United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 23-2069

JENNIFER COTTO, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; JAMIE KIMBALL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; DAVID CUMMINGS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; TODD MOTON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; and TRAVIS MORAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

STACY FOSTER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; JONATHAN RILEY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; and NICOLE WESTCOTT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ANDREA J. CAMPBELL, Attorney General; TIMOTHY SHUGRUE, Berkshire County District Attorney; THOMAS M. QUINN, III, Bristol County District Attorney; ROBERT J. GALIBOIS, II, Cape and Islands District Attorney; PAUL TUCKER, Essex County District Attorney; ANTHONY GULLUNI, Hampden County District Attorney; MARIAN RYAN, Middlesex County District Attorney; MICHAEL W. MORRISSEY, Norfolk County District Attorney; DAVID E. SULLIVAN, Northwestern District Attorney; TIMOTHY J. CRUZ, Plymouth County District Attorney; KEVIN R. HAYDEN, Suffolk County District Attorney; JOSEPH D. EARLY, JR, Worcester County District Attorney; THOMAS G. AMBROSINO, Administrator of the Trial Court; and JOHN MAWN, JR., Massachusetts State Police Interim Superintendent,

Defendants, Appellants,

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; BROCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and all other police departments similarly situated; FALL RIVER POLICE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and all other police departments similarly situated; BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and all other police departments similarly situated; SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, on behalf of itself and all other police departments similarly situated; CHARLIE BAKER, Governor; DEBORAH B. GOLDBERG, Treasurer; EDWARD DOLAN, Commissioner of Probation; and DANIEL BENNETT, Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security,

Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Rikelman, Lynch, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Christine Fimognari, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Anne Sterman and Katherine B. Dirks, Assistant Attorneys General, were on brief, for appellants.

Daniel N. Marx, with whom William W. Fick, Luke Ryan, Fick & Marx LLP, and Strehorn, Ryan & Hoose were on brief, for appellees.

January 21, 2025 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. For almost a decade, two state

chemists in Massachusetts tampered with drug evidence and

falsified test results, undermining the reliability of forensic

evidence in tens of thousands of drug cases. After their egregious

misconduct was discovered, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court (SJC) vacated and dismissed with prejudice over 30,000

criminal cases tainted by their actions. Eventually, the SJC also

determined that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution, affected individuals were entitled to the repayment

of most funds collected as a consequence of their now-vacated

convictions, but not to the automatic return of any forfeited

property seized in connection with those convictions. See

Commonwealth v. Martinez,

(Mass. 2018).

Instead, because of the different legal standards and procedures

necessary for a conviction as opposed to a forfeiture order, the

SJC held that individuals seeking return of their property would

need to file motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of

the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. See

.

Plaintiffs in this case, dissatisfied with the SJC's

ruling on the forfeiture issue, request a federal court order that

would essentially require the automatic return of their forfeited

property. They also seek related relief, such as an accounting of

all forfeited property and additional procedural protections in

Rule 60(b) proceedings. The Commonwealth defendants moved to

- 3 - dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including that

plaintiff's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which

prohibits suits in federal court against a state by its own

citizens. The district court dismissed the complaint in part. It

held that it could not order the automatic return of plaintiffs'

forfeited property, but that plaintiffs' other claims could

proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh

Amendment, which permits suits against state officials in federal

court in certain circumstances. The Commonwealth defendants

appealed.

We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the

relief sought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' attempt to recover their

forfeited property focuses on a past alleged wrong, but the Ex

parte Young exception applies only when individuals seek

prospective relief against a state official's ongoing violation of

federal law. Because there is no ongoing violation to anchor

plaintiffs' various claims, there is no prospective or ancillary

relief to grant. Plaintiffs' claim for additional procedural

protections in state court also cannot proceed under Ex parte Young

because the state officials they sued lack the authority to enforce

or change those procedures. We therefore reverse the district

court's partial denial of the motion to dismiss and remand with

instructions to dismiss the case in full.

- 4 - I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

This case arises from the criminal actions of two former

state forensic chemists, Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak, who

tampered with evidence, falsified drug results, and committed

perjury in state court drug cases beginning in about 2004. After

their misconduct was discovered a decade later, the SJC vacated

and dismissed with prejudice over 30,000 drug cases tainted by

their involvement.

Two individuals whose criminal convictions had been

vacated due to Dookhan's misconduct each raised a federal due

process claim in state court and asked for the return of fees,

victim-witness assessments, restitution, fines, and court costs

associated with their convictions, as well as any civilly forfeited

assets. See Martinez,

. The SJC held that

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the

automatic return of most funds paid as a consequence of their

convictions, but not the forfeited assets that were seized under

a civil statute, section 47 of chapter 94C of the Massachusetts

General Laws ("State Act").

.

The SJC reasoned that the Due Process Clause did not

require the automatic return of forfeited assets because

plaintiffs' civil forfeiture judgments were not solely a

consequence of their invalidated drug convictions.

.

- 5 - As the court explained, because "[t]he finding of probable cause

of nexus that sufficed to order forfeiture in the civil proceeding

did not depend on the finding in the criminal proceeding of

sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of guilt," the issue of

relief from a civil forfeiture judgment must be "separately

litigated [by each impacted individual] . . . through a motion for

relief from judgment under [Rule] 60(b)."

The Martinez

plaintiffs did not file a petition for certiorari to the U.S.

Supreme Court appealing that decision.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs here were criminal defendants in drug cases

impacted by the chemists' misconduct. They brought this case on

behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals,

arguing primarily that defendants' continued withholding of

plaintiffs' forfeited property after the SJC vacated their

underlying drug convictions violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The original defendants

included the Massachusetts Attorney General, the eleven district

attorneys in the Commonwealth, the administrator of the state trial

court, and the interim superintendent of the state police, as well

as four local police departments as representatives of a broader

class of law enforcement agencies. Because the district court

dismissed the claims against the local police departments under

Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York,

- 6 - (1978), and plaintiffs have not cross-appealed,1 we focus our

discussion on the claims against the Commonwealth defendants.

In their complaint, plaintiffs seek a variety of

declaratory and injunctive relief. They request (i) a declaratory

judgment that class members are "entitled to the return of all

Forfeited Property that was taken from them in connection with

their vacated, wrongful convictions" and injunctions ordering

(ii) the "return of all Forfeited Property," (iii) notice to all

class members, (iv) "a full accounting of all Forfeited Property,"

and (v) the implementation of "an efficient, effective, and fair

process to return all Forfeited Property."

The Commonwealth defendants filed a motion to dismiss

the complaint, arguing that plaintiffs' claims were barred by the

Eleventh Amendment (and also failed for other reasons). The

district court partially granted and partially denied the motion,

dismissing on Eleventh Amendment grounds plaintiffs' claim for an

injunction ordering the return of their forfeited property but

allowing their other claims to proceed. Cotto v. Campbell, No.

18-CV-10354,

, at *6-8 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2023).

In the remaining claims, plaintiffs sought "notification of [class

members'] rights to a more robust state procedure under the State

1 Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal on the district court's partial grant of the motion to dismiss but are no longer seeking interlocutory review.

- 7 - Act, or their rights to pursue relief under Rule 60(b)," "a full

accounting of all Forfeited Property," and "additional procedural

due process protections within a Rule 60(b) hearing."2 Id. at *8.

The Commonwealth defendants now appeal the partial

denial of their motion to dismiss. They correctly contend that we

have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review

the district court's order to the extent it denied dismissal on

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. See Doe v. Shibinette,

(1st Cir. 2021) (reviewing under

collateral order doctrine denial of motion to dismiss on Eleventh

Amendment grounds where state official argued district court erred

in concluding lawsuit fit within the Ex parte Young exception).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion

to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. See

.

III. DISCUSSION

The Eleventh Amendment bars a state from being sued in

federal court by its own citizens, citizens of another state, or

2 The district court did not directly discuss whether plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief survived its partial dismissal order, although it did note that "the court is not barred from entertaining Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges" for "relief other than an order from this court directing the payment of money from the state." Cotto,

, at *8. Both parties assume plaintiffs' claim for a declaratory judgment survived the partial dismissal order and address the claim on appeal, so we do as well. See infra Section III.B.3.

- 8 - citizens of a foreign nation. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Hans v.

Louisiana,

(1890). This bar applies to suits

against state agencies and departments, as well as to suits that

are nominally against state officials but where the state is "the

real, substantial party in interest" because the relief sought

"would operate against [the state]." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.

v. Halderman,

(1984) (first quoting Ford Motor

Co. v. Dep't of Treasury,

(1945); and then

quoting Hawaii v. Gordon,

(1963) (per curiam)).

In its landmark decision of Ex parte Young,

(1908), however, the Supreme Court established a critical

exception to the bar on suits in federal court against state

officials. As applied by the Supreme Court, Ex parte Young permits

a federal court to prohibit a state official from enforcing state

law in a way that violates federal law. Edelman v. Jordan,

(1974). The Court justified this exception by

explaining that state laws that conflict with the federal

Constitution, for example, are "void" and cannot "impart to [the

official] any immunity," thereby permitting a lawsuit against a

state official enforcing such a state law. Green v. Mansour,

(1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte

Young,

); see also Papasan v. Allain,

(1986) (same). Thus, under Ex parte Young, the

Eleventh Amendment permits federal courts to issue prospective

- 9 - relief that enjoins state officials from committing future

violations of federal law, but not retrospective relief that

"make[s] reparation for the past." Edelman,

-65

(quoting Rothstein v. Wyman,

(2d Cir. 1972),

cert. denied,

(1973)). Specifically, the Ex parte

Young exception applies if a plaintiff (1) "alleges an ongoing

violation of federal law" by a state official3 and (2) "seeks

relief properly characterized as prospective." Verizon Md., Inc.

v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md.,

(2002) (quoting

Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,

(1997)

3 To be clear, the Ex parte Young exception can also apply when plaintiffs bring what is known as a pre-enforcement challenge, alleging an anticipated (as opposed to an ongoing) violation of federal law, against state officials with the authority to prevent those violations (e.g., by not enforcing the challenged laws). See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Great Nw. v. Labrador,

(9th Cir. 2024) (holding that Ex parte Young applies to pre-enforcement suit against state attorney general who has the "authority to assist in the enforcement of [the allegedly unconstitutional statute]"); Frank v. Lee,

, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2023) (holding that Ex parte Young applies to pre- enforcement suit against state officials who have "some connection with the enforcement" of the statute at issue (quoting Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18,

(10th Cir. 2021))). Ex parte Young itself involved a pre-enforcement challenge. See

(enjoining state official from enforcing state statute based on anticipated violation of due process, in response to lawsuits filed the day before the statute was to take effect). Plaintiffs here did not file a pre-enforcement suit, so our analysis focuses on whether any violation is ongoing, rather than anticipated. And to the extent plaintiffs raise claims about potential future due process violations that could arise during the Rule 60(b) procedures in state court, plaintiffs cannot pursue such claims against the Commonwealth defendants under Ex parte Young because those defendants have no authority to enforce or change those procedures. See infra Section III.C.

- 10 - (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Plaintiffs do not meet either

requirement.

Although plaintiffs attempt to characterize the

Commonwealth defendants' continued withholding of forfeited

property as an ongoing violation, the district court correctly

concluded that plaintiffs had alleged only a past wrong rather

than an ongoing one. And without an ongoing violation and future

misconduct to enjoin, there is no prospective relief or ancillary

relief for a federal court to grant. Finally, plaintiffs' request

for additional procedural protections in state court fails under

Ex parte Young because plaintiffs sued state officials who lack

the authority to enforce or change these procedures.4 Thus, we

conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the plaintiffs'

claims.

4 The parties dispute whether Ex parte Young contains an additional and independent requirement that the relief sought does not "operate against" the state as "the real, substantial party in interest," see Pennhurst,

, or whether Ex parte Young is itself a carveout from the "general rule" that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits where the state is the real party in interest, see

. To the extent the parties identify any tension in the precedent on this point, we do not need to resolve their dispute in this case. Regardless of how the test is formulated, Ex parte Young makes clear that a federal court cannot order relief unless the state officials sued have "some connection with the enforcement of the [allegedly unconstitutional] act," a requirement that plaintiffs cannot meet here for their request for additional procedural protections in Rule 60(b) hearings.

. See infra Section III.C.

- 11 - A. Ongoing Violation of Federal Law

Because the Ex parte Young exception is intended to

balance Eleventh Amendment concerns with the supremacy of federal

law, it only applies in "cases in which a violation of federal law

by a state official is ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal

law has been violated at one time or over a period of time in the

past." Papasan,

(emphasis added). Plaintiffs

argue that they meet this standard, citing allegations from their

complaint that the Commonwealth defendants' "continued

withholding" of forfeited property after plaintiffs' convictions

were vacated is an "ongoing violation" of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Plaintiffs also contend that defendants' arguments to

the contrary are irrelevant because the application of Ex parte

Young does not include an analysis of the merits.

Plaintiffs misunderstand the Ex parte Young doctrine.

We start with plaintiffs' second contention, that the Commonwealth

defendants lodge an impermissible merits argument by pointing out

that plaintiffs have not alleged an ongoing violation. That is

incorrect. The merits argument excluded from the Ex parte Young

analysis is whether the state officials' actions are, in fact,

"inconsistent with federal law." Verizon Md.,

.

Thus, the merits question that is irrelevant in this appeal is

whether the Commonwealth defendants' continued withholding of

forfeited assets violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

- 12 - By contrast, the question defendants ask us to analyze is, even

assuming their withholding does violate the Constitution, whether

any violation is ongoing.

We conclude that the district court's ruling on this

point was correct: There may be a continuing liability for a past

harm, but there is no ongoing violation here. The district court

explicitly rejected plaintiffs' argument that "Defendants' failure

to return their forfeited property is a continuing violation of

federal law," noting that "Plaintiffs' argument that repayment

would remedy a continuing wrong rather than a past one is

unpersuasive." Cotto,

, at *6-7. As the court

explained, "[t]his sort of 'formal distinction' between

Defendants' [alleged] 'continuing obligation' to remedy their

legal violation and their 'ongoing liability' for a past injury is

'of the sort [the Supreme Court] rejected' in articulating its

retroactive relief test."

at *7 (quoting Papasan,

).5

Indeed, the Supreme Court has foreclosed plaintiffs'

argument. In both Edelman v. Jordan and Papasan v. Allain, it

held that state officials' continued withholding of past benefits,

even if wrongful, amounted to a past wrong and not an ongoing

5 We also note that plaintiffs did not cross-appeal the district court's ruling that defendants' continued withholding of their forfeited property did not qualify as an ongoing violation.

- 13 - violation for Ex parte Young purposes. In Edelman v. Jordan,

plaintiffs argued that state officials violated federal law in

calculating benefits under the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled

(AABD) program and, citing Ex parte Young, requested an injunction

ordering defendants "to award . . . all AABD benefits wrongfully

withheld."

. The Supreme Court concluded there

was no ongoing violation of federal law, explaining that

plaintiffs' claims were merely for "a monetary loss resulting from

[the state officials'] past breach of a legal duty."

;

see Papasan,

(similarly noting that the Edelman

plaintiffs' claims rested on "a not-yet-extinguished liability for

a past breach").

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the continued

withholding of funds owed is not an ongoing violation in Papasan

v. Allain. In Papasan, plaintiffs challenged funding disparities

between Chickasaw Cession schools and other Mississippi public

schools by bringing a breach of trust claim.

. To

establish that a breach of trust occurred, plaintiffs first

contended that the federal government "created a perpetual [school

lands] trust, with the State as trustee for the benefit of the

public schools," when it granted land to the state and required it

to use income from that land to fund local public schools.

. Plaintiffs then argued that Mississippi had a trust

obligation to provide Chickasaw Cession schools with appropriate

- 14 - trust income and sought related declaratory and injunctive relief.

. To fit such a suit within the Ex parte Young

exception, plaintiffs claimed that the state's failure to make

appropriate trust income payments to the Chickasaw schools in the

past was an ongoing violation.

.

The Supreme Court disagreed, finding no ongoing

violation and explaining that plaintiffs' claim in Papasan failed

for the same reason that the claim in Edelman did.

("The [plaintiffs'] characterization in [Edelman] of the legal

wrong as the continuing withholding of accrued benefits is very

similar to the petitioners' characterization of the legal wrong

here [in Papasan] as the breach of a continuing obligation to

comply with the trust obligations."). According to the Court,

plaintiffs merely identified past violations that amounted to

"accrued monetary liabilit[ies]," so their claim was barred by the

Eleventh Amendment.

(emphasis omitted) (quoting

Milliken v. Bradley,

(1977)); see also Whalen v.

Mass. Trial Ct.,

(1st Cir. 2005) (finding "no

continuing violation of federal law to enjoin" when laid-off

employee asked for restoration of pension and retirement credit

after reinstatement, because relief sought was designed to

compensate him for his termination, a past injury (quoting Green,

)).

- 15 - Here, even if the Commonwealth defendants' continued

withholding of plaintiffs' forfeited property did violate federal

law, it would be a past violation, not an ongoing one. Just like

the continued withholding of previously owed payments in Edelman

and Papasan did not amount to ongoing violations, defendants'

continued withholding of forfeited property does not qualify as an

ongoing violation. Plaintiffs' claims rest on "the past actions

of the [Commonwealth]," either from the time of their forfeiture

proceedings or from the time their convictions were vacated, rather

than any current or future actions. Papasan,

.

Therefore, plaintiffs have not alleged an ongoing violation of

federal law and the Ex parte Young exception does not apply.

B. Prospective Relief

Our holding that there is no ongoing violation of federal

law also means that the relief plaintiffs seek is not prospective.

We have defined Ex parte Young's prospective relief requirement to

apply to relief that "serves directly to bring an end to a present

violation of federal law." Whalen,

(quoting

Papasan,

). Because there is no such violation to

end here, there is also no prospective relief for a federal court

to grant. And because no prospective relief can be granted, the

Supreme Court's exception for ancillary relief, which supports the

implementation of "prospective relief already ordered by the

court," also cannot save plaintiffs' claims for notice and

- 16 - accounting relief. Green,

-71 (quoting Quern v.

Jordan,

(1979)). Finally, plaintiffs' request

for a declaratory judgment providing that they are entitled to the

return of their forfeited property is barred because it functions

as a "partial 'end run' around" the prospective relief requirement.

Id. at 73. Such a declaratory judgment would, in effect, amount

to an order by a federal court for retrospective relief. Id. We

discuss each of these points in more detail below.

1. No Ongoing Violation, so No Prospective Relief

Although Ex parte Young's prospective relief requirement

is sometimes framed as distinct from its ongoing violation

requirement, see Verizon Md.,

, the two requirements

are closely related. As we described above, Ex parte Young permits

federal courts to issue prospective relief that requires state

officials "to conform [their] future conduct" to federal law, not

retrospective relief that only "make[s] reparation for the past."

Edelman,

(emphasis added). Without an ongoing

violation to curtail, there are no prospective injunctions for a

federal court to issue. See Green,

("Because there

is no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin in this case,

an injunction is not available."). Thus, "[t]he pivotal question

[under Ex parte Young] is whether the relief 'serves directly to

bring an end to a present violation of federal law'" because a

court cannot issue injunctive relief, no matter how "prospective"

- 17 - it may appear, without such a violation. Whalen,

(emphasis added) (quoting Papasan,

).

The district court characterized plaintiffs' requests

for notice, accounting, and procedural protections as "classic

examples of prospective injunctive relief" that "would not entail

payment from the state treasury, and . . . bear[] no resemblance

to a retroactive award of money." Cotto,

, at *8.

The court correctly held that an injunction requiring the payment

of money from the state treasury would be impermissibly

retrospective. But any injunctions for notice and accounting

relief, as well as for additional procedural protections in state

court, would not serve to end an ongoing violation of federal law

because plaintiffs allege only a past wrong. See supra Section

III.A. Thus, these requested injunctions cannot qualify as

prospective relief.

2. Ancillary Relief

The Supreme Court also has upheld as consistent with the

Eleventh Amendment "ancillary relief" that operates as a

case-management device to assist the court with implementing

valid, prospective relief already ordered. In Quern v. Jordan, it

permitted lower courts to order notice relief "ancillary to" two

valid forms of prospective relief: a declaratory judgment finding

that current state regulations violated federal law by withholding

benefits, and an injunction barring state officials from future

- 18 - violations. See

; Edelman,

(precursor to Quern, describing relief sought). The Court

permitted the notice because it supported the relief already

granted by informing class members of existing state

administrative procedures that could determine their eligibility

for repayment; at the same time, the notice left the actual

determination of individual claims "entirely with the State."

Quern,

.

Six years later, the Court granted certiorari in Green

to answer one of the exact questions posed in this case: If "there

is no ongoing violation of federal law," can federal courts still

"order the giving of notice of the sort approved in Quern v.

Jordan, . . . or issue a declaratory judgment that state officials

violated federal law in the past"?6

. The Court

concluded that notice relief "is not the type of remedy designed

to prevent ongoing violations of federal law," so it is unavailable

when there is no prospective relief to which the notice can attach.

. Ultimately, both Quern and Green make clear that

federal courts can only grant relief that is not itself prospective

under Ex parte Young when that relief is "ancillary to the

6 This section discusses Green's holding regarding notice relief. Section III.B.3 discusses Green's holding regarding declaratory relief.

- 19 - prospective relief already ordered by the court." Green,

; Quern,

.

Green is directly on point here. Although plaintiffs

argue that their requested injunctions for notice relief and a

full accounting of all forfeited property qualify as "ancillary

relief" that falls within the Ex parte Young exception, they are

incorrect. Just like in Green, there is no ongoing violation of

federal law to enjoin in this case, so no prospective relief is

available. See supra Section III.A-III.B.1. Because there is no

prospective relief for the notice or accounting relief to attach

to, "ancillary relief" is also not available. Both forms of relief

remain barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

3. "End Runs" Around the Prospective Relief Requirement

Plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment that they

"are entitled to the return of all Forfeited Property that was

taken from them in connection with their vacated, wrongful

convictions" also does not fall within the Ex parte Young

exception. Such a judgment would serve only as a "partial 'end

run' around" Edelman's prospective relief requirement. Green,

.

As the Supreme Court held in Green, declaratory

judgments are barred as impermissible "end run[s]" around Ex parte

Young's prospective relief requirement when their only use would

consist of "be[ing] offered in state-court proceedings as res

- 20 - judicata on the issue of liability."

Issuing a declaratory

judgment in those circumstances would "have much the same effect

as [issuing] a full-fledged award of damages or restitution,"

retrospective remedies that are clearly "prohibited by the

Eleventh Amendment."

Such declaratory judgments, therefore,

are also barred as retrospective.

Again, Green's reasoning directly applies to this case.

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment to establish "res judicata

on the issue of liability" in their state court proceedings to

recover forfeited property.

They propose to use the

declaratory judgment to take the decision of whether to return the

property out of the state's hands, "leaving to the state courts

only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution

would be computed." Id.; see also Quern,

(approving notice about available state administrative procedures

because "whether or not the class member will receive retroactive

benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and

legislature, not with the federal court"). Thus, the declaratory

judgment would function as an impermissible "end run" around Ex

parte Young's prospective relief requirement by allowing a federal

court to, in effect, order retrospective relief: the return of

plaintiffs' forfeited property. As a result, plaintiffs'

requested declaratory judgment is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment.

- 21 - C. The "Some Connection" Requirement

The Commonwealth defendants present a final argument for

why the Ex parte Young exception does not apply, specific to

plaintiffs' request for additional procedural protections in state

court: Defendants do not have the authority to enforce or change

these procedures. We agree and find that plaintiffs' claim for

additional procedural protections fails on this ground too.

Under Ex parte Young, plaintiffs may only seek relief

from state officials with "some connection with the enforcement of

the [allegedly unconstitutional] act."

.

Otherwise, plaintiffs would be "attempting to make the state a

party." See id.; see also Shibinette,

(permitting claims under Ex parte Young where the state official

sued has authority to grant the relief sought). Therefore, if an

injunction against the Commonwealth defendants could not bring

about the relief plaintiffs seek, the Ex parte Young exception

does not apply.

Plaintiffs' requested injunction to "implement an

efficient, effective, and fair process to return all Forfeited

Property to Class Members" runs afoul of this requirement.

Although the district court concluded that it could require

"additional procedural due process protections within a Rule 60(b)

hearing," the court did not address whether the Commonwealth

defendants enforce these procedures or have the authority to change

- 22 - them. Cotto,

, at *8. And, as defendants explain,

they do not have the authority to alter state court procedures.7

Therefore, plaintiffs' request for an injunction requiring

additional procedural protections in state court is prohibited by

the Eleventh Amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

Like the SJC, we acknowledge the tremendous harm caused

by Farak and Dookhan's egregious misconduct. But the Eleventh

Amendment bars federal courts from providing the relief plaintiffs

seek here. For these reasons, we reverse the district court's

partial denial of the Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss

and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the

complaint in full.

7 As a reminder, the Commonwealth defendants consist of the Massachusetts Attorney General, the eleven district attorneys in the Commonwealth, the administrator of the state trial court, and the interim superintendent of the Massachusetts State Police. These individuals cannot change state court procedures for Rule 60(b) hearings; only the SJC can.

- 23 -