United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit


No. 22-1858

                     CARMEN QUINTANA-DIEPPA,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

                       Defendant, Appellee.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]


                              Before

                   Gelpí, Thompson, and Aframe,
                         Circuit Judges.


     Humberto Cobo-Estrella, Cobo Estrella Law Office, Winston
Vidal-Gambaro, and Winston Vidal Law Office on brief for appellant.

     W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, with whom Mariana
E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, and Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant
United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.


                        February 25, 2025
          GELPÍ,      Circuit          Judge.           Carmen      Quintana-Dieppa

("Quintana") sued her employer, the Department of the Army ("the

Army"),   alleging     sex       and    race    discrimination        as   well    as

retaliation,   under        

      et.    seq.,    and     age

discrimination under 

 et. seq.                    Upon conclusion of

discovery, the Army moved for summary judgment, arguing that it

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Quintana's

claims.   The district court agreed and granted the Army’s motion.

Quintana appealed.      For the reasons that follow, we affirm the

district court’s judgment.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

                                       A. Facts

   1. Quintana's Complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity
                       Commission ("EEOC")

          Quintana,     a    62-year-old          Puerto    Rican     woman,     began

working for the Army in 1988, and had served as a Child Youth and

School Services ("CYSS") Coordinator at Fort Buchanan in Puerto

Rico since 2009.      After working for the Army for nearly three

decades, Quintana filed a complaint with the EEOC in September

2014, alleging that the Army discriminated against her based on

her national origin.1




     1  About three years later, in July 2017, an administrative
judge at the EEOC ruled against Quintana, concluding she was not
discriminated against based on her national origin.

                                        - 2 -
                        2. The Army's First Investigation

            While her EEOC complaint was pending, the Army's 81st

Regional Support Command in Fort Jackson, South Carolina, received

allegations      that     mismanagement     and   poor     working   conditions

pervaded the Family and Morale, Welfare and Recreation ("FMWR")

Division at Fort Buchanan.           Shortly thereafter, in May 2016, the

81st Regional Support Command launched an investigation into the

FMWR   supervisory        chain,    which   included      Quintana   and      other

supervisors.       The investigating officer found that Quintana's

authoritative leadership style fostered a toxic work environment

and that she did "not always treat subordinates with dignity and

respect."   Accordingly, the investigating officer recommended that

Quintana be removed from her supervisory position at the CYSS,

suspended for at least ten days, transferred to a nonsupervisory

position    within      the   FMWR    Division,     and     transitioned       into

retirement.      The Commanding General at Fort Jackson accepted the

findings    of   the    investigation,      but   rather    than   adopting      the

proposed remedial measures, he forwarded the results to Colonel

Michael    T.    Harvey    ("Col.    Harvey"),    Fort     Buchanan's       Garrison

Commander, to determine any appropriate disciplinary or corrective

actions.         Col.     Harvey     subsequently        requested      a     second

investigation into Quintana's treatment of her subordinates.




                                      - 3 -
            3. The Army's Second Investigation and Quintana's
                       Performance Evaluations

            The second investigation began in August 2016 and ended

in October 2016. It ultimately confirmed the first investigation's

findings.   For instance, twenty-seven individuals stated that they

had witnessed or been subjected to Quintana's "disrespectful or

disparaging" behavior.    The investigation moreover revealed that

Quintana routinely employed favoritism, intimidating language, and

retaliatory tactics in dealing with her subordinates. As a result,

the investigating officer concluded that her pattern of conduct

warranted disciplinary action.

            Three months after that investigation, Quintana received

a performance evaluation for the period from July 1, 2015, through

June 30, 2016.     Her then-supervisor, Daniel Carter ("Carter"),

gave her a "satisfactory" rating, notwithstanding her outstanding

performance rating in the prior year, because she had not expanded

the youth sports and school programs.     Under oath, she asserted

that it was obvious that her lower performance rating for the

relevant period was tied both to the second investigation's results

and to professional jealousy.2



     2   Quintana did not receive performance standards or an
evaluation for the 2016-2017 period. Carter testified that during
his time as the acting Program Director of FMWR, none of the
fifteen employees he supervised received new performance standards
for the 2016-2017 period and Quintana was among one of multiple
employees who did not receive an evaluation.

                                 - 4 -
              4. Quintana's Reassignment and Promotion Request

             Concerned with Quintana's management issues, Col. Harvey

signed a letter of reassignment to be issued to her on January 25,

2017, demoting her to a nonsupervisory role.                  Two days earlier,

however, a hiring freeze was put in place that lasted about two

and   a    half    months.        So,   Quintana    could    not   be   reassigned

immediately after the second investigation ended.

             Despite      the   reassignment       plans,    Quintana     told    her

supervisor in May 2017 that she needed to be non-competitively

promoted to a NF-05 Coordinator position.                    However, Quintana's

supervisor informed her that Fort Buchannan's CYSS program did not

fit the demographics required for that position.

             In    June   2017,     the    FMWR   Division    at   Fort   Buchanan

experienced personnel changes: Tod Antony Scalf ("Scalf") became

the new Programs Director after Carter vacated his position.                     Soon

after     taking   the    helm,    Scalf    reviewed   the    files     related    to

Quintana's second investigation and determined that removing her

from management was justified. So he signed a revised reassignment

letter, transferring her to a newly created position with the same

pay and grade. The reassignment letter identified serious concerns

about her management style as the reason for the reassignment.                     On

November 17, 2017, she received the reassignment notice and was

placed on a one-day administrative leave.



                                          - 5 -
           About a month and a half later, Wendy Winston, a Hispanic

woman, temporarily assumed Quintana's duties as CYSS Coordinator.

That replacement, however, was short-lived.                 On the last day of

January,    Aida       Aguilú -- another         Hispanic     woman     who     was

approximately      a      year     and      two     months      younger        than

Quintana -- succeeded Winston as the Acting CYSS Coordinator.

                           B. Procedural History

           Quintana      sued    the     Army,    asserting    claims     of    age

discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

("ADEA"), 

 et. seq., discrimination based on sex

and race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), 

 et. seq., and retaliation under Title VII, id.3

After discovery, the Army moved for summary judgment, contending

that there were no genuine issues of material facts, and that it

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all Quintana's

claims.    Along with its motion, the Army submitted a Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts ("Statement of Facts"), setting forth

its version of the facts, as required by the District of Puerto

Rico's Local Rule 56 ("Local Rule 56").              In opposing the Army's

motion, Quintana filed an Opposing Statement of Contested Facts

("Statement of Contested Facts"), which included also a separate




     3 Quintana's complaint included other claims, the disposition
of which she does not challenge in this appeal.

                                       - 6 -
section with additional facts she believed were undisputed and

material ("Statement of Additional Facts").

              After reviewing the parties' submissions, the district

court found that neither Quintana's Statement of Contested Facts

nor her Statement of Additional Facts created any factual dispute

worthy   of    trial.     The   court     reasoned    that   her   Statement    of

Additional Facts was not presented in accordance with Local Rule

56, because Quintana attempted to add facts throughout her response

to the Army's Statement of Facts and, to the extent she provided

a separate section of additional facts, she failed to format them

as separate numbered paragraphs as required by Local Rule 56.

Further,      the   district    court    emphasized    the   record    citations

underlying her Statement of Contested Facts did not contradict the

Army's assertions in its Statement of Facts, did not support

Quintana's own propositions, or, in some cases simply were not

included.      In light of the substantial burden posed by Quintana's

failure to comply with Local Rule 56, the court deemed the Army's

proposed facts almost entirely undisputed.

              Finding   no     genuine    issue   of    material      fact,    and

concluding that no reasonable jury could find in Quintana's favor,

the district court ultimately granted the Army's motion for summary

judgment.      In so doing, the court held that Quintana did not make

out her prima facie case on any of her claims, and that, even if

she had carried that initial burden, she still failed to prove

                                        - 7 -
that the Army's justifications for taking adverse action against

her were a mere pretext to hide a discriminatory or retaliatory

animus.

            Quintana appealed.

                                II. DISCUSSION

            This court "review[s] a district court's grant or denial

of summary judgment de novo, examining the record in the light

most   favorable     to   the   nonmovant     and   drawing    all     reasonable

inferences in that party's favor."             Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins.

Co., 

 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing Murray v. Kindred

Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)).                  A party

moves for summary judgment when it believes that there is no

genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.         Pena v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 

 (1st. Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

"Facts are material when they have the 'potential to affect the

outcome of the suit under the applicable law.'"              Cherkaoui v. City

of Quincy, 

 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Sánchez v.

Alvarado, 

 (1st Cir. 1996)).                 And a dispute is

genuine when the evidence is such "that a reasonable jury could

resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party."                  Doe v. Trs.

of   Bos.   Coll.,    

    (1st   Cir.     2018)    (quoting




                                    - 8 -
Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 

 (1st Cir.

1992)).

          If the moving party shows that no genuine issue of

material fact exists, "the burden shifts to the nonmoving party,

who must . . . demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably

resolve that issue in [his or her] favor."   Dusel, 

(quoting Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 

 (1st Cir.

2016)).   In so doing, the nonmoving party "must present definite,

competent evidence to rebut the motion" on any issue for which it

bears the ultimate burden of proof.    Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

 (1st Cir. 1991) (first citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 

 (1986); and then citing Garside

v. Osco Drug, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1990)).

          "When all is said and done, the [district] court must

'view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party

opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in

that party's favor,' but paying no heed to 'conclusory allegations,

improbable inferences, [or] unsupported speculation.'"      McCarthy

v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 1995) (first

quoting Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 

 (1st Cir. 1990);

and then quoting Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1990)) (alteration in original).     If the court

finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that no



                               - 9 -
reasonable jury would favor the nonmoving party, then it must grant

the moving party’s motion.         Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

             With this standard in mind, we first consider whether

Quintana adequately contested the Army's Statement of Facts, then

turn to address the merits of her claims.

                             A. Local Rule 56

             According to Quintana, the district court fundamentally

erred in constructing the summary judgment record when it found

that she failed to properly contest the Army's Statement of Facts.

When   the   court   made   that   determination,    Quintana   argues,   it

undertook the role of factfinder.            And so, Quintana asserts, the

district court’s decision warrants reversal.

             Local Rule 56 mandates that a motion for summary judgment

"be supported by a separate, short, and concise statement of

material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the

moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact

to be tried."     D.P.R. Loc. R. 56(b).        That rule also demands that

the party opposing the movant's motion must submit "with its

opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material

facts"   which "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting

the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered

paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts."

D.P.R. Loc. R. 56(c).       "Unless a fact is admitted, the opposing

statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record

                                    - 10 -
citation . . . ."    

 If any fact is not supported by "a citation

to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material

supporting    the   assertion,"    the     court   may   "disregard"   the

unsupported statement.     D.P.R. Loc. R. 56(e).         Where a supported

fact is not properly controverted, it "shall be deemed admitted."

            Complying with Local Rule 56 is essential.          For it is

"designed to function as a means of 'focusing a district court's

attention     on    what   is -- and       what    is     not -- genuinely

controverted.'"     Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Calvi v. Knox Cnty., 

 (1st Cir. 2006)); see also López-Hernández v. Terumo P.R.

LLC, 

 (1st Cir. 2023) ("Local Rule 56 is in service

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56." (quoting Tropigas de P.R.,

Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 

(1st Cir. 2011))).    If a party does not comply with the rule, the

"district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion,

to accept the moving party's facts as stated."            Cabán Hernandez,

 (first citing Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 

 (1st Cir. 2004); and then citing Ruiz Rivera v. Riley,

 (1st Cir. 2000)).

            The Army complied with Local Rule 56 when it submitted

its Statement of Facts, along with its motion for summary judgment.

But Quintana failed to so abide in her opposition.           In submitting

                                  - 11 -
her Statement of Contested Facts, Quintana sought to dispute

twenty-four assertions that the Army made in its Statement of

Facts.4   Quintana tried to do so by denying or qualifying the

Army's assertions.5        In trying to contest the Army's factual

statements, however, she failed to properly oppose or qualify the

Army's factual assertions for two reasons: (1) nonexistent or

improper record citations; and (2) denials based on irrelevant

facts, such as her lack of personal knowledge.             On these bases,

the district court acted within its discretion by concluding that

Quintana failed to properly contest the Army's proposed material

facts.

           We turn first to statements 8, 28, 29, 31, 38, and 57 in

the   Army's   Statement    of   Facts.    In   opposing    those   factual

assertions, Quintana alleged she lacked adequate knowledge to

contest those facts.       Appealing to ignorance, however, does not

create a genuine issue of material fact, since lack of knowledge

does not contradict the proposition that the fact is true.              Put


      4 Quintana denied or qualified the following statements from
the Army's Statement of Material Facts: 8, 14, 28, 29, 31, 33, 37,
38, 39, 46, 47, 51, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 75, 76, 85, 89,
and 90. She admitted the remaining allegations.
      5 A "qualification must clarify a statement of fact that,
without clarification, could lead the Court to an incorrect
inference." Pérez v. Oriental Bank & Tr., 

 (D.P.R. 2018). To avoid crossing the line between a statement
of additional fact and a proper qualification or denial, Quintana's
qualifications and denials must be strictly limited to the issues
raised in the Army's assertion. See 

                                  - 12 -
another way, Quintana's asserted lack of personal knowledge as to

the existence of certain facts does not amount to "definite,

competent evidence" controverting their truth.    See Mesnick, 

; see also Chapman v. Finnegan, 

,

292 n.3 (D. Mass. 2013) ("A party opposing summary judgment cannot

create a genuine issue of fact by denying statements, which the

moving party contends are undisputed and supported by sufficient

evidence, on the basis that he lacks knowledge and information to

admit or deny the statement.").    So, Quintana's oppositions to

statements 8, 28, 29, 31, 38, and 57 raised no factual dispute

worthy of trial.6

          Next, we turn to Quintana's argument that she did provide

citations in support of her responses to the Army's Statement of

Facts.   Providing citations alone is insufficient.     See D.P.R.

Loc. R. 56(c), (e).   Instead, Quintana needed to cite to portions

of the record that support her propositions contradicting the

Army's Statement of Facts.   See 

   But that, she failed to do.


     6 Relatedly, Quintana asserts that her response to statement
8 raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether she
was the subject of the second investigation. But Quintana does
not dispute that the subject of the investigation was the FMWR
Supervisory chain, which Quintana admits includes herself and two
other individuals. Whether Quintana was the sole subject of the
second investigation, or one of three subjects, is not of
consequence for summary judgment purposes.     Nor do Quintana's
citations to the Carter deposition testimony, regarding his
limited knowledge of the investigation, actually refute this
point.

                              - 13 -
For instance, many of Quintana's record citations ignored Local

Rule   56(e)'s    instruction    to    identify   the   "specific     page    or

paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion."

See López-Hernández, 

 (quoting D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e))

(concluding that party had not complied with Local Rule 56 where

it   "often    cite[d]   generally     to   multiple    exhibits   which     are

themselves voluminous").        In support of her denials of statements

75 and 76, Quintana's citation consisted of the word "Depos."                She

also cited to the same swathe of record material as supporting, at

least in part, her denials or qualifications to statements 8, 28,

29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 47, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67: namely,

sixteen paragraphs of her "Sworn Statement," one paragraph of her

interrogatory      answer,      two     paragraphs      from    the    "AR-15

Investigation," and eight pages from an "EEO Statement."

              Her citation to those materials remained the same no

matter what facts she was purportedly denying or qualifying.               Even

assuming that support for Quintana's denials or qualifications

exists somewhere in these materials, the district court would have

been forced to search through the record to confirm its existence,

given Quintana's lackadaisical citation style.                 See 

("Said anti-ferret rule is intended to protect the district court

from perusing through the summary judgment record in search of

disputed material facts and prevent litigants from shifting that

burden onto the court." (citations omitted)).           Worse yet, Quintana
                                      - 14 -
did not provide any record citations contradicting statements 14,

46, 75, 76, 85, 89, and 90, directly contravening Local Rule 56’s

instruction   that    "[u]nless   a   fact   is   admitted,    the    opposing

statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record

citation . . . ."     D.P.R. Loc. R. 56(c).7

          Even where Quintana did cite a specific portion of the

record, such as Carter's or Scalf's deposition testimony, the

record citations she provided frequently did not contradict the

Army's statement.       As a result, Quintana did not successfully

dispute statements 33, 37, 39, 47, 51, 54, 61, 62, 63, and 67.

For example, in response to statement 33, Quintana cited three

portions of deposition transcripts regarding whether the second

investigation report recommended her reassignment.             None of these

citations suggest that statement 33, which asserted that reasons

for   Quintana's     reassignment     were   identified   in    the     letter


      7 In response to statement 85, Quintana did cite two Internet
sources describing the impact of Hurricane Maria on Fort Buchanan.
Whether these Internet sources (a press release regarding Fort
Buchanan's recovery from Hurricane Maria and a photograph of Fort
Buchanan after Hurricane Maria) were properly part of the summary
judgment record is questionable, especially where Quintana did not
attach them in her submission to the district court. Even if we
assumed that the articles were part of the record, the language
quoted by Quintana from these sources does not directly respond to
the Army's statement 85, which asserted that the local EEO office
was operational starting on October 12, 2017, following hurricanes
in the summer of 2017. Quintana's sources do not mention the EEO
office, nor foreclose the possibility that the EEO office was open
as of October 12, 2017. Further, the sources do not support other
assertions made by Quintana in her denial, such as Quintana's
"Health Reasons."

                                    - 15 -
reassigning her, was incorrect. Nor do they support the additional

facts that Quintana attempted to squeeze into her response, such

as her claim that she was told that the reassignment was not

punitive, that there was no derogatory information in her file,

and that Scalf might "consider" her for her original position if

it opened back up.

          Without    appropriate    record     citations,   Quintana's

oppositions rest on mere allegations. And, since "mere allegations

are not entitled to weight in the summary judgment calculus,"

Borges v. Serrano-Isern, 

 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing

Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 

 (1st

Cir. 2004)), a "party cannot successfully oppose a motion for

summary judgment by resting [upon them] . . . ."      Pina v. Child.'s

Place, 

 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting LeBlanc v. Great

Am. Ins., 

 (1st Cir. 1993)).

          Still, Quintana insists that the district court failed

to adequately explain its findings that there were no genuine

factual disputes. For instance, Quintana faults the district court

for describing in detail why one qualification to the Army's

Statement of Facts failed to present a genuine factual dispute,

without articulating why the other twenty-three qualifications and

denials were similarly deficient.   The district court, however, is

not required "to ferret through the record to discern whether any

material fact is genuinely in dispute."      Rodríguez-Severino v. UTC

                              - 16 -
Aero. Sys., 

 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting   CMI Capital

Mkt. Inv., LLC v. Gonzalez-Toro, 

 (1st Cir. 2008)).

This is why time and again we have "emphasized the importance of

complying with [that rule]."     López-Hernández, 

(citing Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF, 

 (1st Cir.

2001)).   In light of the purposes of the anti-ferret rule, we do

not impose a requirement that district courts individually explain

why each of a party's responses were deficient.8

          Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

treating the Army’s Statement of Facts as uncontroverted.   And the

district court did not act as a factfinder when it accepted the

Army's facts as uncontroverted based on Quintana's failure to

dispute them in accordance with the local and federal rules.

Indeed, the "[f]ailure to present a statement of disputed facts,

embroidered with specific citations to the record, justifies the

court's deeming the facts presented in the movant's statement of

undisputed facts admitted."     López-Hernández, 

(citation omitted).   This court has admonished that litigants who


     8 Regardless, the district court's opinion shows that it took
painstaking care to assess each of Quintana's denials and
qualifications. For instance, the district court determined that
Quintana did partially dispute statement 60, by citing to evidence
that she had requested a promotion and not received it.        The
district court went on to consider whether the denial of the
promotion constituted discrimination and concluded that it did
not. On appeal, Quintana has not argued that the district court
erred in its analysis of the denial of the promotion as a
discriminatory act.

                               - 17 -
ignore   this   rule   do   so   "at   their   peril,"   P.R.   Am.    Ins.    v.

Rivera-Vázquez, 

 (1st Cir. 2010), for the rule

establishes that a district court "shall have no independent duty

to search or consider any part of the record not specifically

referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts."                D.P.R.

Loc. R. 56(e).

           Setting aside her opposition to the Army's Statement of

Facts, Quintana asserts that the district court should not have

disregarded her separate Statement of Additional Facts because

each statement had a citation.9 Quintana wrote a list of additional

facts in a separate section, with citations to Scalf's and Carter's

deposition transcripts, but did not number her paragraphs.                    The

district court explained that it "should ignore these additional

facts"   because   they     were   unnumbered     and    placed   an    "undue

burden . . . upon the Army and the Court."                If Quintana had

submitted an unnumbered but otherwise unobjectionable Statement of

Additional Facts, we might hesitate to affirm any decision to




     9Quintana also asserts that the government's motion to strike
her Statement of Additional Facts, was untimely. The timeliness
of the government's motion to strike is irrelevant. The district
court had authority enforce Local Rule 56 regardless of whether a
motion to strike was filed. Melino v. Bos. Med. Ctr., __ F.4th
__, No. 24-1527, 

, at *3 (1st Cir. Jan. 29, 2025)
("District courts . . . are entitled to demand adherence to
specific mandates contained in [their local] rules.").

                                   - 18 -
entirely disregard that Statement.10              That is not what happened

here, however.

             To    begin,   we   have   serious     doubts   about    Quintana's

characterization of the record in her citations.                  For instance,

Quintana claimed that Scalf testified that her reassignment had

"nothing to do with" the second investigation.               But as best we can

tell from the limited excerpt of the deposition transcript that

Quintana provided to the district court on summary judgment, Scalf

was    clarifying     his   earlier     testimony    that    a   separate     Army

regulation "ha[d] nothing to do with" the investigation.                    Indeed,

Scalf went on to testify that "removing [Quintana] from management

of    CYS"   was   "justified"    by    the    fact-finding      in   the   second

investigation report.       Moreover, the district court noted that the

additional statements were "by-and-large irrelevant and would not

tilt the needle in a different direction" and, in its discussion

of the merits, took the time to discuss why the additional facts

were not material to the outcome of the case.                 See McCarthy, 56



        Local Rule 56(c) requires that additional facts be set
       10

forth in a separate section, "in separate numbered paragraphs."
D.P.R. Loc. R. 56(c). And Local Rule 56(e) permits the court to
disregard statements of fact when they are not properly supported
by record citations.   D.P.R. Loc. R. 56(e).   But no portion of
Local Rule 56 expressly indicates that the district court may do
the same when the only deficiency with the party's submission is
failure to number its paragraphs.      See 

 ("The court may
disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific
citation to record material properly considered on summary
judgment.").

                                      - 19 -
F.3d at 315 (explaining that a contested fact must be material to

preclude summary judgment).

          Despite the district court's careful attention, Quintana

insists that there are several contested facts that should have

precluded summary judgment.         Because materiality depends on the

substantive law, Anderson, 

, in our assessment of

the merits below, we consider the genuineness and materiality of

any purported factual disputes that were both memorialized in the

Statement of Additional Facts and raised on appeal.11                 As that

discussion   will   show,   there    is   no   genuine   issue   of   fact   in




     11 For the first time on appeal, Quintana seeks to use certain
performance evaluations she submitted, as well as a former
supervisor, Dallas Petersen's ("Petersen"), sworn statement, to
create genuine disputes of material fact. None of that purported
evidence was before the district court at the motion for summary
judgment stage. The 2010-2014 performance evaluations made their
debut on appeal, and Petersen's sworn statement was submitted two
months after Quintana opposed summary judgment.      So we do not
consider either.    We have warned litigants that "[f]ollowing
discovery, a party may not use a later affidavit to contradict
facts   previously   provided   to   survive   summary   judgment."
Escribano-Reyes v. Prof'l HEPA Certificate Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
Moreover, the district judge had no obligation to look outside the
record provided to it on the summary judgment motion. See Hoffman
v. Applicators Sales And Serv., Inc., 

 (1st Cir.
2006)   (affirming   district   court's   decision   to   disregard
"tabulation of 'documentary evidence provided in discovery by
Defendants'" where proponent did not present the underlying
documentary evidence to the court); Colón Ortiz v. Rosario, 

 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that district court was
permitted to ignore materials that were not filed until a
subsequent motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling).

                                    - 20 -
Quintana's Statement of Additional Facts that would have changed

the outcome of this case on summary judgment.

                 Of course, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow

district courts to consider any other material in the record.                              See

FRCP    56(c)(3)         ("The     court    need     to   consider       only    the     cited

materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.")

(emphasis added). But whether the court embarks on that burdensome

task        is    discretionary -- not             mandatory.            See     id.;      cf.

López-Hernández, 

 (explaining the rationale for Local

Rule    56(e)         and    how   "[v]iolations      of    th[at]       local     rule   are

astoundingly common and constitute an unnecessary burden to the

trial       court's     docket     and     time").        Here,    the    district       court

exercised that discretion in deciding not to do so.                            We therefore

discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's construction

of the summary judgment record.

                                   B. Quintana's Claims

                 We    now    examine      Quintana's      claims        relying    on    the

undisputed facts as set forth by the Army.                        Quintana asserts that

three of her claims should have survived summary judgment on

appeal: (1) sex and race discrimination under Title VII, (2) age

discrimination under ADEA, and (3) retaliation under Title VII.12



       Quintana waived both her FLSA retaliation and her Title VII
       12

hostile work environment claims, to the extent they were also
disposed of by the district court's summary judgment decision, for


                                            - 21 -
In   support    of    these    claims,    she     makes       a    slew    of    disjointed

arguments in an attempt to show that the involuntary reassignment

was discriminatory or retaliatory.13               Where, as here, there is no

direct evidence of discrimination and retaliation, we employ the

three-stage     burden      shifting     framework       set       forth    in    McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

 (1973).                         See Vélez v.

Thermo   King        de   P.R.,   Inc.,     

    (2009)

("[P]laintiffs        who   do    not    have    'smoking          gun'     evidence    may

nonetheless      prove        their     cases     by     using       the        three-stage

burden-shifting framework . . . .").


lack of development. On appeal, she makes no argument regarding
her FLSA retaliation claim.      And although she refers to her
hostile-work-environment claim three times in her brief, she only
makes bare bones conclusory assertions.       But judges are not
mind-readers. United States v. Zannino, 

 (1st Cir.
1990). "It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in
the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work,
create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones."
United States v. Arroyo-Blas, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)
(quoting Zannino, 

)).       Instead, litigants must
"'spell out [their] arguments squarely and distinctly,' or else
forever hold [their] peace." Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 

 (1st Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Claims or "issues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." Zannino, 

.
     13 The district court addressed seven purportedly adverse

employment actions or retaliatory acts, but Quintana's appeal
focuses   only   on   her   "involuntary    reassignment"   to   a
non-supervisory role. Quintana's brief occasionally implies that
she may view her denial of a promotion or the Army's two
investigations as retaliatory acts in themselves, but she never
develops an argument as to how the district court erred in its
analysis of these acts. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to
whether Quintana's reassignment was discriminatory or retaliatory.
See Zannino, 

.

                                        - 22 -
           At the first step, Quintana "has the initial burden of

establishing   a   prima    facie   case     of   discrimination"       and

retaliation.   See Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2012); Serrano-Colon v. United States Dep't

of Homeland Sec., 

 (1st Cir. 2024).            Once the

plaintiff meets that initial burden, "a presumption that the

employer   unlawfully    discriminated     against   the    employee"   is

created.   Vélez, 

 n.3 (quoting St. Mary's Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 

 (1993)).

           If she establishes a prima facie case, then the burden

shifts to the Army to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its adverse action against Quintana.            See Rathbun v.

Autozone, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2004).       If the Army does

so, the inference of discrimination "vanishes."        See 

           And finally, if the Army makes that showing, then we

move to the third and last stage of the McDonnell Douglas test.

In that final step, "it is up to plaintiff, unassisted by the

original presumption, to show that the employer's stated reason

'was but a pretext for . . . discrimination.'"        Medina-Munoz, 

 (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 

,

1336 (1st Cir. 1988)).     If Quintana successfully raises a genuine

issue of fact as to the ultimate issue of whether the Army's

employment decisions were motivated by discrimination, then her

claims survive summary judgment.

                                - 23 -
            The    district    court    applied   the    McDonnell     Douglas

framework    to    each   of   Quintana's    claims     for   sex    and   race

discrimination under Title VII, age discrimination under ADEA, and

retaliation under Title VII.           See e.g., López-López v. Robinson

Sch., 

 (1st. Cir. 2020) (applying the McDonnell Douglas

framework to ADEA claims); see also King v. Town of Hanover, 

 (1st. Cir. 1997) (applying the McDonnell Douglas

framework to Title VII claims).         The court concluded that Quintana

had not established a prima facie case of discrimination under

Title VII or the ADEA with respect to her alleged involuntary

transfer or other adverse actions, and, even if she had, her claims

would still fail at the later stages of the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework.       The court reached the same conclusion

with respect to Quintana's claims that the Army retaliated against

her by reassigning her to a new position.

          For the purposes of appeal, we assume, without deciding,

that Quintana established a prima facie case for all her claims

and skip directly to the second and third stages of the McDonnell

Douglas analysis.      We focus on whether Quintana met her burden of

showing that the Army's stated reason for the reassignment is

pretext for discrimination or retaliation such that a trial is

warranted.14      See Lewis v. City of Bos., 

 (1st


     14   In other words, we assume that Quintana adduced sufficient


                                   - 24 -
Cir. 2003) (assuming without deciding that plaintiff established

a prima facie case of race discrimination).

     1.   Claims for Discrimination Under Title VII and ADEA

          As we have explained, "[a]t the second stage of the

McDonnell Douglas approach, the burden of production shifts to the

employer to spell out a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

the adverse employment action."   Dusel, 

.   The Army

stresses that it reassigned Quintana because it had "serious and

substantiated concerns" about her "management style and treatment

of employees under her supervision." These concerns were supported

by the findings from the Army's two investigations, which were

based on statements by many of her subordinates.     These reasons

are sufficient to meet the Army's burden at step two.

          At the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis,

Quintana is required to "'elucidate specific facts which would

enable a jury to find that the reason given' by the defendant for

the adverse employment action 'is not only a sham, but a sham

intended to cover up the employer's real motive.'"      Robinson v.

Town of Marshfield, 

 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting

Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresí Hotels, Inc., 

 (1st


evidence of each element of a prima facie claim, including that
her reassignment was an adverse employment action, that her
performance met the Army's legitimate job expectations, and that
there was a causal link between her reassignment and her protected
activity. As a result, we need not analyze the various arguments
Quintana raises in support of these points.

                             - 25 -
Cir.    2015)).      Quintana     can    meet   that    burden   by   submitting

"competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for [her

reassignment] were in fact a cover-up for a . . . discriminatory

decision."        McDonnell Douglas Corp., 

.                "But,

evidence that would provide a supportable basis for reaching a

different conclusion than the employer did with respect to its

stated basis for the employment action does not suffice for a

plaintiff to defeat summary judgment on the ground that the

employer's stated basis was pretextual."               Dusel, 

(citations omitted).      Rather, Quintana "must present evidence from

which a reasonable jury could supportably conclude 'that the

employer's explanation is not just wrong, but that it is so

implausible that the employer more likely than not does not believe

it.'"   

 at 508 (quoting Forsythe v. Wayfair, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2022)).

            Quintana     argues         that    she    can   prove,      through

circumstantial        evidence,         that    the     Army's    "legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for her involuntary reassignment was

pretextual."      In her attempt to do so, she attacks the validity of

the Army's investigation reports, asserting that "they are based

on inadmissible hearsay statements" and "fabricated."                 Neither of

these attacks has persuasive force.               Our precedent permits an

employer to point to the findings of an internal investigation

into its employee's conduct to prove the basis for any adverse

                                    - 26 -
acts it takes against the employee.               See Ramírez Rodríguez v.

Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 

 (1st Cir.

2005).       This is so because the investigation reports are "not

offered to prove that [Quintana] engaged in misconduct, but rather

to demonstrate that [her] superiors had reason, based on a thorough

investigation, to believe that [s]he had."               Id.; see Ronda-Perez

v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 

 (1st Cir. 2005)

(explaining that the relevant inquiry was not whether complaints

made    by   fellow    employees   were   true,   but    whether     plaintiff's

superiors believed that the complaints were credible when they

decided to terminate him); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2) (defining

hearsay to be out of court statement "offer[ed] in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement").                Nor is

there any evidentiary foundation for the allegation that the

investigation reports were fabricated.                It is a mere conclusory

proposition, as nothing in the record suggests that the Army

fabricated the investigation report, nor did Quintana submit any

evidence     proving    such.15    And    we   have    held   that   "conclusory

allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation"

cannot prove pretext.       Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 

, 502




        Quintana cites the sworn statement of Petersen, averring
       15

that the investigation against her was a sham. As we explained
supra note 11, Petersen's statement is not part of the summary
judgment record.

                                    - 27 -
(1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Benoit v. Tech. Mfg. Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 2003)).

             Quintana further asserts the second investigation report

never recommended reassignment, and that the Army rejected all

other lenient options in taking disciplinary action against her.

We are not persuaded.      Neither rejecting lenient options nor the

second investigation's failure to recommend reassignment proves

that   the   Army's   reasons   are   a   sham   intended   to   cover   up   a

discriminatory motive.     Notably, neither of these facts shows that

the Army failed to follow its own policies or procedures, or

treated Quintana differently than it would a similarly situated

employee outside of the protected class.            See Azimi v. Jordan's

Meats, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that

"[t]he severity of the discipline that [employer] meted out as a

consequence -- termination of employment -- does not itself raise

any inference of pretext or of discrimination or retaliation").

Indeed, the reassignment was entirely consistent with the first

investigation report which recommended that Quintana be removed

from her supervisory role, among other disciplinary measures.             The

Army justified the reassignment based on the reports' findings

that Quintana treated her supervisees with a lack of dignity and

respect. And she, in turn, did not submit direct or circumstantial

evidence proving otherwise.



                                  - 28 -
               Simply stressing that the Army undertook a more punitive

action than the one recommended in the second report -- without

submitting      any   evidence       that   the   Army    did     not    believe       the

information contained in the report -- is the type of argument

that merely suggests that the Army could have reached a different

conclusion.      And that type of submission cannot show pretext.                       See

Dusel,    

     ("[E]vidence      that    would        provide    a

supportable basis for reaching a different conclusion than the

employer did with respect to its stated basis for the employment

action does not suffice for a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment

on the ground that the employer's stated basis was pretextual.")

(citations omitted).16         So not only did Quintana fail to impugn the

veracity of the Army's reasons, but she also failed to elucidate

specific   facts      that     those    reasons    were    a     sham     to    hide     a

discriminatory motive.

               Quintana    nevertheless       insists      that         she     suffered

discrimination because the Army first offered her CYSS Coordinator

position to Chico Medina, a 36-year-old man.                    But even if we give


     16 Our analysis would not change if we accounted for the
deposition testimony Quintana cites in her opening brief.     For
instance, the fact that Carter was not aware of any of Quintana's
misconduct or her performance standards when he started his role,
does not in any way undermine the veracity of the Army's belief
that Quintana's leadership and management ability was lacking.
And Quintana's citation to the absence of a 2017 performance
evaluation, written admonishment, or personal improvement plan
merely adds color to her argument that the Army forwent more
lenient discipline.

                                        - 29 -
Quintana the benefit of the doubt and credit the offer to Medina

as equivalent to hiring younger male substitute,17 we note that

evidence of her replacement's gender and age, if properly included

in the summary judgment record, would typically support a prima

facie case of discrimination.    It does little to meet Quintana's

ultimate burden to show that the Army's non-discriminatory reason

for her reassignment, her poor treatment of her subordinates, was

insincere   or   pretextual.    See    Rathbun,   

(explaining that evidence of pretext was scant where plaintiff

claimed she was more qualified than male employees who received

promotions more quickly than she did).

            Finally, that female, Hispanic employees above 40 years

old were not involved in the decision-making process of Quintana's

reassignment is irrelevant to our analysis.       See Rivas Rosado v.

Radio Shack, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2002) (concluding

that "[t]he mere fact that the decision makers were male does not

alone, absent other evidence, create an inference that they engaged

in gender discrimination" and thus could not show that the reasons

for her firing were pretextual).      The relevant inquiry here at the

third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is whether the Army's


     17Quintana raised, in her Statement of Additional Facts, the
fact that Medina was offered Quintana's former job. We note that
in this case, the Army did not replace Quintana with a younger
man, just that he was interviewed for the role and offered the
position.   The Army replaced Quintana with Aguilú, a Hispanic
woman, who is only about 14 months younger than Quintana.

                                - 30 -
proffered reason for reassigning Quintana was truthful or a pretext

to engage in prohibited discrimination.             See Rathbun, 

.   Indeed, not even "thin evidence of pretext by itself can

defeat summary judgment."      Henderson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.,

, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted)

(citing Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country

Club, 

 (1st Cir. 2000)).              And here, Quintana's

attempt to show pretext amounts not even to thin evidence, but

rather to no evidence at all.         Accordingly, Quintana's Title VII

claim based on sex, race, and age discrimination fails on the

merits.

                  2. Retaliation Claim Under Title VII

            We turn now to Quintana's Title VII retaliation claim.

Quintana's   position    is   that   her     Army    supervisors   retaliated

against her by reassigning her after learning that she had filed

an EEOC complaint.     The Army's position remains that it reassigned

Quintana based on the findings of the two investigations, which

showed that Quintana was a poor manager.            We have already analyzed

why many of Quintana's attacks on the veracity of this stated

reason    fail   to   demonstrate    pretext    in    the   context   of   her

discrimination claim.     Our analysis remains the same to the extent

Quintana reasserts them in support of her retaliation claim.

            Quintana raises a new line of argument in support of her

retaliation claim that we have yet to address.              She attempts to

                                    - 31 -
link her protected conduct and the purportedly retaliatory act by

pointing to temporal proximity -- i.e., according to Quintana, her

November 2017 involuntarily reassignment came shortly after her

supervisors learned about the EEOC action at a meeting in July or

August of 2017 with one of the individuals Quintana named in her

EEOC complaint.   See Rivera-Velázquez v. Regan, 

(1st Cir. 2024) ("One way of showing causation is by establishing

that the employer's knowledge of the protected activity was close

in time to the employer's adverse action." (quoting Wyatt v. City

of Boston, 

 (1st Cir. 1994))).

          Accepting Quintana's version of events at face value,18

we doubt that the three- or four-month period between the two

events would suffice to establish the causal link required for

even a prima facie showing of retaliation.     See Clark Cnty. Sch.

Dist. v. Breeden, 

 (2001) ("[T]he cases that

accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of

protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient

evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly


     18  This is another example of Quintana's questionable
characterizations of the record. Quintana claims that a jury could
conclude that her supervisors Carter and Scalf learned of her EEOC
complaint at a July or August 2017 meeting. This ignores the fact
that Scalf testified that he learned of the pending EEOC action
from Quintana herself, after he issued her reassignment.        See
Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 

 (1st Cir.
2006) (explaining that an employer can not retaliate where it did
not learn of protected conduct until after it undertook purportedly
retaliatory act).

                              - 32 -
hold that the temporal proximity must be 'very close.'" (citations

omitted)); Calero-Cerezo v. United States, 

 (1st

Cir.   2004)    ("Three-     and   four-month    periods   have   been   held

insufficient to establish a causal connection based on temporal

proximity." (citations omitted)).         However, we need not rest our

opinion on this basis.       Simply put, although very close "temporal

proximity may suffice for a prima facie case of retaliation," it

"does not satisfy [Quintana's] ultimate burden to establish that

the true explanation" for her reassignment "was retaliation for

engaging   in    protected    conduct   rather   than   poor   performance."

Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 

 (1st Cir.

2010) (affirming summary judgment and explaining that temporal

proximity of four days did not suffice to show pretext)(citation

omitted); see Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 

 (1st Cir. 2017) (affirming summary judgment and concluding

that temporal proximity of a single day did not satisfy burden to

show pretext). Here, apart from at best modest temporal proximity,

Quintana has provided no other evidence that the Army's reasons

for reassigning her were pretextual.         Thus, she failed to meet her

ultimate burden to show retaliatory motive under the McDonnell

Douglas test.

                               III. CONCLUSION

           For    the   foregoing    reasons,    we   affirm   the   district

court's judgment.

                                    - 33 -