United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit


No. 24-1062

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                              Appellee,

                                  v.

                     ADMILSON PIRES, a/k/a Mikey,

                        Defendant, Appellant.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

              [Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge]


                                Before

                     Gelpí, Kayatta, and Aframe,
                           Circuit Judges.


     Christine DeMaso, Assistant Federal Public Defender,     for
appellant.

     Karen Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.



                             May 28, 2025
           GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.             Following a four-day trial, a

jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Admilson Pires ("Pires") of

conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 

(c) (Count I) and sex trafficking of a minor in

violation of 

(a)(1) and (b)(2) (Count II).                  Pires

appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support

his    conspiracy       conviction     and     that    various    alleged   trial

errors -- namely, the erroneous admission of expert testimony and

certain statements by the government during summation -- tainted

the verdict.      For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

                                    I. BACKGROUND

           On August 1, 2019, Norwood Police Department ("Norwood

PD")   received     a   tip   that    Daisy -- a      missing    sixteen-year-old

girl -- was    located,       and    being   used     for   prostitution,   at   an

apartment in Norwood, Massachusetts.             At the apartment, Norwood PD

officers found two women: the resident, Kathleen Burke ("Burke"),

and a woman who claimed to be a twenty-year-old named "Melissa."

Moments into the encounter, Norwood PD officers saw that "Melissa"

matched the photo on Daisy's missing person's notice, and after a

few minutes of conversing, "Melissa" provided officers with her

real name: Daisy.

           After conversing some more with Burke and Daisy, Norwood

PD officers were given consent to search Burke's cell phone.                 They

then brought Daisy and Burke separately to the Norwood PD station,


                                       - 2 -
where Daisy told officers, among other things, that she had been

engaging in commercial sex.   During Daisy's interview with Norwood

PD officers, Burke's cell phone received several phone calls and

text messages from two contacts -- "Eli 2" and "Mikey" -- who were

later identified as Sandro Rosa ("Eli")1 and Pires, respectively.

At 4:24 p.m., Pires texted, "Hey, w[h]at happened to Mellisa

[sic]," and about three hours later, Eli texted, "you fuck me over

[K]athy [(Burke)] every[]time."   After interviewing Daisy, Norwood

PD officers returned her to her mother.

          On December 9, 2020, a federal grand jury returned a

two-count indictment against Pires, charging him with conspiracy

to commit sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 

(c) and sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 

(a)(1) and (b)(2).   Trial commenced on September 18, 2023,

and lasted four days.   Eight witnesses testified, and when all was

said and done, the jury convicted Pires of both offenses.        In

January 2024, the district court sentenced Pires to a term of 132

months' imprisonment on Count I and 132 months' imprisonment on

Count II, to be served consecutively.   Pires appealed.

          The resolution of the instant appeal centers on the

testimony of three witnesses -- Daisy, Burke, and FBI Special

Agent Daniel Garrabrant ("SA Garrabrant") -- and the parties'


     1 Daisy knew Rosa only as Eli, and so that is how she referred
to him. Here, too, we refer to Rosa as Eli.


                               - 3 -
statements during summation.      Rather than spell it all out here

(and then again below), we summarize the relevant events and

testimony in discussing each claim of error.

                       II. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL

             Pires raises three challenges on appeal.              First, he

contends that his conspiracy conviction was not supported by

sufficient    evidence.      Second,     he   argues    that   some    of    SA

Garrabrant's testimony was erroneously admitted, corrupting the

jury's verdict on both Counts I and II.        And third, he takes issue

with   the   government's   statements    during   summation,      which,    he

insists, inflamed the emotions of the jury and impugned the role

of defense counsel, warranting reversal of both Counts I and II.

We address these challenges in turn.

                   III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

             Pires's sufficiency challenge takes aim only at his

conspiracy conviction. 

(c). He insists that there

is a dearth of evidence showing a conspiratorial agreement between

him    and    either   of   the   coconspirators         offered      by    the

government -- either Eli or Pires's uncle.             Because we determine

that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude    beyond a reasonable doubt            that Pires and Eli

conspired to violate § 1591(a)(1), the challenge fails. See United

States v. Pena, 

 (1st Cir. 2022) ("When a jury

returns a general guilty verdict on a [conspiracy] count, and there


                                  - 4 -
is sufficient evidence as to one of two alternative theories of

guilt in that count, . . . insufficiency of the evidence as to the

other theory of guilt will not undermine the conviction." (footnote

omitted)).

          Both parties agree that the conspiratorial agreement

piece of Count I rests largely on Daisy's and Burke's testimony.

So that is where we turn our focus.      As with all challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence, "we recount the facts in the light

most favorable to the verdict."     United States v. Buoi, 

 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Paz-Alvarez, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)).

                         A. Daisy's Testimony

          We   start   with   Daisy's    testimony.   Daisy   began   by

explaining that from middle school until ninth grade, she had a

"very toxic" relationship with her mother and stepfather.             At

times, her mother would kick her out, so Daisy would end up in the

custody of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families

("DCF") -- often in DCF-run group homes and sometimes in mental

healthcare facilities.

          In January 2019, Daisy (fifteen years old at the time)

was in a DCF-run group home.     With the help of her friend Jaleah

(also a minor), Daisy ran away from the group home.       She went to

live at Jaleah's uncle's home in Brockton, Massachusetts.        Daisy

lived there for about a month, during which time Jaleah taught her


                                 - 5 -
how to make money by posting explicit photos of herself on the

website "MegaPersonals."       While there, Daisy also met Pires, who

was twenty-two years old at the time.

              The day Daisy met Pires, she told him her age and showed

him her missing person's notice containing her age and birthdate.

That same day, Pires indicated to Daisy that he did not care about

her age, and the two had sex.           During the few weeks that Daisy

remained in Brockton, she and Pires saw each other regularly,

engaging in sexual intercourse each time.               When apart,   they

communicated via phone call, text message, and Facebook.           At some

point in February 2019, Pires told Daisy that he loved her.

              That same month, Pires and Daisy's physical relationship

temporarily ended when Daisy went to live with another friend in

Fall River, Massachusetts.           Law enforcement recovered her from

Fall River a few days after she moved there, and they brought her

back to Springfield, Massachusetts.            Daisy did not go to her

mother's home immediately, opting instead to go to another group

home.   At that group home, she remained in contact with Pires by

using the facility's phone.

              Sometime prior to Daisy's sixteenth birthday in June

2019,   she    returned   to   her   mother   and   stepfather's   home   in

Springfield, Massachusetts.          She spent her birthday there but

remained in contact with Pires.        Around this time, Pires and Daisy

both professed their love for each other, and Daisy told him that


                                     - 6 -
she did not want to live at home anymore and that she wanted to be

with him instead.     Ultimately, Daisy fled home and went to live

with Pires at his mother's house.

            While living with Daisy at his mother's house, Pires

organized Daisy's first instance of commercial sex.            As Daisy

explained it, Pires -- jobless and        wanting money -- looked at

Daisy's body and told her that he needed her "to sell that thing."

Shortly thereafter, Pires planned for Daisy to engage in commercial

sex with his uncle.

            Pires followed through with the plan.    Pires's uncle met

him and Daisy outside of Pires's mother's house.         After Pires and

his uncle conversed in Cape Verdean Creole, Pires directed Daisy

to get in his uncle's car.      Pires's uncle drove off, parked the

car, climbed into the backseat, and engaged in oral and vaginal

sex with Daisy. They then returned to Pires's mother's home, where

Pires was waiting outside to receive money from his uncle.          This

encounter   "made   [Daisy]   feel   really   shitty."     Still,   Pires

indicated to Daisy that he wanted her to "do another one."          Daisy

responded that she did not want to do so because she was not

comfortable with    it.   Around that time,       however, Daisy     also

described the MegaPersonals website to Pires, and they created an

account on MegaPersonals.

            Pires and Daisy lasted only about a week and a half at

Pires's mother's house before they were kicked out for not paying


                                 - 7 -
rent.     Pires did not have a job, nor anywhere else to stay, so he

and Daisy spent their nights sleeping in cars in a parking lot.

              At some point in July 2019, Pires's friend, Eli, offered

Pires and Daisy a place to stay in Norwood, Massachusetts.              Daisy

knew Eli because he often was at Pires's mother's house.              And Eli

knew Daisy was a runaway minor because he saw her missing person's

report.    Notwithstanding this knowledge, Eli offered to house her

and Pires at Burke's apartment.             Burke, Eli said to Pires and

Daisy, was "a crack head" and "his bitch" who "would do anything

for him."       Pires told Daisy that Burke's apartment would be a

better place for Daisy to sell her body.

              Pires and Eli brought Daisy to Burke's home.            Before

arriving, Eli warned Pires and Daisy that Burke could not know

Daisy's real identity or age.       So, together, Daisy, Pires, and Eli

concocted fake identities for Daisy and Pires: Daisy claimed to be

a twenty-one-year-old woman named Melissa, and Pires went by Mikey.

              For about two weeks, Pires, Daisy, Eli, and Burke all

lived in Burke's one-bedroom apartment.            Just after moving in,

Pires and Daisy began orchestrating commercial-sex transactions.

Pires   and     Daisy   posted   advertisements    on   the   MegaPersonals

accounts they had created, offering Daisy for commercial sex. Both

Pires     and   Daisy   communicated    with     customers,   using    their

respective phones as well as Burke's.          Daisy engaged in commercial

sex with customers primarily in Burke's bedroom and, on some


                                    - 8 -
occasions,        multiple       times   a   day.2      The    men    would    pay   Daisy

afterward, and she would give the money to Pires.                        Eli and Pires

were       not   always    at    Burke's     apartment    when       Daisy    engaged    in

commercial sex; however, they each were there during some of the

commercial-sex transactions.                 In fact, Pires told Daisy she could

not be too loud during commercial sex because "[h]e would get

jealous" if he heard her and thought she "was actually enjoying

it."

                                  B. Burke's Testimony

                 Burke    also    testified     about    her    involvement      in     the

relevant events.           At the outset, she explained her relationship

with Eli.         After meeting at a bar, she and Eli quickly developed

a relationship.            It started out with Eli providing Burke free

drugs; specifically, crack cocaine.                  Burke, at the time, suffered

from a substance-use disorder, taking approximately "five hits [of

crack cocaine] a day."               Eventually, her relationship with Eli

became sexual.            And after about a month of knowing Burke, Eli

started to bring his friends to Burke's apartment to "[s]moke a

lot of [marijuana]."             Eli did this two-to-three days per week.

                 One day, Eli showed up to Burke's apartment with his

friend "Mikey" (i.e., Pires).                 They asked Burke if Pires and his


       Daisy testified that she and Pires slept on a mattress in
       2

Burke's room. Burke confirmed this arrangement, later testifying
that Pires and Daisy slept in her room and that she slept on her
couch.


                                             - 9 -
friend could stay at Burke's apartment.            After Burke consented,

Pires brought in "Melissa" (i.e., Daisy).

            For   approximately    two   weeks,   Pires,    Daisy,   and   Eli

stayed with Burke, during which time Burke learned that Daisy was

Pires's girlfriend.        Pires told Burke as much, and moreover, he

and Daisy were intimate in front of Burke.           Burke also testified

that she could hear them having sex because it was a small

apartment.

            At some point, Burke started letting Pires and Daisy use

her phone, which they did "[a] lot."          They consistently answered

text messages and phone calls using Burke's phone.               Burke grew

suspicious that they were using the phone to engage in commercial

sex, and she confirmed that suspicion when Daisy had sex with a

man after stating that she "had an appointment."              Burke further

testified    that   when   Daisy   engaged   in   commercial    sex,    Pires

generally would leave the apartment and return just after Daisy

received the money from the customer.        Burke said that Daisy never

kept the money; instead, she always handed it over to Pires.            Pires

was    noticeably   insistent   with     Daisy,   Burke    indicated,   often

demanding that Daisy see more customers to make more money for

him.   Although Burke admitted that she did not hear the details of

conversations between Pires and Eli regarding sex trafficking, she

said that "Eli knew everything that was going on, because it was




                                   - 10 -
just -- when you're in a small house, and that's what's going on,

everybody in the house knows about it."

               Burke confessed that failing to intervene to stop the

commercial sex is one of her biggest regrets.                    She failed to do

so, however, because "[she] was so drugged up" on drugs that Eli

gave her, for the most part, for free.

                                    C. Analysis

               We    review   de    novo     a    preserved    challenge    to   the

sufficiency of the evidence.3              Buoi, 

.       In so doing,

we "examine the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the

light most favorable to the prosecution and decide whether that

evidence, including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom,

would allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant committed the charged count or crime."

United States v. Santonastaso, 

 (1st Cir. 2024)

(quoting United States v. Cruz-Díaz, 

, 172 n.3 (1st

Cir.       2008)).     But    "we   do   not     view   each   piece   of   evidence

separately, re-weigh the evidence, or second-guess the jury's

credibility calls."           United States v. Minor, 

, 125

(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Acevedo-Hernández, 

 (1st Cir. 2018)).                  "[W]e will reverse only if the

verdict is irrational."             Buoi, 

 (alteration in


       The government concedes that Pires preserved his challenge
       3

to the sufficiency of the evidence.


                                         - 11 -
original) (quoting United States v. Connolly, 

 (1st

Cir. 2003)).

              The thrust of Pires's argument             as it relates to a

conspiracy with Eli is that there was insufficient evidence that

he reached an agreement with Eli to commit sex trafficking of

Daisy.   Pires contends, rather, that the government has proven no

more than the fact that Eli gave his homeless friend (i.e., Pires)

a place to live, knowing that Pires was sex trafficking Daisy but

not necessarily intending it to happen.              We disagree.        There was

sufficient evidence to allow a rational factfinder to conclude

that Pires and Eli conspired to violate 

(a)(1).

              We   begin    with   conspiracy     principles.       To    prove   a

conspiracy, "the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant and one or more coconspirators intended to agree

and . . . to commit the substantive criminal offense which was the

object of their unlawful agreement."              United States v. Perrotta,

 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.

Escobar-de-Jesus, 

 (1st Cir. 1999)).                       "[T]he

fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a joint commitment

to an 'endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the

elements   of      [the    underlying    substantive]    criminal    offense.'"

Ocasio   v.    United      States,   

    (2016)     (second

alteration in original) (quoting Salinas v. United States, 

 (1997)).


                                        - 12 -
          The     substantive    underlying      offense   here -- sex

trafficking of a minor in violation of § 1591(a)(1) -- requires

proof in relevant part that someone: (1) knowingly (2) by means of

"interstate or foreign commerce," (3) "recruit[ed], entice[d],

harbor[ed], transport[ed], provide[d], obtain[ed], advertise[d],

maintain[ed], patronize[d], or solicit[ed] by any means a person,"

(4) "knowing . . . that the person has not attained the age of 18

years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act."4

          Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict,

the evidence sufficed to establish that Eli conspired with Pires

to   violate    § 1591(a)(1)    by   knowingly     "harbor[ing]"   and

"maintain[ing]" Daisy with knowledge that she was under eighteen

years old and would be caused to engage in commercial sex.         For

one thing, Pires conceded in his opening brief that "[t]here was

evidence that Eli knew that . . . Pires was trafficking Daisy and

that Eli helped them find a place to stay knowing that they would

continue these activities."     And the record no doubt supports that

concession:     Daisy testified that Eli saw her missing person's

notice, which contained her age;         she testified that Eli was

sometimes there when she engaged in commercial sex; and Burke



     4 We evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence against the
statutory elements, not the jury instructions. See Musacchio v.
United States, 

 (2016) ("We hold that . . . a
sufficiency challenge should be assessed against the elements of
the charged crime . . . .").


                                - 13 -
testified that her apartment (where Daisy engaged in commercial

sex) was small enough that everyone inside it knew that Daisy was

engaging in commercial sex.      What is more, evidence in the record

indicated that Eli's role went well beyond merely providing a

friend, Pires, with shelter: (1) Eli ideated the plan to move Pires

and Daisy to Burke's apartment; (2) he instructed Pires and Daisy

to conceal their identities from Burke, including by using fake

names and a fake age for Daisy;5 (3) after Pires talked with Eli

about the plan, Pires told Daisy that Burke's house would be a

better place to sell her body; (4) after Pires and Daisy moved

into Burke's small, one-bedroom apartment, Eli maintained the

status quo by continuing to supply Burke with drugs; and (5) after

Burke and Daisy were brought to the Norwood PD station, Eli texted

Burke "you fuck me over . . . every[]time."

            Given   that   evidence,   a   jury    could      reasonably    have

inferred that Eli tacitly agreed with Pires to harbor or maintain

Daisy knowing that she would engage in commercial sex.                See United

States v. Alejandro-Montañez, 

 (1st Cir. 2015)

("The    agreement . . . may    consist    of     no   more    than    a   tacit



     5 Pires argues that "[t]he fake name and age could have been
to conceal Daisy's status as a minor and a runaway," not because,
as the government would have it, Eli was trying to prevent Burke
from finding out that Pires was sex trafficking a minor. That is
an alternative explanation, to be sure, but in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the jury's verdict. See Muñoz-Martinez, 79 F.4th at 50.


                                 - 14 -
understanding." (citation omitted)); see also United States v.

Guzman-Ortiz, 

 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[D]ue to the

clandestine nature of criminal conspiracies, the law recognizes

that the illegal agreement may be either express or tacit and that

a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a development and

collocation       of    circumstance."      (quotation    marks   and    citation

omitted)).

               We are unconvinced by Pires's arguments to the contrary.

First, Pires contends that Eli's mere knowledge of, or proximity

to, the illegal conduct is not by itself sufficient to establish

a conspiracy.          In Pires's view, the government had to prove that

Eli    acted    with    specific   intent    to   cause   Daisy   to    engage   in

commercial sex. But even if we accept that contention (about which

we express no opinion), there was enough evidence, construed in

the light most favorable to the verdict, to demonstrate that Eli

did, in fact, have such an intent.

               We have long recognized that in cases such as this, where

the government's evidence of a conspiratorial agreement rests

largely on circumstantial evidence, "[t]he attendant circumstances

tell     the      tale -- and      the      culpability     of    a[n     alleged

coconspirator's] presence hinges upon whether the circumstances

fairly imply participatory involvement."              Guzman-Ortiz, 

 (quoting United States v. Echeverri, 

 (1st

Cir. 1993)).       Far from incidental, Eli's involvement here was, as


                                     - 15 -
we outline above, instrumental, "undercut[ting Pires's] claim that

the   evidence    showed     only    [Eli's]    'mere    presence'     at   a

conspiratorial event."      United States v. Vázquez Rijos, 

, 101 (1st Cir. 2024); cf. Guzman-Ortiz, 

.             Simply

put, the jury was permitted to infer that Eli would not have

engaged in the aforementioned conduct unless he was conspiring

with Pires.6     See United States v. Flanders, 

(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that "the jury could infer that [a

coconspirator] would not have known to [engage in certain conduct]

unless he were in on the [scheme]"); see also United States v.

Llinas, 

 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[A] jury is free to rely

on its common sense and may infer that criminal conspirators do

not involve innocent persons at critical stages of a [crime]."

(citation omitted)).

           Second, Pires says there was no evidence suggesting that

Eli established     his    relationship with Burke for the sole or

specific purpose of harboring Daisy.            Pires points to Eli and

Burke's   preexisting     arrangement:   they   knew    each   other   months



      6Both in his briefing and at oral argument, Pires points to
the lack of direct evidence showing Eli's intent to join the
conspiracy.    But we are unmoved by this argument because
circumstantial evidence alone may prove a conspiratorial
agreement.   See Guzman-Ortiz, 

; see also United
States v. Adorno-Molina, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)
("[S]pecific intent 'may be established through circumstantial
evidence alone.'" (quoting United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 

 (1st Cir. 2012))).


                                    - 16 -
before Pires stayed at her apartment, and throughout that time,

Eli provided Burke drugs in exchange for sex and a place for him

and his friends to hang out.       The record evidence, however,

indicated that this preexisting relationship was precisely the

reason why Eli felt confident about offering Burke's abode to Pires

and Daisy in the first place.     That is, Eli viewed Burke as "a

crack head" and "his bitch" who "would do anything for him," so

he, the jury could have inferred, felt confident that he and Pires

could harbor Daisy there.   Pires cites no authority to support the

contention that, to conspire, Eli would have needed to change his

behavior or increase payments to Burke for the specific purpose of

harboring Daisy.   Nor do we see good reason to require any such

change in the terms of his preexisting affairs.

          Third, Pires attempts to distinguish Eli's involvement

from other cases in which courts have found sufficient evidence of

conspiracies.   Specifically, Pires cites a slew of out-of-circuit

cases, arguing that the government failed to show evidence that

Eli "help[ed] convince Daisy to participate in sex work, photograph

Daisy, post advertisements, communicate with potential buyers,

collect money from Daisy or . . . Pires, engage in other sex

trafficking, or communicate with Daisy or . . . Pires about sex

trafficking."   See, e.g., United States v. Coulter, 

 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Wysinger, 

,

213–14 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Mack, 

, 1081


                               - 17 -
(6th Cir. 2015); Flanders, 

; United States v.

Walsh, 

, 33 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order).7                      As we

note       above,   however,     § 1591(a)(1)         criminalizes      a    host   of

conduct -- including           "recruit[ing],         entic[ing],       harbor[ing],

transport[ing],          provid[ing],          obtain[ing],         advertis[ing],

maintain[ing], patroniz[ing], or solicit[ing]."                        And liability

attaches to any of the acts in that disjunctive list of verbs.

See United States v. Brooks, 

 (9th Cir. 2010)

(rejecting defendant's argument that "there was no evidence that

he   persuaded      or   enticed   [the    minors]       to   become    involved    in

prostitution"       because     the     jury     could    find    that       defendant

"knowingly      transported,       as   well     as    harbored,       the    girls").


       At oral argument, Pires focused on the Fourth Circuit's
       7

opinion vacating a conspiracy conviction in United States v.
McMillan, 

 (4th Cir. 2020). But material factual
distinctions render the decision inapposite.      In McMillan, the
government put forth evidence to show that (1) in May 2014, a
prostitute left one pimp-defendant for another pimp-defendant;
(2) at a later date, one defendant sometimes gave rides with no
documented relationship to sex trafficking to the other one; and
(3) after one defendant was arrested, the other defendant
contacted him on Facebook allegedly to assist him in escaping jail.

 at 849–50. The Fourth Circuit vacated the conviction because
"there [wa]s neither direct nor circumstantial evidence sufficient
to prove that Miller knew Jackson in May 2014 and intentionally
released B.E. to him, that the rides Miller admitted to giving
Jackson in the summer of 2014 were in support of Jackson's
sex-trafficking activities, or that Miller and Jackson's Facebook
correspondence in September 2014 was part of a plot to stymie the
police investigation." 

. Here, conversely, the evidence
the government laid out clearly established that Pires and Eli had
a relationship that pre-dated the sex trafficking of Daisy, and
that Eli's introduction and vouching secured the place needed for
the trafficking operation.


                                        - 18 -
Likewise, here, the jury here could reasonably have found that Eli

knowingly harbored and maintained Daisy.                  It is thus of little

import that the cases Pires cites involve defendants who engaged

in different conduct prohibited by § 1591(a)(1).

              Fourth, Pires points to our decision in United States v.

Canty,       asserting   that   the    government     failed       to    establish

interdependence between him and Eli.              See 

 (1st

Cir.       2022).    That   argument     misses     the    mark.        We   assess

interdependence only to discern whether multiple actors' conduct

evinces "a single general agreement," United States v. Ramos-Baez,

 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Portela,

 (1st Cir. 1999)), to participate in a "single

overarching conspiracy" rather than "individual agreements with

various actors at different times," Canty, 

.                      We

need not engage in that inquiry here because, for the reasons we

give above, the evidence sufficiently demonstrated Eli's tacit

agreement to conspire specifically with Pires.8

                         IV. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES

              We next turn to Pires's contention that the admission of

certain expert testimony corrupted the jury's verdict.                       Before




       8Having identified sufficient evidence to establish a
conspiracy between Pires and Eli, we decline to address Pires's
challenge to the evidence underlying the conspiracy between Pires
and his uncle. See Pena, 

.


                                      - 19 -
reaching the merits, we must determine whether Pires preserved his

objections.      To do so, we recount the relevant history.

        A. SA Garrabrant's Testimony and Pires's Objections

           Prior to trial, the government indicated that it would

offer SA Garrabrant as an expert on:

     (1) The types of victims that are commonly recruited by
     pimps to engage in commercial sex acts;

     (2) The typical means sex traffickers use to target,
     recruit, manipulate, and maintain victims;

     (3) The [c]ommon ways that sex traffickers maintain
     control over victims' actions and to prevent victims
     from leaving the relationship;

     (4) The common reactions of victims of sex trafficking
     to the abuse;

     (5) The logistics of a sex trafficking operation; [and]

     (6) Terms utilized in the sex trafficking industry.

Pires   filed    a   motion    in     limine    objecting   to    the    first   four

categories of anticipated testimony.              In his motion, Pires argued

that such testimony was irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence

("Rule") 401 and thus unhelpful to the jury under Rule 702.                        He

pressed, too,        for exclusion of the testimony               under    Rule 403

because,   he    believed,      the    anticipated     testimony        amounted   to

"highly prejudicial profiling," which "may in fact touch on the

evidence in [Pires's] case," and would "thus encourag[e] the

factfinder      to   infer    guilt    merely    because    his   case     may   have

consistencies with other cases of this nature."



                                        - 20 -
           During trial, but before SA Garrabrant took the stand,

Pires renewed his objections.     He stated, in relevant part:

     I'll    just    refresh   my   objection   for    the
     record. . . . The    testimony  that   I'm  primarily
     concerned about is testimony about common or typical
     traits of victims or common or typical traits of
     traffickers. . . .

     So for the reasons I expressed in my brief, we would
     object to that. We think that there's no relevance to
     it.   This is an individual case.    This is about the
     evidence as to this victim and Mr. Pires. What might
     happen in other cases is not relevant, has no tendency
     to prove anything with respect to this case, and we
     foresee significant danger of undue prejudice, in that
     it both profiled the victim, implying that there
     are -- that alleged victims who may have certain traits
     are victims, and defendants who have certain traits or
     characteristics are traffickers. And for those reasons,
     we're objecting to testimony along those lines.

           Then and there, the district court rejected Pires's

objections.   It stated that the anticipated testimony would be

helpful to the jury in general and was different in kind from the

testimony described in the "profiling" cases Pires had cited.      The

district   court     did,   however,   express   concern   about   the

government's request to ask SA Garrabrant hypothetical questions.

To allay those concerns, the government indicated that it would

not ask such questions without first seeking the court's approval

at sidebar.   The district court then stated that Pires's "rights

[we]re preserved."




                                - 21 -
           Not long after that colloquy, SA Garrabrant took the

stand.   We summarize the portions of his testimony relevant to the

instant appeal.

           At the outset, SA Garrabrant answered questions related

to his qualifications to testify as an expert.                 Pires had no

objection to SA Garrabrant's qualifications, but he reiterated his

"objection to the subject matter that we discussed previously."

The district court again overruled the objection.              SA Garrabrant

then briefly explained that he had no familiarity with the case:

he did not review any reports related to the investigation, did

not speak to any witnesses, did not know the concerned individuals'

names,   and   was   not   in   the    courtroom   while    other   witnesses

testified.     He confirmed that he was "basically [t]here . . . to

testify blindly about what [he] kn[e]w about the commercial sex

trafficking trade."

           Turning to the substance, SA Garrabrant described common

characteristics among the sex-trafficking victims that he had

interviewed.    He opined that victims of sex trafficking are often

vulnerable due to trauma, mental health issues, substance-use

disorders, or a combination of all three.          He said that those same

characteristics are common in minor victims.               He further stated

that minors who "go through child services" or are "in and out of

shelters," are "very vulnerable" to sex trafficking.            He explained




                                      - 22 -
that    instability -- e.g.,            a       lack        of    shelter,        food,     and

necessities -- "make[s] kids more vulnerable."

              SA     Garrabrant     then     shifted         to     delineating       typical

patterns      of     pimps.     Pimps,      he    noted,          are    typically     "super

charismatic" individuals who exploit the vulnerabilities of their

victims, employing a grooming process to attract their victims.

He    said    that    pimps    typically        begin       the     grooming      process    by

establishing strong relationships with the victims.                             For instance,

he elaborated, pimps might give victims a place to stay, buy them

food    and    clothes,       or    supply       them        with       drugs    to   exploit

substance-use disorders.

              SA Garrabrant opined, however, that the grooming process

differs based on the type of pimp.                           He stated that "finesse

pimping"      typically       involves      a    pimp        with       "great    powers    of

persuasion."         Such pimps use persuasive tactics "to both recruit

and    keep   girls     in    the   stable."           By    "stable,"      SA    Garrabrant

clarified, he "mean[t] a group of girls -- like if you have three

girls working for the same pimp, that's called his stable."

              He then contrasted finesse pimps with "gorilla pimps."

He explained that gorilla pimps "use a lot of finesse to get their

girls and recruit them," but unlike finesse pimps, gorilla pimps

"can be incredibly violent." Gorilla pimps, he added, often "steal

girls    from        other     pimps,       [and]       they're          more     likely    to

use . . . physically assaultive behavior."                        SA Garrabrant offered


                                         - 23 -
an example: "If a girl tries to leave, [a gorilla] pimp [is] going

to be extremely physically assaultive," by in some cases, "us[ing]

extreme forms of physical and sexual torture and abuse."         He

explained that finesse pimps and gorilla pimps are in that way

"very different."

           Homing in on finesse pimping, SA Garrabrant underscored

a common dynamic between finesse pimps and their victims: the

victims often view the pimps as their "boyfriend[s]."    Pimps find

this dynamic important because it establishes trust between them

and the victims.    And so, he emphasized, when the police show up,

victims are less likely to "tell on [their] boyfriend[s]."

           SA Garrabrant then described the purpose of the grooming

process.   After having established a strong relationship with the

victims, finesse pimps typically persuade them to begin engaging

in commercial sex.    "[G]etting them to that point," SA Garrabrant

stated, is the goal of the grooming process.      Once that "first

date"9 occurs, in SA Garrabrant's experience, a pimp has a stronger

grasp on the victim.    As SA Garrabrant put it, "a pimp will tell

you . . . [,] once that first date is done, [the victim is] mine."

           After that, SA Garrabrant indicated, sex traffickers

commonly focus on maintaining control over the victims. Generally,



     9  SA Garrabrant defined a "date" as a commercial sex
transaction, specifically, "the act of the female meeting the male
for a sexual engagement."


                               - 24 -
they give victims "street name[s]" and cut off the victims from

their    support    systems,    which   increases   victims'      reliance   on

traffickers.       In addition, even though the victims engage in

commercial sex, SA Garrabrant said, pimps continue to reinforce

that they are the victims' boyfriends, by, for example, continuing

to have intimate sexual relationships with the victims.                  In so

doing,   SA    Garrabrant   explained,    the   pimps    attempt    to   create

"completely dependent" victims, making "it[] really, really hard

[for the victims] to leave."

              Next, SA Garrabrant explained how pimps regulate the

commercial-sex trade.       Pimps, he said, often control the finances.

"[A] lot of pimps," he added, "will strip search girls and make

sure they're not hiding any money," and there are "repercussions"

"if [the victims] get caught hiding money."             The pimps also often

set the rates customers must pay in exchange for commercial sex.

Moreover, SA Garrabrant testified, pimps often prohibit victims

from engaging in commercial sex with Black men.                  SA Garrabrant

stated that "sometimes [he]'ll see in an ad[vertisement that] the

girl will post 'no black men.'"           That is because, SA Garrabrant

elaborated, it is common for pimps to attempt to steal sex workers

from other pimps, and pimps perceive minority men as more of a

threat to steal the victims.

              SA   Garrabrant   finally    testified     about     the   common

reactions of victims after they have been rescued or interviewed


                                   - 25 -
by law enforcement.        Victims "very rare[ly]" incriminate their

pimps immediately after they have been rescued by law enforcement.

This hesitance to confide in law enforcement, SA Garrabrant opined,

is a result of the pimps' efforts to reinforce the victims'

reliance on them.

           Pires did not contemporaneously object to any of SA

Garrabrant's testimony.

                               B. Preservation

           On   appeal,    Pires      takes    aim   at   two   buckets    of   SA

Garrabrant's    testimony.         The      first    bucket     relates   to    SA

Garrabrant's    testimony      about     typical     patterns     used    by    sex

traffickers and typical dynamics between sex traffickers and their

victims   (we   refer     to   this    as     "typical-patterns-and-dynamics

testimony").    The second bucket concerns SA Garrabrant's testimony

regarding "gorilla pimps," or pimps who use violence and abuse to

coerce and control sex workers (we call this the "gorilla-pimp

testimony").

           The government does not dispute that Pires preserved his

objections as to the typical-patterns-and-dynamics testimony, so

the challenge is preserved. See United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz,

 (1st Cir. 2015) ("When the government fails to

request plain error review, we, and many of our sister circuits,

review the claim under the standard of review that is applied when

the issue is properly preserved below." (collecting cases)).                    But


                                      - 26 -
the parties do spar over whether Pires preserved his challenge to

the gorilla-pimp testimony.             For its part, the government argues

that Pires's pre-testimony objections were different from the

arguments he now presses.             Pires counters that he preserved that

argument when he objected -- before trial and at trial before SA

Garrabrant      offered     any       expert    testimony -- to       the   general

relevance of SA Garrabrant's anticipated testimony.

              Ordinarily,         a      defendant       must         timely -- and

specifically -- raise an evidentiary objection to preserve his or

her appellate rights.           See Fed. R. Evid. 103; see also United

States v. Encarnacion, 

, 503–04 (1st Cir. 2022)

("Ordinarily, a defendant must object to particular evidence at

trial    in   order    to   preserve     his     appellate     rights.").     Thus,

determining whether a party preserved a claim for appeal is often

a straightforward task: the party either objected below or didn't.

See, e.g., United States v. Pérez-Greaux, 

 (1st Cir.

2023).    We do, however, permit a defendant to raise an evidentiary

"objection before trial by a motion in limine."                   Encarnacion, 

.         And if "the district court's rejection of the

defendant's position is unconditional, the defendant's objection

may be deemed preserved even if not raised again at trial."                      

But when the ruling is "preliminary, conditional, or 'tentative'"

and   "'clearly       invites     the   party     to   offer    the   evidence   at

trial,' . . . the [defendant] has an obligation to raise [the


                                        - 27 -
objection] again to preserve the claim." United States v. Grullon,

, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.

Almeida, 

 (1st Cir. 2014)).      Critically, we have

said -- indeed, "emphasize[d]" -- that Rule 103 places the onus on

the objecting party "to clarify whether an in limine or other

evidentiary ruling is definitive when there is doubt on that

point."    United States v. Takesian, 

 (1st Cir.

2019) (quoting Crowe v. Bolduc, 

 (1st Cir. 2003)).

           Here, we hold that Pires failed to preserve his claim of

error as to the gorilla-pimp testimony for two independent reasons.

First, Pires nowhere "argue[s] that th[e] rulings [on the motion

in limine] were final rather than tentative, so [his] failure to

renew his objection at trial triggers plain error review on

appeal."   Almeida, 

.    Second, even if unconditional

as to SA Garrabrant's anticipated testimony, Pires offered only a

general relevance objection that does not suffice to cover the

specific challenges he raises on appeal.

           We expand on the latter.      Our starting point is our

discussion in United States v. Rivera Rangel, where we aptly

stated:

     The fact that a party has preserved an objection does
     not mean that, on appeal, the party can raise any
     conceivable ground in support of that objection. In the
     context of a ruling admitting evidence, we have
     explained that a "lack of specificity bars the party
     aggrieved by the admission of the evidence from raising
     more particularized points for the first time on


                              - 28 -
     appeal." . . .   [A] contrary holding would enable a
     party to retrench after an adverse jury verdict and ask
     an appellate court to view the trial judge's evidentiary
     rulings through a new and different lens. This sort of
     second-guessing is antithetic to the core purpose of
     procedural default rules.

 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

            That rationale is determinative here.                  Recall Pires's

pre-trial objections.       In his motion in limine, he explained that

he was objecting to four broad categories of anticipated testimony.

He   emphasized    his     "grave[]     concern[]        that    SA     Garrabrant's

'generalized' testimony may in fact touch on the evidence in his

case, thus encouraging the factfinder to infer guilt merely because

his case may have consistencies with other cases of this nature."

(Emphasis   added.)        During     trial,       but    before      SA   Garrabrant

testified, Pires twice reiterated his objection, noting that he

was "primarily concerned about [the] testimony about common or

typical   traits   of     victims     or    common       or   typical      traits   of

traffickers" because he "fores[aw] significant danger of undue

prejudice, in that it both profiled the victim, implying that there

are -- that   alleged      victims    who    may    have      certain      traits   are

victims, and defendants who have certain traits or characteristics

are traffickers."        Nowhere did Pires object that SA Garrabrant's

testimony would impermissibly touch on conduct in which Pires did

not engage.   Overruling the objection, the district court stated:

"I don't think it's the kind of profiling that the cases [Pires]



                                      - 29 -
cited talked about.         I think it's different.       I think it will be

helpful to the jury in general."          Shortly thereafter, the district

court stated, "Your rights are preserved, by the way."

            To the extent Pires interpreted the district court's

ruling as definitively resolving any future relevance objection,

he is wrong.        Sure, the district court said that Pires's rights

were preserved. But the district court reached its decision before

SA Garrabrant offered any expert testimony and after having heard

only Pires's general relevance objection and his more specific

objections about the profling nature of the anticipated testimony.

So, when the district court qualified its pre-testimony ruling

that   it   did    not   think   the   anticipated     testimony     constituted

profiling and that the testimony "w[ould] be helpful to the jury

in general" (emphasis added), the court was, at most, holding that

the anticipated testimony would not constitute profiling and the

four objected-to categories of anticipated testimony generally fit

the case.    Nothing more.       Far from ordaining as relevant all of SA

Garrabrant's testimony to follow, that ruling left to Pires the

duty   to   level    specific    objections     to   otherwise   objectionable

testimony elicited at trial in accordance with Rule 103.                 Plainly

stated, even if the district court's ruling preserved Pires's

objections    on     some   grounds,     Pires's     general   and    conclusory

invocation of the word "relevance" in his pre-testimony objection

did not preserve his claim as to the gorilla-pimp testimony.                 See


                                       - 30 -


 ("[A] 'lack of specificity bars the party aggrieved by the

admission of the evidence from raising more particularized points

for the first time on appeal.'" (citation omitted)).

           Similar to what we said in Rivera Rangel, see 

 a

contrary   holding   here   would   eviscerate   Rule   103(a)   and   its

underlying purposes: "to allow the judge to avoid error" at trial

and "get the ruling right," United States v. O'Brien, 

 (1st Cir. 2006), and to permit the government to "cure[] the

objection by introducing" the evidence in an appropriate manner,

United States v. Bailey, 

, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2001).

Moreover, such a rule would "increase the heavy burdens already

imposed on trial judges in criminal cases," who would have to sua

sponte anticipate any potential relevance issues without the aid

of a contemporaneous objection.      United States v. De La Cruz, 

 (1st Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).          We refuse to

approve such a practice.

           Therefore, unlike Pires's preserved objection to the

typical-patterns-and-dynamics testimony, Pires's objection to the

gorilla-pimp   testimony    is   unpreserved.    Turning   now   to    the

substance of Pires's evidentiary challenges, we accordingly review

his challenge to the typical-patterns-and-dynamics testimony for

abuse of discretion and his challenge to the gorilla-pimp testimony

for plain error.




                                 - 31 -
                C. Typical-Patterns-and-Dynamics Testimony

              We first consider Pires's objections as outlined in his

motion     in    limine.         Specifically,       Pires       argues    that    the

typical-patterns-and-dynamics              testimony      (1) was     inadmissible

under Rules 702 and 401; (2) amounted to impermissible "profiling"

testimony; and (3) improperly "bolster[ed]" the credibility of

certain witnesses.

              As we note above, because the government did not argue

Pires failed to preserve this objection, we review for abuse of

discretion.      See Encarnación-Ruiz, 

.                    Under that

standard, we afford broad discretion to the "district judge, who

sees and hears the challenged evidence first hand in the context

of the overall trial."           United States v. Gordon, 

(1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Montas, 

(1st   Cir.     1994)).       We    will    overturn      the    district       court's

evidentiary determination "only if it represents a manifest abuse

of discretion."         Id.

                  1. Objection Under Rules 702 and 401

              Invoking    Rules    702     and    401,   Pires    argues    that    the

district      court     should     have    prohibited      SA     Garrabrant       from

testifying      about    typical    sex-trafficking        patterns       and   common

dynamics between sex traffickers and their victims.                   According to

Pires, that testimony did not help the jury understand an opaque

industry and was irrelevant. Although we have not yet had occasion


                                         - 32 -
to   decide    whether    sex-trafficking-pattern     testimony,    like   SA

Garrabrant's,     is     permissible   under   Rule   702,   our   precedent

inevitably leads to the conclusion that it is.

              The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by

Rule 702, which provided at the time of Pires's trial:

      A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
      skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
      the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

      (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
      specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
      understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

      (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

      (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
      and methods; and

      (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
      methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2011); 10 see also Fed. R. Evid. 401 (the general

relevance rule).       The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 702 as

"assign[ing] a 'gatekeeping role for the judge' to determine that

'an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is

relevant to the task at hand.'"          Martínez v. United States, 

 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., Inc., 

 (1993)).             We do not, however,



       As we noted in D'Pergo Custom Guitars, Inc. v. Sweetwater
      10

Sound, Inc., Rule 702 was amended in December 2023.    

, 140 n.11 (1st Cir. 2024). Because that amendment occurred
after Pires's trial, "we apply the version of Rule 702 in effect
at the time of the . . . trial." 

                                   - 33 -
permit expert testimony "when its 'subject . . . is well within

the bounds of a jury's ordinary experience' and so it 'has little

probative    value'   but   'might    unduly     influence   the    jury's   own

assessment of the inference that is being urged.'"                 Gordon, 

 (quoting Montas, 

).

            To that end, consider first whether the sex-trafficking

industry and methods used by sex traffickers are beyond the ken of

laypeople.    District courts making that determination are guided

by a "common sense inquiry."           Montas, 

 (citation

omitted).    Common sense, along with our precedent, dictates that

the intricacies of the sex-trafficking industry and the typical

dynamics between pimps and prostitutes fall well outside the

understanding of the average juror.

            For decades in our circuit, "[w]e have admitted expert

testimony    regarding      the   operation     of    criminal     schemes   and

activities in a variety of contexts."                Gordon, 

(quoting Montas, 

).             We have held to be beyond the

ken of an average juror expert testimony about the "typical methods

of drug dealers," United States v. Monell, 

 (1st

Cir. 2015); "the nature of narcotics trafficking by vessels,"

United States v. Peña-Santo, 

, 694–95 (1st Cir. 2015);

and "certain roles in . . . [a] crime family's 'extensive criminal

organization,'" Montas, 

 (quoting United States v.

Angiulo, 

 (1st Cir. 1990)).               We have said the


                                     - 34 -
same for expert testimony regarding "the behavioral reactions of

abuse victims."        United States v. Alzanki, 

 (1st

Cir. 1995).      More recently, we explained that the average juror

"would [not] be familiar with prototypical grooming behavior by an

individual     seeking    out    sex     with     minors."          United    States    v.

Soler-Montalvo, 

, 17 (1st Cir. 2022).                       SA Garrabrant's

typical-patterns-and-dynamics             testimony       is    no    exception;       the

testimony     falls    outside     the    common       knowledge      of    the    average

layperson.

              Such testimony was plainly relevant, too.                        It, among

other   things,        described       the    sex-trafficking              industry    and

illuminated how Pires's romantic relationship with Daisy "could be

part of a seduction technique."              United States v. Romero, 

 (7th Cir. 1999); cf. also Soler-Montalvo, 44 F.4th at 15,

16–17   (calling       expert    testimony        about     "patterns         of   online

predators" "highly relevant to and probative of the key issue in

the   case"    where    it,   conversely,         "sought      to    explain . . . how

seemingly     sinister    conduct        could    be    part    of    innocent      sexual

fantasy").     It, moreover, may have helped the jury assess Daisy's

credibility, which Pires sought to undermine throughout trial "by

pointing out the inconsistencies in [her] testimon[y], and by

intimating that [she] would not have remained with [Pires] if he

had mistreated [her] as [she] claimed." United States v. Anderson,

, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.


                                         - 35 -
Anderson, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see also United

States v. Taylor, 

 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining

the jury might be "in the dark" about pimp-victim relationships

and thus "may be unprepared to assess the veracity of an alleged

pimp,      prostitute,      or     other      witness   testifying       about

prostitution"); United States v. Rivera, No. 22-2780, 

, at *2 (2d Cir. June 3, 2024) (summary order) (approving

expert testimony about "trauma bonding" because it "would help

jurors understand . . . why a sex trafficking victim might express

affection for their trafficker").

             The overwhelming weight of authority from our sister

circuits     further    supports     the   admissibility     of   such   expert

testimony as well.       See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 

 (10th Cir. 2021) (special agent testimony about "pimping

and prostitution culture" "provided a basis on which the jury could

infer that Defendant recruited a vulnerable girl seeking structure

and stability in her life"); United States v. Young, 

   (7th   Cir.   2020)   (testimony     that   "defined    key   terms   and

explained common sex-trafficking dynamics");               United States     v.

Szczerba, 

, 939–40 (8th Cir. 2018) (testimony regarding

"what pimps and prostitutes 'typically' do," including testimony

about   "how    pimps     recruit,     control,    coerce,    and   advertise

prostitutes" and "practices [pimps] commonly use[]"); Brooks, 

 (testimony about, among other things, pimps' methods


                                     - 36 -
of "isolat[ing] new prostitutes from familiar areas"); Anderson,

 (testimony about "typical characteristics of

adolescent prostitutes and . . . the behavior of pimps"); Taylor,

 (similar); Anderson, 851 F.2d at 393–94 (similar);

United States v. Jenkins, No. 21-4447, 

, at *6 (4th

Cir. Nov. 26, 2024) (broad testimony "about the 'typical human

trafficking experiences of its victims and the common behaviors of

traffickers'" (citations omitted)); United States v. Warren, 

, 782 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (similar).

            Given our precedent and that of our sister circuits, we

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied    Pires's   motion   in   limine    to   prohibit    SA    Garrabrant's

typical-patterns-and-dynamics testimony.

                         2. Profiling Objection

            We turn next to Pires's claim that SA Garrabrant's

testimony amounted to impermissible "profiling."              By that, Pires

means that SA Garrabrant's typical-patterns-and-dynamics testimony

improperly "encouraged the jury to convict [Pires] because the

conduct    described   by    witnesses     mirrored   what    SA    Garrabrant

described as 'typical' sex trafficking."           We are unpersuaded.

            At the outset, we concur with the D.C. Circuit that "the

'profile' label is not helpful in distinguishing admissible from

inadmissible expert testimony."          United States v. Long, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2003), abrogation on other grounds recognized


                                   - 37 -
by United States v. Mohammed, 

 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

Instead, courts must look to "the Federal Rules of Evidence and

the purpose for which the evidence is offered: whether it is

designed improperly to illuminate the defendant's character or

propensity to engage in criminal activity, or whether instead it

seeks to aid the jury in understanding a pattern of behavior beyond

its ken."   

            One problem: Pires does not cite a specific Rule to

support his contention, and several of our sister circuits have

addressed so-called "profiling" objections under different Rules.

See, e.g., United States v. Sosa, 

 (5th Cir. 2018)

(analyzing a "profiling" objection under Rule 704); United States

v. Simpson, 

 (4th Cir. 1990) (same, under Rule

403); United States v. Gillespie, 

, 479–80 (9th Cir.

1988) (same, under Rule 404).11   Under any of those Rules, however,

Pires's challenge fails.


     11 In support of his "profiling" argument, Pires also cites
to the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Mejia, 

 (2d Cir. 2008).      But that case made no mention of
profiling. To be sure, the court did caution against the dangers
of admitting factual testimony under the guise of expert testimony.
See 

 ("An increasingly thinning line separates the
legitimate use of an officer expert to translate esoteric
terminology or to explicate an organization's hierarchical
structure from the illegitimate and impermissible substitution of
expert opinion for factual evidence."). The issue with the expert
testimony there, however, was that it concerned factual matters
"well within the grasp of the average juror." 

. As
such, the testimony was inadmissible because of Rule 702's
requirement that it be based on "scientific, technical, or other


                              - 38 -
            Start with Rule 704(b).     It "prohibits an expert witness

from testifying that a 'defendant did or did not have the mental

state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime

charged.'"    Peña-Santo, 

 (quoting Rule 704(b)).

Pires argues that SA Garrabrant's testimony regarding typical

sex-trafficking patterns implicitly suggested to the jury that

Pires acted as a sex trafficker.        But that challenge falls flat

for an elementary reason: "Rule 704(b) applies only to opinions

about the defendant," and since SA Garrabrant "did not express an

opinion    about   [Pires   him]self . . . ,    his   testimony   did    not

violate Rule 704(b)."       Diaz v. United States, 

(2024) (emphasis added).

            Turn then to Rule 404(a).          Citing United States v.

Gillespie, Pires ostensibly argues that SA Garrabrant's testimony

violated Rule 404(a) by impugning Pires's character.          See 

.   But the expert testimony in Gillespie is distinguishable.

There, the expert testified about the background "characteristics

of   a   molester,"   and   the   government   used   said   testimony   as

substantive evidence of guilt. 

 (emphasis added). Here,



specialized knowledge" -- not because it impermissibly profiled
the defendant. 

     Here, SA Garrabrant came nowhere close to "substitut[ing]
expert testimony for factual evidence of" the underlying crime.
Id. at 195.     Indeed, he explained at the beginning of his
examination that he had no familiarity with the facts of the case
or even the names of the concerned individuals.


                                   - 39 -
to the contrary, SA Garrabrant's testimony touched on the patterns

employed by -- i.e., the modus operandi (m.o.) of -- child sex

traffickers.     Cf. United States v. Cross, 

, 1050 n.66

(11th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing Gillespie).              We routinely permit

experts to opine on the m.o. of certain types of criminal activity.

See,    e.g.,   Soler-Montalvo,    44   F.4th   at   17    (approving      expert

testimony about "whether [the defendant's] actions were consistent

with patterns of known pedophiles or child molesters, similar to

testimony on whether a defendant's actions are consistent with the

patterns of other drug dealers in a case charging intentional

distribution of drug").           And   because the government used SA

Garrabrant's     typical-patterns-and-dynamics            testimony   in     that

way -- rather than to show that Pires's "poor character made him

likely to" engage in sex trafficking of minors -- it did not run

afoul of Rule 404.     United States v. Williams, 

(7th Cir. 2018) (Barrett, J.); see also 

 at 490–91 (rejecting

defendant's argument under Rule 404 where government used expert

"testimony to show that [defendant's] actions were consistent with

common tactics that pedophiles used to lure their victims"); Long,

328 F.3d at 667–68 (approving "expert testimony regarding the modus

operandi" of sexual predators over Rule 404(a) objection).                  So we

reject Pires's challenge under Rule 404(a).12



       Although it appears SA Garrabrant made passing reference
       12

to certain characteristics of sex traffickers -- e.g., "super


                                   - 40 -
            Finally, we analyze Pires's profiling objection under

Rule 403.     "[T]he standard for exclusion under Rule 403 is a high

one." Soler-Montalvo, 44 F.4th at 16. The Rule "permits exclusion

not when the evidence is merely outweighed by the dangers of its

admission, but only when it is 'substantially outweighed.'"      Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).        To support his Rule 403-based

argument, Pires invokes the Fourth Circuit's decision in United

States v. Simpson, where the panel held that the district court

abused its discretion by admitting testimony about the defendant

fitting the "drug courier profile" without the presence of any

factual "evidence linking [the defendant] to the drug trade."    

.       The problem there, though, was not the expert

testimony itself; it was how the expert testimony, standing alone,

had no probative value in the absence of any supportive factual

evidence.13    As the Fourth Circuit explained:

     The relevant issues in dispute at [the defendant's]
     trial were his knowing possession of a gun and his intent
     to board the shuttle to New York.       The drug courier
     testimony had very little probative value to offer on
     these issues while the government made [the defendant's]
     status as a drug courier the centerpiece of its case.

charismatic," "a great talker," "very good at reading people," and
"really      good      at      understanding       vulnerabilities
and . . . manipulating" -- Pires does not contend that the
government argued or introduced any evidence at trial suggesting
that he had such characteristics.
     13Notably, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that "[i]f there
were any evidence linking [the defendant] to the drug trade, the
probative value of th[e] testimony might" be sufficient to outweigh
the prejudicial effect under Rule 403. Simpson, 

.


                                - 41 -


.          "Under th[o]se circumstances," the Fourth Circuit

concluded, "the inherent risk of inflaming the jury, and of

misleading it into focusing on the government's unsubstantiated

and uncharged allegations of drug crimes, was unacceptably high."

     Not     so   here.       The       government      charged    Pires    with    the

substantive offense of sex trafficking a minor and conspiracy to

commit that offense, and SA Garrabrant's testimony, in conjunction

with   Daisy's       and    Burke's    testimony,       was   probative       of     topics

directly at issue in the trial -- i.e., common tactics used by sex

traffickers, the types of victims commonly exploited, and a common

dynamic between victims and their traffickers.

              Our     decision        in     Soler-Montalvo          buttresses        that

conclusion.      44 F.4th at 14–18.              There, the defendant appealed his

conviction for attempting to persuade, induce, or entice a minor

to engage in criminal sexual activity.                      Id. at 6.      Among other

arguments on appeal, the defendant contended that the district

court erred when it excluded the expert testimony of a psychologist

who    "would    have       compared       the    conversations      and   surrounding

circumstances of th[e] case to the patterns of online predators

and    identified          inconsistencies,         thus    suggesting        that     [the

defendant's] actions did not accord with those of a typical

predator."      Id. at 14–15.          We agreed with the defendant.                 After

concluding that such expert testimony did not violate Rule 704(b),



                                           - 42 -
we turned to Rule 403's "balancing test."              Id. at 16.      And, under

that    rubric,        we     held    that       the    psychologist-expert's

"not-a-typical-predator        testimony       was   highly   relevant    to     and

probative of the key issue in the case."               Id. at 16–17.     That is,

the "excluded testimony bore directly on the credibility of [the

defendant's] testimony concerning his state of mind and sought to

explain (just in the converse of oft-admitted government-expert

testimony) how seemingly sinister conduct could be part of innocent

sexual fantasy."       Id. at 17 (citing Long, 328 F.3d at 666–68); see

also   id.     ("Testimony     that    [the     defendant's]        actions     were

inconsistent with the typical m.o. of one attempting to entice a

minor -- as opposed to engaging in role-play with a consenting

adult -- [wa]s highly relevant to th[e] charge.").

             So too here.      SA Garrabrant's testimony about patterns

of child sex traffickers and the techniques they use to attract,

groom, and then control victims -- in other words, "the typical

m.o. of" child sex traffickers -- was highly relevant to the

charges in this case.         Id.

             Of     course,   Rule    403's    balancing      act    requires     an

evaluation of the countervailing interests.                Where, as here, the

objecting party is faced with highly probative evidence, we expect

them   to    point    out   "great"   "countervailing      interests     weighing

against . . . admission" to exclude the testimony under Rule 403.

Id. at 18.        For substantially the reasons we provide above, Pires


                                      - 43 -
has failed to do so.        Therefore, his profiling challenge under

Rule 403's rubric also fails.

                         3. Bolstering Objection

            Pires's      last      challenge      to    SA      Garrabrant's

typical-patterns-and-dynamics testimony is that it impermissibly

bolstered     the    prosecution's      witnesses.     That     argument    is

unavailing.

            "An expert's opinion that another witness is lying or

telling the truth is ordinarily inadmissible . . . because the

opinion exceeds the scope of the expert's specialized knowledge

and therefore merely informs the jury that it should reach a

particular conclusion."         United States v. Teganya, 

 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado,

 (1st Cir. 1997)).          Nevertheless, it is well within

a district court's discretion to permit expert testimony that

"merely provid[es] context that might prove counter-intuitive to

a layperson," without specific reference to another witness's or

victim's testimony.       

     Of particular relevance here, we have

permitted over a "bolstering" objection expert testimony regarding

"the    behavioral    reactions    of   abuse   victims,"    explaining    that

"[t]he overwhelming weight of authority" favors admissibility.

Alzanki, 

;14 see also United States v. Johnson, 860



        Pires tries to distinguish Alzanki by pointing to the
       14

expert's credentials in that case. To the extent Pires seeks to


                                    - 44 -
F.3d 1133, 1140 (8th Cir. 2017) (approving "expert testimony about

how individuals generally react to sexual abuse," which may "help[]

jurors evaluate the alleged victim's behavior").

            That is precisely what SA Garrabrant did here.                 He

described typical traits of victims and explained why they often

form strong bonds with their pimps.           He explained how such bonds

often discourage victims from running away from or exposing the

pimps.     He likewise informed the jury why sex workers commonly

question    customers    about   their    racial   identities.     True,   SA

Garrabrant's testimony tended to support Daisy's story even though

SA Garrabrant neither mentioned her nor claimed to comment on the

specific facts of this case.             But improper witness bolstering

occurs     when   an    expert     "testif[ies]      that   [a]   particular

victim/witness could be believed."           Hoult v. Hoult, 

(1st Cir. 1995); see also Teganya, 

 (rejecting a

bolstering    argument     where    expert    "did    not   purport   to   be

testifying . . . about [defendant] specifically"); Johnson, 860

F.3d at 1140–41 (noting that the expert cannot "impermissibly

'vouch' for the victim by, for example, diagnosing the victim with




challenge SA Garrabrant's credentials, the argument is waived. He
did not object to SA Garrabrant's credentials below, nor has he
developed any such contention on appeal.     See United States v.
Zannino, 

 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in
a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.").


                                    - 45 -
sexual abuse or expressing an opinion that sexual abuse has in

fact occurred").      SA Garrabrant did no such thing.

                        D. Gorilla-Pimp Testimony

           Next, Pires contends that the district court erred by

permitting     SA    Garrabrant    to   testify     about    gorilla   pimps.

Specifically, Pires takes exception to SA Garrabrant's testimony

describing    the   term    "stables"   of   women,   indicating   that   sex

traffickers sometimes "steal" sex workers from each other, and

referring to certain pimps as violent toward sex workers.               Pires

says that such testimony was irrelevant under Rule 401 and thus

unhelpful to the jury under Rule 702 and that, even if relevant,

the testimony's probative value was substantially outweighed by a

danger of undue prejudice under Rule 403.

           We review these arguments for plain error because, as we

conclude above, Pires failed to preserve them below.15             Under our

plain error review, Pires faces the "heavy burden of showing

(1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error was clear or

obvious; (3) that the error affected his substantial rights; and

(4) that     the    error   also   seriously      impaired   the   fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."              United



     15Pires does not conduct any analysis under our plain error
standard in his original brief. The government argues that that
omission means the claim of error is waived. We need not decide
this point because, even on plain error review, Pires's challenge
fails.


                                   - 46 -
States v. Latorre-Cacho, 

 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting

United States v. Prieto, 

 (1st Cir. 2016)).

              Before     reaching        the     analysis,     we    must       frame    the

question.      The question is not whether the district court abused

its    discretion      by   admitting       irrelevant       testimony      that    unduly

prejudiced Pires over a contemporaneous objection.                          Rather, the

issue before us is whether the district court clearly or obviously

erred    by    failing      to    sua    sponte    strike,     or   give     a    curative

instruction         after    SA    Garrabrant       offered,        the     gorilla-pimp

testimony.

              Viewed through that lens, we cannot say that the district

court erred, let alone plainly or obviously so.                     "The general rule

seems to be that a cautionary instruction should be given, if

requested, but the failure of the trial court to give one sua

sponte is not reversible error." United States v. Rivera-Santiago,

, 1083–84 (1st Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).                               The

same rule applies where counselled defendants make the "seemingly

plausible strategic choice[]" not to object to the admission of

objectionable evidence.            United States v. LeMoure, 

(1st Cir. 2007) ("[I]f counsel has not objected to evidence . . . ,

it    does    not   necessarily         follow    that   the   judge      has    erred   by

tolerating the evidence . . . .").                   "[O]ne could describe such

choices as waivers of claims of error, [while] others might say




                                          - 47 -
that there is no error at all when counsel is content and foregoes

an optional objection."         

 (citation omitted).

               While perhaps harsh, this rule is undergirded by weighty

principles.        For one thing, lawyers sometimes make strategic

choices not to object, "think[ing] that 'objectionable' testimony

from an adverse witness helps more than it hurts or that a

cautionary instruction will underscore testimony best ignored."

      And     trial   judges,    saddled    with    the   heavy   burden   of

"superintending a fast-paced criminal trial," cannot play mind

reader: from their perch, it is not "easy to know . . . how sua

sponte interference . . . can disrupt counsel's own strategy, even

when the purpose of the judge is to help rather than to hinder."

United States v. Cudlitz, 

 (1st Cir. 1996).              Given

these practical considerations, we are "extremely reluctant" to

"mandat[e] that the district courts act sua sponte to override

seemingly plausible strategic choices on the part of counselled

defendants."       De La Cruz, 

.

               With that background in mind, we cannot say that, in the

context of this case, the district court clearly or obviously erred

by failing to sua sponte strike, or give a curative instruction

after, SA Garrabrant's gorilla-pimp testimony.

               Recall the context.     Prior to SA Garrabrant's taking the

stand,    Pires     objected,      citing   "grave[]    concern[]"    that    SA

Garrabrant's testimony would too closely resemble "the evidence in


                                      - 48 -
[t]his case, thus encouraging the factfinder to infer guilt merely

because his case may have consistencies with other cases of this

nature."   (Emphasis added.)        He reiterated this same objection

twice.

           Recall, too, what occurred when SA Garrabrant ultimately

took the stand at trial.         He testified about some conduct that

closely    resembled     Pires's     and     other    conduct       that    did

not -- specifically,     he    contrasted    "gorilla"     pimps,    who    are

violent toward and strip search sex workers, with finesse pimps

and defined the term "stable[s]" of women.           In a similar manner,

he described typical dynamics between pimps and sex workers, some

of which tracked Pires's relationship with Daisy and some of which

did not.

           Rather than timely and specifically objecting during the

direct examination, Pires opted to wait until cross-examination to

draw out distinctions between SA Garrabrant's testimony and the

facts of the case.      For instance, he asked SA Garrabrant about:

(1) pimps doing "[b]ody cavity searches" and "[v]ery invasive

type[s] of stuff" to keep money from sex workers; (2) methods pimps

commonly use to exert control over victims, including controlling

sleeping schedules, isolating victims from family and friends,

prohibiting victims from associating with other men, and taking

possessions   away;    and    (3) pimps    wanting   sex   workers    who   are

"compliant," "rule follower[s]," and "not too headstrong."                  And,


                                   - 49 -
in closing, Pires sought to capitalize on these distinctions.

Pires specifically sought to paint himself as a man who: (1) had

one girlfriend (not stables of women); (2) never strip searched

Daisy for money (indeed, he let her have money); (3) did not shower

Daisy with gifts; and (4) did not isolate Daisy.           Pires explained

to the jury that SA Garrabrant's testimony was about "professional"

or "predatory pimps" who take young girls from youth shelters or

suburbs "into the city and win[e] and din[e] them"; "us[e] violence

and threats against women and their families"; or "travel women

around or put them up in hotels, cavity searching and strip

searching their women after dates."          Those patterns, Pires argued,

are "[h]orrible situations that have nothing to do with this case."

          In     light    of     Pires's     conduct   before    and     during

trial -- i.e.,      his        pre-testimony      objections,         lack   of

contemporaneous     objections,       cross-examination,        and     closing

arguments -- the district court reasonably could have understood

Pires to be making a strategic choice to use SA Garrabrant's

allegedly objectionable testimony to show how Pires's "actions

were not consistent with illegal activity."             Soler-Montalvo, 44

F.4th at 15; see also De La Cruz, 

 (holding no

reversible error where, "for tactical reasons, defendant may have"

chosen not to object).     Thus, we discern no error, let alone clear

or obvious error, on the district court's part.




                                    - 50 -
          A note of caution.          There certainly was a risk that SA

Garrabrant's    gorilla-pimp       testimony      could   amount      to    "unfair

prejudice,"    especially    because     of    "the    sordid   and    disturbing

nature of [the] subject matter."               Anderson, 

.

Indeed, we think that, if Pires had contemporaneously objected at

trial, it would have been proper for the district court to strike

the testimony or give a curative instruction.                 But Pires did not

do so.   See Cudlitz, 

 ("[W]e think that while a

cautionary instruction would plainly be proper at the time that

the question is asked and denied, its omission is not normally

error where no such contemporaneous instruction was requested.").

And although we will not lightly infer that a criminal defendant's

non-objection    amounts    to    a   plausible    strategic       decision,     the

context here reasonably indicates that Pires's non-objection was

a considered part of his trial strategy.               District courts are not

required to sua sponte intervene in such circumstances.

                    V. STATEMENTS DURING SUMMATION

          Pires's    final       challenge     takes    aim   at   some     of   the

prosecutor's statements during closing and rebuttal.                   We recite

the relevant events prior to and during summation.

          As part of the government's case in chief, it called

Daisy, who underwent direct and cross-examination.                         Once she

finished testifying, she was dismissed from the witness stand.

But shortly afterward, the district court received documents from


                                      - 51 -
DCF in response to a subpoena issued by Pires.             The documents

included statements that Daisy made to a social worker on August 8,

2019, which arguably undermined Daisy's credibility.

            Pires expressed a desire to question Daisy about the

allegedly   inconsistent   statements.       The    government   objected,

arguing that further questioning would be improper.        In advocating

its position, the prosecutor stated (outside the presence of the

jury) that "if we're going to have [Daisy testify] again, in a

room full of strangers with the defendant, the only person who

should be seen putting her through that is the defense."

            The district court permitted Daisy to testify as part of

the defense's case, allowing the defense to call Daisy back to the

stand during the government's case in chief.          The district court

explained to the jury that Daisy was called out of order "just for

scheduling reasons."     When Daisy took the stand, both Pires and

the government asked questions.

            Summation   occurred     later   that   day.     During   the

government's closing argument, the prosecutor said:

     I expect that you may be implored by the defense not to
     believe Daisy.   And when they ask you not to believe
     her, ask yourselves what in the world would be her
     motivation to come in here and lie, to walk through those
     doors and take that witness stand twice and face a room
     full of strangers, to face the defendant, to discuss her
     body and what was done to it by multiple adult men with
     the help of the defendant, to be forced to view an
     advertisement   selling   her   body,   text   message[s]
     detailing how much she was worth, pornographic images



                                   - 52 -
       and videos that she knew about and, yes, some that she
       did not.

       She did not tell the uniform male officers, who she met
       for the first time on August 1, 2019, that she had been
       trafficked.   When the police -- the people she was
       evading came in and separated her from the person she
       thought she loved, she did not immediately tell on her
       boyfriend. On August 1st, 2019, or as Daisy was brought
       back in here today to tell you, on August 8, 2019, when
       she spoke with DCF. (Emphasis added.)

           Pires objected at the conclusion of the government's

closing argument.       He contended that the prosecutor's statement

impermissibly implied that he had "d[one] something improper by

making" Daisy come back into court to testify, and that the

statements also amounted to vouching.          The district court noted

the objection but took no other action.

           Pires's counsel then had an opportunity to close.           Sure

enough, defense counsel sought to impugn Daisy's credibility,

calling her, among other things, "a troubled teenager, who had a

very   strong   will,   and   a   fiercely   independent   and   rebellious

streak."    Defense counsel continued by attempting to paint Daisy

as the mastermind behind the commercial sex and describing her

story as inconsistent.        In fact, on multiple occasions, defense

counsel said that Daisy lied.           For instance, defense counsel

insisted that Daisy's story about having commercial sex with

Pires's uncle "simply did not happen," and directly stated that

"[s]he lied to you" (i.e., the jury) and "got caught lying to you"

(again, the jury) about who was communicating with the customers.


                                   - 53 -
Defense counsel likewise suggested to the jury that Daisy had

racial biases.       In particular, to undermine Daisy's testimony that

Pires   was    the    one   who    texted   customers   about    their   racial

identities, defense counsel stated that it was Daisy who sent the

texts and said: "race is something that appears to matter a great

deal to Daisy in that text," and, on another occasion, "[r]ace

matters to Daisy."          Defense counsel took aim, too, at Burke's

credibility, calling her an "addict" and accusing her of lying

multiple times.

              Next up, the prosecutor's rebuttal.               The prosecutor

started with:

     I'm not going to get up here and call people liars or
     addicts or racist because I'm not allowed to do that and
     because it's not my job to do that. You all were picked
     for a reason. You were picked because you bring with
     you common sense, and it is your responsibility, your
     sole responsibility to judge the credibility of
     witnesses who come into this room, who raise their right
     hand, and who take an oath to tell the truth. It is
     your job to judge that credibility, not mine, and
     certainly not [defense counsel's].

Although Pires did not object at trial, he now takes issue with

the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal.

                                  A. Preservation

              Pires contends (1) that the prosecutor's statement, "as

Daisy was brought back in here today to tell you," implied to the

jury that Pires did something improper by recalling Daisy to

testify; and (2) that the prosecutor's initial remarks on rebuttal



                                      - 54 -
improperly impugned the role of defense counsel.        Pires preserved

the former challenge but concedes that he did not preserve the

latter.     We review preserved challenges to improper arguments

during summation de novo and unpreserved challenges for plain

error.     See Pérez-Greaux, 

.

                           B. Closing Statements

            We begin with the prosecutor's statement in closing: "as

Daisy was brought back in here today to tell you."16        Viewing that

statement in context, as we must, we discern no misconduct and

thus no error.       See United States v. Bennett, 

 (1st

Cir. 1996) (viewing prosecutor's remarks "[i]n context").            The

statement was one of "incontrovertible truth" -- Daisy was brought

to court twice to testify before the jury.             United States v.

Taylor, 

 (1st Cir. 2017).         What is more, Pires's

contention that the statement implied to the jury that he did

something wrong by recalling Daisy to testify carries no water

because that "was not the comment's 'manifestly intended' or

'natural[] and necessar[y]' meaning when read in the context of

the      defense's     closing   argument."        United   States    v.

Vázquez-Larrauri, 

 (1st Cir. 2015) (alterations



      16Pires also contends in his brief that "[t]he government
used this improper argument to bolster the credibility of its
witness." This lone sentence is unaccompanied by any developed
argument, and so the argument is waived. See Zannino, 

.


                                  - 55 -
in original) (quoting United States v. Newton, 

(1st Cir. 2003)).        And we do "not lightly infer that a prosecutor

intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or

that a jury, sitting through a lengthy exhortation, will draw that

meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations."                            

(quoting United States v. Taylor, 

 (1st Cir.

1995)); cf. Dagley v. Russo, 

 (1st Cir. 2008)

(explaining that the Supreme Court has "warned courts against

giving too much weight to stray remarks in the course of a closing

argument or assuming that the jury would interpret each and every

statement in the most damaging manner possible" (citing Donnelly

v. DeChristoforo, 

 (1974))).

                                C. Rebuttal Remarks

            We    are    also       unconvinced     that    the     district      court's

failure    to    sua    sponte      strike   the     prosecutor's      statements        in

rebuttal amounted to plain error.

            "An    error       is    only    clear     or   obvious        when   it    is

indisputable in light of controlling law."                          United States v.

Facteau, 

 (1st Cir. 2023) (quotation marks and

citation    omitted).          Discerning      whether      there    was    error      here

requires us to determine whether the prosecutor's statements in

rebuttal   crossed       the    blurry      "line    separating      acceptable        from

improper advocacy."        United States v. Young, 

 (1985).

Not only that: even if there is "no doubt the prosecutor" crossed


                                         - 56 -
the line, "[r]eversal is appropriate only if the improper remarks

were so egregious as to amount to plain error."           United States v.

Nickens, 

 (1st Cir. 1992).               "We evaluate the

prosecutor's comments . . . 'not in sterile isolation, but within

the framework and context of the actual trial,'" 

 (quoting

United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 

 (1st Cir.

1989)),    which   includes     reviewing   "the    prosecutor's    improper

remarks . . . in light of defense counsel's analogous impropriety

in provoking them," id. at 122.

            In   this   case,   even   assuming    that   the   prosecutor's

statements amounted to improper advocacy, we hold that the comments

were not so egregious as to constitute plain error.             We have long

acknowledged that "summations in litigation often have a rough and

tumble quality." Bennett, 

.           So we afford prosecutors

"some leeway to respond to inflammatory attacks mounted by defense

counsel."    Nickens, 

 (quoting Rodriguez-Estrada,

).       On plain error review, we are reluctant to

reverse "when a prosecutor's remarks are made to rebut specific

statements by defense counsel[] and are proportionate to that end."

Taylor, 

.

            Here, the prosecutor's statements in rebuttal, while

provocative, were short and directly refuted remarks by defense

counsel.     The statements squarely addressed defense counsel's

similarly provocative remarks in closing -- i.e., that both Daisy


                                   - 57 -
and Burke lied to the jury on multiple occasions, that race

mattered a lot to Daisy, and that Burke was a drug addict lying to

absolve herself of liability.             See Nickens, 

("[B]oth parties have an obligation 'to confine arguments to the

jury within proper bounds,' and defense counsel, no less than the

prosecutor, 'must refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into

the presentation of his case.'" (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 8–9)).

In   short,    "defense     counsel's    remarks   set   the    tone   for   the

prosecutor's rebuttal," and the prosecutor made the complained-of

statements "only after defense counsel, in h[er] closing argument,

repeatedly      expressed     h[er]     personal   beliefs[     and]   accused

prosecution witnesses of lying."          

.

              To be clear, we do not suggest that "a trespass by the

defense gives the prosecution a hunting license exempt from ethical

restraints on advocacy."        United States v. Capone, 

 (1st Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).            Had the prosecutor found

defense   counsel's    statements       objectionable,    the   more   prudent

course of action was to object and "ask the District Judge to deal

with defense counsel's misconduct."            Young, 

.        But,

for the reasons outlined above, we cannot say that the district

court clearly erred here by failing to sua sponte strike the

argument.




                                      - 58 -
                         VI. CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.17




     17Having upheld Pires's convictions on both counts, we need
not reach his argument that vacating one count would warrant
resentencing on the other.


                             - 59 -