United States v. Casillas-Montero
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
United States v. Casillas-Montero
Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 23-1859
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO CASILLAS-MONTERO, a/k/a Stone City Kennel,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Silvia L. Carreño-Coll, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Lipez, and Rikelman,
Circuit Judges.
Linda A. Backiel for appellant.
Thekla Hansen-Young, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United
States Attorney, Jonathan L. Gottfried, Assistant United States
Attorney, Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, Rachel Heron,
Ethan C. Eddy, and Allen M. Brabender, Environment and Natural
Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief, for
appellee.
September 16, 2025
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Antonio
Casillas Montero ("Casillas") -- a "legend" in the dogfighting
world -- pleaded guilty to three counts under the Animal Welfare
Act ("AWA"): one count for conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare
Act and two counts for possession of dogs for use in an animal
fighting venture. The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR")
calculated the Sentencing Guidelines Range ("GSR") as 12 to 18
months, but it noted that Casillas's conduct could justify both an
upward departure under the relevant guideline and an upwardly
variant sentence. Citing a medley of factors, the district court
imposed on Casillas an 84-month term of imprisonment: 36 months on
the conspiracy count, and 24 months on each of the possession
counts, all to be served consecutively.
On appeal, Casillas levels a broadside attack on his
sentence. He starts with the adequacy of the sentence's
explanation, claiming that the district court's stated reasons
were inadequate, improper, or both. He then argues that the
district court's imposition of consecutive sentences violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Finally, he insists that the sentence was substantively
unreasonable because similarly situated defendants received lesser
sentences. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
- 2 -
I. BACKGROUND1
The facts of this case, while heinous, are relatively
straightforward. For 35 years, Casillas operated Stone City
Kennel, where he and at least one co-conspirator bred and trained
dogs for dogfighting in the United States and abroad. Known to
some as a "legend" in the dogfighting world, Casillas was
extensively involved in dogfighting through Stone City Kennel. He
trained as many as 40 dogs at a time, employing grueling techniques
to enhance the dogs' fighting capabilities;2 sold dogs for
thousands of dollars to international clientele; mentored others
involved in dogfighting; promoted dogfighting events; and
participated in over 150 dogfights across the Americas and the
Caribbean, including several U.S. states, Puerto Rico, the
Dominican Republic, Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru. None of those facts
are disputed.
On October 6, 2022 -- days after Casillas had admitted
incriminating information to an undercover federal agent -- a
grand jury sitting in the District of Puerto Rico indicted him for
"This appeal arises following a guilty plea, so we draw the
1
facts from the undisputed sections of the presentence
investigation report ('PSR') and the transcripts of the
change-of-plea and sentencing hearings." United States v. Burgos,
133 F.4th 183, 187 n.1 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
His training techniques included chaining the dogs to
2
treadmills to walk or run for long distances; giving the dogs
steroids and hormones; and holding test fights between dogs at his
residence in Humacao, Puerto Rico.
- 3 -
conspiracy to violate the AWA in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156and18 U.S.C. § 49
. Casillas was arrested that same day. Following the arrest, the government searched Casillas's property and found, among other things, four dogs living in poor conditions and suffering from a litany of health problems.3 Those findings gave rise to the November 2022 superseding indictment, which restated the conspiracy count and tacked on four more counts for possession of dogs for use in an animal fighting venture in violation of7 U.S.C. § 2156
(b) and18 U.S.C. § 49
. (In other words, the
superseding indictment charged Casillas with one possession count
for each dog found on his property during the October 2022 search.)
In May 2023, Casillas pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and
two possession counts. The plea agreement did not include an
agreed-upon guidelines calculation.
In due course, the Probation Office prepared the PSR.
After recounting the offense conduct in detail, the PSR grouped
together the three offenses, calculated a total offense level of
13 and a criminal history category of I, and set the GSR at 12 to
18 months.
Toward the end of the PSR, the Probation Office also
included reasons why the district court could both upwardly depart
3 The PSR recites in some detail the grim picture of the four
dogs on Casillas's property. All we need to say here is that the
dogs were found to have various bacterial and fungal infections,
parasites, and lesions. They have all fully recovered.
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from the relevant guideline and impose an upwardly variant sentence
based on the statutory sentencing factors. First, the PSR cited
Application Note 2 to section 2E3.1 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines,4 remarking that it permits an upward departure where
the offense involves "animal fighting on an exceptional scale."
Second, the PSR indicated that the district court could exercise
its discretion to impose an upwardly variant sentence after
considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The PSR then listed Casillas's relevant conduct for
the district court to consider in either departing or upwardly
varying. In particular, the PSR pointed to Casillas's
participation in more than 150 dogfights over the course of 35
years; the international reach of his dogfighting operation; his
4 Application Note 2 provides in full:
The base offense levels provided for animal fighting
ventures in subsection (a)(1) and (a)(3) reflect that an
animal fighting venture involves one or more violent
fights between animals and that a defeated animal often
is severely injured in the fight, dies as a result of
the fight, or is killed afterward. Nonetheless, there
may be cases in which the offense level determined under
this guideline substantially understates the seriousness
of the offense. In such a case, an upward departure may
be warranted. For example, an upward departure may be
warranted if (A) the offense involved extraordinary
cruelty to an animal beyond the violence inherent in
such a venture (such as by killing in a way that prolongs
the suffering of the animal); or (B) the offense involved
animal fighting on an exceptional scale (such as an
offense involving an unusually large number of animals).
U.S.S.G. § 2E3.1, app. n. 2.
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promotion of fights; and his practice of letting dogs die -- rather
than removing them and tending to their injuries -- if the dogs
were losing during the course of a fight.
Both parties then filed their respective sentencing
memoranda. For his part, Casillas advocated for a sentence between
18 and 24 months, emphasizing his personal background and Puerto
Rico's tradition of animal fighting as mitigating factors but
acknowledging that Application Note 2 might warrant an upward
departure. The government disagreed with Casillas's calculation.
It sought a 120-month sentence, arguing that either an upward
departure or a variance was justified by the magnitude of
Casillas's conduct and the section 3553(a) considerations.
The district court held a sentencing hearing in
September 2023. The government called two agents to testify as
experts: one as an expert in forensic digital evidence, and the
other as an expert on dogfighting. The forensic digital expert
confirmed that he had extracted incriminating information from
Casillas's cell phone. And, more relevant for purposes of this
appeal, the dogfighting expert -- who had conducted over 60
dogfighting investigations in nine years -- testified with
particularity about Casillas's unprecedented involvement with
dogfighting. On that score, the dogfighting expert described
Casillas's dogfighting operation as "by far . . . the
longest . . . and probably the farthest-reaching" he had seen in
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his career. He explained, too, that he had never had a case in
which the dogfighter participated in more than 150 matches, nor
had he ever seen an event the size of the one Casillas hosted in
the Dominican Republic. Moreover, the dogfighting expert remarked
that Casillas's practice of letting losing dogs die during or after
fights was "very uncommon."5
The parties then argued their respective positions. The
government started by citing other dogfighting cases in which
defendants received sentences above the GSR for conduct that, the
government represented, was less severe than Casillas's. It then
turned to Casillas's extensive dogfighting history and his roles
as dog trainer, dogfighter, organizer, and mentor. The government
argued that those case-specific facts along with a heightened need
for deterrence in Puerto Rico warranted an upwardly variant
sentence of 120 months' imprisonment.
Casillas responded by attempting to distinguish his case
from those cited by the government. He asserted that the
government's cases often involved additional crimes unrelated to
dogfighting. Moreover, Casillas said that the items found during
the search of his property indicated that he was winding down his
operations. Next, Casillas sought to undermine the government's
Notably, the government presented to the district court a
5
video showing one of Casillas's dogs slowly dying from blood loss
due to injuries suffered during a dogfight.
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deterrence argument by noting that statistics from drug cases
demonstrate that high sentences do not actually deter others from
committing crimes. Finally, Casillas turned to the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, highlighting Casillas's "personal factors" and
arguing that they "outweigh[ed] the negativity of" his offending
conduct.
After having heard the experts' testimony and the
parties' arguments, the district court rendered its sentence. It
began by taking note of the relevant charges and sentencing
guideline and determining that the PSR had accurately "applied the
correct guideline computations." The district court then
addressed Casillas's personal characteristics, including his age,
education, professional qualifications, medical conditions, and
criminal history.
Turning to the offense conduct, the district court
highlighted the exceptional scale of Casillas's dogfighting
venture. It pointed to Casillas's admitted participation in over
150 dogfights, his enterprise's international reach, and his
status "as a Caribbean legend and a sought[-]after teacher and
mentor" in the dogfighting world. The district court also
referenced "[t]he evidence presented during the [sentencing]
hearing," which "showed examples of extreme cruelty." In
particular, the district court cited Casillas's penchant for
letting dogs who lost a dogfight die instead of removing them from
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the fight. "In 2018," the district court noted, "[Casillas]
explained during a Facebook conversation that his dog lost due to
a nosebleed that never stopped, and he did not stop the fight but
instead le[t] the dog bleed out and die." The district court
recalled, too, a video presented to it, which showed Casillas's
"dog breathing in agony[, which] later died from the injuries he
sustained during [the dog]fight." Casillas, the district court
remarked, made "no attempt to alleviate [the dog's] suffering."
And the district court considered Casillas's advertising
dogfighting events and the expert testimony that the 24-match event
hosted by Casillas "[wa]s unprecedented in [the expert's]
experience."
The district court next explicitly invoked "the Title 18
U.S. Code, Section 3553 sentencing factors," including "the need
to promote . . . respect for the law, protect the public from
further crimes by the defendant, as well as address the issues of
deterrence and punishment." After doing so, the district court
mentioned Application Note 2 to section 2E3.1. It noted that the
guideline accounted for the violent nature of animal fighting
ventures, but that its departure provision recognizes "there may
be cases in which the offense level determined under [section
2E3.1] substantially understates the seriousness of the offense."
Perhaps contemplating that guideline, the district court found
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that "the number of fights and the duration of . . . Casillas's
involvement [wa]s extraordinary in nature."
The district court, however, then reiterated a question
from Casillas's sentencing memorandum: "How much of a departure is
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the
statutory directive set forth in Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)?" The
district court responded, "In answering that question, the Court
would like to begin by stating that the facts of this case are
extreme. As such, the guidelines do not properly reflect the
seriousness of the offenses committed by Mr. Casillas." So,
ostensibly incorporating by reference the policy disagreement of
another district judge, the district court said:
Just as a sentencing judge expressed in [United States
v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012)], other than
the criminal dogfighters in America, every other person
in America would be shocked beyond belief that [one] can
do what [Casillas] did and come out with a federal
sentence of 12 to 18 months.6
The district court then reiterated much of Casillas's
offense conduct. At its penultimate step before pronouncing the
6 The statement with which the district court expressed its
agreement is as follows:
I would say that other than the criminal dog fighters in
America, every other person in America would be shocked
beyond belief that you could do what [Hargrove] did and
come out with a federal sentence of zero to six
months . . . . No one could defend that. No judges.
No legislators. No president.
Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 159-60.
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sentence, the district court stated, "The fact that a varian[t]
sentence deviates significantly from the advisory guideline range
does not alone render it presumptively unreasonable." Finally,
the district court considered the cases cited by the government in
support of its proposed 120-month sentence. At Casillas's
suggestion, the district court agreed that the government's
comparator cases were distinguishable because those "had a drug
and/or gun nexus." Holding that "the nexus [wa]s not present in
this case," the district court took that "distinction into
consideration."
The district court ultimately fashioned a total sentence
of 84 months: 36 months on the conspiracy count and 24 months on
each of the two possession counts, all to be served consecutively.
The district court stated that the consecutive sentences were "just
and not greater than necessary after considering all of the
sentencing factors and [wa]s supported by the undisputed facts
presented" at the sentencing hearing.
When all was said and done, the district court asked
defense counsel whether he had "[a]ny specific requests." Defense
counsel requested only that the district court recommend to the
Bureau of Prisons that Casillas "be designated for an institution
within the southern part of the United States, Florida, so that
his family would be closer to him." The district court consented
and then asked whether defense counsel had "[a]ny other request,"
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to which defense counsel responded, "No, ma'am." The sentencing
hearing concluded at 7:45 p.m.
In its "Statement of Reasons," the district court
described the sentence as an upward variance -- not an upward
departure. It indicated that the sentence was based on the section
3553(a) factors. As justifications for the upward variance, the
district court specifically marked (1) "[t]he nature and
circumstances of the offense"; (2) Casillas's "history and
characteristics"; (3) "[t]o reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense"; (4) "[t]o afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct"; and (5) "[t]o protect the public from
[Casillas's] further crimes." Beyond checking those boxes, the
district court further explained the basis for the variance by
reciting, almost verbatim, the justifications it had given during
the sentencing hearing -- namely, Casillas's extensive and
extremely cruel conduct and Casillas's personal history and
characteristics. That more-detailed statement also repeated the
district court's mention of Application Note 2 to section 2E3.1
and its agreement with the sentencing judge in Hargrove.
Casillas timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Casillas raises three principal challenges on appeal.
He generally asserts (and not in this order) that the district
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court erred by (1) imposing three consecutive sentences for only
one actual offense and thus violating the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause; (2) failing to adequately explain the sentence;
and (3) imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. We
address each argument, starting with the constitutional questions.
A. Double Jeopardy
Casillas contends that the consecutive sentences
violated double jeopardy principles in two ways. First, he points
to the conspiracy count, arguing that because it encompassed the
same conduct underlying the two possession counts, the imposition
of consecutive sentences for each count resulted in double
punishment. Second, he asserts that consecutive sentences for the
two possession counts are multiplicitous, i.e., they impermissibly
punish him twice under the same statute and for the same conduct.
We see no merit in Casillas's double jeopardy
contentions. The Double Jeopardy Clause states that "[n]o person
shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. In the sentencing
context, this constitutional guarantee "bars a sentencing court
from imposing multiple punishments for the same offense." United
States v. Grant, 114 F.3d 323, 328 (1st Cir. 1997).
As mentioned above, Casillas first argues that
consecutive sentences on the conspiracy and possession counts
violated double jeopardy principles because the conspiracy count
- 13 -
encompassed the acts underlying the possession counts. Casillas
is wrong. The Supreme Court has explained that "a substantive
crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the 'same
offense' for double jeopardy purposes." United States v.
Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 327 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Félix,503 U.S. 378, 389
(1992)). That rationale applies even if the conspiracy "was based on the same underlying incidents, because the 'essence' of a conspiracy offense 'is in the agreement or confederation to commit a crime.'" Félix,503 U.S. at 389
-90 (quoting United States v. Bayer,331 U.S. 532, 542
(1947)).
That rule finds ready application here: even though
Casillas's October 2022 possession of two different dogs for
dogfighting purposes were overt acts included in the conspiracy
charge, the possession and the conspiracy "[we]re separate and
distinct offenses." Id.at 390 (quoting Pinkerton v. United States,328 U.S. 640, 643
(1946)). We thus discern no double
jeopardy violation for Casillas's consecutive punishment for the
conspiracy and possession offenses.
Casillas's second argument -- that the two dog
possession counts are multiplicitous -- fares no better. The dog
possession counts both charged Casillas under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(b) and18 U.S.C. § 49
with contemporaneous possession of two different
dogs found at his property for use in an animal fighting venture.
Casillas argues that the two charges "impose multiple punishments
- 14 -
for what is essentially the same offense." See United States v.
Medina-Villegas, 700 F.3d 580, 585 (1st Cir. 2012).
"In general terms, when 'a claim of multiplicity is
premised on an indictment alleging several violations of a single
statutory provision, an inquiring court must determine whether
there is a sufficient factual basis to treat each count as
separate.'" United States v. Gordon, 875 F.3d 26, 32(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Stefanidakis,678 F.3d 96, 100-01
(1st Cir. 2012)). But where, as here, a defendant challenges the constitutionality of consecutive sentences imposed for charges to which he plead guilty, he "must show that the indictment was facially multiplicitous to prevail." Grant,114 F.3d at 329
. And if the allegedly duplicative charges arise from the same transaction, we must determine "whether Congress intended to punish separately each of the alleged violations." Gordon,875 F.3d at 32
; see also Jeffers v. United States,432 U.S. 137, 155
(1977) ("The critical inquiry is whether Congress intended to
punish each statutory violation separately.").
Our inquiry centers on "[w]hat Congress has made the
allowable unit of prosecution" under § 2156(b). Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 81(1955) (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,344 U.S. 218, 221
(1952)). In conducting
this task, we keep in mind that Congress "has no difficulty in
expressing" its "will . . . of defining what it desires to make
- 15 -
the unit of prosecution." United States v. Armenteros-Chervoni,
133 F.4th 8, 18(1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Bell,349 U.S. at 83
). Thus, "if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses."Id.
(quoting Bell,349 U.S. at 84
). This is "a question of statutory interpretation, [so] our review is de novo." United States v. Smith,919 F.3d 1, 15
(1st Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
"In ascertaining congressional intent, we employ 'the
traditional tools of statutory construction, including a
consideration of the language, structure, purpose, and history of
the statute.'" Gordon, 875 F.3d at 33(quoting McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.,475 F.3d 418, 423
(1st Cir. 2007)). We, of course, begin with the text, and where "Congress chose words that it did not define, we assume those words 'carry their plain and ordinary meaning.'"Id.
(quoting Stornawaye Fin. Corp. v. Hill,562 F.3d 29, 32
(1st Cir. 2009)).
Here, the statutory text is quite clear about the unit
of prosecution.7 Section 2156(b) provides that "[i]t shall be
7 Casillas relied on Courtland to argue that other similarly
situated defendants did not face higher sentences due to the
quantity of dogs in possession. However, the circumstances in
Courtland are inapposite to those in Casillas because the
defendants in Courtland did not plead to a possession count or
only pleaded to one possession count each, unlike Casillas who
agreed to plead to multiple possession counts. See United States
v. Courtland, 642 F. 3d 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
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unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy, possess, train,
transport, deliver, or receive any animal for purposes of having
the animal participate in an animal fighting venture." 7 U.S.C.
§ 2156(b). The provision's use of the definite article "the" in the clause "for purposes of having the animal participate in an animal fighting venture,"id.
(emphasis added), suggests
Congress's intent to designate as the unit of prosecution each
individual animal, rather than the actions of selling, buying,
training, transporting, delivering, or receiving any number of
animals.
To be sure, Congress's use of the singular is not
dispositive on the question before us. After all, the Dictionary
Act instructs courts interpreting statutes that "words importing
the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or
things," "unless the context indicate otherwise." 1 U.S.C. § 1; cf. 289 Kilvert, LLC v. SBC Tower Holdings LLC,133 F.4th 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2025) ("[W]e do not interpret a statute's text 'in a
vacuum'; we read the words 'in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme.'" (quoting Sturgeon
v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424, 438(2016))). Yet the context supports the government's reading. For instance, other sections of the each defendant pleaded guilty to a conspiracy count); see also United States v. Richardson,796 F. App'x 795
, 796-97 (4th Cir.
2019) (explaining the charges each defendant pleaded guilty to).
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same statute employ the singular. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (prohibiting "knowingly sponsor[ing] or exhibit[ing] an animal in an animal fighting venture" (emphases added)); see alsoid.
§ 2156(c) (prohibiting certain conduct "for purposes of advertising an animal . . . [or] furthering an animal fighting venture" (emphases added)). And Congress moreover made clear its intent in Section 2131, its "statement of policy." See Bittner v. United States,598 U.S. 85
, 98 n.6 (2023) ("A preamble, purpose
clause, or recital is a permissible indicator of meaning." (quoting
A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 217 (2012))). Section 2131 states in relevant part:
The Congress finds . . . that regulation of animals and
activities as provided in this chapter is
necessary . . . in order--
(1) to insure that animals intended for use in research
facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets
are provided humane care and treatment; and
(2) to assure the humane treatment of animals during
transportation in commerce. . . .
That proclamation evinces Congress's central aim: the humane care
and treatment of animals. As the government points out, each
animal experiences suffering individually, so prosecuting
separately each instance of possession of a dog for dogfighting
purposes hews closely to the statute's text, including its explicit
purpose.
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Casillas ignores these text-based indicators.8 In fact,
he scarcely mentions the statutory text. And although he quotes
part of section 2156(b), he omits the latter clause -- "for
purposes of having the animal participate in an animal fighting
venture." Instead, relying on our decision in United States v.
Rodriguez, 525 F.3d 85(1st Cir. 2008), and the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. United States,349 U.S. 81
(1955), Casillas
offers an alternative unit of prosecution under section 2156(b):
the action. In his view, section 2156(b) criminalizes the act of
selling, buying, training, transporting, delivering, or receiving
any number of animals.
As we have already explained, the government's
interpretation faithfully adheres to the text and express purpose
of the statute. Casillas's incomplete text-based argument does
not move the needle. Nor does his invocation of our decision in
Rodriguez or the Supreme Court's decision in Bell.
Take Rodriguez. 525 F.3d 85. There, we analyzed a defendant's two convictions under18 U.S.C. § 924
(c).Id. at 111
.
Both convictions arose from the possession of a gun in relation to
the same drug conspiracy; the only difference between the two
counts was that one possession occurred nine days before the other
Casillas adds some new arguments to his reply brief. But
8
it is well-settled in our circuit that we do not consider arguments
raised for the first time in a reply brief. SEC v. Navellier &
Assocs., Inc., 108 F.4th 19, 35 n.9 (1st Cir. 2024).
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conviction. Id.Reiterating our earlier decision in United States v. Pena-Lora,225 F.3d 17
, 32 (1st Cir. 2002), we vacated the consecutive sentences. Rodriguez,525 F.3d at 111-12
. Our decision was based on our determination that the section 924(c) convictions were "principally" meant as "sentencing-enhancement mechanism[s] for application to persons convicted of underlying crimes of violence." Pena-Lora, 225 F.3d at 32. Because those two convictions arose out of one predicate offense, and because the 924(c) convictions stacked consecutive punishment on top of the punishment received for the one predicate offense, we held that stacking those sentences "would impinge upon fundamental 'double jeopardy' principles." Rodriguez,525 F.3d at 111
(quoting
Pena-Lora, 225 F.3d at 32).
But that decision carries no weight here. Unlike the
defendant in Rodriguez, Casillas pleaded guilty to independent
possession offenses for each dog he possessed, effectively
"conced[ing] that he ha[d] committed . . . separate offenses."
Grant, 114 F.3d at 329(quoting United States v. Broce,488 U.S. 563, 570
(1989)). And, as we explained above, those are distinct
substantive offenses for which Casillas can be punished
independently.
Bell, too, does not alter our decision. 349 U.S. 81.
There, the petitioner pleaded guilty under the Mann Act for having
transported two women for the purposes of prostitution. The
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provision of the Mann Act at issue stated that "[w]hoever knowingly
transports in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any woman or
girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id. at 82(citing18 U.S.C. § 2421
). Because Bell "transported the two women on the same trip and in the same vehicle," he argued that "he committed only a single offense and could not be subjected to cumulative punishment under the two counts."Id.
Holding that the Mann Act was ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution, the Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity, resolving the ambiguity in the defendant's favor and "against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses."Id. at 84
. The Mann Act did not contain a
definite article explicitly stating units of prosecution whereas
the Animal Welfare Act does.
The rule of lenity applies only "where there is a
'grievous ambiguity' that cannot otherwise be resolved." United
States v. Millette, 121 F.4th 946, 952(1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Dion,37 F.4th 31, 39
(1st Cir. 2022)). Because no such ambiguity exists here, "the rule of lenity has no application." Dion,37 F.4th at 39
. Having assured ourselves
that Casillas's sentence does not frustrate double jeopardy
principles, we move to the reasonableness of his sentence.
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B. Reasonableness
Typically, when faced with challenges to the
reasonableness of a sentence, we bifurcate our review. United
States v. Rosario, 143 F.4th 41, 45(1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Ayala-Vazquez,751 F.3d 1, 29
(1st Cir. 2014)). First, we assess the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, and then, we test its substantive reasonableness. Ayala-Vazquez,751 F.3d at 29
.
1. Procedural Reasonableness
"A sentence is procedurally sound so long as the district
court did not commit a procedural error in arriving at the
sentence." United States v. Nelson, 793 F.3d 202, 205(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Trinidad-Acosta,773 F.3d 298, 308-09
(1st Cir. 2014)). Procedural errors may include:
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
[GSR], treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the section 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an
explanation for any deviation from the [GSR].
Id.(quoting Trinidad-Acosta,773 F.3d at 308-09
). "We review preserved procedural challenges for abuse of discretion, and in doing so, 'we review the District Court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.'" United States v. Burgos,133 F.4th 183, 189
(1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. García-Pérez,9 F.4th 48, 52
(1st Cir. 2021)). We, however,
- 22 -
review unpreserved arguments for plain error. United States v.
Colcord, 90 F.4th 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2024).
Although the parties spar over whether Casillas
preserved his challenge to the procedural reasonableness, we need
not decide the issue because Casillas's challenges do not pass
muster even with the benefit of our abuse-of-discretion review.
We thus employ the abuse-of-discretion standard and move to the
merits. And because all of Casillas's procedural-reasonableness
arguments relate to the district court's explanation, we begin by
outlining the district court's obligation to adequately explain
the sentence before reaching Casillas's specific contentions.
A district court must "state in open court the reasons
for its imposition of [a] particular sentence." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c). This requirement "serves multiple purposes: it not only gives the defendant (and the public) an understanding of why the defendant is receiving a particular sentence, but it also 'allow[s] for meaningful appellate review' and 'promote[s] the perception of fair sentencing.'" United States v. Perez-Delgado,99 F.4th 13, 21
(1st Cir. 2024) (alterations in original) (quoting Gall v. United States,552 U.S. 38, 50
(2007)).
We have long recognized that "explaining the reasons for
a particular sentence is more of an art than a science."
Perez-Delgado, 99 F.4th at 21; see also United States v. Colón-Cordero,91 F.4th 41, 50-51
(1st Cir. 2024) ("Just what kind
- 23 -
of explanation is needed depends on the context of each individual
case."). So, when we review a sentence on appeal, we do not demand
that the district court's explanations be "exhaustive" or "precise
to the point of pedantry"; we simply ask whether the district court
set forth "the primary factors underlying the sentence in a
plausible and coherent manner." Burgos, 133 F.4th at 193(quoting United States v. Rivera-Berríos,968 F.3d 130, 134
(1st Cir. 2020)). Moreover, the rationales supporting the sentence "need not always be explicit." Perez-Delgado,99 F.4th at 21
-22 (quoting United States v. Flores-Nater,62 F.4th 652, 656
(1st Cir. 2023)). Indeed, we may glean inferences from the sentencing record as long as "such inferences [are] anchored in 'what the judge did.'" United States v. Carrasquillo-Sánchez,9 F.4th 56, 62
(1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Jiménez-Beltre,440 F.3d 514
, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States,551 U.S. 338
(2007)).
When it comes to "brevity or length, conciseness or
detail, when to write, what to say," that all "depends upon
circumstances." Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. For instance, if the chosen sentence falls within the GSR, "a less elaborate explanation" typically suffices. Perez-Delgado,99 F.4th at 21
(quoting United States v. Murphy-Cordero,715 F.3d 398, 402
(1st Cir. 2013)). By contrast, "an outside-the-GSR sentence (whether above or below) requires more."Id.
"Just how much more depends
- 24 -
on the degree of the variance. The more the sentencing court
decides to vary, the more it needs to explain." Id.; see also
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50(stating that it is "uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one"); cf. Nelson,793 F.3d at 206
(explaining the difference between a "departure" and "variance").
In any case, a district court that imposes a GSR-variant
sentence must justify that variance by articulating why the
defendant's "'case differ[s] from the norm,' or, in other words,
'the mine-run of [similar] cases.'" United States v.
Serrano-Berríos, 38 F.4th 246, 250(1st Cir. 2022) (first quoting United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez,761 F.3d 171, 177
(1st Cir. 2014); and then quoting Rivera-Berríos,968 F.3d at 136
); see also United States v. Mojica-Ramos,103 F.4th 844, 851
(1st Cir. 2024)
("Where the offense involves 'idiosyncratic facts,' or 'especially
heinous' conduct, a court may impose an upward variance to account
for the fact that the guidelines' 'heartland' merely contemplates
a typical or 'mine-run' case." (citations omitted)).
With those principles in mind, we turn to the district
court's sentencing determination. Recall the rationale the
district court set forth at the sentencing hearing. It started
with Casillas's personal history and characteristics, before
moving to an extensive discussion of Casillas's conduct. It then
expressly invoked the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. Just
- 25 -
afterward, the district court mentioned section 2E3.1 and
highlighted verbatim section 2E3.1's upward departure provision,
Application Note 2. The district court said:
Pursuant to [section] 2E3.1, Application Note 2, the
base offense levels provided for animal fighting
ventures is subsection (a)(1) and (a)(3) and reflect
that an animal fighting venture involves one or more
violent fights between animals and that a defeated
animal is often severely injured in the fight, dies as
a result of the fight, or is killed afterwards.
Nonetheless, there may be cases in which the offense
level determined under this guideline substantially
understates the seriousness of the offense.
In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted.
For example, an upward departure may be warranted if the
offense involved extraordinary cruelty to an animal
beyond the violence inherent in such a venture. In this
case, the number of fights and the duration of Mr.
Casillas's involvement is extraordinary in nature.
Compare with U.S.S.G. § 2E3.1, app. n. 2.
The district court did not stop there, however. It next
considered Casillas's question posed in his sentencing memorandum:
"How much of a departure is sufficient but not greater than
necessary to comply with the statutory directive set forth in Title
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)?" And the district court answered that
question by citing Casillas's extreme conduct and noting that "the
guidelines d[id] not properly reflect the seriousness of the
offenses committed by Mr. Casillas." In particular, the district
court considered (1) "the number of fights and the duration of Mr.
Casillas's involvement"; (2) Casillas's "fam[e]" and "celebrity"
as "a legend in the dogfighting industry with over 35 years of
- 26 -
experience"; (3) his role in perpetuating dogfighting by, for
instance, "mentoring newcomers and participating and maintaining
fighting dog pedigree records"; and (4) the "deplorable
conditions" of the dogs seized from Casillas's home. At one point,
too, the district court expressed its disagreement with the
guidelines, "[j]ust as a sentencing judge expressed in [United
States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012)]." Finally, the
district court reiterated that the sentence "[wa]s just and not
greater than necessary after considering all of the sentencing
factors."
Casillas says that that explanation wasn't enough.
Although Casillas often minces concepts and arguments in his
briefing, we distill the following four arguments (not made in
this order): (1) the district court improperly departed from the
relevant guideline; (2) it impermissibly relied on facts already
accounted for in the relevant guideline; (3) it relied too heavily
on general deterrence; and (4) it failed to adequately explain why
it was deviating from the alleged guidelines regarding concurrent
and consecutive sentences. We reject each contention.
First, Casillas challenges the district court's apparent
upward departure. According to Casillas, the district court failed
to adequately explain "why she varied" because she "does not
explain why she declined to apply the vehicle provided for upward
- 27 -
departures . . . and jettison[ed] the Guidelines structure
entirely." Casillas is misguided.
As a threshold matter, there is a distinction between a
departure and a variance. See United States v. Fletcher, 56 F.4th
179, 187(1st Cir. 2022) (acknowledging that "[w]e have observed that 'a departure is just a variance by another name,'" but explaining that the "difference between [the two terms] 'is hardly semantic'" (first quoting United States v. Santini-Santiago,846 F.3d 487, 490
(1st Cir. 2017); and then quoting United States v. Miranda-Díaz,942 F.3d 33, 40
(1st Cir. 2019))). "A 'departure,' as explained by the Supreme Court, 'is a term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.'" Nelson,793 F.3d at 206
(quoting United States v. Aponte-Vellón,754 F.3d 89, 93
(1st Cir. 2014)). "Variant sentences, by contrast . . . result from a court's consideration of the statutory sentencing factors enumerated in [section] 3553(a)."Id.
(quoting Aponte-Vellón,754 F.3d at 93
). That distinction matters because "[t]he procedural requirements for variances are more lenient than those for departures."Id.
But we need not "inquire into the bona fides of the upward departure" when a district court makes clear that its sentence would also be fully supportable as an upward variance. United States v. Heindenstrom,946 F.3d 57, 62
(1st Cir. 2019).
- 28 -
Such is the case here. We need not address the validity
of the district court's alleged upward departure because, as we
explain herein, the district court made clear that the section
3553(a) factors fully supported an upwardly variant sentence.9 See
Nelson, 793 F.3d at 207 ("[T]o the extent that there was any
procedural error -- which we doubt -- it was harmless; the record
makes clear that 'the district court would have imposed the same
sentence as a variance in any event.'" (quoting Aponte-Vellón, 754
F.3d at 93)). So, viewing the district court's analysis as an
upward variance, we reject Casillas's departure-based argument and
consider the remainder of his arguments through that lens.
9 Casillas made no effort in his brief to distinguish between
a departure and a variance; indeed, he often used the terms
interchangeably. Without any properly briefed arguments from
Casillas, we see no issue in viewing the district court's analysis
as primarily driven by the section 3553(a) factors. We conclude
as much given the district court's invocation of the 3553(a)
factors during the sentencing hearing, and its statement of reasons
afterward, which indicated that it imposed only an upwardly variant
sentence under section 3553(a). See United States v. Mendes, 107
F.4th 22, 32(1st Cir. 2024) (holding that, "notwithstanding [a] district court's unfortunate use of the term 'depart,'" a "district court's intent to vary upward is evidenced by its explicit reference to section 3553(a)"); see also Nelson,793 F.3d at 206-07
(similar).
What is more, even if we construed the district court as
having employed only an upward departure, we discern no error in
its analysis. After all, Application Note 2 to section 2E3.1
provides for upward departures where the defendant's conduct
involves extreme cruelty or animal fighting on an exceptional
scale, and the district court pointed to those factors in
fashioning the sentence.
- 29 -
Second, Casillas insists that the district court
impermissibly relied mostly on facts common in the mine-run of
these offenses. Although his argument is scattered throughout
multiple, separately marked parts of his brief, we understand it
as follows: Casillas believes that the explanation for the upwardly
variant sentence was unreasonable because the district court
relied on facts inherent in, or "already fully accounted for by[,]
the applicable guidelines." Rivera-Berríos, 968 F.3d at 134.
We disagree. Casillas's argument depends on an unduly
narrow reading of the guidelines. As mentioned earlier,
Application Note 2 defines "extraordinary cruelty" as "killing
[the animal] in a way that prolongs the suffering of the" animal.
Casillas takes that example and suggests that extraordinary
cruelty must mean something like "crude executions by
electrocution, bludgeoning, [or] drowning." And so, he says, his
practice of letting his dogs die in fights instead of trying to
alleviate their suffering was not beyond the scope of conduct
inherent in the guideline.
We do not see how Application Note 2's example of
extraordinary cruelty limits the term's definition to only the
intentional killing or torturing of animals. We likewise see no
reason why the definition of extraordinary cruelty would exclude
Casillas's conduct here. As with all upwardly variant sentences,
we ask whether the government proved, and the district court
- 30 -
adequately explained, how the defendant's case differs from "the
mine-run of similar cases." Serrano-Berríos, 38 F.4th at 250
(citation modified). And that happened here.
Recall that Casillas admitted in text messages that he
did not "pick up" losing dogs, meaning he let them die instead of
removing them from the fights. Beyond those texts, the government
presented to the district court a video showing the result of
Casillas's practice: as the district court noted, the video
demonstrated Casillas's losing dog's prolonged suffering, its
"breathing in agony," and its bleeding out with Casillas making no
attempt to alleviate the dog's suffering. The government's
expert -- with nearly a decade and over 60 dogfighting cases of
experience -- called this practice "not very common at all."
Given that evidence and testimony, and in the absence of
countervailing evidence or testimony, the district court
permissibly found that Casillas's conduct was extraordinarily
cruel. Casillas has not shown us a reason to disturb the district
court's conclusion.
Casillas's challenge falters for yet another reason: in
focusing on how cruelty is inherent in the guidelines, Casillas
made little effort to contest the district court's other findings
that justified the upward variance, namely, his involvement in
dogfighting on an exceptional scale. In fashioning the upwardly
variant sentence, the district court relied on Casillas's
- 31 -
participation in 150 dogfights over 35 years, his role in
perpetuating dogfighting, and his advertising dogfighting events
of unprecedented size. Casillas does not meaningfully contend
with those distinguishing factors. Instead, he constructs a straw
man, arguing only that he was winding down his operations and that
his having four dogs on his property indicates that his offenses
did not involve an unusually large number of animals. We are
unmoved. That Casillas was winding down does not change the fact
that his involvement was extensive and spanned 35 years. Moreover,
his contention that because he had only four dogs meant he was not
engaging in dogfighting on an exceptional scale is belied by his
own statement that he kept up to 40 dogs at a time.
In sum, the district court explained how the
extraordinary cruelty and exceptional scale of Casillas's
operation took this case outside the mine-run of similar offenses,
and Casillas has not convinced us to disturb that decision.
Third, Casillas argues that "general deterrence was the
driving force" and a "defining factor[]" of the district court's
justification for imposing an upwardly variant sentence. Working
from that premise, Casillas blames the government for its lack of
enforcement of animal welfare laws, saying that it is not now
reasonable for the government to weaponize its own
"inaction . . . as a basis for extraordinary punishment" against
Casillas. Casillas misses the mark.
- 32 -
"Generally, the weight attributed to each sentencing
factor is largely within the district court's informed
discretion." Burgos, 133 F.4th at 193. "[T]he relative weight of each factor will vary with the idiosyncratic circumstances of each case." United States v. Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad,930 F.3d 1, 9
(1st Cir. 2019). We have cautioned that "[i]t is possible for a sentencing judge to focus too much on the community and too little on the individual and, thus, impose a sentence that cannot withstand the test of procedural reasonableness." United States v. Flores-Machicote,706 F.3d 16, 24
(1st Cir. 2013). But we have held that "procedural error generally does not lie when a district court grounds an upwardly variant sentence in a well-reasoned mix of case-specific and community-based characteristics, distinguishing the defendant's particular circumstances from the ordinary offense covered by the guidelines." Burgos,133 F.4th at 193
.
Here, the district court did just that. As we noted
above, the district court invoked various case-specific facts that
made clear that Casillas's offenses were out of the ordinary. And
"[o]ur review of the record does not reveal any 'compelling
indication that the court gave undue weight to'" general
deterrence. Id.at 194 (quoting United States v. Aponte-Colón,104 F.4th 402, 419
(1st Cir. 2024)). Nor has Casillas "attempt[ed]
to explain, in light of the district court's multifaceted
- 33 -
rationale, how we should discern the precise weight the district
court accorded to" general deterrence. Id.Given that "a variant sentence may be 'based on a complex of factors whose interplay and precise weight cannot . . . be precisely described,'" we doubt we could accurately parse out the precise weight the district court ascribed to general deterrence such that we could find it to be the driving force behind the upward variance. United States v. Matos-de-Jesús,856 F.3d 174, 179
(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Martin,520 F.3d 87, 92
(1st Cir. 2008)). Indeed, as
far as we can tell from the record, general deterrence seemed to
play little part in the sentencing court's overall decision: in
passing sentence, the district court made only superficial
references to deterrence interests, mentioning deterrence only
alongside the other section 3553 sentencing factors.
Fourth and finally, Casillas argues that the district
court sidestepped its obligation to explain why it was deviating
from the guidelines and imposing a consecutive sentence.10 His
10 Throughout his brief, Casillas spills much ink claiming
that the district court failed to follow "grouping principles."
As we see it, Casillas's "grievance" seems to be "with the court's
decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences,
apparently on the theory that grouping precludes consecutive
sentences." United States v. García-Torres, 341 F.3d 61, 74(1st Cir. 2003). But, for one, "the district court did not fail to 'group'" the counts.Id. at 73-74
. And, for another, we made clear in García-Torres that grouping counts is distinct from -- and "does not preclude" -- "the imposition of consecutive sentences on each of them."Id. at 75
. So this argument fails.
- 34 -
assertion relies on the language of guidelines section 5G1.2(d),
which states:
(d) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the
highest statutory maximum is less than the total
punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of
the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to
the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence
equal to the total punishment. In all other respects,
sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except
to the extent otherwise required by law.
Casillas ostensibly suggests that "total punishment" means the GSR
calculated in the PSR, which the district court deemed was
accurately calculated. And so, Casillas's argument goes, the
district court erred by failing to explain why it opted to impose
consecutive sentences when the total punishment was allegedly 12
to 18 months.
Casillas's contention disregards our precedent. Even if
the district court had an obligation to explain any departure from
section 5G1.2(d), the district court did not deviate from the
guideline. While it is true that "'[t]he total punishment' under
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 is normally determined by the guideline range,"
(here, 12 to 18 months), that is only part of the picture. See
United States v. Hernandez Coplin, 24 F.3d 312, 320 n.9 (1st Cir.
1994). Indeed, we have made pellucid that "where the sentencing
court lawfully departs from the [GSR], 'the total punishment' is
the punishment specified as a result of that departure; and
sentences then run consecutively 'to the extent necessary to
- 35 -
provide a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.'" Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d)). Simply put, the
"total punishment" here was the level at which the district court
set it after its upward variance from the guidelines, and so the
district court's decision to impose consecutive sentences to reach
that total punishment did not conflict with section 5G1.2(d).11
2. Substantive Reasonableness
Having disposed of Casillas's procedural-reasonableness
challenges, we turn to his claim that the sentence imposed was
substantively unreasonable. We review preserved challenges to the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Santiago-Lozada, 75 F.4th 285, 293(1st Cir. 2023). We keep in mind that "reasonableness is a protean concept": "[t]here is no one reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes." Burgos,133 F.4th at 195
(first quoting United States v. Merced-García,24 F.4th 76, 81
(1st Cir. 2022); and then quoting United States v. Polaco-Hance,103 F.4th 95, 104
(1st Cir. 2024)). "Our task is
simply to determine whether the sentence falls within this broad
11 In his reply brief, Casillas seemingly insists that the
district court had an obligation to precisely explain the offense
level to which it was upwardly varying. Yet, Casillas waived this
argument because he raised it for the first time in his reply
brief. See Navellier & Assocs., Inc., 108 F.4th at 35 n.9
("Arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs are generally
deemed waived." (quoting United States v. Evans-Garcia, 322 F.3d
110, 114 (1st Cir. 2003))).
- 36 -
universe, and we do so by looking for the hallmarks of a
substantively reasonable sentence: a plausible sentencing
rationale and a defensible result." Id.(citation modified). To prevail on his challenge, Casillas "must adduce fairly powerful mitigating reasons and persuade [us] that the district judge was unreasonable in balancing pros and cons." Rosario,143 F.4th at 49
(quoting Ayala-Vazquez,751 F.3d at 32-33
).
Besides Casillas's general deterrence argument, which we
construed as a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of the
sentence, Casillas's only remaining argument to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence is that similarly situated
defendants -- and defendants with worse offense
conduct -- received better sentences than him.12 We are not
convinced.
Section 3553(a)(6) directs courts to consider "the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). It "is primarily concerned with
12 We have treated disparity arguments as challenges to both
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
See, e.g., United States v. García-Sierra, 994 F.3d 17, 39-40(1st Cir. 2021); United States v. Reyes-Santiago,804 F.3d 453, 468
(1st Cir. 2015). Casillas couches the disparity argument in terms
of substantive reasonableness, insisting that the sentence itself
creates glaring disparities between him and similarly situated (or
more culpable) defendants. So we consider it under the substantive
reasonableness umbrella.
- 37 -
national . . . disparities." United States v. González-Rivera,
111 F.4th 150, 155(1st Cir. 2024). "To establish a well-founded claim of sentencing disparity, a defendant must 'compare apples to apples.'" United States v. Coplin-Benjamin,79 F.4th 36, 43
(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Reyes-Santiago,804 F.3d 453, 467
(1st Cir. 2015)). "Where 'material differences between the defendant and the proposed comparator suffice to explain the divergence,' a sentencing disparity claim is unlikely to prevail."Id.
(quoting United States v. Demers,842 F.3d 8, 15
(1st Cir. 2016)). The defendant bears the burden of "furnish[ing] the court with enough relevant information to permit a determination that he and his proposed comparators are similarly situated." González-Rivera,111 F.4th at 155
(quoting United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno,852 F.3d 168, 177
(1st Cir. 2017)).
On this record, we cannot conclude that the district
court erred. For one thing, Casillas spent much of his time at
the sentencing hearing highlighting some distinctions between his
conduct and that of the defendants in the cases cited by the
government in support of its position for an upward variance.
Casillas's principal assertion was that some of the similarly (or,
in some cases, more severely) punished defendants' crimes involved
drugs, guns, or more seized dogs. That exercise, though perhaps
helpful in convincing a district court to impose a lower sentence,
was far afield from furnishing the court with sufficient
- 38 -
information to determine whether the proposed comparators were
similarly situated and received comparatively lower sentences.
See Rodríguez-Adorno, 852 F.3d at 177 (noting defendant's
obligation to provide the court with relevant information and
holding that "the appellant utterly failed to lay any foundation
on which to build a claim of sentencing disparity").
In all events, Casillas's attempt to rehash more
thoroughly his disparity argument on appeal fails on the merits
too. Although some of the comparators Casillas points out were
similarly situated in one, or even several, aspects, "material
differences between [Casillas] and the proposed comparator[s]
suffice to explain the divergence." United States v. Romero, 906
F.3d 196, 211(1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Demers,842 F.3d at 15
) (second alteration in original). Plainly stated, Casillas did not present a single comparator who, standing alone, matched both the "extraordinary cruelty" and "exceptional scale" of his involvement in the dogfighting world. Remember, Casillas was a legend in the dogfighting world; engaged in dogfighting for 35 years; participated in 150 dogfights; raised and trained fighting dogs for sale on an unprecedented and international scale; hosted a dogfighting event of unprecedented size; mentored others to perpetuate dogfighting; and let his dogs die if they lost in a fight. See United States v. Bishoff,58 F.4th 18, 26
(1st Cir.
2023) (explaining that "[m]aterial differences" include
- 39 -
"dissimilar criminal involvement" between the defendant and the
comparator (quoting United States v. Candelario-Ramos, 45 F.4th
521, 526 (1st Cir. 2022))).
To be sure, Harry Hargrove's length of involvement and
his conduct comes close: Hargrove engaged in dogfighting for 40
years, was also considered a "legend" in dogfighting circles, had
up to 250 dogs at one time, had 36 dogs seized at the time of his
arrest, and had jumper cables, which he presumably used to
electrocute dogs. United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 158(4th Cir. 2012). Hargrove received only a 60-month sentence. On its face, that disparity -- 24 months below Casillas's sentence -- seems inextricably disparate. United States v. Hargrove, No. 7:10-cr-00135 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 2011), ECF No. 42 at 45-46. But again, a material distinction deprives the comparison of much value: Hargrove faced a conviction on only one count (Casillas faced three), and that one count carried a statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 60 months.Id.
In other words, the district court in that case could not have imposed a higher sentence. And the court in Hargrove's case did, in fact, note that "if [Hargrove] had been indicted for other charges, he would be facing significantly more time."Id.
We need not belabor the point. The other dogfighting
defendants that Casillas counts on as comparators were not
- 40 -
materially similar to him.13 See Rosario, 143 F.4th at 48(explaining that "a sentencing disparity claim is unlikely to prevail" "if 'material differences between the defendant and the proposed comparator[s] suffice to explain the divergence'" (quoting Demers,842 F.3d at 15
)). Nor do the sentences in those
cases suggest to us that Casillas's sentence here is substantively
unreasonable. Casillas raises no other challenges to the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence. And, in any event,
the district court provided a plausible sentencing rationale and
the ultimate sentence was defensible given Casillas's decades-long
involvement in this heinous conduct. We accordingly discern no
abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
For all those reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
13 Casillas briefly invokes Puerto Rico's statistical data,
claiming that it shows that all 38 criminal defendants with his
same total offense level and criminal history category received a
16-month sentence on average. But without more specific
information, that sterile data set tells us nothing about the
substantive reasonableness of Casillas's sentence. See
Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d at 24 ("Statistical evidence that fails
to satisfy minimum standards of reliability proves nothing.").
- 41 -
Reference
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