of

Columbia v. Wesby,

, 56-57 (2018)). The existence of

probable cause is determined by what the police officer knew "at

the time of the arrest." United States v. Jones,

(1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brown,

(1st Cir. 1999)). "[P]robable cause determinations predicated on

information furnished by a victim are generally considered to be

- 12 - reliable," B.C.R. Transp. Co. v. Fontaine,

(1st

Cir. 1984), and victim statements can therefore be relied on by

officers to support the determination of probable cause, Forest,

(citing id.). Even where there is no admission of

tortious conduct by the alleged suspect, the bare accusation by

the victim can be enough to support probable cause. See Holder v.

Town of Sandown,

(1st Cir. 2009). Therefore, in

situations where police rely on a victim's statement, "the primary

inquiry . . . is whether there is any evidence that the officers

acted unreasonably when they determined that [the victim]'s

accusation was credible, in light of all the circumstances known

at the time." Forest,

.

It is helpful to establish the relevant, undisputed

facts that Officer Wyrostek knew at the time of the arrest in order

to proceed with our analysis. At the time of the arrest, it is

undisputed that Officer Wyrostek had interacted with Warner and

collected his statement that Deaton had assaulted him and put his

hands on his throat, had interacted with Deaton and collected his

statement that he was assaulted by Warner and denied choking him,

did not observe any injuries on Warner, and knew that Deaton was

the new partner of Warner's ex-wife. Officer Wyrostek, then, knew

that Warner claimed Deaton choked him and that Warner and Deaton

had a strained relationship. These facts, standing alone,

constitute "reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient

- 13 - to warrant a prudent [officer] in believing that" Deaton assaulted

Warner. Beck,

.

However, Deaton claims that additional facts should be

factored into the probable cause analysis and ultimately result in

a lack of probable cause, or at least, disputed facts that must go

to a jury. First, Deaton claims that because Warner had an active

warrant out for his arrest at the time Deaton was arrested, this

should have impacted Warner's credibility. However, as the

district court pointed out, Deaton merely mentioned to Officer

Wyrostek that Warner could have a warrant out for his arrest, and

Officer Wyrostek did not have actual knowledge of the warrant until

after Deaton was placed in handcuffs. Officer Wyrostek was "not

required to credit a suspect's story," Cox v. Hainey,

,

32 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004), and therefore did not need to take Deaton's

claim of an alleged warrant into consideration when determining

probable cause. Second, Deaton argues Officer Wyrostek knew at

the time of the arrest that Deaton told him Warner seemed to be

under the influence of illegal substances and had a propensity for

violence. However, Officer Wyrostek was not required to consider

these statements as true, as we just explained. Third, Deaton

also argues that because Officer Wyrostek admitted in his

deposition that he did not have probable cause before receiving a

corroborating statement from a witness, the issue was required to

go to the jury. This argument fails. "The question of probable

- 14 - cause, like the question of reasonable suspicion, is an objective

inquiry. The 'actual motive or thought process of the officer is

not plumbed.'" Holder,

(quoting Bolton v. Taylor,

(1st Cir. 2004)). Therefore, the district court did

not err as a matter of law because Officer Wyrostek could have

established probable cause at the time of arrest without the

witness statement corroboration.

Thus, the additional facts that Deaton claims Officer

Wyrostek knew at the time of his arrest, even if taken as true, do

not materially alter the analysis. "On issues where the nonmovant

bears the ultimate burden of proof," as here, "he must present

definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Mesnick v.

Gen. Elec. Co.,

(1st Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986)). Evidence

provided that is "merely colorable or is not significantly

probative" cannot successfully defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Anderson,

.

Deaton claims that the following were also known to

Officer Wyrostek at the time of his arrest and should have been,

and should be, considered.8 Officer Wyrostek had limited

information about Warner as he did not confirm Warner's identifying

information, Deaton told Officer Wyrostek that Warner had

8Deaton posits said information is contained in Officer Wyrostek's, as well as his own, deposition.

- 15 - assaulted both Warner's ex-wife and his current partner, Deaton

told Officer Wyrostek that Warner was "out of control," Officer

Wyrostek confirmed that Deaton had no active warrants for his

arrest, Officer Wyrostek had declined to let Deaton take his

children home before being handcuffed, Deaton was placed in

handcuffs within one to two minutes of speaking with Officer

Wyrostek, and Officer Wyrostek was unaware of what his co-worker

Officer DeCristoforo was doing.9 These facts, even if true, do

not require a reversal of the district court's ruling. "We are

not . . . required to 'accept as true or to deem as a disputed

material fact, each and every unsupported, subjective, conclusory,

or imaginative statement' made by a party." Bonefont-Igaravidez

v. Int'l Shipping Corp.,

(1st Cir. 2011) (quoting

Torrech–Hernández v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

(1st Cir.

2008)).

We now turn to the probable cause analysis pertaining to

Warner as the alleged victim in the altercation. Thus, we must

determine if, based on the totality of the circumstances and

information known at the time, Officer Wyrostek acted unreasonably

9 Two additional alleged facts Deaton claims Officer Wyrostek knew before he was placed in handcuffs were that Deaton told Officer Wyrostek he was a lawyer and would not jeopardize his practice by choking Warner and that Warner was using Officer Wyrostek as a part of a "scheme to cause problems for Deaton." However, these alleged facts come from Deaton's own deposition testimony where he claimed they were said after he was handcuffed, not before, so they are irrelevant to the probable cause analysis.

- 16 - after he assumably, for purposes of the probable cause analysis,

determined that Warner's account of the incident was credible.

Warner, the alleged victim, gave Officer Wyrostek his

account of the incident, after having called 911, claiming to have

been in a verbal altercation with Deaton that resulted in Deaton

grabbing his throat. Deaton claimed that Warner was the initial

aggressor and he was defending himself by pushing Warner away.

Warner's "uncorroborated testimony . . . standing alone . . . can

support a finding of probable cause" that Deaton committed assault,

battery, or disorderly conduct. Acosta,

. Deaton

argues that because Officer Wyrostek did not see any injuries on

Warner, this fact negated the probable cause determination and

lends to the unreasonableness of crediting Warner's account. This

argument fails for two reasons: (1) apparent injuries are not

required for a battery, and (2) probable cause need only be

determined for one of the three charges Deaton was arrested for,

which include disorderly conduct and assault, both of which do not

require a physical touching.

Deaton also argues that even though the district court

acknowledged that Officer Wyrostek knew of the relationship

between Deaton and Warner, the district court "completely ignored

the fact that [Officer] Wyrostek testified that it was cause to

suspect Warner's credibility in this case." However, to support

this contention Deaton relies solely on Officer Wyrostek's

- 17 - deposition testimony given in response to a hypothetical question.

The inquiry remains the same: a determination of probable cause is

analyzed by facts leading up to and at the time the arrest was

made, not by deposition testimony provided afterwards when a civil

lawsuit is filed. Regardless, we agree with the district court's

statement that although it is true that the nature of Deaton and

Warner's relationship could provide cause to suspect Warner's

credibility, see Mistretta v. Prokesch,

(E.D.N.Y. 1998), it doesn't render Warner per se uncredible. In

addition, we have never held that a past relationship between the

parties automatically renders the victim's credibility

questionable and have in fact rejected such argument. See Holder,

(rejecting the argument that because the officer

knew of a prior bad relationship, the "witness's credibility must

be considered questionable").

The facts in Holder are comparable. Mr. Holder and his

estranged wife Ms. Holder got into an altercation at their child's

soccer game.

. Ms. Holder called the police and told

the officer on scene that Mr. Holder had pushed her.

Mr.

Holder told the officer on scene that Ms. Holder initiated a verbal

confrontation and "made contact with him" before he pushed her

back.

He told the officer that Ms. Holder was his estranged

wife who was attempting to get a restraining order and keep him

from their child.

He further informed the officer that the

- 18 - two were involved in a tumultuous divorce and child custody battle,

urging the officer to speak with other witnesses.

.

The police arrested Mr. Holder for simple assault, the charges

were dismissed, Mr. Holder sued for lack of probable cause to

arrest, summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants,

and Mr. Holder appealed.

. We held that even without

an admission by Mr. Holder that he had pushed Ms. Holder, Ms.

Holder's claim that she was pushed was enough because "information

furnished by a victim is generally considered sufficiently

reliable to support a finding of probable cause."

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acosta,

).

Therefore, in this case, Officer Wyrostek could have concluded

that probable cause to arrest Deaton existed based solely on

Warner's claims about Deaton.

In addition, we have held that a police officer is not

required to further "investigate potential defenses or resolve

conflicting accounts prior to making an arrest." See

(citing

Acosta,

). "[W]e have made it clear that an officer

normally may terminate her [or his] investigation when she [or he]

accumulates facts that demonstrate sufficient probable cause."

Acosta,

. Deaton implies that because Officer

Wyrostek did not interview other witnesses to the altercation, he

could not have made a proper probable cause determination. But

because Officer Wyrostek could have found probable cause by

- 19 - weighing of Deaton's and Warner's accounts, he was not required to

investigate further. Therefore, the witnesses' statements were

not required.

Similarly, Deaton attempts to argue that because he and

Warner had conflicting accounts, there could not have been probable

cause to arrest him. He supports this claim with Officer

Wyrostek's deposition, which he alleges the district court

ignored. However, "[a] reasonable police officer is not required

to credit a suspect's story." Cox,

n.2. Police

officers "do not have an unflagging duty to complete a full

investigation before making a probable cause determination," even

when presented with conflicting accounts. Charron v. Cnty. of

York,

, 616 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also Acosta,

(explaining

that police do not have an obligation to investigate defenses

before finding probable cause). An "officer [is] not obligated to

make a definitive credibility judgment about the relative accuracy

of the accounts of the protagonists." Holder,

.

Therefore, Deaton's arguments as to conflicting accounts, the past

relationship, lack of apparent injuries, and lack of witness

statements fails to materially alter the probable cause analysis.

See

("The fact that Mr. Holder and Ms. Holder were not

on good terms and had given somewhat differing accounts of the

encounter did not render unreasonable Officer Morrow's conclusion

- 20 - that it was fairly probable that Mr. Holder had committed a simple

assault.").

Deaton lastly claims that "[t]he [district] court held

that [Officer] Wyrostek's credibility determination was not

unreasonable yet also stated that a reasonable officer could decide

Warner was more credible than Deaton." Deaton argues that the

district court was contradicting itself and making its own

credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. This is

incorrect. The district court was analyzing what Officer

Wyrostek's credibility assessment could have been and his

permissible probable cause determination. The district court was

analyzing whether Officer Wyrostek had enough facts known to him

at the time of arrest to support a credibility analysis of Warner,

Deaton, and the probable cause determination. Accordingly, the

district court did not engage in a credibility determination.

In conclusion, Officer Wyrostek had sufficient

information to make a probable cause determination and arrest

Deaton. "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the

assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not

readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."

Maryland v. Pringle,

(2003) (alteration in

original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,

(1983)).

Police officers are permitted to "draw reasonable inferences from

[the] facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior

- 21 - experience." Estrada v. Rhode Island,

(1st Cir.

2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ortiz,

(1975)). Thus, based on these facts and Officer

Wyrostek's experience and evaluation of the situation, it was

reasonable for Officer Wyrostek to have concluded probable cause

existed.

B. Post-Judgment Motion

Deaton asks us to conclude that the district court's

denial of his post-judgment motion for relief was plain error.

"The hurdle [to succeed] is a high one." Latin Am. Music Co. v.

Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers,

(1st Cir. 2011); see also Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp.,

(1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that "relief under Rule 60(b) is

extraordinary in nature and that motions invoking that rule should

be granted sparingly"). "To obtain relief, the movant must

demonstrate either that newly discovered evidence (not previously

available) has come to light or that the rendering court committed

a manifest error of law." Palmer v. Champion Mortg.,

(1st Cir. 2006) (citing Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp.,

, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)); see also Karak,

(noting "a party who seeks recourse under Rule 60(b) must persuade

the trial court, at a bare minimum, that his motion is timely;

that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary

relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff

- 22 - to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no

unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the

motion be granted"). "[W]e will not overturn the district court's

denial of a motion for reconsideration absent an abuse of

discretion." Palmer,

(first citing Iverson v. City

of Boston,

(1st Cir. 2006); and then citing In re

Sun Pipe Line Co.,

(1st Cir. 1987)).

Deaton claims that the district court found probable

cause on a clear mistake of fact. In other words, because Officer

Wyrostek testified in his deposition that he did not have probable

cause to arrest Deaton until he had the coach's witness statement

corroborating Warner's account, then it was impossible for Officer

Wyrostek to make a credibility determination that Warner's account

was more credible than Deaton's at the time of arrest. This claim

was already made in the opposition to the motion for summary

judgment and was properly considered by the district court, as we

explained, therefore there was no error. "[A] motion to alter or

amend is not 'a mechanism to regurgitate old arguments previously

considered and rejected.'" Ing v. Tufts Univ.,

, 85-86

(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,

(1st Cir. 2014)).

In addition, Deaton argues that because the district

court found that "there are genuine issues of material fact as to

whether Officer Wyrostek was plainly incompetent," as to 12 R.I.

- 23 - Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) in relation to Count I, then it must be

true that a jury could find him incompetent to determine

credibility for probable cause. This is misguided. The probable

cause analysis was properly decided by the district court because

there were no disputed material facts. Because there were no

disputed material facts, the district court was permitted to

analyze and conclude as a matter of law whether Officer Wyrostek

could have concluded there was probable cause. Therefore, Deaton

did not meet the high hurdle to succeed on his post-judgment motion

for relief claim.

C. Remanded State Court Claims

Lastly, Deaton asks us to reverse the district court's

entry of summary judgment and order it to abstain from hearing any

federal claims. Deaton argues that the constitutional claims in

this case rest on unsettled questions of state law under

(1956), therefore, according to Railroad

Commission of Texas v. Pullman,

(1941), the state-law

claims should be settled first. This argument was made for the

first time in his post-judgment motion for relief. Deaton's

failure to request abstention before judgment counsels against

upsetting the district court's decision. See First Fed. Sav. &

Loan Ass'n of Bos. v. Greenwald,

(1st Cir. 1979)

(explaining that failure to raise an abstention argument below

creates a "poor position, equitably, to seek abstention"). Because

- 24 - parties can come "close to waiving, if they [do] not actually

waive, any claim that the district court should abstain" when they

seek to "send [an] already-decided case to another tribunal," we

may "take into account the proponent's failure to bring the issue

to the lower court's attention where the argument is not clearly

suggested by the circumstances."

, 425 n.9. Regardless,

abstention is inappropriate here.

A party seeking Pullman abstention has the burden of

showing that the resolution of "settling [an uncertain] question

of state law [raised by the suit] will or may well obviate the

need to resolve a significant federal constitutional question.”

Casiano-Montanez v. State Ins. Fund Corp.,

(1st

Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, questions about

(1956) have no bearing on Count IV, which is

rooted only in the federal constitution and therefore necessarily

requires a court to reach the federal probable-cause issue. Thus,

we will not abstain from hearing Deaton's claims because resolution

of the

(1956) question would not

"avoid[] unnecessary decision of constitutional issues." 17A

- 25 - Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 4242 (3d ed. 2023).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the district court's orders

granting summary judgment and denying post-judgment relief are

Affirmed.

- 26 -