United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 24-1239

                    LEONARDO GONCALVES LEAO,

                           Petitioner,

                               v.

               PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General,*

                           Respondent,


              PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF
                THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS


                             Before

                   Gelpí, Lipez, and Thompson,
                         Circuit Judges.


     Annelise M. J. de Araujo, with whom Araujo & Fisher, LLC was
on brief, for petitioner.

     Spencer Shucard, with whom Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Keith I. McManus,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on
brief, for respondent.



                          July 14, 2025



    *  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi is automatically substituted for
former Attorney General Merrick B. Garland as respondent.
            GELPÍ,    Circuit       Judge.     After      being   charged   with

violating immigration laws and conceding removability, Petitioner

Leonardo Goncalves Leao ("Petitioner") sought cancellation of

removal.     He claimed that his removal would cause exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to his then-minor son, Gustavo -- a

U.S. citizen.        The immigration judge ("IJ") disagreed, holding

that Petitioner failed to meet the high burden to establish such

hardship.     The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") subsequently

affirmed the IJ's judgment on two independent grounds: (1) it held

that because Gustavo had turned 21 years old while the appeal was

pending, Petitioner could no longer count him as a qualifying

relative in his cancellation of removal petition; and (2) in the

alternative, it agreed with the IJ's hardship determination.                This

petition for review followed.          Because we discern no error in the

hardship determination, we deny the petition for review and do not

address the BIA's age-based rationale.

                                          I.

                              A. Legal Background

            A noncitizen found removable for violating immigration

law may seek discretionary cancellation of removal under section

240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified at 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)).          If an IJ grants the application, the

noncitizen    may    remain    in   the    country   as   a   lawful   permanent

resident.    Id.


                                      - 2 -
          In       evaluating        a      noncitizen's      application       for

cancellation of removal,           known as a 42B application,             the IJ

"proceeds in two steps."           Wilkinson v. Garland, 

(2024).      First,    the    IJ   determines       whether   a   noncitizen    has

established four statutory requirements: (1) the noncitizen "has

been physically present in the United States for a continuous

period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of

[the] application"; (2) the noncitizen "has been a person of good

moral character during such period"; (3) the noncitizen "has not

been   convicted      of"    certain      criminal     offenses;    and    (4) the

noncitizen's "removal would result in exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship to the [noncitizen's] spouse, parent, or child,

who is a citizen of the United States or a[ noncitizen] lawfully

admitted for permanent residence."               8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D).

Then, at the second step, the "IJ decides whether to exercise his

discretion    favorably      and    grant    the    noncitizen    relief   in   the

particular case."      Wilkinson, 

.             The "noncitizen

bears the burden of proving that he both 'satisfies the applicable

eligibility requirements' and 'merits a favorable exercise of

discretion.'"    

 at 213 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)).

          Following an unfavorable IJ decision, the noncitizen may

appeal to the BIA.          

(b)(3).          The BIA, in turn,

reviews de novo "the IJ's conclusions of law and discretionary




                                         - 3 -
determinations," and examines for clear error the IJ's factual

findings.      Contreras v. Bondi, 

 (1st Cir. 2025).

                  B. Factual and Procedural Background

              In 2001, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, had

a brief relationship with Aparecida dos Santos ("Ms. dos Santos").

Unbeknownst to Petitioner, Ms. dos Santos became pregnant and moved

to the United States.         There, she gave birth to their son Gustavo

(a U.S. citizen) in February 2002.            Motivated by a desire to be

with    his    son,   Petitioner   entered    the   United   States   without

inspection via the Mexican border on June 8, 2004.            By the end of

that day, Petitioner had arrived in Boston, Massachusetts, and met

Gustavo for the first time.          Since then, Gustavo has lived with

Ms.    dos    Santos,   but   Petitioner    has   lived   nearby,   providing

financial and emotional support.

              On October 9, 2014, the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security issued and served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear,

charging him with impermissibly entering the United States.              As a

result, Petitioner was detained until November 5, 2014, when an IJ

released him on bond.          In April 2015, Petitioner admitted the

allegations and conceded removability, but he expressed an intent

to seek cancellation of removal.           So he filed a 42B Application in




                                    - 4 -
May 2016.    Citing his heavy caseload, the IJ set the hearing date

on Petitioner's 42B application for April 25, 2019.1

            The    hearing   occurred   as   originally    scheduled.       The

presiding IJ accepted Petitioner's five documentary exhibits.               We

summarize    the    relevant   evidence,      starting    with   Petitioner's

testimony.

            Petitioner stated his age (42 years at the time) and

recounted his journey from Brazil to the United States.                     He

described    his    relationship   with      Gustavo,    explaining   how   he

consistently saw him three times per week.              Petitioner said that

Gustavo grew up a happy, calm kid.            But Petitioner noticed that

Gustavo began to change in 2014 -- around the time of Petitioner's

detention.    Petitioner testified that, as of the date of the

hearing, Gustavo "[wa]s out of school" and "refusing to go back to

his studies."

            Petitioner's testimony, along with the other evidence,

paints a bleak picture.        As Petitioner's brief puts it, Gustavo

was "a teenager out of control and spiraling downwards."                On one

occasion, Gustavo broke a classmate's cell phone. And, on another,

he brought a box cutter to school.           His troubles extended beyond



     1 In setting the hearing date, the IJ flagged to Petitioner's
counsel that "if [she] ha[d] everything ready to go and all
supporting documents say in a couple of months, [he] would consider
a motion to move [the hearing] up if [he] had a cancellation."
Petitioner nowhere suggests that he filed any such motion.


                                   - 5 -
the classroom: at one point, police detained him for stealing a

cell phone at the YMCA.     Following the alleged theft, police told

Petitioner that Gustavo was hanging out with troublesome peers,

including someone accused of a local shooting.

           With Petitioner's blessing, Ms. dos Santos moved Gustavo

to the Town of Walpole.      Despite the distance from negative peer

influences, Gustavo's problems persisted.             He refused to go to

school,   lost   multiple   jobs,   and     used   marijuana.    Petitioner

admitted that he tried talking to Gustavo and that Gustavo had

refused help, even with resources available to him.

           Petitioner stated that he wished to stay in the country

so that he could continue supporting Gustavo in this pivotal time.

And he expressed concern that his removal would cause Gustavo to

lose his emotional support system.          He likewise feared that, if he

were removed to Brazil, he would be making much less money ($160

per week there versus $850 per week in the United States) and thus

would be less able to financially support Gustavo.

           On     cross-examination,         the    government   extracted

concessions      from   Petitioner.          For    instance,    Petitioner

acknowledged that Gustavo was healthy and that it was ultimately

Gustavo's choice whether to follow advice or not.          Petitioner also

noted that Gustavo had never lived with him.          Petitioner admitted,

too, that Gustavo had refused the opportunity to provide live

testimony or an affidavit to support Petitioner at the hearing.


                                    - 6 -
And Petitioner conceded that Gustavo had visited Brazil before.

He explained, however, that neither he nor Ms. dos Santos would be

able to    afford Gustavo's flight to        Brazil if Petitioner was

removed.

           Turning     to   the    documentary     evidence,   Petitioner's

declaration tracked much of his testimony, with a few additional

details.   In particular, he added that the catalyst for Gustavo's

spiral was not only Petitioner's detention, but also the deaths of

two family members.     Petitioner also noted that Gustavo spent much

of his time locked in his bedroom, sometimes smoking marijuana.

           Ms.   dos   Santos's    declaration     similarly   corroborated

Petitioner's testimony.       She explained the extent of Petitioner's

support for her and Gustavo, and how she would be unable to support

Gustavo alone.     She described how she saw Gustavo beginning to

change during Petitioner's detention             and experiencing   anxiety

about losing his father.          She also confirmed that Gustavo had

routinely refused offers to help, including from his parents and

the local government.       She, too, shared that Gustavo had developed

a marijuana smoking habit.        And she expressed her worry about what

would happen following Petitioner's removal: Gustavo would "find[]

bad examples to follow in the vacuum that would be left by

[Petitioner's] absence," and his "chances of turning his life

around would be gone."




                                    - 7 -
              After   the    IJ   heard   the   testimony    and    reviewed   the

documentary evidence, the parties had an opportunity to present

closing arguments.          Petitioner argued that this was no ordinary

case, in part, because Gustavo did not have "a physical health

issue" nor was he "receiving special attention at school[,] such

as   an    individualized      educational      plan."   Instead,     Petitioner

contended that the case was about a rebellious teenager spiraling

out of control and in need of his father.                That downward trend,

Petitioner pressed, would exacerbate after Petitioner's removal,

such that Gustavo would not "become[] a good adult and turn[] his

life      around."    "[T]aking      away    that   chance   from    [Gustavo],"

Petitioner stressed, would be "exceptional."

              The government then had its opportunity to close.                 It

began by conceding the importance of a present parent in an

adolescent's life.          Still, it insisted that Petitioner had failed

to prove that his removal would cause Gustavo exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship.          The government cited Gustavo's age at

the time of the hearing (17 years old), his responsibility for

poor decision-making, and the presence of his mother, who would

remain his primary caretaker after Petitioner's removal and thus

blunt the severity of any hardship.

              After closing arguments, the IJ issued an oral ruling.

He remarked that, although the case was "very close" and the facts

were "very sympathetic," Petitioner failed to prove that his


                                      - 8 -
removal would cause Gustavo exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship.    The IJ made the following factual findings to support

that   conclusion:       (1) Petitioner       was     a     credible    witness;

(2) Gustavo was 17 years old and had various troublesome incidents,

including bringing a boxcutter to school, breaking a classmate's

phone, and stealing a cell phone at the YMCA; (3) Gustavo had

dropped out of school and refused to hold a job; (4) the record

did not reflect that Gustavo suffered from any medical issues;

(5) Gustavo lived with his mother, who worked full-time and earned

roughly $32,000 per year; (6) Petitioner provided financial and

emotional support to Gustavo; (7) Petitioner talked to Gustavo

regularly; and (8) Petitioner never lived with Gustavo.

            In    his   legal   analysis,     the   IJ     addressed   the   four

statutory factors noted above, finding that Petitioner had met the

first three -- physical presence in the United States for at least

ten years, good moral character, and no convictions for the

specified   offenses.       The      government     does    not   contest    those

findings, and we therefore focus only on the IJ's analysis of the

fourth factor: whether Petitioner had proven that his removal would

result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.

            The    IJ   began   by    acknowledging        that   Gustavo    would

experience hardship if Petitioner were removed.                   But he decided

that the hardship "would not be substantially beyond that which

would ordinarily be expected."          The IJ bolstered his conclusion by


                                      - 9 -
pointing to Ms. dos Santos, who was Gustavo's primary caretaker

and had a steady income.       The IJ then took notice of the lack of

evidence showing Gustavo had a medical diagnosis.              "[I]ndeed," he

observed, Petitioner's counsel "argue[d] this [wa]s not a case in

which [Gustavo] ha[d] any medical issues, but rather the separation

and     [Gustavo's]   life     would     essentially      go     in     a   bad

direction . . . if [Petitioner] was deported."

            The IJ next considered whether Gustavo had academic or

learning disabilities.       And he found that none were apparent from

the record.      Although the IJ noted Gustavo's brief stint in

substance abuse therapy in 2018, he found that such therapy would

remain available in Petitioner's absence.          The IJ also mentioned

the lack of record evidence suggesting that Petitioner "provide[d]

healthcare services or health insurance to [Gustavo]."                Likewise,

he stated that Petitioner had proffered no expert or medical

reports "to provide an opinion that would be helpful to [the IJ]

on the issue of what effect [Petitioner's] removal would have

on . . . Gustavo."

            As for Petitioner's relationship with Gustavo, the IJ

found   that   Petitioner    "d[id]    help   [Gustavo]   financially       and

emotionally in both support and in an attempt to get his life back

on track."     And from Brazil, the IJ said, Petitioner could earn a

living and continue to "provide that guidance and advice [to

Gustavo] either telephonically or messaging."          At bottom, despite


                                  - 10 -
Gustavo's troubles and Petitioner's role in Gustavo's life, the IJ

held that Petitioner had failed to carry his burden of showing

that Gustavo would experience exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship if Petitioner were removed from the country.

           Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on May 22, 2019.

Because   of   the   BIA's   alleged   delay   in   issuing   transcripts,

Petitioner claims he could not submit his appellate brief to the

BIA until September 2021.

           The BIA ruled on the appeal in February 2024.               The

analysis underlying the decision spans two paragraphs and resolves

the appeal on two alternative grounds.         First, the BIA held that,

because Gustavo had reached 21 years old while the appeal was

pending, he no longer qualified as a "child" for purposes of an

application for cancellation of removal. And second, the BIA ruled

in the alternative that it "agree[d] with the [IJ's] reasoning

that respondent did not establish [Gustavo]'s hardship would rise

to the level of exceptional or extremely unusual hardship."            The

BIA acknowledged Petitioner's contention that Gustavo's problems

arose after the ICE detention in 2014, but it said that "the [IJ]

assessed [Gustavo's] circumstances, including that his biological

mother is his primary caretaker, and that he can receive therapy

even if [Petitioner] is removed."       The BIA noted, too, that the IJ

found that "the record lacked any expert or medical reports which

indicate what the effect of the [Petitioner's] removal will be on


                                  - 11 -
[Gustavo]."      In   sum,   the   BIA    determined   that,   despite   the

"sympathetic circumstances presented, [it] agree[d] with the [IJ]

that" Petitioner had not "shown that [Gustavo's hardship would]

rise[] to the requisite level for cancellation of removal."

          Petitioner timely sought our review.

                                    II.

          Before we address the merits, we must first draw the

boundaries of our review.      That is, we must decide whether to fix

our scope on solely the BIA's decision, or to look also to the

IJ's decision.    We likewise must delineate the limitations on our

jurisdiction to review a denial of an application for cancellation

of removal.

                                     A.

          We begin with the scope.          We have said that "[w]hen the

BIA 'adopts and affirms' an IJ's conclusion," Varela-Chavarria v.

Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Barnica-Lopez

v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2023)), or "embraces the

[IJ's] decision" but adds its own "'gloss to the IJ's findings and

conclusions, we treat the two decisions as one,'" Loja-Tene v.

Barr, 

 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Murillo-Robles v.

Lynch, 

 (1st Cir. 2016)).         Similarly, when "the BIA

has deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning, we review both the

BIA's decision and relevant parts of the IJ's decision."              Conde

Cuatzo v. Lynch, 

 (1st Cir. 2015).            If, however,


                                   - 12 -
"the BIA does not adopt the IJ's findings, we review the BIA's

decision rather than the IJ's."   Odei v. Garland, 

(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2023)).

          Here, the BIA stated that it "agree[d] with the [IJ's]

reasoning that [Petitioner] did not establish his son's hardship

would rise to the level of exceptional or extremely unusual

hardship."   It added a bit of gloss and then, again, pronounced

its agreement with the IJ's decision "that although [Gustavo] will

face hardship upon [Petitioner's] removal," Petitioner had not

"shown that [the hardship] r[ose] to the requisite level for

cancellation of removal."

          In other words, the BIA expressly adopted the IJ's

reasoning and embraced his factual findings.   So we view the two

decisions as one.2   And, in doing so, "we refer to the IJ and BIA

collectively as 'the agency.'"    Martinez v. Bondi, 

,




     2 Petitioner does not meaningfully contend with our precedent
in his opening brief, ostensibly assuming that our review centers
only on the BIA's decision. His reply brief, too, devotes little
time to this cause.    So he waived any argument challenging the
scope of our review.    See Odei, 

 ("It is firmly
settled in our jurisprudence that 'arguments advanced in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by citations to relevant
authority, are deemed waived.'" (quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2010))); see also id. at 80 (holding the same for
arguments first raised in a reply brief). And even if we set aside
our well-settled waiver rules, we disagree with Petitioner's
reading of the BIA's decision.


                              - 13 -
78 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Khalil v. Garland, 

(1st Cir. 2024)).

                                          B.

            We turn next to the limitations on our review. "Congress

has      sharply        circumscribed          judicial          review       of    the

discretionary-relief process."             Patel v. Garland, 

   (2022).       It    "has   stripped        courts     of     'jurisdiction       to

review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of' discretionary

relief,    which    includes      the     denial       of    an    application     for

cancellation of removal under § 1229b."                 Contreras, 

 (quoting 

(a)(2)(B)(i)).                   Yet "[t]his bar has an

important qualification."            

 (alteration in original) (quoting

Patel,    

).      "Courts      retain       jurisdiction       to

'review . . . constitutional claims or questions of law.'"                         

(omission in original) (quoting 

(a)(2)(D)).

            Recent developments in our precedent and that of the

Supreme Court have clarified the questions subject to our review

in this context.         Most relevant here, a petitioner's challenge to

"'the    application      of   the     exceptional      and       extremely     unusual

hardship standard to a given set of facts'" -- "a mixed question

of law and fact" -- constitutes a "'reviewable question of law.'"

   (quoting     Wilkinson,     

).        So    too   does   a

petitioner's claim that the agency disregarded its settled course




                                        - 14 -
of adjudication.        See Adeyanju v. Garland, 

 (1st

Cir. 2022).

            But   the       Supreme     Court    has   reiterated      that      we   lack

jurisdiction to review factual questions.                    Wilkinson, 

 ("[A] court is still without jurisdiction to review a factual

question   raised      in    an   application       for      discretionary    relief."

(citing Patel, 

)).                 That means we cannot disturb

the agency's factual findings, such as "an IJ's determination that

a witness was credible or that a child 'had a serious medical

condition.'"      Contreras, 

 (quoting Wilkinson, 

).

                                          III.

            Assured of the scope of our review and our jurisdiction,

we move to the merits.            Petitioner raises a slew of challenges to

the agency's hardship determination.                Most of his claims relate to

the    agency's     failure        to     follow       its     settled     course      of

adjudication -- legal questions subject to our de novo review.

See id. at 20 ("[W]e review preserved claims of legal error (that

is,    claims   that    turn      on    pure    questions      of   law)    de    novo."

(alteration       in        original)          (quoting       United       States       v.

Padilla-Galarza, 

 (1st Cir. 2021))).                      And his final

complaint is that the agency                erred in its ultimate hardship

determination.      As the Supreme Court has instructed, our review of

that       determination -- a              "primarily           factual"          "mixed


                                         - 15 -
question" -- "is deferential."     Wilkinson, 

; see

also Figueroa v. Garland, 

, 166 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2024).

                                  A.

          We begin with the legal questions.        Petitioner claims

that the agency ran afoul of its settled course of adjudication in

five ways: (1) the BIA did not explicitly state a standard of

review; (2) the BIA applied the incorrect standards of review;

(3) the agency sidestepped some of the Monreal factors in making

its determination; (4) the agency        cherry-picked evidence; and

(5) the agency impermissibly demanded expert or medical reports to

prove hardship.    We take these arguments in turn and find none to

be persuasive.

                   1. Failed to State the Standard

          First,   Petitioner   contends    that   the   BIA     erred   by

neglecting to expressly invoke a standard of review.           Not so.

          Petitioner rests his argument on Hernandez v. Garland,

where the Second Circuit stated that "the BIA must not only state

the correct standard, but apply it."       

 (2d Cir.

2023).   Working from that statement, Petitioner seems to suggest

that the BIA has a duty to expressly spell out the standard of

review in each of its decisions.

          No matter the effect of the Second Circuit's ruling, it

does not control here.      Indeed, we have flatly rejected such a

"standard-of-review-based    challenge"    where   the   BIA's    opinion


                                - 16 -
"found the IJ's holding to be 'correct[]' and cited legal authority

for its conclusion."    See Samayoa Cabrera v. Barr, 

 (1st Cir. 2019).    And to the extent that Petitioner invites us

to revisit that precedent, we decline to do so because he has not

developed sufficient argumentation.      See Odei, 

.

                    2. Applied the Wrong Standard

            Second, building off the mistaken premise that the BIA

needed to explicitly invoke the standard of review, Petitioner

asserts that the BIA then applied the wrong one.      We disagree.

            The BIA reviews an IJ's factual findings for clear error

and the IJ's ultimate hardship determination de novo.      See Barros

v. Garland, 

 (1st Cir. 2022).        "For our part, we

review de novo the question of whether the BIA applied the correct

standard of review."    Khalil, 

.

            As we   just explained,   the   BIA need not   recite    the

familiar incantations "clear error" or "de novo" in reaching its

decision.    See Samayoa Cabrera, 

.         That is so

because we attach a "presumption of regularity . . . to the BIA's

official acts."     

 (quoting Enwonwu v. Gonzáles, 

 (1st Cir. 2007) (per curiam)).        And we spot legal error

only where the petitioner shows some evidence or indication that

the BIA employed the wrong standard.     See 

 ("[W]hile it is true

that the BIA's opinion does not explicitly spell out the standard

of review it applied on this point, we see no evidence that it


                                - 17 -
reviewed the IJ's conclusion for clear error . . . ."); see also

Nolasco v. Bondi, 

 (1st Cir. 2025) ("[T]here is

no indication that an incorrect standard was applied here.").

            There is      no such indication here.              Start with the

allegedly suspect factual findings.               Petitioner insists that the

BIA must have applied the wrong standard of review because it did

not disturb the IJ's baseless conclusions. He offers as an example

the IJ's finding about Petitioner's ability to provide adequate

guidance to Gustavo from Brazil.                  Had the BIA conducted the

requisite clear-error review, Petitioner attests, it would have

found to be unsupported the IJ's conclusion that Petitioner "can

provide     that    guidance    and     advice     either    telephonically   or

messaging from Brazil."

            Petitioner is wrong.         To continue Petitioner's example,

the IJ's factual finding about Petitioner's ability to provide

guidance from Brazil was a "predictive finding[] of what may or

may not occur in the future" -- a factual finding subject to the

BIA's clear-error review.              Samayoa Cabrera, 

(quoting Matter of Z-Z-O-, 

 (BIA 2015)).

And as we've already mentioned, the rest of Petitioner's challenges

to the IJ's factual findings were subject to the same clear-error

review by the BIA.        See Barros, 

.          That standard is

a   tough   one    to   meet   and    requires    deference    unless -- "after

whole-record       review -- [the      BIA]     ha[s]   'a   strong,   unyielding


                                       - 18 -
belief' that the [IJ] stumbled."        Adeyanju, 

 (second

alteration      in    original)        (quoting    United     States     v.

Rivera-Carrasquillo, 

 (1st Cir. 2019)).

            Given the BIA's decision, we cannot say that it applied

the   wrong    standard   to   the     IJ's   factual   findings.      After

acknowledging the difficult situation Petitioner's removal has put

Gustavo in, the BIA stated "[h]owever, the [IJ] assessed the son's

circumstances," and proceeded to list important factual findings.

This process of first addressing Petitioner's argument before

deferring to the findings of the IJ is consistent with clear-error

review.     So we see no evidence that the BIA reviewed the IJ's

findings for anything besides clear error and reject Petitioner's

argument.     See Samayoa Cabrera, 

.

            Nor has Petitioner convinced us that the BIA skirted its

obligation to review de novo the IJ's hardship determination.           The

sum total of Petitioner's argument on this score is that the BIA's

one-paragraph exposition reflects "a highly deferential (non-de

novo) review to the entire hardship decision," or worse yet, "a

thoughtless summary of [the BIA's] favorite parts [of] the IJ's

decision."      That lone sentence, however, does not provide an

indication that the BIA applied the wrong standard of review.            To

the contrary, the BIA stated, "we agree with the [IJ's] reasoning

that [Petitioner] did not establish his son's hardship," and cited

its guiding precedent on this legal issue, Matter of Monreal.             To


                                     - 19 -
agree with "suggests not deference to, but rather alignment with"

the IJ's assessment.      DeCarvalho v. Garland, 

 (1st

Cir. 2021).      Alongside the supportive citation, see Khalil, 

, we find no indication that the BIA failed to review

the IJ's hardship determination de novo.

           For these reasons, we reject Petitioner's arguments that

the BIA reviewed his appeal under an incorrect standard of review.

                        3. Ignored Monreal Factors

           Third, Petitioner claims that the agency disregarded its

settled course of adjudication when it did not consider all the

Monreal factors.      We are unpersuaded.

           Both parties agree that the BIA's decision in Matter of

Monreal-Aguinaga, 

 (BIA 2001), is the starting

point for determining what constitutes exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship standard.            There, the BIA explained that the

relevant factors to consider include (1) the age of the qualifying

family member, (2) "family ties in the United States and abroad,"

(3) "length of residence in this country," (4) "the health of the

[petitioner] and qualifying family members," (5) "the political

and   economic    conditions   in     the    country   of   return,"    (6) "the

possibility      of   other   means     of     adjusting    status,"    (7) "the

[petitioner's] involvement and position in his or her community

here," and (8) the petitioner's "immigration history."                 

.

The agency considers these facts "in the aggregate" and makes


                                      - 20 -
hardship determinations on a case-by-case basis.                       Nolasco, 

 (quoting Matter of Monreal, 

).

              Viewing the BIA's holding (in which it expressly cited

Monreal) together with the IJ's decision, we see no reason to

believe that the agency ignored the Monreal factors relevant to

the hardship determination in this case.               To be sure, the agency's

decision did not invoke each Monreal factor.                   But Monreal itself

uses permissive language when discussing the factors -- that is,

it says that the eight factors "are all proper factors to be

considered."     Matter of Monreal, 23 I. & N. at 63.                And Petitioner

cites no authority suggesting that Monreal obligates the agency to

consider every factor in every case.               What is more, Petitioner

"ha[s] not explained how consideration of [his desired factors]

would bolster [his] hardship claim."              Nolasco, 

.

So "we cannot conclude it was legal error for the agency not to

explicitly address" those desired factors.                Id.

                     4. Failed to Consider All Evidence

              Fourth, Petitioner contends that the BIA cherry-picked

certain record evidence while ignoring other evidence that would

have changed the outcome. That argument resembles the petitioner's

contention     in    Tacuri-Tacuri       v.   Garland:    "that      the   governing

caselaw 'force[s the BIA] to address the complete record.'"                        

   (1st   Cir.   2021),      abrogation       on   other     grounds

recognized     by    Figueroa,     

    (1st    Cir.    2024)


                                     - 21 -
(alteration in original).       But here, as there, the "argument falls

flat"   because    Petitioner       "cites    no   caselaw    to   support    the

proposition      that   the   BIA     must    specifically     address    every

evidentiary submission within the record." 

 And, to the extent

Petitioner argues that the agency overlooked critical evidence,

that claim would fail, too, because he has not pointed to any such

evidence, nor has he proffered how consideration of such evidence

would bolster his claim.        See Nolasco, 

.

                  5. Required Medical or Expert Report

          Fifth, Petitioner argues that the agency defied its own

precedent by requiring him to provide expert or medical reports to

establish Gustavo's hardship.           We see nothing in the record to

support such an assertion.          Indeed, the BIA has acknowledged that

a   testifying    applicant     generally      "will   lack    the   firsthand

knowledge and medical expertise needed to provide persuasive and

sufficiently specific testimony regarding the seriousness of a

qualifying    relative's      medical    condition . . . to        meet      [his]

burden" of proof on that issue.          Matter of J-J-G, 

 (BIA 2020).       In other words, if the record lacks expert

confirmation of a claimed medical condition, the petitioner may

have more difficulty proving the severity of the relative's medical

issues.   The IJ's conclusion here that Petitioner's evidence fell

short is fully consistent with the BIA's observation and a far cry

from imposing a categorical requirement for expert or medical


                                     - 22 -
reports.     And, to the extent Petitioner is seeking to dispute the

IJ's factual determination on Gustavo's medical condition, we lack

jurisdiction    to    second-guess      that   evidentiary   finding.      See

Contreras, 

 ("[A]part from any associated legal

errors, we may not consider . . . petitioner['s] assertion that

the IJ erred in determining that [the qualifying relative] 'does

not   suffer   from     any   serious    medical   conditions.'"     (quoting

Wilkinson, 

)).

                                        B.

           With   the    purely   legal      questions   addressed   and   the

factual findings set, we turn to Petitioner's final claim.                 It

"boil[s] down to his fundamental disagreement with how the [agency]

weighed and considered the facts in his case."           Tacuri-Tacuri, 

.    Yet, as we explain, the agency "adequately explained

and supported its decision that [Petitioner] failed to meet the

'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' standard."              

           To constitute "exceptional and extremely unusual, the

hardship to a noncitizen's relatives must be substantially beyond

the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a close family

member leaves this country."         Nolasco, 

 (citation

modified).     This "standard is supposed to be hard to meet and is

evaluated in comparison to the hardships typically felt by children

whose parents are removed from the country -- this in itself sets

a high bar."      Tacuri-Tacuri, 

.             Although that


                                   - 23 -
standard does not mandate the hardship be "unconscionable," the

circumstances must be "truly exceptional."      Matter of Monreal, 

.         And our review of the agency's

determination "is deferential."3      Figueroa, 

.

            Given that high burden and our deferential standard of

review, we cannot hold that the agency erred in reaching its

hardship    determination.   Recall    the   agency's   decision.   It

evaluated the relevant facts and held that Petitioner did not meet

the high burden of showing exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship.   It acknowledged Petitioner's relationship with Gustavo,



     3In one sentence in his opening brief, Petitioner urges "this
Court [to] review the [agency's] hardship determination de novo."
But the argument suffers from multiple levels of waiver. First,
such a bare statement, unaccompanied by developed argumentation,
"is plainly insufficient as an argument."      Martinez-Burgos v.
Guayama Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 2011).       And although
Petitioner spends a little more time on this proposition in his
reply brief, we do not consider it. See 

 ("Arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief are waived." (quoting United
States v. Vanvliet, 

, 265 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008))).
     Second, even if we set aside that threshold defect, the
argument as presented in his reply brief likewise falls short for
lack of development.     We elaborate briefly.     At its core,
Petitioner's position in reply is that the Supreme Court's
statement in Wilkinson -- that the "review is deferential" -- is
dictum. Petitioner, however, makes no effort to wrestle with our
precedent, which binds us and dictates that our review of these
questions is deferential. See Contreras, 

 & n.7
(explaining that "[o]ur review of the BIA's determination 'is
deferential'"). So that argument, too, is waived. See Figueroa,

. We accordingly proceed as we did in Figueroa:
viewing the BIA's hardship determination through a deferential
lens, without deciding the amount of deference we afford to such
determinations. See 

 at 166 n.7.


                               - 24 -
including his role financially and emotionally supporting Gustavo.

And, in light of Gustavo's troubles in school, the community, and

at home, the agency did find that Gustavo would experience hardship

after Petitioner's removal.          But, given other evidence in the

record,   the   agency    found    that     the   hardship      would    not     be

substantially beyond that which is normally expected when a close

family member leaves this country. It held as much because Gustavo

would still have his mother -- who is his primary caretaker and

has a stable income.      The agency likewise rested its conclusion on

the fact that Gustavo would continue to have access to therapy and

other health services.       And it considered, too, that Petitioner

failed to prove that Gustavo needed him for either healthcare

services or health insurance.

          Petitioner      says    that    the     agency's      conclusion      was

"unjustifiable."    In his words, "[t]he question presented was

whether a 17-year-old drug addict who had dropped out of high

school would suffer 'substantially beyond the ordinary hardship

that would be expected when a close family member leaves the

country.'"         And,      he      continues,          "nothing       in      the

record . . . indicate[s]      that   Gustavo,      who    had    been   refusing

treatment, would somehow overcome this position in light of losing

his father's presence."

          We do not doubt the hardship that Gustavo has faced, let

alone what he will face following his father's removal.                      At the


                                   - 25 -
same time, the question before us is whether Petitioner carried

his burden of showing that Petitioner's removal would cause Gustavo

to experience exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.                The

corollary requirement is that the petitioner must prove some nexus

between his remaining in the country and the qualifying relative's

hardship.       Relevant here, Petitioner had to demonstrate that his

presence in the country was reasonably necessary to prevent, or at

least manage, the resulting hardship.

            The agency found that Petitioner failed to make that

showing.    We agree.      Remember, Petitioner admitted that Gustavo

did not heed parental guidance and refused to accept available

treatment -- despite       Petitioner's      proximity    to,   and   regular

contact with, Gustavo.          And, aside from Petitioner's conjecture,

there was no evidence to show that Gustavo's poor decisions would

subside    if    the   agency    granted   Petitioner's    application    for

cancellation of removal.         True, Petitioner claims that Gustavo's

behaviors were symptomatic of psychological difficulties for which

he might need treatment or parental guidance and assistance.              But

the agency supportably found that Petitioner did not prove that

Gustavo suffered from psychological difficulties so severe that

the loss of Petitioner's presence and in-person guidance would

result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.             Cf. Pandit

v. Lynch, 

 (1st Cir. 2016).




                                    - 26 -
         In   sum,   although   we   sympathize   with   Petitioner,   we

cannot conclude that the agency got it wrong on this record.

                                 IV.

         For all these reasons, we deny the petition for review.




                                - 27 -