United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 21-1855

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

WILFREDO ISAAC DELGADO, A/K/A EL GORDO,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Montecalvo and Lipez, Circuit Judges, and Burroughs,* District Judge.

Héctor Sueiro-Álvarez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, were on brief, for appellant.

Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.

July 3, 2024

* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. While completing a term of

supervised release, Wilfredo Isaac-Delgado ("Isaac") tested

positive for multiple controlled substances, failed to abide by

the regulations of his residential reentry center, and was charged

with violating Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute for

harassing a former romantic partner. Isaac's probation officer

detailed these actions, each of which violated the conditions of

Isaac's supervised release, in two motions to the district court.

Those motions requested that the court revoke Isaac's supervised

release.

At the beginning of a hearing on the motions, Isaac

informed the court that he would "not be contesting the[]

violations" described by his probation officer. Isaac instead

identified mitigating circumstances that, in his view, justified

a sentence within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.

Relying on the uncontested representations about Isaac's conduct

from the probation officer, the district court imposed a sentence

more than three times longer than the high end of the Guidelines

range. Isaac now challenges that sentence as procedurally

unreasonable. Finding no procedural flaw, we affirm the sentence

imposed by the district court.

- 2 - I.

A. Isaac's Conditions of Supervised Release

In November 2018, Isaac completed a term of imprisonment

for federal offenses related to a bank robbery and began serving

a five-year term of supervised release. Less than a year later,

in August 2019, Isaac's probation officer notified the district

court that Isaac had violated two conditions of his release: one

that prohibited him from committing another crime and another that

required him to follow the instructions of his probation officer.

The probation officer explained that Isaac had violated a court-

issued restraining order imposed because he had threatened and

mistreated a former romantic partner. Despite his probation

officer's instructions to the contrary, Isaac continued to contact

his former partner and, as a result, he was criminally charged

with violating Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute

("Commonwealth charges").

The district court initiated proceedings to consider

revoking Isaac's supervised release. However, before Isaac's

preliminary revocation hearing, the Commonwealth charges were

dismissed. Isaac's probation officer then moved to vacate the

revocation proceedings, asking that the court instead add new

conditions to Isaac's supervised release. The court granted that

request, with Isaac's acquiescence. Among the new conditions was

a requirement that Isaac participate in reentry support programs,

- 3 - including cognitive behavioral treatment services related to

domestic violence.

One year later, Isaac's probation officer notified the

district court that Isaac had again violated his conditions of

release by using controlled substances and failing to follow the

instructions of his probation officer. The probation officer

reported that Isaac had tested positive for marijuana five times

in the past year and had failed to call into his drug testing

program on more than sixty occasions. He recommended that Isaac

be admitted to a residential reentry center. Isaac agreed, and

his conditions of release were modified to include his

participation in such a residential reentry program.

B. Isaac's Violations of Supervised Release

During his short-lived stay at a residential reentry

center, however, Isaac failed required drug screens, testing

positive for marijuana four times between February and April 2021,

and, in one instance, also testing positive for benzodiazepines.

Isaac also continued exhibiting aggressive behavior

toward another of his former romantic partners, Johanna

Gonzalez-Crespo ("Gonzalez"). In May 2021, staff members at the

reentry center heard Isaac insulting a woman over the phone. Two

months later, on July 19, 2021, Gonzalez reported to the probation

office that Isaac was inundating her with harassing and threatening

calls. She explained that, despite blocking his number, she

- 4 - continued to receive threatening calls from Isaac, who started

using the phones of other individuals to insult and intimidate

her. The probation office reviewed hostile voicemails left by

Isaac and recommended that Gonzalez seek assistance from her local

police department.

A week later, on July 26, Gonzalez reached out to the

reentry center to report her problems with Isaac. She explained

that Isaac had been calling her from different phone numbers and

coming to her residence to threaten her family. The following

day, Gonzalez filed a police report against Isaac detailing the

relevant events, including Isaac's threat that "if she is not with

him, she will not be with nobody [sic]."

When police officers went to the reentry center to arrest

Isaac, he refused to report to the lobby upon request. He became

agitated, slammed electronics, violently kicked a desk, and

announced: "If they are coming to arrest me, they have to take me

death [sic]." After an hour of negotiations, he surrendered to

the police. On July 28, Isaac was again charged with violating

Puerto Rico's domestic violence law. Two days later, the probation

office received a "failure letter" from the reentry center,

reporting that Isaac had violated several of the center's

regulations.

Isaac's probation officer notified the district court of

Isaac's violations of supervised release stemming from these

- 5 - events. In two filings ("Docket Entries 108 and 117" or,

collectively, "Probation Motions"), the probation officer detailed

Isaac's repeated positive tests for marijuana and benzodiazepines,

his threats to Gonzalez, and the resulting criminal charges. The

Probation Motions also noted Isaac's prior criminal charges

involving his mistreatment of two other women. In addition to the

2019 episode described above, Isaac was also arrested in 2008 on

criminal domestic violence charges.

Finally, the probation officer explained that Isaac

refused medication to treat his anxiety and substance dependence,

despite the probation office paying the cost of his prescription

medications. The Probation Motions asserted that Isaac's refusal

to take these medications "sabotag[ed] his mental health

treatment," thus violating his condition of release requiring him

to "participate in a mental health program . . . as arranged and

approved by [his] U.S. Probation Officer."

Isaac waived his right to a preliminary revocation

hearing, and the district court subsequently entered a finding of

probable cause "as to all violations included in the motions filed

by [Isaac's probation officer] at Dockets No. 108 and 117." The

matter proceeded to a final revocation hearing.

C. Final Revocation Hearing

Isaac began the final revocation hearing by admitting to

the violations: "[A]fter review of both the motions of the

- 6 - Probation Officer notifying violations at docket entry 108 and

117, the Defendant will not be contesting these violations but we

would like to be heard before Your Honor pronounces sentencing."

Isaac then broadly summarized the allegations, explaining that the

Probation Motions allege "four positive results to marijuana and

another one to benzo[diazepines] and the other one, basically the

Probation Officer informed the Court of a domestic violence case

that the Defendant had in State Court."

Isaac then identified mitigating circumstances for the

court's consideration in sentencing, explaining that the most

recent Commonwealth domestic violence charges involved no force or

physical aggression, only threats. And those charges, he noted,

were dismissed before the final revocation hearing. Isaac also

stressed that an existing restraining order would preclude him

from "communicat[ing] with the victim."

Isaac further explained that he had been diagnosed with

impulsiveness, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. He stated that,

to treat these conditions, he "was taking his medications" and had

been attending a mental health clinic every month for nearly a

year, even while working. Citing monthly reports from the clinic,

Isaac highlighted that he "had taken positive steps toward [his

treatment] goals, that he was on time for his appointments[,] and

was communicative." And, despite the prior modifications of his

release conditions, Isaac noted that "[t]his [was] basically his

- 7 - first revocation hearing." Isaac's own allocution to the court

requested one "last opportunity" to "not go on the way that [he]

ha[d] been going," and he asked for a sentence within the

applicable Guidelines range of four to ten months of imprisonment.

The government requested a much longer term of

imprisonment. Isaac's conduct, the government argued, justified

a sentence beyond the Guidelines range because he had harassed his

former romantic partner, continuing a pattern of threatening women

going back to 2008. Though the Commonwealth charges were

eventually dismissed, the government viewed Isaac's multiple

arrests for similar conduct as occurring "too many times . . . to

be a coincidence." Even accepting that Isaac's conduct came "from

a place of mental health," the government asserted "he's not fixing

it." On that basis, the government concluded that a prison

sentence "closer to three years" was more appropriate than the

applicable Guidelines range.

Although the district court acknowledged that the

relevant Guidelines range provided for a term of imprisonment of

four to ten months, the court nonetheless imposed a prison sentence

of thirty-six months -- a sentence more than three times longer

than the high end of the applicable Guidelines range. The court

justified its significant upward variance because Isaac had "shown

that he is unable to comply with the conditions of supervision

imposed on him." Specifically, the court explained that Isaac did

- 8 - not follow the requirements of his mental health and substance

abuse treatment programs in that he continually used controlled

substances and declined to pick up his prescribed anti-anxiety

medications. The court noted that the probation office had spent

more than $8,000 providing for Isaac's treatment, including the

cost of his medications. Moreover, Isaac had engaged in conduct

constituting a crime by threatening his former romantic partner.

Thus, the court concluded, Isaac's sentence was necessary to

"promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for his

violations . . . and to protect the public from additional crimes

by Mr. Isaac."

Isaac objected to the sentence as procedurally and

substantively unreasonable.1 In so doing, Isaac again explained

that "he was benefitting from treatment" and "manag[ed] to go to

every single session for over a year" while holding a stable job.

Isaac emphasized that he "underst[ood] what he did was wrong," and

once more stated "[h]e did not contest the allegations." But,

Isaac concluded, "[his] conduct d[id] not amount to the punishment"

1 Isaac does not advance a substantive reasonableness claim on appeal. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 2, No. 21-1855 (1st Cir. Feb. 3, 2023), ECF No. 48 ("On appeal, Mr. Isaac does not argue he did not violate his conditions of release, or that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. He is challenging the procedural reasonableness of his sentence . . . .").

- 9 - imposed by the district court. The court noted the objection for

the record. Isaac now appeals his sentence.2

II.

We review preserved sentencing challenges for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Viloria-Sepulveda,

(1st Cir. 2019). Unpreserved challenges are subject only to plain

error review. United States v. Bruzón-Velázquez,

(1st Cir. 2022). "Under the plain error standard, the appellant

must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious

and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights,

but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings." Viloria-Sepulveda,

n.1 (quoting United States v. Soto-Soto,

(1st Cir. 2017)).

A criminal defendant's sentence must be procedurally and

substantively reasonable. United States v. Contreras-Delgado,

(1st Cir. 2019). A district court commits a

procedural error by, among other things, "selecting a sentence

based on clearly erroneous facts."

(quoting Gall v. United

States,

(2007)). In making factual findings, a

2 Isaac was released from incarceration in October 2023. However, he is currently serving a term of supervised release. Isaac thus continues to have a stake in the outcome of this appeal because "[i]f we were to determine that his incarcerative sentence was unreasonable, he could seek equitable relief." United States v. Reyes-Barreto,

(1st Cir. 2022).

- 10 - sentencing court may consider evidence not usually admissible in

a criminal trial. See United States v. Colón-Maldonado,

(1st Cir. 2020). That said, a court may only consider reliable

evidence in determining a sentence. Id.; see also United States

v. Mills,

(1st Cir. 2013) ("[T]he court can consider

all kinds of relevant information regardless of admissibility at

trial (including hearsay that has never been tested by

cross-examination), provided it has 'sufficient indicia of

reliability to support its probable accuracy.'" (quoting U.S.S.G.

§ 6A1.3(a))).

III.

Isaac challenges the procedural reasonableness of his

sentence on two grounds. First, he argues that the district court

based its sentence on impermissible factual findings. Second, he

claims that the district court failed to consider relevant

mitigating evidence as required by

(a). We address

each argument in turn.

A. Factual Basis for the Sentence

1. Medications

Isaac contends that the district court erred in finding

that he was "not taking or even picking up the mental health

[medication] with which he was prescribed for his anxiety

disorder." Isaac notes that, during the final revocation hearing,

he told the district court that "he was taking his medications for

- 11 - [his] mental health treatment." Because the government never

disputed that statement, Isaac insists the district court erred in

making a contrary finding absent any evidence on the issue.

As an initial matter, we note that the parties dispute

whether Isaac preserved his challenge concerning the district

court's reference to his medication regimen. If not, we would

review his argument under the plain error standard. However, we

need not resolve that issue because Isaac cannot prevail even if

we grant him the benefit of reviewing the district court's decision

for abuse of discretion, United States v. Polaco-Hance,

(1st Cir. 2024), the more favorable standard of review.

By admitting to the violations detailed in the Probation

Motions, Isaac himself provided the district court with a

sufficiently reliable basis for the factual finding regarding his

prescribed medication. True, Isaac did not mention his medication

regimen in his quick summary of the Probation Motions at the

beginning of the hearing. However, both before and after that

summary, Isaac provided a broad, unqualified statement that he was

not contesting the violations described in the Probation Motions.

In addition to detailing how Isaac failed several drug tests and

was arrested multiple times on allegations of domestic violence,

those motions explained that Isaac had "sabotaged his mental health

treatment" by, among other things, "refus[ing] his medication paid

[for] by the probation office." It is well established that a

- 12 - defendant's admission to certain conduct provides a sufficiently

reliable basis for a court to consider the admitted-to conduct

during sentencing, and the district court was therefore entitled

to rely on Isaac's concession. See United States v. Rivera-Ruiz,

(1st Cir. 2022); see also United States v.

Dávila-Bonilla,

(1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that a

district court did not err in considering a local charge that did

not result in conviction because the defendant's admissions in an

unobjected-to presentence report ("PSR") "provide some greater

indicia of reliability that the actions triggering the arrests

occurred" (alteration and quotation marks omitted) (quoting United

States v. Rodríguez-Reyes,

(1st Cir. 2019))).

Perhaps recognizing that district courts are generally

allowed to rely on such admissions, Isaac instead focuses his

argument on the scope of his concession. Isaac contends that,

although he accepted responsibility for violating his conditions

of release, he never made a blanket admission to every underlying

factual allegation detailed in the Probation Motions. He asserts

that, by later telling the sentencing court he "was taking his

medications," he had in fact disputed the contrary representations

found in the Probation Motions. And because those representations

were disputed, Isaac concludes that the district court abused its

discretion in finding, without evidence, that he was not taking

his medications.

- 13 - Isaac's position is unsupported by the record and

precluded by our precedent. In United States v. Portell-Márquez,

(1st Cir. 2023), for example, Portell was charged

with violating Puerto Rico's domestic violence law while on

supervised release.

. As here, Portell's Commonwealth

charges were dismissed before his revocation hearing, but the

probation officer's motion still described the altercation

underlying his arrest.

at 535 n.1. At his first revocation

hearing, Portell similarly told the court that he did not contest

the violations and, more specifically, that "he was not

contesting . . . the [docketed] motion filed by the probation

officer."

(quotation marks omitted). For reasons

unrelated to the present issue, we vacated Portell's sentence from

his first revocation hearing.3 On remand, in his second revocation

hearing, Portell again did not contest the violations as set forth

in his probation officer's motion. He instead argued, like Isaac,

that a Guidelines sentence was appropriate and "informed the court

During his first revocation hearing, Portell urged the 3

district court to find that his conduct underlying the arrest constituted a "grade B" violation, which carries a lower Guidelines range than a "grade A" violation. See Portell-Márquez,

. The district court determined that Portell's conduct constituted a grade A violation, and Portell appealed the resulting sentence. In Portell's first appeal to this court, the government conceded the district court's grading analysis was erroneous, so we vacated Portell's sentence and remanded the case to the district court for another revocation hearing. See United States v. Portell-Márquez, No. 21-1447,

, at *1-2 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 2021).

- 14 - that he would be receiving treatment for his anger management

issues."

. The district court imposed an upwardly

variant sentence based on the conduct described in the probation

officer's motion, and Portell again appealed his sentence.

In affirming, we explained that district courts "may

rely on [a defendant's] admission as demonstrating reliably that

the conduct alleged [in a probation officer's motion] occurred,

just as we have previously held that it may do so where the

admission is made to conduct described in a PSR."

.

Like Isaac, Portell had asserted "that the district court

misunderstood the scope of his admission, claiming that while he

admitted to violating [Puerto Rico's domestic violence statute],

and thus the conditions of his supervised release, he did not admit

to any specific conduct in violation of [that statute]."

We

rejected that argument because Portell told the court that he was

"not contesting" his probation officer's motion, which detailed

the facts at issue.

Moreover, Portell's arguments in favor

of mitigation at sentencing "were implicitly premised on the facts

alleged in the probation officer's motion," so he could not

"disclaim[] their validity" on appeal.

Isaac's admission here was substantively identical to

the admission in Portell-Márquez. Again, Isaac categorically

stated that he was not contesting the violations found in the

Probation Motions; his only request was that he "be heard before

- 15 - [the district court] pronounce[d] sentencing." By accepting

responsibility for his non-compliant conduct, Isaac appears to

have made a reasonable strategic choice to glide quickly through

the "guilt or violation-determination phase" of the hearing,

focusing instead on mitigation arguments in hopes of a more lenient

sentence. See Colón-Maldonado,

(describing the

division in revocation hearings between "the guilt or violation-

determination phase" and "the sentencing phase"). Isaac cannot

now disclaim his admission simply because his mitigation arguments

did not result in the sentence he requested.

We do not view Isaac's passing comment that he "was

taking his medications" as revoking or otherwise qualifying his

broad admission at the outset of the revocation hearing. If Isaac

wanted to walk back his unqualified admission, he needed to do so

expressly. Indeed, Isaac's concluding remarks from the revocation

hearing reconfirmed his initial admission. Despite having stated

that he "was taking his medications," Isaac later emphasized that

"he did not contest the allegations."4 The district court was thus

entitled to rely on the details in the Probation Motions in

finalizing Isaac's sentence.

To be precise, Isaac stated that "he did not contest the 4

allegations" in noting his objection to the district court's sentence.

- 16 - 2. Cost of Treatment

Isaac next argues that the district court erred in noting

that the probation office had spent more than $8,000 on his

treatment, including the cost of his medications. More

specifically, Isaac draws our attention to the following comments

by the district court at sentencing:

During his period of supervision, the Probation Officer afforded Mr. Isaac with mental and substance abuse treatment with which Mr. Isaac did not follow by continuously using controlled substances and by not taking or even picking up the mental health [medication] with which he was prescribed for his anxiety disorder. He preferred to self-medicate by using marijuana.

The Probation Office[] has spent over $8,000 providing Mr. Isaac with the substance abuse and mental health treatment including paying for prescription drugs to absolutely no avail.

In addition, Mr. Isaac has engaged in conduct constituting a crime and failed the Residential Reentry Center, as ordered by the Court, verbally harassed his former consensual partner, hundreds of times, from different telephones and going to her work place with convicted felons and threatening her and her children. He has also become violent towards third parties.

Though the uncontested Probation Motions explained that

the probation office had paid for Isaac's substance-abuse and

mental-health treatment, including his medications, the $8,000

price tag is not in the record. Isaac contends that the district

court erred by making a factual finding about the cost of his

treatment sua sponte. However, Isaac failed to object to any

finding by the district court concerning the cost of his treatment.

- 17 - We therefore review this argument for plain error. See United

States v. Ramos-Carreras,

, 5 (1st Cir. 2023) (applying

plain error standard where defendant "did not raise any objection

to the court's description of the alleged conduct"); see also

Soto-Soto,

& n.1 (applying plain error standard

because only an "[in]sufficiently specific," "general objection"

was raised to the court's comments later challenged on appeal).5

The district court's reference to the off-record $8,000

figure does give us pause. A sentencing court may rely on

off-record evidence from a probation officer only if "new facts

relevant to the sentencing calculus . . . are disclosed to the

parties and subjected to whatever adversarial testing may be

appropriate." United States v. Bramley,

(1st Cir.

2017). Here, although Isaac acknowledges that he was aware of the

$8,000 cost of his treatment because "a similar monetary figure is

5 Isaac argues in a Rule 28(j) letter that our decision in United States v. Teixeira,

(1st Cir. 2023), requires us to apply an abuse of discretion standard where counsel did not have a sufficient opportunity to object to a particular ruling. We disagree with the applicability of that precedent. The district court in Teixeira, after making the relevant ruling, "did not invite comments from the lawyers" before moving to a different phase of the proceeding and then ending the hearing.

. We took a practical view of those circumstances and held that a lawyer need not "[i]nterrupt[] a judge in mid-stride" to properly preserve an objection.

In contrast, the district court here affirmatively gave Isaac an opportunity to object to the sentence. Indeed, Isaac used that opportunity to contest the court's lack of consideration of his mitigation-related arguments. See infra Section III.B.

- 18 - found in the disclosures that Probation made in preparation for

the final revocation hearing,"6 it is difficult to see how Isaac

had a meaningful opportunity to test that figure in an adversarial

forum. After all, the first and only mention of the $8,000 during

the proceeding was by the district court just before it pronounced

Isaac's sentence.

Ultimately, however, we need not resolve the

adversarial-testing issue because nothing in the record suggests

that the $8,000 cost of treatment affected the length of Isaac's

sentence. Isaac therefore cannot satisfy the third element of

plain error review, which requires an appellant to show the

purported error "affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings." United States v. Gilman,

(1st

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Olano,

(1993)).

In explaining its sentence, the district court stressed

that Isaac's substance-abuse and mental-health treatment had been

unsuccessful, even with financial assistance from the probation

6 Neither the district court's docket nor the record on appeal reveals how these disclosures were made. Thus, we may only speculate as to how the district court learned of the $8,000 figure. The court's local rules recommend that disclosures related to revocation proceedings be made "via email when possible." L. Crim. R. 132.1(c) (D.P.R. 2023). Hence, the district court may have been included on email correspondence containing the relevant disclosures. Alternatively, Isaac's probation officer may have mentioned the $8,000 figure in an ex parte discussion with the court.

- 19 - office, given Isaac's multiple positive drug tests and allegations

of harassment. Viewed in context, the district court's

consideration of that admitted-to conduct was unrelated to the

amount of money the probation office had spent on Isaac's

treatment. For the district court, the bottom-line was that

Isaac's treatment appeared to be doing little to stem his

concerning conduct. The specific cost of that treatment was a

superfluous detail unconnected to the justifications for the

sentence. Accordingly, we cannot say that, "but for" the district

court's consideration of the $8,000 figure, "the district court

would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence."

(quoting United States v. Turbides-Leonardo,

(1st

Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Padilla,

(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("[T]he proponent -- the party asserting

plain error -- must show 'a reasonable probability that, but for

[the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been

different." (second alteration in original) (quoting United States

v. Dominguez Benitez,

(2004))).

In sum, we see no plain error in the district court's

factual findings related to Isaac's sentence.

B. Consideration of Section 3553(a) Factors

Under

(a)(1), a sentencing court must

consider, among other things, "the history and characteristics of

the defendant" in determining the appropriate sentence. Isaac

- 20 - argues the district court failed to evaluate his specific history

and characteristics because the court pronounced his sentence

without mentioning his clinical attendance record, positive

treatment reports, or employment status. Isaac objected to his

sentence on the same basis. We review this preserved claim under

an abuse of discretion standard. See Viloria-Sepulveda,

.

It is true that the district court did not engage in a

point-by-point analysis of each argument Isaac raised in favor of

mitigation. But we have never required district courts to rebut

a defendant's sentencing arguments at such a granular level. See

United States v. Landrón-Class,

(1st Cir. 2012)

("[A] sentencing court is not required to address frontally every

argument advanced by the parties, nor need it dissect every factor

made relevant by

." (quoting Turbides–Leonardo,

468 F.3d at 40–41)). To the contrary, "[w]hen a defendant has

identified potentially mitigating sentencing factors and those

factors are thoroughly debated at sentencing, the fact that the

court did not explicitly mention them during the sentencing hearing

suggests they were unconvincing, not ignored." United States v.

Coplin-Benjamin,

(1st Cir. 2023) (quotation marks

omitted) (quoting United States v. Díaz-Lugo,

(1st Cir. 2020)).

- 21 - Here, the district court satisfied its obligations under

§ 3553(a). The court began its decision by stating on the record

that it had "taken into consideration the factors set forth in

Title

(a) and the seriousness

of Mr. Isaac's violations." Though we do not give much weight to

that boilerplate pronouncement, the court then properly proceeded

to engage with Isaac's broader argument regarding the efficacy of

his medical treatment. In other words, the district court

distilled most of Isaac's arguments as standing for the proposition

that his mental health and substance abuse treatment was working.

The district court considered and rejected that argument by noting

that Isaac had been afforded treatment "to absolutely no avail."

That is because, the court explained, Isaac had admitted to

"continuously using controlled substances" and "harass[ing] his

former consensual partner[] hundreds of times." The court

continued by noting that Isaac "ha[d] also become violent towards

third parties," as evident from his standoff in the residential

center during his most recent arrest.

These observations by the district court directly

address Isaac's history and characteristics as required by

§ 3553(a)(1). A district court may commit procedural error by

"failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors," Gall,

,

but the depth of a district court's consideration of those factors

is typically a matter of discretion. Isaac's assertion that the

- 22 - district court should have rebutted his arguments with more

specificity does not demonstrate an abuse of that discretion. See

Coplin-Benjamin,

. Though the district court could

have provided more detail in justifying Isaac's sentence, its

explanation of the chosen sentence was nonetheless adequate. Cf.

Gall,

(noting a district court may abuse its

discretion by failing to explain why a sentence deviated from the

Guidelines range). Hence, Isaac has failed to show that the

district court abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence.

We thus affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

So ordered.

- 23 -