United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 21-1942

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JEAN CARLOS POLACO-HANCE,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Montecalvo and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Mauricio Hernandez Arroyo, with whom Law Offices of Mauricio Hernandez Arroyo was on brief, for appellant.

Jonathan L. Gottfried, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.

June 3, 2024 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Jean Carlos Polaco-Hance

("Polaco") received a seventy-two-month sentence after he was

convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and

unlawfully possessing a machinegun. Pointing out that his sentence

is forty percent higher than the upper end of the range recommended

under the federal sentencing guidelines, Polaco challenges the

procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. After

careful consideration, we conclude that the district court

provided sufficient reasons to justify its higher sentence here,

including the large amount of ammunition in Polaco's possession,

and therefore affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts1

In 2019, Polaco pled guilty to attempting to smuggle

about $100,000 in cash in bulk from the United States to the

Dominican Republic and making a false statement to a United States

agency. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment for

each offense, to be served concurrently, and three years of

supervised release. He began his supervised release term on May

29, 2020.

1"In considering [Polaco's] challenge to his sentence, we take the facts from the trial record, the undisputed portions of the presentence investigation report, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing." United States v. Brown,

, 53 n.1 (1st Cir. 2022).

-2- About three months later, Polaco was arrested for the

offenses that form the basis of this appeal. The events that led

to his arrest and conviction transpired on September 10, 2020,

when four police officers were driving in an unmarked police car

through a retail area in Carolina, Puerto Rico. As they drove

past an auto-repair shop where Polaco worked, one of the officers

observed Polaco standing in front of the shop with a bag over his

shoulder. The officer witnessed Polaco reach into the bag and

turn his body as he watched the path of the unmarked car.

Suspecting that Polaco had a firearm in his bag, the officer

informed his colleagues that an individual standing in front of

the auto-repair shop was armed. The driver turned the car around

and parked in between the shop and a bakery located next door; as

they exited the vehicle, the four officers called out to Polaco

that they were police. In response, Polaco began to flee toward

a fence at the back of the shop and threw his bag over the fence.

The officers quickly caught up, arrested Polaco, and recovered the

bag. Inside it, they found a Glock pistol modified to fire

automatically2 and loaded with a magazine capable of holding twelve

rounds of ammunition; four extended magazines capable of holding

twenty-two rounds of ammunition each; and a total of 111 rounds of

"[A] fully automatic weapon [is one] that fires continuously 2

with a single pull on the trigger." United States v. O'Brien,

, 922 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008), aff'd,

(2010).

-3- ammunition. Most of the 111 rounds were distributed between the

magazines, though sixteen rounds were loose in the bag.

A federal grand jury indicted Polaco on one count of

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of

(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and one count of unlawfully possessing

a machinegun, in violation of

(o) and 924(a)(2).

The case proceeded to trial, after which a jury found Polaco guilty

on both counts.

B. Sentencing Proceedings

Prior to the sentencing hearing, a probation officer

prepared a presentence report ("PSR") setting forth the guideline

calculations that applied in Polaco's case. The sentencing

guideline that covers Polaco's offenses is section 2K2.1. It calls

for a base offense level of twenty if (1) the "offense involved"

a "firearm that is described in

(a)," (2) the

defendant was a "prohibited person" at the time of the offense

(for instance, someone previously convicted of a felony), and (3)

there is no other basis for a greater enhancement under the

guideline. U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(II),

(ii)(I) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2023) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Section

5845(a), in turn, includes a machinegun among the "firearm[s]" it

lists.

(a)(6). And a machinegun is defined as

"any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily

-4- restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual

reloading, by a single function of the trigger."

§ 5845(b).

Relying on section 2K2.1, the probation officer

calculated Polaco's base offense level as twenty,3 see U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(II), (ii)(I), and then subtracted two levels

for acceptance of responsibility. Polaco's two prior federal

convictions and the fact that he committed the firearms offenses

while on supervised release resulted in a criminal history category

of III. Together, these tabulations yielded a guideline sentencing

range of thirty-three to forty-one months of imprisonment. The

PSR noted that, in determining whether a sentence outside of that

range was appropriate, the court could consider, among other

things, "that [Polaco's] possession of five (5) magazines, four

(4) of which were extended, carrying a total of 111 rounds of

ammunition to be used on a pistol that was converted to fire

automatically[,] increases the likelihood of harm to society

should the defendant in fact discharge the weapon." Neither party

filed objections to the PSR.

The government did, however, file a sentencing

memorandum challenging the guideline calculation and contending

that a sentence above the guideline range was warranted. The

3 Polaco's two offenses (being a felon in possession of a firearm and unlawfully possessing a machinegun) were grouped together for the purpose of calculating his guideline sentencing range.

-5- two-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility was

incorrect, the government maintained. Because Polaco went to trial

to contest factual elements of guilt, rather than to preserve

separate, legal challenges, it argued, his case was not one of the

"rare situations" refenced in the guidelines in which a defendant

can demonstrate acceptance of responsibility while simultaneously

exercising their right to trial. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2.

The government's guideline calculation, with the two-level

deduction removed from the total offense level, was forty-one to

fifty-one months.

The government then requested a sentence of sixty

months, nine months above that range, for four key reasons. First,

it pointed to the 111 rounds of ammunition and four high-capacity

magazines that Polaco possessed. Second, it contended that guns

that are modified into machineguns pose a heightened danger

compared to machineguns that are manufactured as such. In support

of that proposition, it cited two publications issued by the United

States Army that discuss safety protocols and design features of

manufactured machineguns that soldiers use to stabilize the recoil

and muzzle rise from their weapons. The government asserted that

those features were absent in the simple pistol that Polaco

possessed and, as such, the pistol was particularly hard to control

and particularly dangerous. Third, the government contended that

an upward variance was justified because of the "social context of

-6- the offense[s]" -- that is, high rates of gun-related homicide in

Puerto Rico relative to the rest of the United States -- when

"combined with [the] specific facts" here. Those facts included

Polaco's possession of 111 rounds of ammunition and multiple

high-capacity magazines during the daytime in a retail area of

Puerto Rico. Fourth, citing the need for adequate deterrence, the

government insisted that a higher-than-average sentence was

necessary because the within-guideline sentence Polaco received in

his prior case did not deter him from engaging in new criminal

conduct just three months into his supervised release term.

The district court held the sentencing hearing in

November 2021. At the hearing's outset, Polaco challenged the

government's arguments in support of an upward variance. As

relevant to the issues before us, he contended that the

government's discussion of murder rates in Puerto Rico was

unrelated to his case. He stressed that he never removed the

firearm from the bag he was carrying; rather, his offenses were

victimless and nonviolent. Additionally, Polaco disputed the

government's assertion that the machinegun he possessed was

especially dangerous. He maintained that it was misleading to

rely on the Army publications that discussed design features to

improve stability and avoid recoil for a machinegun, when the

weapon that he possessed was a handgun. Polaco concluded by

requesting a sentence within the guideline range calculated by the

-7- PSR. The government repeated the arguments from its sentencing

memorandum explaining its calculation of the guideline range and

why a nine-month variance above that range was justified.

The district court then proceeded with sentencing. It

instructed the probation officer to amend the PSR so that the

guideline calculation did not include a two-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility.4 That adjustment -- the only one

the district court made to the PSR's calculation -- yielded a

corrected guideline sentencing range of forty-one to fifty-one

months. Next, the court cited its review of the

(a) sentencing factors. And it quoted the introductory

commentary to Part A of Chapter Four of the guidelines, which

discusses calculating a defendant's criminal history score. That

commentary states that "repeated criminal behavior will aggravate

the need for punishment with each recurrence." U.S.S.G. ch. 4,

pt. A, introductory cmt.

Shifting gears, the court briefly discussed Polaco's

age, educational background, and employment status. Turning to

Polaco's offense conduct, the court noted that he had in his

possession 111 rounds of ammunition and five magazines, four of

which were extended and all of which were loaded. It proceeded to

highlight the "highly dangerous and unusual" nature of machineguns

4 Polaco does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

-8- in general. And then it remarked on the dangerousness of altered

machineguns in particular, stating that "pistols altered [to be]

machine[]guns are difficult, if not impossible, to control."

Ultimately, the court concluded that neither party's

recommended sentence reflected the seriousness of the offenses,

addressed the need for deterrence and punishment, protected the

public, or promoted respect for the law. It instead imposed a

sentence of seventy-two months. This timely appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review claims of sentencing error by using a two-step

process. United States v. Colón-Cordero,

(1st

Cir. 2024). Under this approach, "we first determine whether the

sentence imposed is procedurally reasonable and then determine

whether it is substantively reasonable." United States v.

Clogston,

(1st Cir. 2011).

At both steps, we review preserved objections for abuse

of discretion. United States v. De Jesús-Torres,

(1st Cir. 2023). Under the abuse-of-discretion umbrella, we review

the sentencing court's factual findings for clear error and its

legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Carrasquillo-Vilches,

(1st Cir. 2022).

-9- III. DISCUSSION

Polaco challenges both the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of his seventy-two-month sentence. We address each

claim in turn.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

Polaco argues the district court procedurally erred by

relying on a factor already accounted for in his guideline range

to justify its upward variance -- the nature and dangerousness of

machineguns -- without indicating why that factor deserved extra

weight here. He further contends that the court compounded this

procedural error by considering the violent-crime rates in Puerto

Rico without connecting those rates to his individual case, which

involved no violence.

At the outset, we note that the parties debate whether

Polaco preserved his procedural claim by sufficiently raising

these issues before the district court. We need not resolve this

dispute, however, because we conclude that Polaco cannot prevail

even if we grant him the benefit of abuse-of-discretion review.

See United States v. Rijos-Rivera,

(1st Cir.

2022).

Under our precedent, the dangerous nature of a

machinegun cannot alone provide an adequate basis for an upward

variance for offenses covered by section 2K2.1. See United States

v. García-Pérez,

(1st Cir. 2021); United States

-10- v. Carrasquillo-Sánchez,

(1st Cir. 2021); United

States v. Rivera-Berríos,

(1st Cir. 2020).

But here, the district court considered Polaco's machinegun

possession only alongside other, case-specific factors, namely,

the large cache of ammunition and the high-capacity magazines

Polaco had when he was arrested, as well as what the district court

viewed as a heightened need for deterrence.

We begin with the large cache of ammunition and the

high-capacity magazines. At the sentencing hearing, the court

twice noted that Polaco had in his possession 111 rounds of

ammunition and highlighted that he possessed five magazines, four

of which were extended and all of which were loaded. It also

stated that the purpose of extended magazines that hold greater

amounts of ammunition is increased lethality. It is true that, at

the hearing, the district court mentioned the ammunition and

high-capacity magazines in its recitation of the facts, rather

than as part of its explicit justification for the sentence. But

the court's written statement of reasons says that, in imposing

its sentence, it "considered that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

d[o] not account for the amount of ammunition and/or magazines

involved in the offense[s]." Further, one of the government's

principal arguments made both in its sentencing memorandum and at

the sentencing hearing was that the court should vary upward

because of the amount of ammunition and four high-capacity

-11- magazines Polaco possessed. From all this information –- the

government's arguments in support of a variance, the district

court's repeated references at the hearing to the magazines and

ammunition, and the written statement of reasons -- it is apparent

that the court predicated Polaco's sentence on the amount of

ammunition and number of high-capacity magazines found in his

possession when he was arrested. See United States v.

Montero-Montero,

(1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that

we may glean a court's explanation for the chosen sentence "by

fair inference from the sentencing record"). We have held

repeatedly that the amount of ammunition and the number of extended

magazines, at least in a range consistent with the amount and

number present in this case, can be valid bases for an upward

variance for firearms offenses. See, e.g., United States v.

Rivera-Santiago,

(1st Cir. 2019).

The district court also implicitly grounded its variance

in deterrence and recidivism-based concerns. It began its

§ 3553(a) analysis by quoting the following introductory comment

to the guidelines chapter on criminal history: "General deterrence

of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be sent to

society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need

for punishment with each recurrence." U.S.S.G. ch. 4, pt. A,

introductory cmt. This language mirrors the government's argument

that a higher-than-average sentence was necessary to prevent

-12- future crimes in part because Polaco received a sentence within

the guideline range in his prior case and then engaged in new

criminal conduct -- this time, firearms offenses -- only three

months after his release from imprisonment. By comparing the

government's assertion with the district court's discussion, we

can fairly infer that the court was adopting the government's view

that a variance was needed because a previous within-guideline

sentence did not deter Polaco from engaging in illegal conduct

shortly after his release. "Although the district court could

have made its rationale more explicit," there is enough information

in the record for us to evaluate the district court's reasoning

from what it said and did. United States v. Vázquez-Martínez,

(1st Cir. 2016) (reasonably inferring from the district

court's discussion of deterrence and the one-and-a-half years

between the defendant's commencement of supervised release and new

criminal conduct the court's "concern that a Guidelines-range

sentence did not adequately take into account [the defendant's]

potential for recidivism"). Again, our case law indicates that a

district court does not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward

variance for repeated criminal activity that occurs shortly into

an individual's supervised release term. See id.; cf. United

States v. Vázquez-Vázquez,

(1st Cir. 2017).

Against this backdrop, the district court gave

permissible weight to a factor already accounted for in the

-13- guidelines insofar as it relied on the inherent dangerousness of

machineguns. Importantly, in varying upward, the court did not

give dispositive weight to that factor alone but rather considered

it along with the other valid and individualized factors we've

just outlined. Cf. United States v. Flores-Machicote,

(1st Cir. 2013) (finding that sentencing court made an

individualized assessment of defendant's case when it "addressed

the nature and circumstances of the particular offense [and] its

seriousness" and "paid particular heed both to the fact that the

defendant's weapon was 'a nine millimeter, semi-automatic pistol

with a high capacity magazine,' and to the defendant's likely

recidivism").

For similar reasons, the district court did not abuse

its discretion to the extent it considered "community factors," by

which Polaco means the alleged prevalence of machineguns and gun

violence in Puerto Rico. Polaco asserts that the government's

references to homicide rates "clearly advised and moved the

district court to allude to Puerto Rico's gun problems, murder

rate and armed violent crimes to support a sentence 21 months above

the guideline sentencing range." And yet, he states, those factors

were "completely unrelated to [him] or his case," which involved

no allegations of past or present violence.

We have deemed "well-settled" the principle that the

district court "may take into account the characteristics of the

-14- community in which the crime took place when weighing the offense's

seriousness and the need for deterrence." United States v.

Zapata-Vázquez,

(1st Cir. 2015). That is because

"the incidence of particular crimes in the relevant community

appropriately informs and contextualizes the . . . need for

deterrence." Flores-Machicote,

. At the same time,

the court still must assess the § 3553(a) factors "in case-specific

terms." Id.; see also United States v. Rivera-González,

, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding "the high incidence of violent

crime in Puerto Rico" to be an appropriate consideration at

sentencing but explaining that "a sentencing court's appraisal of

community-based considerations does not relieve its obligation to

ground its sentencing determination in individual factors related

to the offender and the offense"). Indeed, a district court's

"emphasis on factors that are not specifically tied to either the

offender or the offense of conviction . . . may . . . go too far."

Flores-Machicote,

. It is "possible for a sentencing

judge to focus too much on the community and too little on the

individual and, thus, impose a sentence that cannot withstand the

test of procedural reasonableness." Id.; see also Rivera-Berríos,

-37 (citing Flores-Machicote,

).

To the extent the district court emphasized community

characteristics here, it did not do so "at the expense of also

weighing the specific circumstances of [Polaco's] case."

-15- Zapata-Vázquez,

. The government argued both in its

sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing that, although

"social background cannot be viewed in a void," the district court

could consider rates of armed violent crime in Puerto Rico when

"combined with specific facts of [Polaco's] offense[s]." It then

pointed to Polaco's "carrying a machinegun with over 100 rounds of

ammunition and multiple high-capacity magazines in broad daylight

in a retail area of Puerto Rico" as reasons for an upward variance.

In turn, at the sentencing hearing, the court referenced the

ammunition, loaded high-capacity magazines, and its concern that

those magazines contribute to the firearm's lethalness. From these

comments and the government's arguments, we can deduce that the

court based its variance in part on those factors, that is, the

particulars of Polaco's case. See Montero-Montero,

(explaining that we can discern the rationale for a sentence

from the parties' oral and written arguments and the sentencing

colloquy).

Because the district court did not predicate its

variance merely on the inherent dangerousness of machineguns or on

community considerations to the exclusion of the circumstances of

Polaco's offenses, the sentence is not procedurally unreasonable.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

We now turn to Polaco's substantive reasonableness

claim. Echoing his procedural claim, Polaco argues that the upward

-16- variance here is substantively unreasonable because his conduct

falls squarely within the heartland of machinegun possession cases

covered by the guidelines, and there is "nothing [in] the record

that suggests that his sentence could not be sheltered within the

guideline[] [range]."

Before turning to the merits of this claim, we address

a threshold issue regarding the standard of review. At his

hearing, Polaco advocated for a sentence within the guideline

sentencing range calculated by the PSR. "[W]e have consistently

held that by arguing for a shorter sentence before the district

court, a defendant preserves a challenge to the substantive

reasonableness of his sentence on appeal." United States v.

Melendez-Hiraldo,

(1st Cir. 2023); see also United

States v. Rand,

(1st Cir. 2024); United States

v. Rodriguez-Monserrate,

(1st Cir. 2021).

The government agrees, but only to a point. It concurs

that Polaco preserved a general claim that his sentence was too

long, but it contends that simply asking for a shorter sentence is

insufficient to preserve his specific substantive reasonableness

argument on appeal -- that there was no plausible rationale for an

upward variance when the record shows his case is no different

than the run-of-the-mill machinegun possession offense.

We need not decide if Polaco's specific substantive

reasonableness argument is preserved by his request for a sentence

-17- shorter than the one the district court pronounced. Even if we

assume it was preserved and therefore abuse-of-discretion review

applies, we conclude that Polaco cannot succeed on his claim. See

United States v. Vargas-Martinez,

, 102 n.7 (1st Cir.

2021) (assuming favorably for defendant that advocating for a

shorter sentence preserved his substantive reasonableness claim

that the district court relied exclusively on the elements of the

offense to justify an upward variance).

As always, we begin by setting out the governing legal

principles. In conducting our substantive-reasonableness inquiry,

we keep in mind that "[t]here is no one reasonable sentence in any

given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing

outcomes." United States v. Santiago-Lozada,

(1st Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Ortiz-Pérez,

(1st Cir. 2023)). As such, our

task is "to determine whether the sentence falls within this broad

universe." United States v. Rivera-Morales,

(1st

Cir. 2020). To make that determination, "we look for the hallmarks

of a substantively reasonable sentence: 'a plausible sentencing

rationale and a defensible result.'" United States v. Díaz-Lugo,

(1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Martin,

(1st Cir. 2008)).

When, as here, the district court imposes a sentence

above the guideline sentencing range, it "must justify a variance

-18- of the magnitude in question," Martin,

, and "the

rationale underlying the upward variance should 'be rooted either

in the nature and circumstances of the offense or the

characteristics of the offender,'" United States v. Flores-Nater,

(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Martin,

). Further, when the court relies on a factor that is already

accounted for in the guideline range to vary upward, it "must

articulate specifically the reasons that this particular

defendant's situation is different from the ordinary situation

covered by the guidelines calculation." United States v.

Guzman-Fernandez,

(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United

States v. Zapete-García,

(1st Cir. 2006)).

We look to various aspects of the record in evaluating

the district court's rationale. We consider its "contemporaneous

oral explanation of the sentence, its near-contemporaneous written

statement of reasons, and what fairly can be gleaned by comparing

what was argued by the parties or proffered in the [PSR] with what

the sentencing court ultimately did." Martin,

.

With this context in mind, we turn to Polaco's claim.

To recap: Polaco's guideline sentencing range was forty-one to

fifty-one months, and the district court imposed a

seventy-two-month sentence. The chosen sentence was therefore

twenty-one months above the top-end of the guideline range, which

equals about a forty percent variance. We conclude that the

-19- district court provided a plausible rationale for a variance of

this magnitude.

As we've explained, we can infer that the district court

based its variance in part on the 111 rounds of ammunition and on

the four extended and loaded magazines found with the gun. Under

our precedent, a sentencing court may consider both the amount of

ammunition and the number of high-capacity magazines as

aggravating factors not already accounted for by the guidelines if

they exceed what is consistent with simple possession.5 See, e.g.,

United States v. Bruno-Campos,

(1st Cir. 2020)

(explaining that defendant's possession of a "substantial amount

of ammunition [eighty-nine rounds] packed into four separate

magazines, two of which were high-capacity" was not factored into

section 2K2.1). Accordingly, we have affirmed similar upward

variances when the district court relied on an amount of ammunition

or number of high-capacity magazines comparable to that present

here as part of its justification for the variance. See, e.g.,

United States v. Morales-Negrón,

(1st Cir. 2020)

(upholding twenty-four-month variance for felon-in-possession and

5As a reminder, the guideline provision that covers Polaco's offenses of conviction, section 2K2.1, applies to an individual who possessed "a firearm," which, in turn, includes "a machinegun," defined as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(II), (ii)(I);

(a), (b).

-20- machinegun-possession offenses after finding that "the substantial

amount of ammunition [fifty-seven rounds] and

multiple-high-capacity magazines [four] involved in the offense"

constituted one of "several plausible rationales for the upward

variance"); Díaz-Lugo,

(affirming

twenty-three-month variance based in part on court's expressed

concern over the fact that the defendant was arrested with two

machineguns and four high-capacity magazines, facts that

"remove[d] th[e] case from the heartland of the applicable

guideline provisions" for machinegun possession); United States v.

Contreras-Delgado,

(1st Cir. 2019) (determining

that district court provided an individualized rationale for its

sixteen-month variance in part because it considered that "the

machine gun possession offense . . . involved a substantial amount

of ammunition [seventy-seven rounds] and multiple high-capacity

magazines [three], heightening the risk posed to the public").

Further, the government's arguments considered alongside

the court's invocation of the Chapter Four guidelines commentary

indicate the court adopted the government's theory that a

heightened need for deterrence existed in this case, given that

Polaco committed new, firearms offenses just three months into his

term of supervised release. This theory goes beyond the mere fact

that Polaco had a prior criminal history, which already was

calculated and factored into his guideline sentencing range. Thus,

-21- for all these reasons, the court did not, as Polaco contends, rest

its rationale solely on factors already accounted for in the

guidelines. See United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez,

(1st Cir. 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion when the

upward variance was "anchored in a plausible, albeit not

inevitable, view of the circumstances sufficient to distinguish

this case from the mine-run of cases covered" by the guidelines).

The court also based Polaco's sentence on facts "to which

it alluded in open court immediately before imposing the sentence,

and which were relevant to the nature and circumstances of the

offense and to [Polaco's] characteristics." Vargas-Martinez,

. In addition to considering the ammunition, loaded

magazines, and perceived need for deterrence to address repeated

criminal behavior at the outset of a supervised release term, the

district court appropriately emphasized the dangerousness of the

firearm and community factors, for the reasons we explained above.

Taken collectively, these factors "add up to a plausible

rationale." Martin,

.

Finally, based on our precedent, the sentence imposed

here is a defensible result, given those factors the court cited.

See Morales-Negrón,

. Polaco argues, however, that

a twenty-one-month variance is unwarranted in light of his

mitigating factors, which include being a provider for his family

and his full-time employment at the time of the offenses. To the

-22- extent he contends that the district court did not consider his

mitigating factors, the district court noted that Polaco was

employed at the auto-repair shop before he was arrested. See

García-Pérez, 9 F.4th at 52 (finding that sentencing court

demonstrated that it considered a mitigating factor by mentioning

it). It is true that the district court did not expressly refer

to Polaco's status as a breadwinner for his family. And we have

held that a court fails to offer a case-specific rationale for its

sentence when it entirely ignores the "dominant mitigation

argument" that a defendant relies on in advocating for a particular

sentence. See Colón-Cordero,

(finding that

sentencing court failed to make an individualized assessment of

defendant when "the mitigating individual characteristic," the

defendant's intellectual disability, "and the argument about it

were completely ignored"). By contrast, here Polaco "trains his

gaze on a sentencing court's failure to address one of his

[mitigation] arguments," but "our caselaw is clear that, in fact,

[a court] need not 'address every argument that a defendant

advances in support of his preferred sentence.'"

(quoting

Rivera-Morales,

). The fact that Polaco provided

for his family was discussed in the PSR and mentioned by his

counsel at the sentencing hearing. "On this record, the more

appropriate inference" from the lack of express mention of this

fact "is that, in the court's view, the mitigating factor[] that

-23- [Polaco] highlighted [was] unpersuasive," not ignored. United

States v. Santa-Soler,

(1st Cir. 2021); see also

United States v. Lozada-Aponte,

(1st Cir. 2012).

Although Polaco also disagrees with how the district court weighed

the mitigating and aggravating factors here, that is not enough to

show an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Serrano-Delgado,

(1st Cir. 2022) (explaining that "a sentence is

not substantively unreasonable simply because the court chose not

to attach to certain of the mitigating factors the significance

that the defendant thinks they deserved" (cleaned up) (quoting

United States v. González-Rodríguez,

(1st Cir.

2017))).

Finding a plausible rationale and defensible result on

this record, we conclude that Polaco's sentence was substantively

reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we affirm.

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