United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit


No. 22-1652

                         FAGBEMI MIRANDA,

                      Petitioner, Appellant,

                                v.

                         STEPHEN KENNEDY,

                      Respondent, Appellee.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

          [Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]


                              Before

                       Barron, Chief Judge,
              Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.


     Susan J. Baronoff, with whom Baronoff Law Office was on brief,
for appellant.

     Eva M. Badway, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts,
with whom Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on
brief, for appellee.


                         January 3, 2025
           HOWARD, Circuit Judge.        In June 2013, Fagbemi Miranda

was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts state court.

At the jury trial, defense counsel's aim was to discredit the

government's key witness, advancing the theory that Miranda's

brother   was    instead   responsible   for   the   shooting.   Miranda,

however, wanted to testify that he shot the victim but that it was

in self-defense, so he should be acquitted -- a theory that trial

counsel and the judge did not believe to be viable.         The issues in

this habeas case stem largely from that disagreement in approach.

Under the deferential standard of review we apply to state-court

convictions on habeas review, we find Miranda's arguments to be

unavailing and affirm.

                                    I.

                                    A.

           The charges against Miranda stemmed from events that

took place in the evening of October 10, 2005.1         Miranda and a man

named Christopher Barros were engaged in an argument outside the

house where Miranda lived with his family (the "Miranda home"),

screaming and aggressively gesturing at one another in close

proximity.      A third, unidentified man looked on.       Shortly before


     1 We primarily draw the facts of the October 10 altercation
from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision affirming
Miranda's conviction.    Commonwealth v. Miranda, 

(2020). These are facts that "the jury could have found based on
the Commonwealth's evidence." 

. Details of Miranda's
trial, including his testimony, are drawn from trial transcripts.


                                  - 2 -
8:30 p.m., Miranda's younger brother, Wayne Miranda ("Wayne"),

came out of the Miranda home and joined the argument.   He then ran

back inside and returned with a black handgun, which he pointed at

Barros's forehead.    Miranda tried to get the gun away from Wayne

and push him back into the Miranda home, repeatedly yelling "no"

and telling him to stop.

          Barros ran across the street and into an open driveway

alongside a nearby house.     Wayne chased after him, and Miranda

chased after Wayne, with the unidentified man following behind.

When the brothers reached the end of the driveway, they halted

near the garage, and after briefly exchanging words, Wayne passed

the gun to Miranda.    A neighbor who lived on the second floor of

the house saw Miranda raise the gun and point it toward the fence

on the far side of the yard.     Two gunshots rang out.     Another

neighbor then saw both Miranda brothers and the unidentified man

emerge from the driveway onto the sidewalk, where one of the

brothers passed the gun to the other brother before going inside

the Miranda home.

          Police responded soon after and located Barros, who was

unconscious, on the other side of the fence.   No weapons were found

on his person or nearby.    He had been shot in the left arm and

leg, and he was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital.   The

neighbor living in the house did not report what she had seen in

the driveway and refused to make a formal statement.       Based on


                               - 3 -
their   initial   investigation     that    night,    police       arrested    and

charged Wayne.

            About 18 months later, police executed a search warrant

at the neighbor's house, resulting in her arrest for trafficking

cocaine in a school zone and related charges.               She entered into a

cooperation agreement with the government to avoid incarceration

in exchange, in part, for truthful testimony about the October 10

shooting.

                                     B.

            In March 2008, Miranda was indicted for the murder of

Barros, as well as assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and

unlawful possession of a firearm.          By 2011, Miranda and his first

counsel disagreed about how best to approach the case.                Miranda's

counsel wanted to defend the case by attacking the neighbor's

credibility, given the cooperation agreement and the fact that she

was the only one who identified Miranda as the shooter.                Miranda,

however, insisted that he fired the gun in self-defense and wanted

to testify to that effect.         Miranda's counsel filed a motion to

withdraw, which the judge granted.          The same conflict arose with

his second counsel.        Miranda maintained that he did not want to

"place the guilt" on Wayne.        This time, however, the judge twice

denied counsel's motion to withdraw, the second time in part

because   Miranda   told    the   judge   that   he   was    not    prepared   to

represent himself at that time.


                                    - 4 -
          At     trial,   these   differences   in   desired   approach

persisted.     Although Miranda's habeas petition challenges several

aspects of his trial, we focus below on the facts relevant to the

issue that we deem closest (though we ultimately conclude it lacks

merit): counsel's failure to direct his testimony.

          After the government rested at trial, defense counsel

requested that he introduce Miranda to the jury and allow him to

testify in narrative form instead of through direct examination.

The judge granted that request.           In narrative form, Miranda

testified that he drove home after dinner, parked his car, and

noticed Barros in an unfamiliar car parked across the street.        In

his telling, Miranda recognized Barros in the car and approached

to greet him, but Barros got out of the car and punched him "for

no apparent reason."      Miranda testified that they then got into a

shouting match, with Miranda seeking an explanation.      After seeing

the unidentified man then emerge from the passenger side of the

car, Miranda continued, he felt that he was outnumbered and yelled

for help from his brothers inside.    He went on to state that Wayne,

who knew there had been a lot of shootings in the neighborhood,

came out with the gun to try to get them to go away.           Moreover,

Miranda added, Barros said to Wayne, "Mother-fucker, I'm going to

kill you. Come at me with that, I'm going kill [sic] you." Miranda

then recounted that Barros ran down a nearby driveway, kicked out

a basement window of the adjacent house, and "went to go reach for


                                  - 5 -
something."         Miranda testified that he then took the firearm from

Wayne at the beginning of the driveway and followed Barros into

the house's yard.         He thought he saw Barros on the other side of

a fence, he continued, where "it looked like he's reaching."                     So,

in his telling, he shot at Barros's arm and leg to "disarm him and

stop the mobility there, that's all," emphasizing that he did not

intend to kill Barros.

              The    prosecutor      cross-examined    Miranda,   during       which

Miranda again admitted to killing Barros but denied that he made

a "conscious decision" to do so because "[e]verything [was] moving

fast."       Miranda also explained that the driveway Barros ran down

was located directly across from his house, so "if [Barros] would

have came [sic] out of that driveway while [they] were walking in

the    house     and    started      shooting,"    Miranda,    Wayne,    and    his

grandmother would have been in the line of fire.                Defense counsel

did    not    conduct    redirect     examination     or   introduce    any    other

evidence.

              At the trial's conclusion, defense counsel delivered a

summation that emphasized the jury's role in assessing witness

credibility.         To do so, he made two arguments that each drew on

that    theme.         First,   he    criticized    the    credibility    of     the

prosecution's        witnesses,      highlighting     in   particular    why     the

neighbor's cooperation agreement with the government called the

veracity of her testimony into doubt.               Second, he noted that the


                                        - 6 -
jury could "credit everything Mr. Miranda said," "[t]ake it at

face value," and nonetheless acquit him of first-degree murder in

light of mitigating circumstances.             Defense counsel concluded his

remarks by asking the jury to evaluate the prosecution's evidence

"piece    by    piece,    witness     by    witness,"   rather      than   consider

Miranda's testimony alone.

               Miranda was ultimately convicted of first-degree murder

with     deliberate      premeditation,       assault   and     battery       with   a

dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm.                       He was

sentenced to life in prison without parole.

               After trial, Miranda filed a notice of appeal and a

motion for a new trial.             Following review in lower courts, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") affirmed Miranda's

convictions      and   the   denial    of    his   motion     for   a   new    trial.

Commonwealth v. Miranda, 

, 818, 836 (2020).                      Miranda

filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States

Supreme Court, which was denied in November 2020.                       Miranda v.

Massachusetts, 

, 683 (2020).

               Miranda then turned to the federal courts for habeas

relief, filing a petition in the District of Massachusetts in

October 2021. The district court denied the petition and dismissed

the case in July 2022 but granted a certificate of appealability.

Miranda v. Kennedy, 

, at *8 (D. Mass. July 26,

2022).    We now review his petition on appeal.


                                       - 7 -
                                          II.

            Our review of the district court's denial of habeas

relief is de novo.       Scott v. Gelb, 

 (1st Cir. 2016).

However, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

("AEDPA"),      "our     review    of     state        court   legal       and    factual

determinations is highly deferential."                   Teti v. Bender, 

   (1st   Cir.    2007).         When    assessing      a     claim      that   was

adjudicated on the merits in state court, we "must defer to the

state court determination unless it:

            (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
            to, or involved an unreasonable application
            of, clearly established Federal law, as
            determined by the Supreme Court of the United
            States; or

            (2) resulted in a decision that was based on
            an unreasonable determination of the facts in
            light of the evidence presented in the State
            court proceeding."

 (quoting 

(d)).                 This is a steep hurdle for

Miranda    to   overcome.         Even   what     we    may    deem   an    "incorrect"

application of federal law may not be an "unreasonable" one.

Scott, 

 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Harrington v.

Richter, 

 (2011)).                An "unreasonable application"

of federal law exists when "the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's

case."     Porter v. Coyne-Fague, 

 (1st Cir. 2022)



                                         - 8 -
(alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 

   (2000)).   The   application   "must   be   'objectively

unreasonable,' not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not

suffice."    White v. Woodall, 

 (2014) (quoting

Lockyer v. Andrade, 

 (2003)). And an application

is unreasonable "if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly

established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could

be no 'fairminded disagreement' on the question."            

 at 427

(quoting Harrington, 

).

            As the district court concluded, Miranda's arguments do

not clear this hurdle.      He argues (1) that defense counsel's

actions interfered with his right under McCoy v. Louisiana, 

 (2018), to decide the objective of his defense -- namely,

to not blame his brother for what he had done and to argue that he

acted in self-defense; (2) that his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process was violated by the trial judge's refusal to instruct

the jury on self-defense; and (3) that because Miranda was required

to testify in narrative form without preparation, and because his

counsel told the jury in closing argument that they need not credit

Miranda's testimony, Miranda was deprived of his rights to testify

and to effective assistance of counsel.        All of these are either

issues on which the SJC's rulings were correct or, at a minimum,

issues on which fairminded jurists could certainly disagree.          We

briefly explain why as to each issue, but we go into more depth as


                                 - 9 -
to the one issue that merits the closest attention: whether the

failure of Miranda's counsel to prepare and direct his testimony

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                  A.

          Miranda first argues that his trial counsel interfered

with his right to set the objective of his defense under McCoy,

pointing to his counsel's presentation of a witness-credibility

defense   instead   of   the   self-defense   argument   that   Miranda

advocated.   The SJC disagreed with Miranda, holding that in this

case "defense counsel and the defendant shared the same principal

objective: outright acquittal" and that their disagreement was as

to "what strategic and tactical approach should be used to achieve

that end."   Miranda, 484 Mass. at 822.         Specifically, the SJC

observed that "defense counsel did not concede the defendant's

guilt over objection or alleviate the prosecution's burden of proof

on any elements of the charges."       Id. at 823.   It thus found this

case to be distinguishable from McCoy, which it described as a

case in which "defense counsel's concession of guilt had interfered

with his client's right to insist on his innocence."       Id. at 822.

We do not find that the SJC's reasoning was an unreasonable

application of this principle from McCoy.

                                  B.

          Miranda's next argument takes aim at the state trial

court, claiming that the trial judge's refusal to issue a jury


                                - 10 -
instruction       on   self-defense    deprived    him    of   his   Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process.              On review, the SJC considered

"whether there [was] any record evidence to support at least a

reasonable doubt that" Miranda "actually and reasonably believed"

that he was in imminent danger necessitating the use of deadly

force, attempted to use "all proper means and reasonably available

avenues of escape prior to" doing so, and only used the "level of

force reasonably necessary."          Id. at 810-11.     We see no reversible

error in the SJC's conclusion that Miranda was not entitled to a

jury instruction on self-defense because "[he] had no reasonable

basis for concluding that the victim was armed" and "had numerous

opportunities to retreat and avoid the confrontation once the

victim fled across the street."          Id. at 811-12.

                                        C.

             Finally,     Miranda     argues    that     his   conviction     is

constitutionally defective because of purported violations of his

rights to testify and to effective assistance of counsel.               To make

this argument, Miranda relies on two events at trial: his counsel

and the court's decision to let him testify in an undirected

narrative form without preparation and his counsel's suggestion to

the   jury   in    closing   argument    that     they   may   discredit    that

testimony.     The SJC found these arguments unavailing, and under

the highly deferential framework of AEDPA, we cannot say they make

out "clear error" with which no "fairminded jurist" could agree.


                                      - 11 -
See White, 

; Strickland v. Goguen, 

(1st Cir. 2021).    We first address Miranda's arguments pertaining

to his narrative testimony before turning to his arguments about

counsel's closing argument.

                                  1.

          As an initial matter, it was not unreasonable for the

SJC to conclude that the issue of Miranda's narrative testimony is

properly analyzed under the Strickland v. Washington ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel   framework      (which   requires   a   showing   of

prejudice), 

 (1984), rather than the United States

v. Cronic deprivation-of-counsel framework (which does not), 

 (1984).     Under Strickland, an individual claiming

ineffective assistance of counsel must show both "that counsel's

performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense."      Strickland, 

.         Cronic

outlines an exception to that standard, presuming prejudice "if

the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial."

466 U.S. at 659; see also id. at 659 n.25 ("The Court has uniformly

found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when

counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the

accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.").            However,

"the Cronic exception is exceedingly narrow" and applies only

"where the defendant has demonstrated that 'the attorney's failure

[was] complete.'"   United States v. Theodore, 

 (1st


                                - 12 -
Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v. Cone, 

 (2002)).    "In other words, 'the circumstances

leading to counsel's ineffectiveness [must be] so egregious that

the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at

all.'"   

 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Griffin, 

 (5th Cir. 2003)).   Other circuits have

applied the Cronic exception when counsel slept through portions

of a capital murder trial and when counsel sat silently throughout

the entire trial.   

 (citing Burdine v. Johnson, 

 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Harding v. Davis, 

 (11th Cir. 1989)).   We have held that it does not apply to

cases involving "bad lawyering, regardless of how bad."       

(quoting Scarpa v. Dubois, 

 (1st Cir. 1994)).

          Miranda argues that his counsel's errors regarding his

testimony amount to denial of counsel and therefore fall under

this exception to the prejudice requirement. But the cases Miranda

cites are consequentially unlike the situation here, where counsel

continued to represent the defendant throughout the trial, advised

him not to testify after explaining the law of self-defense to

him, opted for the strategy of narrative testimony when the

defendant persisted in his desire to testify, and objected to

various questions on cross-examination.   Cf. Ferguson v. Georgia,

 (1961) (holding that state law requiring

narrative testimony deprived defendants of counsel).   Given these


                              - 13 -
affirmative            steps     by    Miranda's      counsel     to        "subject     the

prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," it does not

follow       that      his     counsel    "entirely        fail[ed]"   to     oppose     his

prosecution.           Bell, 

 (quoting Cronic, 

).       Rather, Miranda identifies "specific attorney errors" made

by his counsel in the course of defending his case akin to those

that       the    Supreme      Court     "[has]   held      subject    to    Strickland's

performance and prejudice requirements."                       

.          Given

the lack of any contradictory Supreme Court decision directly on

point, we thus cannot conclude that the SJC unreasonably applied

clearly established law in determining that this situation did not

fall under Cronic.              See Wright v. Van Patten, 

, 125-

26 (2008) (finding no unreasonable application where no Supreme

Court decision "clearly establishes that Cronic should replace

Strickland in this novel factual context").2 We therefore proceed,

as   the         SJC   did,    with    applying      the     Strickland      ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel rubric.




       In concluding that the issue of Miranda's testimony was "not
       2

structural" and instead "properly analyzed as an issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel," the SJC, while citing to
Cronic, did so only for the proposition that Strickland generally
requires a showing of prejudice. See Miranda, 484 Mass. at 830
n.6. But we need not decide whether the SJC's determination "falls
beyond the ambit of AEDPA," Clements v. Clarke, 

(1st Cir. 2010), because even on de novo review, counsel's error
does not fall under Cronic for reasons already explained.


                                            - 14 -
           Addressing   the   first   step    of   Strickland,    the   SJC

concluded that defense counsel had erred by failing to prepare

Miranda to testify and by failing to direct his testimony during

trial.    Miranda, 484 Mass. at 828.         The SJC analyzed the issue

under Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(e), which

provides that counsel may not aid in construing false testimony if

counsel knows that the defendant intends to perjure himself.            Id.

The SJC concluded that because counsel did not make a formal

invocation of Rule 3.3(e), he did not indicate that he had made a

"good faith determination that there was a firm basis in fact to

conclude his client was about to perjure himself."          Id.     Absent

that good faith determination, the SJC wrote, "counsel and the

court should not have restricted the form of the defendant's

testimony to an undirected narrative," "defense counsel should

have prepared the defendant to testify," and "defense counsel then

should have directed the defendant's trial testimony."             Id. at

828-29.    Thus, the SJC concluded that Miranda had established

deficient performance by counsel, satisfying the first prong of

Strickland.   See 466 U.S. at 687.

           Turning to the second Strickland prong, however, the SJC

concluded that there was no prejudice based on this failure to




                                - 15 -
prepare and direct testimony.3            Miranda, 484 Mass. at 831.            This

prong requires the individual to demonstrate that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland, 

.             The "defendant need not show that

counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the

outcome   in    the      case,"   only    that       there   was    a    "reasonable

probability"      that    it   did.      

.       "A    reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome."      

.        The SJC reasoned that because Miranda

had no viable self-defense claim, "there was no likelihood that

counsel's error prejudiced the defendant," "regardless of whether

the   testimony    was    presented      in    narrative     or    directed   form."

Miranda, 484 Mass. at 831.               It noted specifically that "the

defendant's armed pursuit of the victim through the alley and

around the corner, conclusively established by the defendant's own



      3 More precisely, the SJC concluded that there was no
"substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arising out of
the error." Miranda, 484 Mass. at 814. In assessing ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims, the SJC applies this standard set
forth by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278 § 33E, "which is more favorable
to a defendant than are the Federal or State constitutional
standards."   Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 

, 546 n.6
(2003). Given that this standard requires a lesser showing than
prejudice, the SJC's conclusion that Miranda had not met this
standard inherently encompassed the conclusion that Miranda had
not met Strickland's prejudice standard either. We therefore frame
our discussion solely in terms of federal constitutional
requirements.


                                       - 16 -
testimony, compelled the verdict in the instant case."   

 at 831

n.47.

          Miranda contends, however, that the SJC did not engage

with his argument that counsel's errors impaired his chances for

a lesser verdict of guilt, such as second-degree murder, even if

it did not affect his chances of outright acquittal.4        Under

Massachusetts law, to find a defendant guilty of first-degree

murder on a theory of deliberate premeditation, the state must

show that "he purposefully caused [the victim's] death after

reflection" and that there were no "mitigating circumstances."

Commonwealth v. Andrade, 

, 527-28 (2021); see also

Commonwealth v. Vargas, 

 (2016) ("[M]alice and

mitigating circumstances are mutually exclusive."); Commonwealth

v. Dubois,   

 (2008) ("Murder with deliberate

premeditation requires the Commonwealth to prove deliberation and

premeditation, a decision to kill and a killing in furtherance of

the decision.").   Mitigating circumstances include heat of passion

upon a reasonable provocation, heat of passion induced by sudden



     4 Even though "AEDPA constraints do not apply where a state
court decision does not resolve a federal claim that was presented
to it, and a habeas court will afford de novo review to the claim,"
Cooper v. Bergeron, 

 (1st Cir. 2015), Miranda
does not argue for de novo review of this issue on appeal and
instead assumes that the deferential framework of AEDPA applies.
We need not decide the standard of review as to this issue,
however, because we conclude, for reasons explained below, that
Miranda's challenge would fail under either standard.


                               - 17 -
combat, and excessive use of force in self-defense or in defense

of another.     Massachusetts Court System, Model Jury Instructions

on Homicide: IV. Murder in the first degree (2018); see also

Andrade, 488 Mass. at 528; Commonwealth v. Britt, 

 (2013).

           There   is    no   question    that    the   prejudice       prong    of

Strickland applies to situations in which a defendant might have

achieved   a   lesser    sentence   or    conviction      in   the     absence   of

counsel's errors.       See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 

(2012) ("[A]ny amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment

significance." (second alteration in original) (quoting Glover v.

United States, 

 (2001))).                     In other words,

prejudice does not require showing that there is a reasonable

probability that the defendant would have been fully acquitted,

only that "the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland, 

.         Being convicted of a lesser crime

than first-degree murder certainly would have been a different

result.    Miranda thus must show, at a minimum, a reasonable

probability    that     his   testimony   would    have    led    to    a   lesser

conviction had it been properly developed and directed by counsel.

He fails to do so.

           Miranda first argues that "[d]efense counsel's very act

of abandoning [him] to testify in narrative form . . . undermined

[his] testimony" concerning both deliberate premeditation and


                                    - 18 -
mitigating circumstances by "communicat[ing] to the jury that

defense counsel did not want [him] to testify and did not credit

his story."    Given the speculative nature of this contention,

however, we do not see how the format of the testimony -- on its

own -- could give rise to a reasonable probability of a lesser

conviction.   Nor does Miranda cite any authority holding that it

does.

          Miranda also argues that because he was left to testify

to these issues in narrative form without preparation, direction,

or redirection, his testimony was disorganized and incomplete,

leaving out key explanations.     Miranda testified that he did not

intend to kill Barros, that he believed Barros was reaching for a

gun, that Barros threatened to kill his brother, and that Barros

began the confrontation by striking Miranda.     He contends that,

with preparation and direction, he would have explained why he

thought Barros had access to a firearm, why he believed it was not

possible to retreat, or what he knew about Barros's prior acts of

violence and involvement in the drug trade.    In sum, he contends

that he was "unable to explain fully the reasons for [his] state

of mind at the time."

          But Miranda did explain his state of mind during his

testimony.    He testified, albeit during cross-examination, that

Barros chose not to run "south on Purchase [Street]," which was an

"avenue[] of escape," and instead ran down a driveway that is "a


                                - 19 -
known stash spot" for weapons and drugs, because it was "the only

driveway that's on that street with no gate."         And in response to

the prosecutor's question about his decision not to retreat, he

explained that he was "not making a conscious decision" at the

moment because "[e]verything [was] moving fast" and he was worried

that Barros had a weapon and "would [come] out of that driveway

while we were walking in the house and start[] shooting."          Indeed,

in articulating what he would have said had counsel prepared and

directed him, Miranda largely repeats what he did say on the stand

during   his   narrative   testimony.5      And   "[c]umulative   evidence

generally 'offer[s] an insignificant benefit, if any at all' for

purposes of a Strickland claim."         Ayala v. Alves, 

, 60

(1st Cir. 2023) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wong v.

Belmontes, 

 (2009)).

           Thus, even assuming that Miranda had a viable claim for

second-degree    murder    or   voluntary    manslaughter,   we   see   no

reasonable probability that his testimony would have led to such



     5 The only additional explanation that Miranda proffers for
his state mind on appeal -- on top of what he testified to
above -- pertains to what he knew or heard about: (1) Barros's
prior acts of violence and involvement in the drug trade; and (2)
the tendency of "people in the drug trade" to "track people to
their homes and assault them there if they have a beef with them."
Given the explanations that Miranda did provide in his narrative
testimony -- that Barros punched him for "for no apparent reason"
and threatened to kill his brother -- we see no reasonable
probability that this additional testimony would have led to a
different outcome.


                                  - 20 -
a    conviction had it been properly developed and directed by

counsel, and we certainly do not find the SJC's conclusion to the

same effect to be unreasonable.

                                         2.

             As for Miranda's challenge to defense counsel's closing

argument, the SJC concluded that it did not violate Miranda's

rights to testify and to effective assistance of counsel. Miranda,

484 Mass. at 833-34.          After reviewing defense counsel's closing

argument, the SJC held that "he made proper argument in the

alternative, providing the jury a path to an acquittal if the jury

decided to believe that the defendant's testimony was designed to

protect his younger brother, or to a verdict of less than murder

in    the   first    degree   if   the    jury   credited   the   defendant's

testimony."         Id. at 833.     Although Miranda contends that the

summation "heavily skewed toward" the defense counsel's preferred

strategy, the SJC's conclusion to the contrary did not constitute

an "unreasonable application" of federal law under our deferential

standard of review.       See 

(d)(1).

                                     III.

             We therefore affirm the district court's denial of the

petition.




                                    - 21 -