Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter

            United States Court of Appeals
                         For the First Circuit


No. 24-1209

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                  Appellee,

                                       v.

                               ARIEL LEGASSA,

                          Defendant, Appellant.


            APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

              [Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]


                                    Before

               Montecalvo and Aframe, Circuit Judges,
                  and Vélez-Rivé, District Judge.


     Leslie Feldman-Rumpler for appellant.

     Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom
Leah B. Foley, U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts,
was on brief, for appellee.


                                July 30, 2025




     
         Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
            AFRAME, Circuit Judge.            Ariel Legassa, a former vice

president at New England Sports Network ("NESN"), was charged with

stealing nearly $600,000 from NESN by setting up a fake company

and using it to charge NESN for work that was never done.                  Based

on this conduct, a jury convicted Legassa of seven counts of mail

fraud, 

, and three counts of money laundering, 

.       Legassa appeals his conviction, arguing that

erroneously admitted evidence tainted the verdict thus requiring

a new trial.     We affirm.

                                I.    Background

            We   describe   the      relevant    facts,    taking   a   "balanced

approach" to our description of the record.                See United States v.

Velazquez-Fontanez, 

, 212 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

            NESN hired Legassa in September 2019 as vice president

of digital operations, with a starting annual salary of $255,000

plus bonus compensation.          Legassa reported to Raymond Guilbault,

NESN's   chief   operating      officer    and    chief     financial   officer.

Guilbault, in turn, reported to NESN's former chief executive

officer, Sean McGrail.          This case involves Legassa's conduct in

2021 and early 2022.

            Legassa's    job     duties    included       budgeting,    strategic

planning,   staffing,     and     hiring   vendors    to     strengthen   NESN's

digital capacity.       Legassa set the 2021 budget for NESN's digital


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operations.   That budget allotted a substantial sum to pay outside

vendors for various projects such as revamping NESN's website and

designing new online products. Ordinarily, when a vendor completed

work for NESN's digital operations, it would send an invoice

directly to Legassa, who would approve the invoice and submit it

for payment through NESN's invoicing system.              Any invoice for

$50,000 or more required additional approval from Guilbault, while

invoices for less than $50,000 required only Legassa's approval.

NESN paid approved invoices by paper check, which Guilbault and

McGrail personally signed, and which NESN then mailed to the

vendors.

           In early 2021, Legassa reached an agreement with Alley

Interactive, LLC ("Alley NY"), a New York-based vendor, to assist

in the development of NESN's website.            On March 3, 2021, NESN

(through Legassa) and Alley NY signed a master services agreement

that governed the work Alley NY would do for NESN.             Legassa was

Alley NY's only contact at NESN.            At Legassa's request, NESN

budgeted approximately $1 million to pay Alley NY for services

provided in 2021.

           Meanwhile, at around the same time, Legassa established

a   fictitious   vendor   in    Connecticut,     which   he   called   Alley

Interactive, LLC ("Alley CT"), and which he controlled.                   On

February    8,    2021,    he     created    a    new    email    address,

"[email protected]," for the business.            The next day,


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he applied for a mailbox in Stamford, Connecticut, and listed

"Alley Interactive LLC" on the application.           Two days later, he

filed a signed certificate of incorporation for Alley CT with the

Connecticut Secretary of State, using the newly created mailing

and email addresses.    And the following week, he opened a business

checking account for Alley CT with Santander Bank.

             As part of his scheme, Legassa created an Alley CT

invoice that looked like an Alley NY invoice.              To create the

invoice, Legassa emailed Alley NY's chief executive officer to

request an Alley NY invoice.       This request came more than a month

before   NESN   and   Alley   NY   entered   into   the   master   services

agreement.    Alley NY did not send the invoice, so Legassa followed

up a week later. Again, Alley NY did not send an invoice. Finally,

on March 4, 2021, a day after NESN and Alley NY signed the master

services agreement, Alley NY sent Legassa an invoice. Legassa then

altered the invoice by adding the Alley CT address and removing

Alley NY's banking information.

             Soon after, Legassa began approving and submitting Alley

NY invoices for work it performed on NESN's website.          At the same

time, Legassa also began submitting Alley CT invoices for work

that was never performed.     To evade any suspicion that might arise

from the slightly different vendor names and invoice forms, Legassa

told NESN's accounts payable and payroll supervisor that Alley NY

and Alley CT were "two entities working together, but separately


                                   - 4 -
incorporated.   They plan to merge . . . at the end of the year and

they asked me to please create a separate account and send payment

[to Alley CT] separately until then."

            Legassa submitted a total of eleven Alley CT invoices

from March 2021 to January 2022. Guilbault gave the final approval

to five of the first six, each of which exceeded $50,000.    Legassa

alone approved the next three because they each were for $48,500

and thus did not require Guilbault's approval.    Finally, Guilbault

rejected the last two invoices because, by then, Guilbault knew

that Legassa owned Alley CT.

            NESN paid the first nine Alley CT invoices through seven

checks totaling $575,500.    Legassa deposited each check into the

Alley CT checking account.     He then withdrew money and used it to

fund various personal and family expenses, including approximately

$250,000 in credit card bills, wires to a joint checking account

owned by Legassa and his wife, two car loans, an airplane loan,

home improvements, and taxes.

            On September 19, 2021, following a threat by Legassa to

leave NESN, Guilbault and McGrail increased Legassa's salary to

$265,200.    Following further negotiating by Legassa, NESN again

increased his salary in November 2021 to $325,000.          Also in

November 2021, Legassa asked NESN's finance department to increase

the 2022 Alley NY budget to $1.5 million.     The finance department

granted that request.


                                - 5 -
             Legassa's scheme crumbled in January 2022, after Alley

NY conducted a public records search and discovered both the

existence of Alley CT and that Legassa owned the company.                         Word of

this   discovery     reached      NESN,   which       fired    Legassa      on    January

6, 2022. Thereafter, a grand jury indicted Legassa on seven counts

of mail fraud -- one count for each check NESN sent to Alley CT.

It also charged him with three counts of money laundering for each

withdrawal    from   the    Alley    CT    checking         account   that       exceeded

$10,000.     Legassa pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.

             At trial, the district court allowed the introduction of

evidence,     sometimes     over    Legassa's         objection,      that       involved

witness    characterizations        alleged      to    be    improper    lay      opinion

testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.                         The court also

allowed the introduction of evidence, over defense objection, of

Legassa's spending and certain bank transfers Legassa made from a

personal     account    after       he    was     fired.            Legassa       argued,

unsuccessfully,      that    the    admission         of    this    latter       evidence

violated Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, because it was

irrelevant or, alternatively, because its unfairly prejudicial

effect substantially outweighed its probative value.

             As a defense, Legassa alleged that Alley CT was actually

a joint effort among him, Guilbault, and McGrail to provide him

extra compensation, so he would not leave NESN and thereby set

back   NESN's   progress     in    digital       operations        during    the    COVID


                                         - 6 -
pandemic.     Unpersuaded, the jury found Legassa guilty on all ten

counts.     The district court subsequently sentenced Legassa to

forty-two months of imprisonment and ordered that he pay $580,500

in restitution.        This timely appeal followed.

                       II.   Challenges under Rule 701

            Legassa first argues that the district court mistakenly

allowed Guilbault to make two statements using the word "fraud"

during his testimony.        Legassa also argues that a third statement

by Guilbault, in which he called a theoretical side deal to pay

Legassa "unethical and illegal," and which the court immediately

struck,     nonetheless      tainted    the    proceedings   sufficiently    to

require a new trial.          Legassa argues that all three statements

were legal opinions by a lay witness that did not meet the

requirements set forth by Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which

governs    opinion     testimony   by   lay     witnesses.    The   government

responds that there was no error and that, if there was error, it

was harmless.

            We start with Guilbault's two uses of the term "fraud."

The government called Guilbault and asked him on direct examination

why   he   did   not   approve   the    final    two   invoices   that   Legassa

submitted to him.       Guilbault responded that he "put a stop payment

on those two invoices once [he] became aware of the situation

regarding the fraud that was perpetrated against [NESN]."                Legassa

did not object.        Later in the examination, the government asked


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Guilbault to remind the jury why he did not approve the final

invoices.    Guilbault   responded   that   "[i]t   had   come   to   [his]

attention that those payments were being made to a fraudulent

company."     This time, Legassa objected and stated that he also

should have objected to Guilbault's prior use of the word "fraud."

Because Legassa's objection to the first statement was untimely,

the district court overruled his objection to the first "fraud"

statement.      In response to Legassa's objection to the phrase

"fraudulent company," the court instructed Guilbault to "keep the

adjectives out" of his testimony.

             Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides:

             If a witness is not testifying as an expert,
             testimony in the form of an opinion is limited
             to one that is: (a) rationally based on the
             witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly
             understanding the witness's testimony or to
             determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based
             on scientific, technical, or other specialized
             knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

The government does not contest that the admission of this evidence

is governed by Rule 701, and we assume the same for the sake of

argument.     We also assume that the issue is fully preserved and

that the statements should not have been allowed under Rule 701.

Even with those assumptions, the admission of this evidence was

clearly harmless.

             An error in the admission of testimony is harmless if

"it is highly probable that the error did not influence the



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verdict."     United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 

(1st Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).                 Factors we consider in

determining if erroneously admitted testimony is harmless include

"the importance of the testimony to the case, the cumulativeness

of the testimony, the presence or absence of other evidence

corroborating   or    contradicting       the     testimony,    the   extent   of

permitted   cross-examination,      and     the    overall     strength   of   the

government's case."      United States v. Andino-Rodríguez, 

, 22 (1st Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).              The burden of showing

that any error was harmless rests on the government. United States

v. Taylor, 

 (1st Cir. 2017).

            Here, the evidence against Legassa was so overwhelming

that there is no likelihood that the Guilbault's "fraud" testimony

"influence[d] the verdict."         Rodríguez-Adorno, 

(citation omitted).      Legassa indisputably invented a fake vendor

with a name and invoice similar to a vendor already working for

NESN, and whose only contact at NESN was Legassa.               He also made an

email   address,     obtained   a   mailing        address     in   Connecticut,

incorporated a company in Connecticut, and opened a business

checking account for Alley CT in his own name.                 It was therefore

essentially undisputed that Alley CT was a fake company.                   Then,

over eleven months, Legassa fabricated eleven invoices for the

fake company and banked almost $600,000, which he spent on home

improvements, vehicles, loans, and credit card payments, among


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other expenses.        In view of this evidence, we do not see how

Guilbault's use of the terms "fraud" and "fraudulent company,"

each a single time, influenced the verdict.           This is especially so

because the government did not present Guilbault as someone with

special   knowledge     of   what    constitutes     fraud.         Rather,    the

government presented Guilbault as an executive of the victim

company whom Legassa duped into signing fake invoices and Legassa

cross-examined Guilbault to suggest that he was part of the scheme.

No matter which view of Guilbault the jury took, it is unlikely

that, in these circumstances, the jury would have given Guilbault's

view of what constitutes fraud substantial weight.

             Nor does Guilbault's use of the phrase "unethical and

illegal" provide a basis for a retrial.                    Guilbault's use of

"unethical    and   illegal"       occurred   when   the     government       asked

Guilbault    whether    he   was    complicit   in   the    Alley    CT   scheme.

Guilbault responded that he was not.            When the government asked

why not, Guilbault responded, "[b]ecause it would be unethical and

illegal."     Legassa objected, and the district court immediately

struck Guilbault's statement.         At the conclusion of the trial, the

court reiterated an instruction it gave at the beginning of the

trial that the jury should disregard any stricken evidence.

             Legassa   argues      that,   notwithstanding      the       district

court's ruling and curative instruction, Guilbault's statement

must have affected the jury's verdict because it "went to the heart


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of the government's case."      We are unpersuaded.    "[O]n review, we

must presume that jurors will follow a direct instruction to

disregard the offending evidence."          Ramírez v. Debs-Elías, 

 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Sepulveda,

 (1st Cir. 1993)).         "This presumption is only

rebutted if 'it appears probable that . . . responsible jurors

will not be able to put the testimony to one side, and, moreover,

that the testimony will likely be seriously prejudicial to the

aggrieved party.'"      

 (omission in original) (quoting Sepulveda,

).

          Here, Legassa has provided us with no reason to think

that the jurors were unable to set this testimony to the side.

Moreover, we fail to see how this stricken testimony was seriously

prejudicial given that it was Guilbault's response to Legassa's

accusation that he was part of the wrongdoing.             We thus decline

Legassa's request to vacate his convictions on this basis.

               III. Challenges under Rules 401 and 403

          Legassa next argues that the district court violated

Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 when it admitted (1) evidence

of Legassa's spending on luxury items during the scheme, and

(2) evidence    that,    shortly    after   NESN   fired    him,   Legassa

transferred money out of a joint bank account he shared with his

wife.   Legassa contends that this evidence was irrelevant under

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 or, alternatively, of such marginal


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relevance, and so likely to engender unfair prejudice, that its

admission violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403.         In support of

his unfair prejudice argument, Legassa says that evidence of his

spending on luxury items invoked class prejudice and that the

evidence of bank transfers likely misled the "jurors to assume

that there was something nefarious about the transfer of funds."

The government responds that the admission of this evidence was

appropriate under Rules 401 and 403.

            We review preserved challenges to evidentiary rulings,

including challenges to rulings under Rules 401 and 403, for an

abuse of discretion.     United States v. Rathbun, 

, 47

(1st Cir. 2024).    Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if "it has

any tendency to make a fact more or less probable" and "the fact

is of consequence" in the case.      A district court may only admit

evidence that it deems relevant, Fed. R. Evid. 402, but Rule 401

sets a "very low bar."   United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 

 (1st Cir. 2014).        Our review of a district court's

relevance determinations is "quite deferential," and we will only

reverse such determinations in "exceptional cases."      United States

v. Armenteros-Chervoni, 

, 27 (1st Cir. 2025) (citations

omitted).

            Under Rule 403, a district court "may exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a

danger   of . . .   unfair   prejudice"   or   "misleading   the   jury."


                                - 12 -
Relevant evidence may be unfairly prejudicial if it has a "tendency

to suggest decision on an improper basis," such as "an emotional

one."   Old Chief v. United States, 

 (quoting Fed.

R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note).             We have said that "only

in the rarest and most compelling cases 'will we, from the vista

of a cold appellate record,' reject a judge's on-the-scene Rule

403 ruling."   Rodríguez-Soler, 

 (quoting DiRico v.

City of Quincy, 

 (1st Cir. 2005)).

            Here, the evidence of Legassa's voluminous spending on

luxury items was plainly relevant because it was probative of his

motive to steal money from NESN.            See United States v. Appolon,

 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that evidence of spending

on marijuana, clothes, vehicles, and firearms had "significant

probative   value"    in    establishing    motive    for   participating    in

mortgage fraud scheme).       Similarly, the bank transfer evidence was

plainly relevant because it tended to show Legassa's consciousness

of guilt, insofar as he wanted immediately to remove the money

from a personal account in his name once he learned that NESN was

suspicious of his conduct.       See United States v. Mangual-Santiago,

 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that evidence of

post-conspiracy      bank   activity   in    conspiracy     to   commit   money

laundering case was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial because

it showed defendant's intent to conceal funds).              Moreover, there

is nothing about this case suggesting that it involves rare and


                                   - 13 -
compelling circumstances calling for appellate disruption of the

district court's weighing of the Rule 403 balance.    In concluding

that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial, we note that the

record contains no hint of an appeal to class prejudice or any

suggestion that the transferred funds were tainted by anything

other than their connection to the fraud that was the subject of

this prosecution.

                          IV. Conclusion

          For   the   foregoing   reasons,   we   affirm   Legassa's

convictions.




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