United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit


No. 24-1759

  TRIUMPH FOODS, LLC, CHRISTENSEN FARMS MIDWEST, LLC, THE HANOR
 COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, LLC, NEW FASHION PORK, LLP, EICHELBERGER
 FARMS, INC. and ALLIED PRODUCERS' COOPERATIVE, individually and
                    on behalf of its members,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                v.

    ANDREA JOY CAMPBELL, in her official capacity as Attorney
  General of Massachusetts, and ASHLEY RANDLE, in her official
   capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of
                     Agricultural Resources,

                      Defendants, Appellees.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

          [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]


                              Before

                  Gelpí, Thompson, and Rikelman,
                         Circuit Judges.


     Michael T. Raupp, with whom Ryann A. Glenn, Cynthia L. Cordes,
Spencer Tolson, and Husch Blackwell LLP were on brief, for
appellants.

     Maryanne Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Massachusetts
Office of the Attorney General, with whom Vanessa A. Arslanian,
Assistant Attorney General, and Grace Gohlke, Assistant Attorney
General, were on brief, for appellees.
October 3, 2025
          GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.    In 2016, Massachusetts passed the

Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals (the "Massachusetts Act").

As relevant here, the Massachusetts Act prohibits the use of

certain methods of confinement ("gestation crates") on pig farms

in Massachusetts.1    Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. § 1-2.    It

also prohibits the sale, in Massachusetts, of pork products derived

from pigs who were confined in gestation crates.      See id. § 1-3.

Plaintiffs   are     out-of-Massachusetts   pig   farmers   and    the

slaughterhouse those farmers co-own (collectively, "Plaintiffs").

They sued to challenge the Massachusetts Act, chiefly arguing that

it violated the dormant Commerce Clause and that it was preempted

by federal law.      The district court disagreed, first dismissing

most of the claims and later entering summary judgment against

Plaintiffs on the remaining dormant Commerce Clause claim.          We

affirm the district court's rulings.

                            I. Background

          A. The Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals

          The Massachusetts Act became enforceable on August 24,

2023, after a series of legal challenges.2    Its stated purpose is


     1 Gestation crates are "stalls so small [breeding pigs] cannot
lie down, stand up, or turn around" in them. Nat'l Pork Producers
Council v. Ross, 

, 363 (2023).
     2  Though enacted in 2016, the Massachusetts Act became
effective following the Supreme Court's decision in National Pork,
a decision we will invoke later. We note that the parties and the
district court refer to that decision as "Ross," we adopt "National



                                - 3 -
to "prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm

animal confinement, which also threaten the health and safety of

Massachusetts consumers, increase the risk of foodborne illness,

and   have    negative   fiscal    impacts      on   the    Commonwealth        of

Massachusetts."      Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. § 1-1.                 To

that end, the Massachusetts Act prohibits pig farmers within

Massachusetts from knowingly causing a breeding pig "to be confined

in a cruel manner," defined in relevant part as "in a manner that

prevents the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending

the animal's limbs or turning around freely."3             Id. §§ 1-2, 1-5.

             The   Massachusetts   Act   also   makes      it   illegal   for    a

"business owner or operator to knowingly engage in the sale within

[Massachusetts] of any: . . . Whole pork meat that the business

owner or operator knows or should know is the meat of a covered

animal that was confined in a cruel manner, or is the meat of the

immediate offspring of a covered animal that was confined in a

cruel manner."      Id. § 1-3.     A sale is defined as "a commercial

sale by a business that sells any item covered by section 3" and




Pork" to conform with recent circuit opinions. See Ass'n to Pres.
& Protect Loc. Livelihoods v. Sidman, No. 24-1317, 

,
at *15 (1st Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
      3The Massachusetts Act also covers other animals and animal
products, such as eggs and "veal meat." 

 § 1-3. We focus here
only on those provisions relevant to the Plaintiffs' claims.


                                   - 4 -
"shall be deemed to occur at the location where the buyer takes

physical possession of" the relevant item.             Id. § 1-5.

            B. Procedural Background

            Plaintiffs are a combination of pig farmers and one pork

processor (Triumph).      Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell, 

, 148 (D. Mass. 2024).             Triumph-produced pork is sold

throughout the country, including in Massachusetts.                 Plaintiffs

are all located outside of Massachusetts, "in Minnesota, Iowa,

Nebraska,    Illinois,    South    Dakota,     Wisconsin,    Oklahoma,   North

Carolina, Missouri, Wyoming, and Indiana."             

   The pork products

they sell are produced from pigs housed in gestation crates.                On

July 25, 2023, Plaintiffs sued to preliminarily and permanently

enjoin the Massachusetts Act.           They filed an amended complaint

(hereinafter, "complaint") on July 31, 2023.

            Their     complaint     asserted     ten    causes    of   action:

(1) dormant Commerce Clause violations by directly discriminating

and by unduly burdening interstate commerce; (2) Privileges and

Immunities Clause violations; (3) express preemption under the

Federal Meat Inspection Act (the "FMIA"); (4) conflict preemption

under the FMIA; (5) preemption under the Packers and Stockyards

Act (the "PSA"); (6) Full Faith and Credit Clause violations;

(7) Due     Process   Clause      violations;    (8) Import-Export       Clause

violations; (9) declaratory relief on unconstitutionality; and

(10) judicial review of the Massachusetts Act's regulations.                In


                                     - 5 -
support of these claims, Plaintiffs pleaded that the Massachusetts

Act    "discriminates   against    out-of-state        farmers    and   pork

processors in purpose and effect," "[g]iven that no Massachusetts

pig farmers confine breeding sows in a manner that is prohibited

by the [Massachusetts] Act."

           The district court consolidated Plaintiffs' request for

a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(1).            See Triumph Foods, LLC

v. Campbell, 

, 66 (D. Mass. 2024).                       The

Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General ("Massachusetts" or

"the   Commonwealth")   then   moved   to    dismiss     the   complaint   on

September 28, 2023.     It argued that the Massachusetts Act did not

discriminate facially, in purpose or effect, and that the Supreme

Court's decision in Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. Ross foreclosed

Plaintiffs' argument under the unlawful burden test set forth in

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 

 (1970).               The district

court granted Massachusetts' motion to dismiss as to all claims,

except for the dormant Commerce Clause claim (Count I).

           Plaintiffs   then   filed   a    motion    for   partial   summary

judgment on that remaining count, which solely focused on the

direct discrimination claim.       Massachusetts opposed that motion

and requested that the district court enter summary judgment sua

sponte.   As to Plaintiffs' claim under Count I, the district court

severed a provision of the Massachusetts Act, "the slaughterhouse


                                  - 6 -
exemption,"    which   the    district       court    determined     violated   the

dormant Commerce Clause.4        It later entered summary judgment sua

sponte against all Plaintiffs (aside from Triumph Foods).

           Plaintiffs assert a slew of challenges on appeal, namely

that the district court erred in: (1) dismissing most of their

claims without a written order; (2) entering summary judgment sua

sponte on their Pike dormant Commerce Clause claim when there were

disputed material facts concerning the Massachusetts Act's burden

on   interstate   commerce     and     without    notice     under    FRCP   56(f);

(3) entering      summary       judgment         sua        sponte     on    their

direct-discrimination dormant Commerce Clause claim by holding

that the Act did not discriminate against Plaintiffs and without

notice under FRCP 56(f); and (4) holding that the Massachusetts

Act is not preempted by the FMIA and the PSA.

                          II. Standard of Review

           This   court      reviews    de     novo    an   order    dismissing   a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).           See Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey


      4The district court concluded that one portion of the statute
did discriminate against out-of-state farmers, so it severed that
portion.   The "slaughterhouse exception" provided an "exemption
from [the Massachusetts Act's] requirements for pork products when
those products are sold on the premises of an FMIA-inspected
facility."    Triumph Foods, LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 149.       The
district court held: "The only way Triumph would be able to take
advantage of the slaughterhouse exception would be to open its own
federally   inspected   facility   within   the   Commonwealth   of
Massachusetts, which the Supreme Court has held violates the
Commerce Clause." Id. at 153. Neither party argues that severance
was inappropriate, so it is not at issue before us.


                                       - 7 -
Health, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing Rivera v.

Kress Stores of P.R., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2022)).            We

review sua sponte grants of summary judgment under the same de

novo standard.     See McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, 

(1st Cir. 2023).       We affirm where "the record, viewed in the light

most favorable to the [appellants], discloses 'no genuine dispute

as to any material fact'" and shows that Massachusetts is "entitled

to judgment as a matter of law."         See 

                           III. Procedural Errors

          Plaintiffs       assert that the district court committed

procedural error in both its order of dismissal and its grant of

summary judgment.        We address each argument in turn.

          A. Motion to Dismiss

          Plaintiffs emphasize that most of their claims were

dismissed "without a written order" and "without any reasoning on

the record."     While recognizing there is no "technical requirement

for a court to 'state findings or conclusions when ruling on a

motion under Rule 12,'" they contend that the court "err[ed] both

on   substance     and     procedure."        Massachusetts   counters    by

referencing      the     district   court's    "consider[ation   of]     the

complaint, pars[ing of] the language of the relevant statutes,

and . . . due consideration [of] the parties' arguments."

          As Plaintiffs concede, there is no requirement that

district courts state their findings or conclusions when ruling on


                                    - 8 -
a motion under Rule 12.          Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3).            Rule 52(a)

"explicitly states that district courts are 'not required to state

findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or

56.'"      Barry   v.   Moran,    

,    702    n.9    (1st   Cir.

2011)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3)).             Accordingly, "[w]e may

quickly dispose of this argument."             

     We find no procedural

error on this issue.

           B. Summary Judgment

           Plaintiffs also argue that the district court committed

procedural error in granting summary judgment on their Pike claim

and on the farmers' direct discrimination claim.                 To understand

this argument, it is important to note that Plaintiffs divide their

dormant    Commerce     Clause     claim    into     two      legal    theories:

(1) intentional discrimination against interstate commerce and

(2) a substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike

test.     Plaintiffs contend that they moved for partial summary

judgment only as to the first legal theory, and not as to the

second. Thus, Plaintiffs tell us, their motion for partial summary

judgment contained no evidence in support of their Pike claim.

However, in Massachusetts' opposition brief below, it requested

summary judgment sua sponte as to both legal theories.                        The

district court then entered judgment sua sponte against Plaintiffs

on both dormant Commerce Clause theories.               In doing so, it held




                                    - 9 -
that   Massachusetts'      opposition      motion     was     an   "outright"

opposition, such that both issues were properly before the court.

            Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), a district

court may grant a motion for summary judgment "on grounds not

raised by a party" after "giving notice and a reasonable time to

respond."    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).        In other words, "[a] district

court can enter summary judgment even though none of the parties

asks for it."     Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt., Corp., 

(1st Cir. 2007).      "A district court must meet two criteria before

entering    summary   judgment   sua     sponte:    (1) discovery    must   be

sufficiently    advanced    to   afford     the     parties    a   reasonable

opportunity to glean the material facts; and (2) the targeted party

must have been given notice and a chance to present its evidence

on the essential elements of the claim or defense."                 McCoy, 

 (citation modified).

            On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that Massachusetts did not

move for summary judgment and that the district court did not

provide the required notice of a sua sponte ruling.                Plaintiffs

assert that the district court "never received any evidence with

respect to [the Pike] theory." Massachusetts disagrees. According

to   the   Commonwealth,   the   court    (1) gave    pre-summary    judgment

notice that the Pike theory was in jeopardy and (2) made the same




                                  - 10 -
clear at the hearing.    Massachusetts also claims that the parties

had "fully briefed" the Pike issue and theory (twice).

           We first examine whether the first requirement for sua

sponte summary judgment -- that discovery must be sufficiently

advanced to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to glean

the   material   facts -- has   been   met.   "[W]hat   amounts   to   a

'reasonable opportunity' largely depends on the state of the

particular litigation and the nature of the issue decided by the

sua sponte summary judgment procedure."       Sanchez, 

.

We have previously held that summary judgment sua sponte is proper

once "'discovery had proceeded to the point where the parties

understood the material facts' at issue."         

 at 7 (quoting

Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Me., 

, 562 (1st

Cir. 1997)). We have "affirmed summary judgment entered sua sponte

[even] before any discovery had taken place, where the decision

was based on legal conclusions independent of any potentially

available evidence."    Id. (emphasis added) (citing Bank v. Int'l

Bus. Machs. Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 1998)).

           Here, we find that      discovery did occur.      When   the

district court issued the summary judgment, Plaintiffs' counsel

had noted that "extensive discovery [was] going back and forth on

issues related to" the Pike claim.        Moreover, as Massachusetts

points out, at the beginning of the case, Plaintiffs asserted that




                                - 11 -
"discovery was unnecessary."    In our view, Plaintiffs' concession

belies their own claims regarding lack of discovery.

           Further, the district court reached legal conclusions,

which informed its summary judgment decision on the Pike issue,

independent of available evidence.      The court stated that the

"legal issue had been fully briefed and the [c]ourt's resolution

obviated the need for evidence."    Triumph Foods, LLC, 715 F. Supp.

3d at 152.     Considering the briefing and record before it, the

district court determined that the Supreme Court's Nat'l Pork

decision foreclosed Plaintiffs' claim, as a legal matter.       Id. at

151.    We find no procedural error here, where the district court

based    its   summary   judgment   ruling   on   independent   legal

conclusions.

           We next review the second requirement for sua sponte

summary judgment: the targeted party must have been given notice

and a chance to present its evidence on the essential elements of

the claim or defense.     "In the context of a sua sponte summary

judgment, 'notice' means that the targeted party 'had reason to

believe the court might reach the issue and received a fair

opportunity to put its best foot forward.'"   Leyva v. On the Beach,

Inc., 

 (1st Cir.        1999) (citation omitted).

"Notice" does not require that the opposing party "receive a formal

document called 'notice' or that the district court had to say the

words 'you are on notice' or even that the court had to explicitly


                               - 12 -
tell [the opposing party], 'I am thinking of ordering summary

judgment for [the winning party] sua sponte.'"     Nat'l Expositions,

Inc. v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 1987).

Rather, the question is simply whether, "given the procedural

circumstances of the case, the original movant [i.e., Plaintiffs]

has had an adequate opportunity to show that there is a genuine

issue and that his opponent is not entitled to judgment as a matter

of law."   

 at 133–34 (quoting 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M.

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 34 (1983)).

           Indeed, the district court provided adequate notice that

it might reach the Pike claim.        First, in an October 25, 2023

order -- in response to requests from both parties for "sweeping

discovery" -- the district court said it "must say frankly that

the more it examines the jurisprudence of the 'dormant [C]ommerce

[C]lause,'" the less it understood why certain aspects of discovery

were necessary.     There, the district court also cited National

Pork, noting that Plaintiffs "frequently" relied on the National

Pork Court's dissent.        Further, during the November 14, 2023

hearing,   the    district   court   recognized   that   Massachusetts

requested "summary judgment taken against" the Plaintiffs, which

put Plaintiffs "on notice that summary judgment may be taken

against them."    Perhaps most importantly, in Plaintiffs' reply in

support of their motion for partial summary judgment (in response

to   Massachusetts'    opposition     motion),    Plaintiffs   clearly


                                - 13 -
recognized      that    Massachusetts        requested        summary   judgment    sua

sponte    on    the    Pike    claim.        There,     Plaintiffs      affirmatively

responded      to    Massachusetts'        request    for     summary   judgment    sua

sponte, indicating Plaintiffs were aware that summary judgment on

the   Pike     claim    was    a    possibility.       Thus,     Plaintiffs   had    an

"adequate opportunity," in their response in support of their

motion for partial summary judgment, to show that there was a

genuine issue of material fact.               See Crowley Mar. Corp., 

.

               In their brief, Plaintiffs rely on Leyva v. On the Beach,

Inc. to suggest that, as in the facts in that case, they did not

"receive[] a fair opportunity to put [their] best foot forward."

.         The facts here are clearly distinguishable from

those in Leyva, where the district court, "[p]rior to making [a]

spontaneous ruling[,] . . . never informed the plaintiffs that it

was considering [rendering] a judgment" on certain claims.                          

Instead, "the court's margin order . . . stated in no uncertain

terms that its decision would conform to the limited scope of the

motion."       

     The court in Leyva thus found that the district

court "did not afford the plaintiffs adequate notice and a suitable

opportunity to be heard before it exceeded the scope of the motion

that was pending before it."                

.        It is clear from the

facts presented to us that, as opposed to the court's actions in

Leyva,    the       district       court   made     various    pronouncements      that


                                           - 14 -
suggested the possibility that summary judgment might be taken

against the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' reliance on Leyva is therefore

incorrect.

              Equally unconvincing is Plaintiffs' argument that the

district court committed procedural error in granting summary

judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on the farmers' direct

discrimination claim.          Plaintiffs acknowledged that the direct

discrimination claim was fully briefed.            Plaintiffs also asserted

in    their    motion    for    partial     summary     judgment      that    the

discrimination claim "[could] be decided by [the] Court without

any fact finding," as it was "based on the statute itself" as well

as    on   "publicly    available    uncontroverted        material."        Given

Plaintiffs'     representations,      the   sua   sponte    grant    of   summary

judgment on the direct discrimination claim was proper.                   See Bank

v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 1998).

              For these reasons, we conclude that the district court

did not procedurally err in entering summary judgment sua sponte.

                          IV. Substantive Errors

              Finding no procedural error, we next analyze the claims

on the merits.      We affirm both the district court's dismissal of

Counts II-X and its entry of summary judgment on Count I.

              A. Privileges and Immunities Clause

              Plaintiffs argue that the Massachusetts Act "directly

and   intentionally     targets     and   seeks   to   regulate     out-of-state


                                     - 15 -
activity that is permissible in the states in which it occurs" and

represents   an   attempt    to    "effectively      regulate     pig   farming,

manufacturing, and production in other states."                 They posit that

the   Massachusetts    Act     therefore     offends    the     Privileges    and

Immunities Clause of the Constitution because that Clause protects

the "right to practice a trade or profession."            In support of these

assertions, Plaintiffs argue that because "Massachusetts pig farms

did not use gestation crates for housing breeding sows," the

"burden of compliance with the [Massachusetts] Act's Minimum Size

Requirements falls almost entirely on out-of-state pig farmers and

pork processors to the benefit of in-state farmers and pork

processors."

           The    Privileges      and   Immunities     Clause    provides    that

"Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and

Immunities of Citizens in the several States."                U.S. Const. art.

IV, § 2, cl. 1; Nat'l Pork, 598 U.S. at 370.               "[T]he Privileges

and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to corporations[.]"                W. & S.

Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of California, 

, (1981); see also Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass'n

v. Thomas, 

 (2019).                 Because Plaintiffs are

corporations, their argument fails.5


      5Plaintiffs describe themselves, in their complaint, as a
"farmer-owned company" and a series of member-owners, who are LLCs,
an LLP, a corporation, and a cooperative. In their briefing on



                                    - 16 -
            B. Dormant Commerce Clause Claim

            Plaintiffs articulate two theories under the dormant

Commerce Clause: (1) intentional discrimination against interstate

commerce and (2) a substantial burden on interstate commerce under

the Pike test.         We address each argument in turn.

            i. Intentional Discrimination

            The Constitution's Commerce Clause gives Congress the

power      to         "regulate    Commerce . . . among        the     several

States . . . ."         U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   It also "embodies

a negative aspect" which "prevents state and local governments

from impeding the free flow of goods from one state to another."

All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 

 (1st Cir. 2005)

(quoting Houlton Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 

 (1st Cir. 1999)). This so-called dormant Commerce Clause "bars

states          and       localities       from     pursuing         'economic

protectionism -- that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit

in-state        economic      interests     by    burdening     out-of-state

competitors.'"          Becky's Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket, 

 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v.

Limbach, 

 (1988)).               "To ascertain whether a

regulatory measure is so designed, we look for evidence of 'either

discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect,' recognizing 'the


appeal, they also describe themselves as "several limited
liability companies, a limited partnership and cooperative."


                                       - 17 -
primacy of [the latter] in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis of

facially neutral legislation.'"6                     

 (alteration in original)

(quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. R.I. Tpk. & Bridge Auth., 

, 36–37 (1st Cir. 2024)).                    "[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned

that the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry should be undertaken by

'eschew[ing] formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of

purposes and effects.'"              Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 

, 55

(1st       Cir.    2005)      (alteration      in   original)    (quoting   West   Lynn

Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 

 (1994)).

                  This     court    has        "discussed   the     methodology    for

determining legislative purpose when a state statute is allegedly

motivated          by    an    intent     to    discriminate      against   interstate

commerce."          Fam. Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 

(1st Cir. 2010) (citing All. of Auto. Mfrs., 

).                      This

methodology requires us to "look to 'the statute as a whole,'

including statutory text, context, and legislative history" and to

"consider whether the statute was 'closely tailored to achieve the

legislative purpose' the state asserted."                       

 (quoting All. of

Auto. Mfrs., 

).

                  In determining whether a state law is discriminatory in

effect, we must analyze whether "in practice, it affects similarly

situated entities in a market by imposing disproportionate burdens


       Plaintiffs here have not claimed that the Massachusetts Act
       6

discriminates on its face.


                                            - 18 -
on out-of-state interests and conferring advantages upon in-state

interests."     

 at 10 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of

Envtl. Quality, 

 (1994)).           Cf. Ass'n to Pres. and

Protect Loc. Livelihoods v. Sidman, 

, 59-60 (1st Cir.

2025) ("[A] plaintiff must first show that the measure does

discriminate.      To do so, a plaintiff must do more than show that

the measure burdens out-of-state entities more than local ones."

(internal citations omitted)).           When challenging a statute as

discriminatory in effect, plaintiffs "must present evidence as to

why the law discriminates in practice."           Jenkins, 

(citing Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 

(1st Cir. 2007)).      When "a statute is evenhanded on its face and

wholesome in its purpose," such showing of discriminatory effect

must be "substantial."        Cherry Hill, 

.

           Before a district court, "[t]he proponent of a dormant

Commerce   Clause     claim    bears     the   burden    of   proof     as    to

discrimination."     All. of Auto. Mfrs., 

.             "To block

summary judgment, the party having the burden of proof on a

critical   issue    must   present     evidence   on   that   issue    that   is

'significantly probative,' not 'merely colorable.'"             

 (quoting

Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 

 (1st Cir. 1997))(finding

appellant's evidence "inadequate to make out a genuine issue of

material fact" as to discrimination).




                                     - 19 -
                 We hold that the district court did not err in finding

insufficient         evidence     of     discriminatory         effect      and    of

discriminatory         purpose.         To   show     discriminatory        purpose,

Plaintiffs identify supposed "legislative underpinnings" to argue

that the Massachusetts Act was intended to discriminate against

out-of-state        pork   producers.        The    "underpinnings"      Plaintiffs

identify -- a        comment    that    gestation     crates    are   not   used   in

Massachusetts, a comment that Massachusetts uses meat produced out

of state on farms that use "these cruel tactics," and a comment

that       the   Massachusetts    Act   would      protect   animals     outside   of

Massachusetts -- do not support the                 purported conclusion they

draw.        In reality, none of these comments make reference to

supporting        in-state   farmers    to   the    detriment    of    out-of-state

farmers.7        As Massachusetts tells us, the Act's nondiscriminatory

purpose is plain from its text:              "The purpose of this Act is to

prevent animal cruelty by phasing out extreme methods of farm



       Plaintiffs also cite a 2016 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
       7

Court (SJC) decision -- Dunn v. Attorney General, 

 (2016) -- for the proposition that "in-state farmers' economic
benefit is a central purpose of the [Massachusetts] Act." Contrary
to this contention, the SJC stated that the purpose was
"prevent[ion of] farm animals from being caged in overly cramped
conditions, consistent with the statement of purpose in section 1
of [the Massachusetts Act], 'to prevent animal cruelty by phasing
out extreme methods of farm animal confinement.'" 

 The SJC
also   recognized    that   the   Massachusetts   Act    "protects"
Massachusetts farmers, without holding that was a purpose of the
Massachusetts Act or that the protection ran afoul of the dormant
Commerce Clause. See 

                                        - 20 -
animal confinement[.]"         Further, because the Massachusetts Act was

enacted as a result of a ballot initiative passed by Massachusetts

voters, and not as a bill passed by the Massachusetts State

Legislature, statements made during legislative hearings do not

constitute an ideal "source of context."                 See Simmons v. Galvin,

 (1st Cir. 2009)("[S]ince [the challenged statute]

was put before the voters, the Information for Voters Guide is a

better     source     of     context"       than   "sporadic"       comments       from

legislators).              Plaintiffs,       therefore,       did    not     present

"significantly probative" evidence to create a genuine issue of

material    fact     concerning       the    discriminatory     purpose      of     the

Massachusetts Act.           See All. of Auto. Mfrs., 

(quoting Cadle Co., 

).

            On discriminatory effect, Plaintiffs contend that the

Massachusetts Act regulates conduct occurring only at out-of-state

farms, which provides a "distinct advantage to in-state farmers."

They,    again,      reference        the     legislative      history       of     the

Massachusetts Act, stating that "legislative committee hearing

members had direct knowledge of" the alleged discrimination. Their

sole factual allegation in support of this claim is that no

Massachusetts       farmers    used    gestation     crates    at   the     time    the

Massachusetts Act passed.            Massachusetts counters that Plaintiffs

failed     to   demonstrate      that       the    Massachusetts      Act    imposes

differential      treatment     on    in-state     and    out-of-state      economic


                                        - 21 -
interests.    Massachusetts also tells us that the Supreme Court's

opinion in National Pork is instructive in evaluating Plaintiffs'

discrimination claim here, even though that case involved only a

Pike claim.

          Plaintiffs contend that National Pork is distinguishable

from the present case because there was no discrimination claim in

that case.    It is true that National Pork did not deal directly

with a discrimination claim. The National Pork plaintiffs conceded

that the California law imposed "the same burdens on in-state pork

producers that it impose[d] on out-of-state ones."     598 U.S. at

370; see also Ass'n to Pres. & Protect Loc. Livelihoods, 147 F.4th

at 61 ("[T]he plaintiffs in National Pork explicitly disclaimed

any discrimination-based arguments . . . . ").8    The Court also

accepted this concession.   See Truesdell v. Friedlander, 

 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 

 (2024),

and cert. denied, 

 (2024) (citing Nat'l Pork, 598

U.S. at 367).




     8 The Court in National Pork referred to the Massachusetts
Act, stating that "Massachusetts prohibits the sale of pork
products from breeding pigs (or their offspring) if the breeding
pig has been confined 'in a manner that prevents [it] from lying
down, standing up, fully extending [its] limbs or turning around
freely.'" 598 U.S. at 365 (alterations in original) (quoting Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. §§ 1-3, 1–5 (Cum. Supp. 2023)). It
also noted that Florida, Arizona, Maine, Michigan, Oregon, and
Rhode Island all have similar laws that regulate animal confinement
practices. Id.


                               - 22 -
            The    National     Pork     Court    addressed   a     California   law

"banning the in state sale of certain pork products derived from

breeding pigs confined in stalls so small they cannot lie down,

stand up, or turn around."             Id. at 363.   Much like the case before

us, National Pork involved out of state pork producers filing suit,

alleging that the law was in violation of the dormant Commerce

Clause.     Id. at 364.       The Court "synthesized decades of dormant

Commerce Clause jurisprudence into a few key principles.                      Chief

among them is that economic 'antidiscrimination . . . lies at the

very      core     of    [the         Court's]     dormant     Commerce       Clause

jurisprudence.'"        New Jersey Staffing All. v. Fais, 

 (3d Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l Pork,

598 U.S. at 369).

            While the similar California law at issue in National

Pork ultimately did not offend the dormant Commerce Clause, see

598 U.S. at 390-91, we acknowledge that the petitioners' concession

in   that   case    limits      its    instructive    value    for     the   present

discrimination claim.        The Court in National Pork, however, relied

on an older case that defeats Plaintiffs' claim.                    See Exxon Corp.

v. Governor of Maryland, 

 (1978) (addressing

a Maryland law that prevented producers or refiners of petroleum

products from operating retail service stations in Maryland).

There, Exxon argued that the "effect of the [Maryland law was] to

protect      in-state      independent           dealers     from     out-of-state


                                        - 23 -
competition."     

.        The Court recognized that all of

Maryland's gasoline supply "flows in interstate commerce" and

there were "no local producers," and, as such, "claims of disparate

treatment     between   interstate    and   local    commerce      would   be

meritless."      

    "The Court rejected the refiners' dormant

Commerce Clause challenge because the statute did not affect the

right of only out-of-state entities to compete in the Maryland

market; rather, all independent dealers (in and out-of-state) were

permitted to compete and all refiners were excluded."                Walgreen

Co., 405 F.3d at 59 (citing Exxon, 437 U.S.at 127).

            So   too,   here.   "[A]    neutral     law    that   'regulates

even-handedly' by treating interstate and intrastate commerce the

same does not discriminate against interstate commerce simply

because it affects more out-of-state businesses than in-state

ones."   Truesdell, 

 (citations omitted); see also

Pike, 

; Exxon, 

.                    Plaintiffs'

arguments on this point are no different than those the Court

squarely rejected in Exxon over 40 years ago.             The mere fact that

a statute's requirements fall solely on interstate companies does

not lead "to a conclusion that the State is discriminating against

interstate commerce."      Exxon, 

.          Plaintiffs have

not demonstrated that the Massachusetts Act affirmatively grants

in-state pork producers a "competitive advantage over out of state

dealers."     See 

.   Thus, Plaintiffs have not "satisfied


                                - 24 -
their initial burden of showing that [the Massachusetts Act] is

discriminatory in effect."            See Cherry Hill, 

.

            Still, Plaintiffs urge us that this case is factually

similar    to   Jenkins.           There,        we     held     unconstitutional          a

Massachusetts         statute      ("Section 19F")               which      established

differential        methods      for      distribution             of     wine     within

Massachusetts.        Jenkins, 

.                  That statute provided

that "large" wineries, that is, those producing more than 30,000

gallons of grape wine annually, could only sell their wine either

through wholesalers or directly to consumers.                            

.        By

contrast, "small" wineries could simultaneously sell their wine

through wholesaler distribution, through retail distribution, and

by shipping directly to consumers.                

      Section 19F was "neutral

on   its   face,"     as   it   "[did]     not,       by   its     terms,   allow       only

Massachusetts       wineries     to     distribute         their    wines    through       a

combination"     of    the      methods    mentioned           above.       

.

"Section 19F instead use[d] a very particular gallonage cap to

confer [a] benefit upon 'small'" wineries, which included all

Massachusetts wineries, "as opposed to 'large' wineries," which

were all located outside of Massachusetts.                         

    We held that

Section 19F     violated the dormant Commerce Clause chiefly because

the gallonage cap (1) had the ultimate effect of "enabl[ing]

Massachusetts's       wineries     to     gain    market       share     against    their

out-of-state competitors," while simultaneously "burden[ing] all


                                        - 25 -
the    larger        out-of-state         competitors"        and    (2) "conferred          a

competitive advantage upon Massachusetts wineries by design."9 

.

                 Jenkins    is    distinguishable        from       the       instant    case.

There, we found that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs

demonstrated that Section 19F created a "competitive advantage" to

in-state          wineries,       and     a     "comparative        disadvantage"          for

out-of-state wineries.               See 

.           Massachusetts wineries

did,       in    fact,   take     advantage      of    the   benefits          conferred   by

Section 19F,         with     most      Massachusetts'       wineries         obtaining    the

"small" wineries license and distributing "71 percent [of their

annual          production]      through      retail    outlets,"         a    benefit     not

conferred to "large" wineries.                   

.             We also found

that, by "[c]ombining [] distribution methods," Massachusetts

wineries could sell wines "at maximum efficiency because they

serve[d] complementary markets."                  

.    "'[S]mall' wineries'

distribution costs [were also lowered] because they [could] choose


       Plaintiffs cite Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert.
       9

Comm'n for the same proposition. See 

 (1977).
There, North Carolina adopted a regulation, "unique in the 50
States," which required all closed containers of apples sold in
the state to display either the "applicable USDA grade or none at
all."   

.   But that case, too, is inapposite, as the
statute at issue there "ha[d] the effect of stripping away from
[another state's] apple industry the competitive and economic
advantages it ha[d] earned for itself through its expensive
inspection and grading system." 

. Plaintiffs do not,
and cannot, point to any similar reputational "leveling effect"
here. See 

                                              - 26 -
which   method     or     combination       of     methods     [would]      be   most

cost-effective      for    a   particular        wine."       

     By    contrast,

out-of-state,      "large"      wineries     faced        "comparatively      greater

distribution costs because they [could not] always distribute a

given wine through the most cost-effective method."                        Id. at 12.

"Large" wineries' option to choose between wholesaler distribution

or direct shipping also implied a "significant loss of potential

profits, since using a single method result[ed] in a comparative

loss of consumer sales."         Id.; contrast id.          with Cherry Hill, 

 (finding that plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden

of showing that a Maine law that allowed wineries to conduct direct

sales   to    consumers        only   in    face-to-face        transactions      was

discriminatory in effect, as plaintiffs failed to present evidence

that the law protected Maine vineyards or harmed out-of-state

wineries).

             No   "substantial"       evidence     of     discriminatory      effect,

either of advantage to in-state producers or disadvantage to

out-out-state producers, is present here.                   See Cherry Hill, 

.       Plaintiffs contend that Massachusetts farmers will

obtain competitive advantage from the Massachusetts Act, as they

will    "gain[]     a     larger      market       share      [in    Massachusetts]

uninterrupted by any cost, delay, or burden associated with the

Act."        Plaintiffs'       contention      that     the    Act   substantially

disadvantages out of state farmers, however, is not supported by


                                      - 27 -
specific citations to record material.                 The summary judgment

record, in fact, squarely refutes this allegation: Massachusetts

pork    production     decreased   from   2021    to    2022,    the   year   the

Massachusetts Act went into effect.10

              In Cherry Hill, we highlighted the important distinction

between regulatory schemes that "explicitly discriminate against

out-of-state goods or products" and those that do not.                 

.       Because the Maine statute at issue "flatly outlaw[ed] any

and    all    direct   shipping    of   wine"    for   both     "in-state"    and

"out-of-state wineries," we rejected plaintiffs' dormant Commerce

Clause challenge.       

; 35-36.11      Like Maine, Massachusetts

has flatly outlawed a particular practice.             Both Massachusetts and

out-of-state producers must abide by the same regulations, and the

Massachusetts Act does not favor local groups over similarly


       We note that an amicus brief filed by another major pork
       10

producer presents data that is consistent with the record in this
case. See Br. for Perdue Premium Meat Company, Inc. D/B/A Niman
Ranch as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 11-14 (explaining
that Tysons Foods, one of the world's largest meat processing
companies, conceded that the materially identical California law
discussed in National Pork did not harm the company's operations
and Seaboard Foods, which maintains a herd of 7.2 million hogs,
reported increased sales after the California law took effect).
        "[Cherry Hill] only addressed the kind of showing required
       11

when a statute is challenged as discriminatory in effect but is
concededly non-discriminatory in purpose." Jenkins, 

 n.11 (citing Cherry Hill, 

). Here, we need not,
and do not, comment on "whether a lesser showing might suffice
when a law is allegedly discriminatory in both effect and purpose,"
as we have already concluded that the Massachusetts Act is not
discriminatory in purpose. See 

                                    - 28 -
situated out-of-Commonwealth farmers or producers.                  Cf. Walgreen

Co., 405 F.3d at 55-60 (invalidating, on dormant Commerce Clause

grounds, a Commonwealth of Puerto Rico statute requiring all

pharmacies seeking to open or relocate within Puerto Rico to obtain

a   "certificate       of    necessity   and   convenience,"    but    exempting

existing pharmacies          from such certificate requirement).12              In

short, the Massachusetts Act does not establish different "playing

fields"    for    in   and    out-of-state     interests.     See   id.   at   58.

Massachusetts "market share previously enjoyed by one group of

profit-seeking, out-of-state businesses (farmers who stringently

confine    pigs    and      processors   who   decline   to   segregate    their

products) [may] be replaced by another (those who raise and trace

[the Massachusetts Act]-compliant pork)."                See Nat'l Pork, 598

U.S. at 385.      The dormant Commerce Clause does not protect against

this reality.      See id. (citing Exxon, 

).

            We thus discern no error in the district court's decision

on this issue.




      12In fact, Massachusetts asserts that the Massachusetts Act
is, taken as a whole, more burdensome on Massachusetts farmers
than out-of-state farmers.     Massachusetts farmers can neither
confine pigs in gestation crates nor sell those pigs. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. §§ 1-2, 1-3. Out-of-state farmers can
still confine pigs in gestation crates, they just cannot sell those
specific, non-compliant pork products within Massachusetts.


                                     - 29 -
          ii. Pike

          The Supreme Court has recognized that, even where a state

law is not facially discriminatory, its "practical effects may

also disclose the presence of a discriminatory purpose."       Nat'l

Pork, 598 U.S. at 377.       The Court articulated the "practical

effects" test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., holding that "[w]here

the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate

local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are

only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on

such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative

local benefits."     See 

.   Such a statute "engenders

a lower level of scrutiny."     All. of Auto. Mfrs., 

(citing Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 

(1st Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v.

Walsh, 

, (2003)).

          Plaintiffs contend that the district court improperly

entered summary judgment on their Pike claim.        To succeed on a

Pike theory, Plaintiffs "must demonstrate that a challenged law

imposes a 'substantial' or 'significant' burden on interstate

commerce before Pike balancing can occur."       Flynt v. Bonta, 

 (9th Cir. 2025).      "Plaintiffs here face a heavy

burden: 'the Supreme Court has not invalidated a law under Pike in




                                - 30 -
more than 30 years.'"        

 at 931 (quoting Truesdell, 

) (citation modified).

          The district court relied on National Pork in ruling on

the Pike issue, noting:

          The Supreme Court ruled that "harm to some
          producers' favored methods of operation" did
          not rise to a "substantial harm to interstate
          commerce," and that "increased production
          expenses" cannot be compared by a court to
          "noneconomic" state benefits.    Further, the
          Court explained, "judges often are 'not
          institutionally suited to draw reliable
          conclusions of the kind that would be
          necessary . . . to satisfy [the] Pike' test as
          petitioners conceive it."

Triumph Foods, LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 151 (first quoting Nat'l

Pork, 598 U.S. at 385-87; then quoting id. at 380-81; and then

quoting id. at 380).

          Plaintiffs argue that the district court incorrectly

relied on a portion of the National Pork opinion that was joined

by "only three justices."            Because that portion was not the

majority's opinion, the argument goes, the district court erred in

"refus[ing]    to   engage    in    any   Pike   analysis."     In   response,

Massachusetts avers that "[a] majority of the [National Pork] Court

affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a                  Pike challenge to

California's    materially         identical     law.      Appellants'   Pike

challenge, based on indistinguishable allegations and evidence,

was therefore correctly rejected."             We agree.




                                     - 31 -
               The record makes clear that the district court engaged

with Plaintiffs' Pike claims both at oral argument and in its

February 5, 2024 Order.               Triumph Foods, LLC, 715 F. Supp. 3d at

151.        While the district court did not apply the Pike balancing

test, it did determine that the California state statute at issue

in National Pork was "nearly identical" to the Massachusetts Act

at issue here.            Id. (citing Nat'l Pork, 598 U.S. at 367).              Having

reached that conclusion, the district court was under no obligation

to apply the Pike test.13             Because we hold that the Massachusetts

Act    is      not       discriminatory,     the     National       Pork   holding    is

dispositive.

               In    National      Pork,   five     justices    concluded      that   the

petitioners' Pike claim failed, but they were unable to agree on

a single rationale for that holding.                 598 U.S. at 390-91.        Justice

Gorsuch,       in    a    plurality    opinion      joined     by   Justices    Thomas,

Sotomayor,       and      Kagan,   reasoned    that,    because      the   petitioners



       "The Justices in [National Pork] . . . agreed that whether
       13

a law imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce is a
threshold inquiry, although given the fractured nature of the
Court's decision on the Pike question, there is no portion of any
opinion on this point that commanded a majority." Flynt, 

 (first citing Nat'l Pork, 598 U.S. at 383 (plurality); then
citing id. at 393 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("Alleging a
substantial burden on interstate commerce is a threshold
requirement that plaintiffs must satisfy before courts need even
engage in Pike's balancing and tailoring analyses."); then citing
id. at 394 (Barrett, J., concurring) (similar); and then citing
id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (similar)).


                                           - 32 -
failed to "plead facts 'plausibly' suggesting a substantial harm

to interstate commerce," the Pike claim could not proceed.                    Id. at

385.   In a separate plurality, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices

Thomas and Barrett, concluded that this claim failed because the

alleged    "costs"    and   "benefits"       of    the   California     law      were

incommensurable, as economic burdens could not be weighed against

noneconomic benefits.       Id. at 380-82.

            Plaintiffs claim, however, that five justices would have

upheld the Pike claim in National Pork: the four justices in

dissent,    Chief    Justice    Roberts,      along      with    Justices     Alito,

Kavanaugh,   and     Jackson,   as    well    as    Justice      Barrett    in   her

concurrence.    Plaintiffs cite United States v. Johnson, 

 (1st Cir. 2006), to suggest that we should combine their

separate opinions to uphold a Pike claim here.                  But putting aside

any lurking issues regarding the application of the framework set

forth in Marks v. United States, 

 (1977), see Johnson,

, Plaintiffs are simply incorrect that there were

five votes to uphold a Pike claim in National Pork.                  See 

 (1st Cir. 2006).           Justice Barrett did agree with the

dissenters that the complaint in National Pork plausibly alleged,

as a matter of fact, a substantial burden on interstate commerce.

598 U.S. at 393-94 (Barrett, J., concurring).                   Nevertheless, she

concurred in the judgment that the petitioners there failed to

state a Pike claim as a matter of law because the benefits and


                                     - 33 -
burdens of the state law were incommensurable.         Id.   The benefits

and burdens Plaintiffs point to here are indistinguishable from

those alleged in National Pork, so Justice Barrett's concurrence

cannot be combined with the dissenting opinion to save the day for

Plaintiffs.

          The   Court   in   National   Pork    ultimately   declined   the

"petitioners' incautious invitation[]" to "prevent a State from

regulating the sale of an ordinary consumer good within its own

borders on nondiscriminatory terms."           Id. at 390-91.   We follow

the rationale in National Pork to resolve the matter before us.

Because the Massachusetts Act is not discriminatory, we find that

Plaintiffs' claim also "falls well outside Pike's heartland."           See

id. at 380.   For these reasons, we agree with the district court's

decision to enter summary judgment against the Plaintiffs on the

Pike claim.

          C. Preemption

          Plaintiffs alleged that both the FMIA and the PSA preempt

the Massachusetts Act's enforcement.           At summary judgment, the

district court held that the Massachusetts Act was not preempted.

Triumph Foods, LLC, 742 F. Supp. 3d at 66.         We review the district

court's entry of summary judgment de novo to determine whether

Massachusetts is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.               See




                                 - 34 -
McCoy, 

 (citing Cruz v. Mattis, 

(1st Cir. 2017)).

           "[C]ongressional    enactments   may   preempt   conflicting

state laws."   Nat'l Pork, 598 U.S. at 368 (citing U.S. Const. art.

VI, cl. 2).      "Federal preemption of a state law     . . . 'may be

either express or implied.'"    Nw. Selecta, Inc. v. González-Beiró,

 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting Bower v. Egyptair Airlines

Co., 

 (1st Cir. 2013)).       "When a federal statute

has an express preemption clause, 'we do not invoke any presumption

against [preemption].'"       

 (alteration in original) (quoting

Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 

(2016)).   Rather, we focus on the plain wording of the clause.

See 

 (quoting Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Whiting, 

 (2011)).     We also look to the "preemption clause's statutory

context and the statute's overall purpose."       

           "Conflict preemption," on the other hand, "may occur

'where the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives

of Congress.'"    Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows, 

 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Arizona v. United States, 

 (2012)).     "What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of

judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a

whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects."            Me.

Forest Prods. Council v. Cormier, 

 (1st Cir. 2022)


                                 - 35 -
(quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 

(2000)).

            i. The FMIA

            As we have previously explained, the district court

ruled     that        one     portion    of    the     Massachusetts           Act -- the

"slaughterhouse             exception" -- violated           the     dormant     Commerce

Clause.    Accordingly, it severed that provision.                       Plaintiffs argue

that, given that severance, the Massachusetts Act is expressly

preempted and preempted by conflict under the FMIA.                              Hearing

Plaintiffs' arguments post-severance, the district court held that

"Congress ha[d] not preempted the state law in question" and

granted summary judgment to Massachusetts.                         Triumph Foods, LLC,

742 F. Supp. 3d at 66.

            The FMIA is a federal statute which "regulates the

inspection,       handling,       and   slaughter       of    livestock        for    human

consumption."          Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 

(citing 

 et seq.).                    "The FMIA regulates a broad

range of activities at slaughterhouses to ensure both the safety

of meat and the humane handling of animals."                       

   Meat processing

facilities are inspected under the FMIA and the United States

Department       of    Agriculture      Food   Safety    and        Inspection       Service




                                         - 36 -
examines the product, facilities, and records of the processing

facilities.     The FMIA's express preemption clause provides:

            Requirements within the scope of [the FMIA]
            with respect to premises, facilities and
            operations     of    any     [FMIA-inspected]
            establishment . . . which are in addition to,
            or different than those made under [the FMIA]
            may not be imposed by any State . . . .

.

            The district court concluded that the Massachusetts Act

is not preempted because it does not regulate how a slaughterhouse

operates or prohibit a slaughterhouse from processing meat that

does not comply with the Massachusetts Act.            Triumph Foods, LLC,

742 F. Supp. 3d at 70.       In so holding, the district court provided

an overview of National Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 

, a 2012

case in which the Court reviewed whether               the FMIA expressly

preempted   a   California    provision     (the   "California   Act")   that

regulated slaughterhouses within the state.              

.

There, the California Act contained, in relevant part, a provision

that banned the "process, butcher, or [sale of] meat or products

of nonambulatory animals for human consumption."            See 

 at 459

(quoting Cal. Penal Code § 599f(b)).               The Court held that the

California Act was expressly preempted by the FMIA because the

California Act "substitute[d] a new regulatory regime" for the one

the FMIA prescribed.      Id. at 460.        The Court further held that

although "the FMIA's preemption clause does not usually foreclose



                                   - 37 -
'state    regulation      of    the    commercial     sales     activities    of

slaughterhouses,' the California Act's sales ban was "a criminal

proscription calculated to help implement and enforce each of the

section's other regulations," and was thus preempted by the FMIA.

Id. at 463-64.

            Plaintiffs rely on the National Meat holding for much of

their    preemption    argument.         Because    the    Massachusetts     Act

"directly regulates FMIA regulated facilities," the argument goes,

the Massachusetts Act is prohibited by the Supremacy Clause and

the    FMIA's   express    preemption     clause.         In   advancing    these

arguments, Plaintiffs suggest that the Massachusetts Act functions

in the same way as the California Act struck down in National Meat.

By    contrast,   Massachusetts       argues   that    Plaintiffs'    "express

preemption argument fails because they identify no 'requirements'

'within the scope' of the FMIA that the [Massachusetts] Act imposes

on    slaughterhouses."           Plaintiffs    also      contend    that    the

Massachusetts Act "adds a class of adulteration unrecognized in

federal law by predetermining what meat may be sold."

            Again, the California Act examined by National Meat

specifically provided:         "No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher,

or sell meat or products of nonambulatory animals for human

consumption."     Nat'l Meat Ass'n, 

 (quoting Cal.

Penal Code Ann. §599f (West 2010)).            This language was in direct

contention with the FMIA's proscriptions, which include that a


                                      - 38 -
"slaughterhouse may hold (without euthanizing) any nonambulatory

pig that has not been condemned [a]nd the slaughterhouse may

process      or    butcher      such       an     animal's        meat     for     human

consumption . . . ."         Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted).

             The   California     Act      at     issue    in     National    Meat       is

fundamentally different than the Massachusetts Act.                        See Triumph

Foods, LLC, 742 F. Supp. 3d at 70.                "[T]he Act here only bans the

sale   of    noncompliant     pork     meat;     it    does   not    regulate      how   a

slaughterhouse operates."            Id.        Plaintiffs do not identify any

operational requirement in the Massachusetts Act, nor could they.

And    the   FMIA's   express    preemption           provision     applies      only    to

"[r]equirements within the scope of [the FMIA]."                         See 

.

             Indeed, the Supreme Court in National Meat expressly

disavowed that its holding means what Plaintiffs now say it means.

See 

.         The Court stated that the record before

it did not "disclose whether [the California Act's] ban on purchase

ever applies beyond the slaughterhouse gate."                     

     "And because

that [was] so, [the Court had] no basis for deciding whether the

FMIA would preempt it."         

     By contrast, the Massachusetts Act

explicitly applies "beyond the slaughterhouse gate."                      See id.; see

also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. § 1-4(c) ("[A] covered

animal shall not be deemed to be 'confined in a cruel manner'

during: . . . Slaughter         in      accordance         with     any     applicable


                                       - 39 -
laws . . . .").    In short, unlike National Meat California Act,

the Massachusetts Act regulates pork production, rather than pork

inspection.   The FMIA regulates only the latter and "Congress has

yet to adopt any statute that might displace . . . laws regulating

pork production . . . ."   See Nat'l Pork, 598 U.S. at 368.

          We also conclude that the Massachusetts Act does not

create a "class of adulteration unrecognized in [the FMIA]."   See

Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 

 (2019) (Ginsburg,

J., concurring)(citing Nat'l Meat Ass'n, 

)("The

distinction drawn in National Meat . . . supports this conclusion:

A state law regulating an upstream activity within the State's

authority is not preempted simply because a downstream activity

falls within a federally occupied field."); see also Br. for Perdue

Premium Meat Company, Inc. D/B/A Niman Ranch as Amicus Curiae

Supporting Appellees at 9 ("Producers have used segregation and

tracing mechanisms for years to provide consumers with premium

pork products that follow organic, non-GMO, specific breeds, and

other unique specifications.").

          As for Plaintiffs' conflict preemption claim, we find

that the Massachusetts Act is not preempted by conflict with the

FMIA.   The Massachusetts Act does not "render it impossible to

comply with the [FMIA], nor serve as an obstacle to its purposes

and objectives."    See Iowa Pork Producers Ass'n v. Bonta, No.




                              - 40 -
22-55336, 

, at *5 (9th Cir. June 25, 2024), cert.

denied, No. 24-728, 

 (June 30, 2025).

          Accordingly, we hold that the Massachusetts Act is not

preempted by the FMIA.

          ii. The PSA

          Plaintiffs also alleged that the Massachusetts Act is

preempted by the Packers and Stockyard Act ("PSA")                   based on

principles of conflict preemption.            The PSA "makes it unlawful

'for any packer or swine contractor' to '[m]ake or give any undue

or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person

or locality in any respect, or subject any particular person or

locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in

any respect.'"    Id.14

          Plaintiffs        argue   that    the   PSA    prevents    "'unfair,

discriminatory,       or     deceptive     practices'     in   the     packing

industry .   . . ."        Re-emphasizing    their   earlier   arguments    on

discrimination, Plaintiffs state they must now "source compliant

pigs to gain access to the Massachusetts marketplace and thus must

pay a premium to farmers who meet the demand."                  Because the

Massachusetts     Act      does   not    discriminate,    it   follows   that



     14We need not address other claims dismissed by the district
court -- including injunctive and declaratory relief -- to which
Plaintiffs perfunctorily aver. See United States v. Zannino, 

 (1st Cir. 1990). As those claims are underdeveloped on
appeal, they are waived. See 

                                    - 41 -
Plaintiffs' PSA preemption claim, based wholly on discrimination

grounds, fails.   The Massachusetts Act "does not require packers

or wholesalers to favor or disfavor any pork producers based on

their location.   It instead prohibits packers and wholesalers from

selling non-compliant pork meat in [Massachusetts], regardless of

where such meat originates."     

    The Massachusetts Act does not

"render it impossible to comply with the [PSA], nor serve as an

obstacle to its purposes and objectives."        See 

           Accordingly, we hold that neither the FMIA nor the PSA

preempts the Massachusetts Act.

           D. Full Faith and Credit Clause

           Plaintiffs   allege   that   the   Massachusetts   Act   is   in

"direct conflict" with the "Right to Farm" laws that exist in

several states where the Plaintiffs operate, such as in Missouri,

Wyoming, and Indiana.     See Mo. Const. art. I, § 35; 

 (2025); 

-2-3, 14-2-4

(2025). For this reason, Plaintiffs contend that the Massachusetts

Act violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

           The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States

Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "Full Faith and

Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,

and judicial Proceedings of every other State."        U.S. Const. art.

IV, § 1.   "A statute is a public Act within the meaning of the

Full Faith and Credit Clause."         Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 578


                                 - 42 -
U.S. 171, 176 (2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

A State, however, is not required to "substitute for its own

statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the statute

of another State reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy."

Id. (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 

 (1955)).           The

Supreme Court has noted that a State's decision to decline to apply

another State's statute cannot be preceded by that State's adoption

of a "policy of hostility to the public Acts of [the] other State."

 (citation modified).

          The Massachusetts Act does not ban farming practices in

the states Plaintiffs have cited as having Right to Farm laws.

Rather, the Massachusetts Act bans the sale of products resulting

from certain practices in Massachusetts.       Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,

ch. 129, App. § 1-3.   Because these out-of-state farmers are free

to continue with their current farming practices, it is our view

that the Massachusetts Act     does not constitute     a "policy of

hostility" to their "Right to Farm" laws.      See Hyatt, 578 U.S. at

176.

          We thus find that the Massachusetts Act does not violate

the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

          E. Due Process Clause

          Plaintiffs   argue   that     the   Massachusetts   Act   is

"unconstitutionally vague" in violation of the Due Process Clause

because (i) "it fails to define what it means to 'engage in the


                               - 43 -
sale' of the prohibited pork product" and (ii) it fails "to specify

the square footage requirements for a breeding pig to 'turn around

freely.'"       They posit that it is unclear whether "engaging" in a

sale refers only to those who "sell" or includes all those who

participate in the supply chain.                 Plaintiffs also allege that,

because sows are not "one size fits all," their ability to "turn

around freely" varies.         As such, Plaintiffs are unable to discern

whether the shipment of their pork products into Massachusetts

will be compliant with the Massachusetts Act.

            A    statute     can   be    unconstitutionally           vague     in   two

circumstances.      "First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct

it   prohibits.       Second,      if   it   authorizes       or    even     encourages

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."                Hill v. Colorado, 

 (2000) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 

(1999)).        Specifically,      "'enactments        with    civil    rather       than

criminal penalties' are held to a less exacting vagueness standard

'because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less

severe.'" McCoy, 

 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates

v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 

 (1982)).

            The Massachusetts Act defines a "sale" as "a commercial

sale   by   a     business    that      sells    any    item       covered    [by     the

Massachusetts Act]," subject to certain exceptions.                        Mass. Gen.

Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. § 1-5 (emphasis added).                    Moreover, a sale


                                        - 44 -
"shall be deemed to occur at the location where the buyer takes

physical possession of an item covered by [the Act]."             Id.   In our

view,   a   person   of   "ordinary   intelligence"     will     most   likely

understand    from    this   definition    that   the   Massachusetts       Act

specifically prohibits sellers from "engaging in the sale" of the

products prohibited by the Act.       See id.     We find it unlikely for

this provision to be interpreted as being applicable to all those

who participate in the supply chain, as Plaintiffs argue in their

Brief. We thus disagree with Plaintiffs' argument that this phrase

renders the Massachusetts Act unconstitutionally vague.

            We also disagree with Plaintiffs' contention that the

requirement that sows must be able to "turn around freely" is

unconstitutionally vague.        As contended by Massachusetts, the

Massachusetts   Act    clearly   defines   "turning     around    freely"    as

"turning in a complete circle without any impediment, including a

tether, and without touching the side of an enclosure or another

animal."    Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 129, App. § 1-2.           We find that

this definition clearly states the standard that pig farms must

follow to comply with this requirement. The lack of square footage

requirements in this provision, therefore, does not render it

unconstitutionally vague.

            Accordingly, we find that the Massachusetts Act is not

unconstitutionally vague.




                                  - 45 -
            F. Import-Export Clause

            Plaintiffs       argue    that     "the    [Massachusetts]        Act

essentially imposes a duty or tax on out-of-state goods through

its   imposition    of   a   particular      method   of   raising   pigs,"   in

violation   of   the     Import-Export    Clause      of   the   United   States

Constitution. See U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl. 2. In its response,

Massachusetts explains that the application of the Import-Export

Clause is limited to products imported from foreign countries, not

other states.

            We agree with Massachusetts.           The Import-Export Clause

prohibits States from "lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties on Imports

or Exports" without the consent of Congress.               U.S. Const. art I,

§ 10, cl. 2.       "[T]he Import-Export Clause was long ago held to

refer only to international trade." Tenn. Wine and Spirits Retail.

Ass'n v. Thomas, 

 (2019) (citing Woodruff v.

Parham, 

 (1869)).           In a textual and historical

analysis of the Constitution, the Court in Woodruff explained that

"the words imports and imposts were used with exclusive reference

to articles imported from foreign countries."                

.

The Supreme Court therefore concluded that "no intention existed

to prohibit, by [the Export-Import Clause], the right of one State

to tax articles brought into it from another."                    

.

Plaintiffs ask us to apply the Import-Export Clause to prevent

Massachusetts from "essentially impos[ing] a duty or tax" on goods


                                     - 46 -
imported by other States.    Because the Import-Export Clause does

not bar states from imposing taxes or duties on imports from other

States, we conclude that the Massachusetts Act does not violate

the Import-Export Clause.   

.

                            V. Conclusion

          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.




                               - 47 -