United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit


No. 22-1616

                            DIANA AVDEEVA,

                        Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                  v.

  SHANITA TUCKER, Field Office Director, U.S. Citizenship and
   Immigration Services; PETER SIMONDS, Immigration Services
  Officer, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; DENIS C.
  RIORDAN, District Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
 Services; KIKA SCOTT, Senior Official Performing the Duties of
    the Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,*

                        Defendants, Appellees.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

              [Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]


                                Before

                        Barron, Chief Judge,
               Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.


     Gregory Romanovsky, Esq., with whom Romanovsky Law Offices
was on brief, for appellant.

     Huy M. Le, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, William C. Peachey,

    *  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director Kika Scott
is substituted for former Director Ur Mendoza Jaddou.
Director,   District  Court   Section, Office  of  Immigration
Litigation, and T. Monique Peoples, Senior Litigation Counsel,
were on brief, for appellees.


                         May 28, 2025




                            - 2 -
              HOWARD, Circuit Judge.           Diana Avdeeva appeals from the

district      court's    denial    of    her    motion   for     attorney's    fees.

Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 

, Avdeeva sought to recover the fees that she incurred in

bringing a lawsuit -- which was ultimately settled -- against the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") for

its       failure   to    timely        adjudicate       her     application     for

naturalization within the statutorily mandated period.1 Concluding

that Avdeeva is not a "prevailing party" and is thus not entitled

to fees under EAJA, we affirm.

                                          I.

              In 2013, Avdeeva, a citizen of Russia, married Grigoriy

Rogach, a United States citizen. Shortly thereafter, Avdeeva filed

an application for lawful permanent-resident status with USCIS.

USCIS       approved     Avdeeva's        application          but   granted     her

permanent-resident status on a conditional, two-year basis because

she had been married to Rogach for less than two years.                        See 8

U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1).

              Avdeeva and Rogach subsequently filed a petition (the

"I-751 petition") to have the conditional nature of her residence


      1Avdeeva initiated suit against various USCIS personnel in
their official capacities: Shanita Tucker, Field Office Director;
Peter Simonds, Immigration Services Officer; Denis C. Riordan,
District Director; and Ur Mendoza Jaddou, Director. Taking the
parties' lead, we refer to the defendants-appellees collectively
as "USCIS" for simplicity's sake.


                                        - 3 -
in the United States removed. USCIS neither scheduled an interview

on the I-751 petition nor waived the interview requirement within

ninety days of Avdeeva's filing of the petition as required.                  See

(b)(1)        ("The   director   must   either    waive   the

requirement for an interview and adjudicate the petition or arrange

for an interview within 90 days of the date on which the petition

was properly filed.").            USCIS did, however, request additional

evidence from Avdeeva in connection with its review.

             Avdeeva and Rogach divorced in 2018.             Avdeeva notified

USCIS of the divorce and requested that the I-751 petition (on

which USCIS had still not acted) be converted to a waiver petition.

See   

(a)(1)(ii)       (providing     for   waiver   where

applicant can establish that "[t]he marriage upon which his or her

status was based was entered into in good faith by the conditional

resident alien, but the marriage was terminated other than by

death").     In support of that request, she submitted materials

demonstrating that she and Rogach had been in a bona fide marital

relationship.      In 2019, still without any action from USCIS on her

I-751 petition, Avdeeva applied for naturalization.

             USCIS    in   turn    scheduled    a    supposed     naturalization

interview, but at the interview, the immigration officer instead

focused on Avdeeva's pending I-751 petition.                USCIS subsequently

denied that petition on the basis that Avdeeva had failed to

establish that       she   entered into       her marriage      in good faith;


                                      - 4 -
terminated her permanent-resident status; and placed her into

removal proceedings.         USCIS then closed Avdeeva's naturalization

case on the ground that it could not adjudicate her naturalization

application because she was subject to removal proceedings.

             Avdeeva brought two actions against USCIS in response:

the first suit        (the "APA suit") challenged USCIS's actions as

having      violated        various      immigration         regulations,     the

Administrative Procedure Act, and her right to due process; the

second suit (which forms the basis of this appeal), meanwhile,

alleged     that    USCIS    failed   to   adjudicate    her     naturalization

application within the statutorily-mandated period and asked the

district court to take jurisdiction over that application pursuant

to 

(b).           The government moved to dismiss both

actions.

             While the government's motions to dismiss were pending,

the parties entered into a settlement agreement and filed a joint

motion to remand the matters to USCIS pursuant to that agreement.

The parties' settlement agreement obligated USCIS, within sixty

days   of   remand,    to    terminate     Avdeeva's    removal    proceedings,

approve her I-751 petition, and conduct a new naturalization

interview.         USCIS    further   agreed   that,    if    Avdeeva   met   all

requirements for naturalization, her naturalization oath would be

administered within that same sixty-day period.                   For her part,

Avdeeva agreed to "voluntarily dismiss all pending claims and


                                      - 5 -
withdraw her claim for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act"

following USCIS's performance under the agreement.

           Pursuant to the agreement, the district court remanded

this case to USCIS and stayed the APA action.                    Avdeeva was

naturalized in August 2020.           She then voluntarily dismissed the

APA suit and received a judgment of dismissal from the district

court "in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement" in

the instant action.        Avdeeva in turn moved for attorney's fees in

the instant action pursuant to EAJA.             The district court denied

that motion on the basis that special circumstances -- namely, the

terms of the parties' settlement agreement -- would make an award

of attorney's fees to Avdeeva unjust.              The district court also

suggested, but did not definitively conclude, that Avdeeva was not

a "prevailing party" under EAJA. Avdeeva appeals from that denial.

                                      II.

           Avdeeva challenges the district court's findings that:

(1) she   may   not   be   entitled    to     prevailing-party   status,   and

(2) even if she were a prevailing party, special circumstances

would make an award of attorney's fees unjust. Because we conclude

that Avdeeva is not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of

EAJA, we agree with the district court that she is not entitled to

attorney's fees and accordingly affirm the dismissal below.2


     2 Although the district court did not base its dismissal on
its finding that Avdeeva was likely not a prevailing party, "[w]e


                                      - 6 -
            EAJA dictates that, in a civil action involving the

United States as a party, "a court shall award to a prevailing

party    other      than    the   United    States     fees     and     other

expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the

United     States   was    substantially   justified   or     that    special

circumstances make an award unjust."        

(d)(1)(A).

            As it is used in EAJA, the term "prevailing party" is a

"legal term of art" that refers to "one who has been awarded some

relief by the court."        Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V.

Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 

 (2001).           "We review

a determination of 'prevailing party' status de novo."           Hutchinson

ex rel. Julien v. Patrick, 

 (1st Cir. 2011).             "Where,

as in this case, the application of [a fee-shifting] statute cuts

through the government's traditional sovereign immunity, it 'must

be construed strictly in favor of the government.'"            

 (quoting

Aronov v. Napolitano, 

 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

            To qualify as a prevailing party for the purposes of

EAJA, a party must show: (1) a "material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties" and (2) a "judicial imprimatur on the

change."    Aronov, 

 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at




are at liberty to affirm a district court's judgment on any ground
made manifest by the record." United States v. George, 

 (1st Cir. 2018).


                                   - 7 -
604-05).3     Avdeeva and USCIS agree that there was a material

alteration of their legal relationship but disagree as to whether

there was a "judicial imprimatur" on that change.                    Our analysis

thus focuses on that second prong of the test.

             The judicial-imprimatur requirement is satisfied where

a   plaintiff      "receive[s]   a     judgment       on   the   merits"   or,     as

potentially       applicable   here,    where     a    plaintiff    "obtain[s]     a

court-ordered consent decree."           Buckhannon, 

.              We

have clarified "that the formal label of 'consent decree' need not

be attached" to a court order for us to find judicial imprimatur

and that, instead, we must determine "whether the order contains

the   sort   of    judicial    involvement      and    actions     inherent   in    a

'court-ordered consent decree.'"               Aronov, 

.           The

Supreme Court has "emphasized three related factors" relevant to

this determination: (1) "the change in legal relationship must be

'court-ordered'"; (2) "there must be judicial approval of the

relief vis-à-vis the merits of the case"; and (3) "there must be

judicial oversight and ability to enforce the obligations imposed

on the parties."       

 (discussing Buckhannon, 

 &


      3"Although the issue in Buckhannon was the fee-shifting
provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the
American With Disabilities Act of 1990, . . . the Supreme Court's
reasoning in 'Buckhannon is presumed to apply generally to all
fee-shifting   statutes   that   use   the   "prevailing   party"
terminology . . . .'" Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Schs., 

,
22 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Bos.
Pub. Schs., 

 (1st Cir. 2004)).


                                       - 8 -
n.7). Avdeeva fails to demonstrate that any of these three factors

are present.

                                        i.

            First, Avdeeva cannot demonstrate that the change in the

legal relationship between her and USCIS was achieved via court

order.

            When determining whether a change in the parties' legal

relationship     was    "court-ordered,"      we   distinguish        between    "a

situation in which the court order triggers the change in the

relationship between the parties" and "one in which 'the court

merely recognizes what the government has voluntarily agreed to do

and only requires the government to follow through.'"                 Hutchinson,

 (cleaned up) (emphasis added) (quoting Aronov, 

).      Where a case falls into the latter category, the

change in legal relationship cannot fairly be characterized as

"court-ordered."         See   Buckhannon,     

     ("A

defendant's      voluntary     change    in   conduct,      although      perhaps

accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,

lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. . . . [T]he

term 'prevailing party' [does not] authorize[] federal courts to

award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who, by simply filing a

nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially meritless lawsuit (it

will     never   be    determined),     has   reached    the        'sought-after

destination' without obtaining any judicial relief."); see also


                                      - 9 -
Smith v. Fitchburg Pub. Schs., 

 (1st Cir. 2005)

("The    Court   expressly   rejected      the   '"catalyst       theory,"       which

posits that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" if it achieves the

desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change

in the defendant's conduct.'" (quoting Buckhannon, 

)).

             The change in the legal relationship between Avdeeva and

the government was achieved through the parties' settlement and,

ultimately,      USCIS's     grant    of      Avdeeva's         application        for

naturalization, not the district court's remand order.4                    Instead,

the district court's order simply stated that it was remanding the

matter pursuant to the parties' settlement, and the settlement

agreement    placed    a   conditional     obligation      on    USCIS    to     grant

Avdeeva's     naturalization     application       "[i]f    [she]        me[t]     all

requirements     for   naturalization."          The   change      in    the     legal

relationship was thus not "court-ordered."                 Indeed, the Fourth

Circuit explained as much in Ge v. USCIS, 

 (4th

Cir. 2021), where it held that an order of remand did not confer




     4 Theparties' settlement agreement did place an unconditional
obligation on USCIS to grant Avdeeva's I-751 petition. However,
Avdeeva voluntarily dismissed, and does not seek attorney's fees
in, her lawsuit concerning USCIS's adjudication of that petition;
instead, Avdeeva seeks attorney's fees only for her challenge to
USCIS's handling of her application for naturalization, and thus
it is the legal change between the parties with respect to that
application that is relevant here.


                                     - 10 -
prevailing-party status in a § 1447(b) action (albeit one that did

not involve a settlement between the parties):

          Upon commencing this action, the legal
          relationship between [the plaintiff] and USCIS
          was that [the plaintiff] was an applicant for
          naturalization; USCIS was the agency that
          could grant or deny that application; and no
          determination on the merits of the application
          had been made. . . . After the district court
          entered its remand order, [the plaintiff] was
          still the applicant; USCIS was still the
          agency   that   could  grant   or   deny   the
          application; and no determination had been
          made     on      the    merits      of     the
          application. . . . Simply   put,   the   legal
          relationship with respect to the underlying
          dispute had not changed as a result of the
          remand order, and therefore the order did not
          make [the plaintiff] the prevailing party.

          Avdeeva   argues    that,    regardless        of     the   parties'

settlement and the effect of USCIS's actions, the change was

necessarily "court-ordered" because the filing of her § 1447(b)

action   deprived   USCIS    of    jurisdiction     to        adjudicate   her

application for citizenship until there was district court action

in the form of a remand.    We rejected this exact argument in Aronov

and do the same here.   See 

 ("We need not resolve

the question of whether the agency could have acted without the

remand, as it does not matter to our resolution of the judicial

imprimatur issue.   The order remanding to the agency is alone not

enough to establish the needed imprimatur." (footnote omitted)).




                                  - 11 -
                                         ii.

            Second, there was not "judicial approval of the relief

vis-à-vis the merits of [Avdeeva's] case."                 

.

            The district court's remand order expressly stated that

the    parties'      settlement    agreement,        not   the   district     court's

resolution of the merits of Avdeeva's § 1447(b) claim, provided

the basis for the remand.         See Order of Remand 1, ECF No. 29 ("This

matter is remanded to [USCIS] in accordance with the parties'

settlement agreement . . . ." (emphasis added)).                   Avdeeva argues

that the district court nonetheless necessarily considered the

merits of its claim given that "this case involved two fully

briefed motions to dismiss, as well as a scheduling conference

during which both sides presented their legal arguments." However,

the fact that the merits were argued before the court does not

compel the conclusion that the court's relief was based on its

consideration of those merits.           Indeed, the court explicitly noted

that it did not do so here.          See Mem. & Order 9, ECF No. 57 ("Here,

although the parties fully briefed the government's Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. No. 14], as in Aronov, prior to dismissal, '[t]he

court    made     no    evaluation      at     all    of   the    merits      of    the

controversy -- indeed the court was never asked to do so; it was

only    asked   to     dismiss    the   case.'"      (quoting    

(alteration in original))).




                                        - 12 -
                                   iii.

           Finally, both "judicial oversight and [the] ability to

enforce the obligations imposed on the parties" are absent here.

Aronov, 

.

           A consent decree "'includes an injunction, or some other

form of specific relief,' which may ultimately be enforceable by

contempt," whereas a private settlement, which may be enforceable

through an action for breach of contract, "does not require the

same level of judicial oversight" and "is insufficient to meet the

standards for a consent decree."          

 at 91 (quoting Charles A.

Wright & Mary Kay Kane, Law of Federal Courts § 98, at 702 n.2

(6th ed. 2002)).       Here, the district court's order merely noted

that the matter was "remanded to [USCIS] in accordance with the

parties' settlement agreement."         Critically, the order "did not

contain   provisions    for   future   enforcement    typical    of   consent

decrees" and "did not resolve a dispute between the parties[;] it

merely returned jurisdiction to the agency to allow the parties to

carry out their agreement."      Id. at 92.

           Avdeeva, however, argues that the district court did

retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because

the   remand   order   incorporated    its   terms.    This     argument   is

unconvincing.

           "[A] federal court does not have inherent jurisdiction

to enforce a settlement merely because it presided over the law


                                  - 13 -
suit that led to the settlement."      F.A.C., Inc. v. Cooperativa de

Seguros de Vida de P.R., 

, 189 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

(1994)).     A federal court can exercise ancillary jurisdiction to

enforce that agreement only where the terms of the agreement are

incorporated into the order of dismissal.          Id. at 189-90.

            There was no such incorporation here, however, as the

district court's order merely noted the existence of the parties'

agreement.     See Kokkonen, 

 ("The judge's mere

awareness and approval of the terms of the settlement agreement do

not suffice to make them part of [her] order.").        We have explained

that, even where a district court's order explicitly notes that it

is made "pursuant to" the parties' settlement agreement, this "is

not enough to 'incorporate the terms'" of that agreement into the

order.     F.A.C., Inc., 449 F.3d at 190; see also Aronov, 

 n.13 ("[I]t is . . . firmly the law that there must be a

clear basis within the [district court's order] for both the

court's    continuing   jurisdiction   and   its   power   to   enforce   an

agreement between the parties. . . . [The] court's order must

expressly retain jurisdiction or expressly incorporate the terms

of a settlement agreement . . . ." (emphasis added)); Smyth ex

rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 

 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Where a

court merely recognizes the fact of the parties' agreement and

dismisses the case because there is no longer a dispute before it,


                                 - 14 -
the terms of the agreement are not made part of the order and

consequently will not serve as a basis of jurisdiction.").

             The only other support that Avdeeva advances in favor of

this argument is the district court's statement, made in its

subsequent order on the motion for attorney's fees, that it had

"retain[ed] jurisdiction over the matter."          See Mem. & Order 10,

ECF No. 57.    However, in Aronov we explained that we do not credit

a district court's later characterization of its remand order as

having   retained    jurisdiction    where   that   order   unambiguously

"lacked any provision mandating the USCIS to act or expressly

retaining jurisdiction to force the government to act."          

 n.13.     The district court's comment thus does not bear the

weight that Avdeeva ascribes to it.

                                    III.

             For the reasons stated, Avdeeva cannot establish that

she is a "prevailing party" under EAJA, and the district court's

dismissal of her petition for attorney's fees is accordingly

affirmed.5




     5Because we conclude that Avdeeva is not a "prevailing party"
under EAJA, we need not address whether the parties' settlement
agreement would make an award of attorney's fees unjust.


                                - 15 -