United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 25-2089

  RHODE ISLAND STATE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
 NONPROFITS; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; MAIN STREET
  ALLIANCE; CITY OF CENTRAL FALLS; CITY OF PAWTUCKET; CITY OF
  PROVIDENCE; CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; CITY OF BALTIMORE; CITY OF
  COLUMBUS; CITY OF DURHAM; CITY OF NEW HAVEN; AMOS HOUSE; DR.
  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. COMMUNITY CENTER; EAST BAY COMMUNITY
  ACTION PROGRAM; FEDERAL HILL HOUSE ASSOCIATION; THE MILAGROS
 PROJECT; UNITED WAY OF RHODE ISLAND; NEW YORK LEGAL ASSISTANCE
                   GROUP; BLACK SHEEP MARKET,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                               v.

BROOKE L. ROLLINS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
     United States Department of Agriculture; UNITED STATES
 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; RUSSELL T. VOUGHT, in his official
 capacity as Director of the United States Office of Management
and Budget; UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET; SCOTT
  BESSENT, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United
 States Department of the Treasury; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
                  THE TREASURY; UNITED STATES,

                    Defendants, Appellants.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

       [Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                     Barron, Chief Judge,
              Gelpí and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
     Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D.
McArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, and
Laura E. Myron, Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, on brief for appellants.

     Amy R. Romero, Kevin Love Hubbard, DeLuca, Weizenbaum, Barry
& Revens, Ltd., Kristin Bateman, Catherine M.A. Carroll, Jyoti
Jasrasaria, Michael J. Torcello, Andrew Liang Bookbinder, Adnan
Perwez, Robin F. Thurston, Skye L. Perryman, and Democracy Forward
Foundation, on brief for appellees.

     Jonathan Miller, Jenny Ma, Jean Larsen, and Public Rights
Project, on brief for local governments and local government
leaders as amici curiae in support of appellees.

     Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Anna
Lumelsky, Deputy State Solicitor, Michelle Pascucci, Vanessa
Arslanian, State Trial Counsel, Liza Hirsch, Chief, Children's
Justice Unit, Cassandra Thomson, Rauvin Johl, Peter Walkingshaw,
Jak Kundl, Assistant Attorneys General, Katherine Dirks, Chief
State Trial Counsel, Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General of Arizona,
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Philip J. Weiser,
Attorney General of Colorado, William Tong, Attorney General of
Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General of Delaware,
Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General of the District of Columbia,
Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawai'i, Kwame Raoul, Attorney
General of Illinois, Laura Kelly, in her official capacity as
Governor of Kansas, Andy Beshear, in his official capacity as
Governor of Kentucky, Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General of Maine,
Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General of Maryland, Dana Nessel,
Attorney General of Michigan, Keith Ellison, Attorney General of
Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General of Nevada, Matthew J.
Platkin, Attorney General of New Jersey, Raúl Torrez, Attorney
General of New Mexico, Letitia James, Attorney General of New York,
Jeff Jackson, Attorney General of North Carolina, Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General of Oregon, Josh Shapiro, in his official capacity
as Governor of Pennsylvania, Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General of
Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark, Attorney General of Vermont,
Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General of Washington, and Joshua L.
Kaul, Attorney General of Wisconsin, on brief for Massachusetts,
et al., as amici curiae in support of appellees.

     Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Laurel A. Raymond, Brian Hauck, Jenner
& Block LLP, Julia Spiegel, Emily Kirby, Allegra Chapman, Carlos
Guevara, Inbar Pe'er, and Governors Action Alliance, on brief for
bipartisan former governors as amici curiae in support of
appellees.


                             - 2 -
November 9, 2025




   - 3 -
          RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge.       Forty-two million people, one

out of every eight Americans, use monthly benefits from the federal

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to buy food for

themselves and their families.        On October 24, 2025, a few weeks

into the current government shutdown, the United States Department

of Agriculture (USDA), which administers SNAP funding on behalf of

the federal government, announced it would not provide any funds

for   November   SNAP     benefits.        The       plaintiffs      in   this

case -- nonprofits,     local   governments,     a    union,   and    a   food

retailer -- sued to require USDA to provide full November benefits

using SNAP contingency funds Congress had appropriated for this

very purpose, as well as other funds available to USDA.                    The

district court granted a temporary restraining order requiring the

government to provide either full SNAP payments by November 3 or

partial payments by November 5.       The government elected to provide

partial benefits.     On Thursday, November 6, the district court

determined that the government had failed to comply with the order

because it did not provide partial payments in a timely manner; it

thus ordered the full payment of SNAP funds for November.                 The

government now asks us to stay that order in its entirety pending

its appeal.   We deny that request.




                                - 4 -
                              I. BACKGROUND

                           A. Relevant Facts

           SNAP provides monthly benefits to around one in eight

Americans, including fourteen million children and eight million

elderly   individuals.     Beneficiaries    receive     funds   through   an

electronic debit card that they use to buy food at grocery stores

and other food retailers.       Although the federal government pays

for SNAP benefits, state governments administer them, including by

determining who is eligible and the amount of benefits                 that

eligible individuals and families should receive.            See 

(a).   Under federal law, SNAP benefits "shall be furnished

to all eligible households" that apply.        

 § 2014(a).

           For   low-income   Americans,    SNAP   is   a   vital   bulwark

against hunger and food insecurity.       Access to food is, of course,

a basic human need.      Further, food security is a critical factor

in health and well-being, the ability to stay in stable housing,

and children's physical and educational development.                Without

SNAP, tens of millions would go hungry -- the first among a cascade

of other health and financial harms that would befall those forced

to go without enough food, particularly in the months leading up

to winter.

           Congress appropriates federal funding for SNAP on an

annual basis.    See id. § 2013(a).     The latest annual appropriation

for SNAP expired on September 30, 2025.            To take into account


                                - 5 -
emergencies, however, Congress has provided for additional funds

to "be placed in reserve for use only in such amounts and at such

times as may become necessary to carry out program operations"

("contingency funds").              Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,

 Stat. 25, 93; see also Full-Year Continuing

Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, 

1101(a), 1103, 1109(a), 

, 10.                         At the beginning of

October 2025, the contingency funds amounted to about $6 billion.

            The current lapse in congressional appropriations -- the

government shutdown -- began on October 1, 2025.                         On October 10,

USDA sent a memorandum to state officials stating that "if the

current    lapse     in      appropriations         continues,          there    will   be

insufficient       funds     to    pay    full     November       SNAP    benefits      for

approximately       42     million       individuals          across    the     [n]ation."

Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Agric. on Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance      Program     (SNAP)       Benefit    and       Administrative      Expense

Update    for     November    2025       (Oct.   10,      2025)    (emphasis      added),

https://perma.cc/LDG4-DQMC.

            Statutes governing SNAP provide for how the government

should manage shortfalls in funding.                     The statutes indicate that

USDA "shall limit the value of [SNAP payments] issued to an amount

not in excess of the appropriation" for a given fiscal year. 

(b).          USDA regulations then set forth procedures for

making    those    reduced        payments.        See    

.       The


                                         - 6 -
regulations require, for example, that once USDA decides to make

reduced payments, it "shall notify State agencies of the date the

reduction is to take effect and by what percentage maximum SNAP

allotments amounts are to be reduced."               

 § 271.7(d)(1)(i).

According to the record here, USDA did not take any steps to

prepare to make partial payments            either before or after        the

shutdown.    Instead, it only acted after it was ordered to do so by

the district court on October 31, during this litigation.                 The

record reflects that, before early November, USDA did not even

perform the calculation to determine what percentage of November

benefits could be paid with the contingency funds.

            On October 24, as the shutdown continued, USDA announced

that it would "suspend[] all November 2025 benefit allotments until

such time as sufficient federal funding is provided, or until [it]

directs State agencies otherwise."          Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of

Agric., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefit

and Administrative Expense Update for November 2025 (Oct. 24,

2025).    Thus, one week before November SNAP benefits should have

kicked in, the government communicated that it would not provide

any benefits.      USDA also announced that it would not use the $6

billion     in   contingency   funds     that    Congress   had    previously

appropriated to make up for a shortfall.           See Memorandum from U.S.

Dep't of Agric., Impact of the Government Lapse on November

Supplemental      Nutrition    Assistance       Program   (SNAP)    Household


                                 - 7 -
Benefits (Oct. 24, 2025), https://perma.cc/L343-L7YA.                 As USDA

explained its view at the time, those contingency funds were

available only to supplement benefits for which an appropriation

existed, so the funds could not be used once an appropriation

lapsed.1 On October 27, USDA posted to its website a banner stating

that "there will be no [SNAP] benefits issued November 01" because

"the well has run dry" in light of the shutdown.            Food & Nutrition

Serv.,      U.S.     Dep't      of     Agric.       (Oct.      27,     2025),

https://perma.cc/BL88-8QU6.

                         B. Procedural History

            The    plaintiffs   are    nonprofit    organizations,      local

governments, a union, and a food retailer that represent and serve

people who rely on SNAP benefits.           On October 30, they filed a

lawsuit alleging that USDA and other government entities and

officials   ("the    government")     had   violated    the    Administrative

Procedure Act (APA) through their October 24 directive suspending

November SNAP benefits.      They claimed that suspending benefits was

arbitrary   and    capricious   and   contrary     to   law,   and   that   the




     1 The district court noted that in the past, including in 2019
during President Trump's previous term in office, the government
had acknowledged that it could use these contingency funds to cover
SNAP benefits in the event of a government shutdown.


                                 - 8 -
government had "unlawfully withheld" SNAP payments.2              See 

(1), (2)(A).

              On the same day the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, they

moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO).              Specifically, they

asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin USDA's October 10

and 24 directives.          They also asked the district court to require

the government to "release the withheld funding for SNAP benefits

insofar as funds are available under the contingency funds . . .

[or] under 

."               Section 2257 is a statute providing

that       seven   percent    of     the    annual   appropriations   "for   the

miscellaneous expenses of the work of any bureau, division, or

office       of    [USDA]    shall     be     available   interchangeably    for

expenditures on the objects included within the general expenses

of such bureau, division, or office."                

 (emphasis

added).       It further states that USDA may not add more than that

amount (seven percent) "to any one item of appropriation except in

cases of extraordinary emergency."              

 (emphasis added).

              At a hearing on October 31, the district court granted

plaintiffs' motion for a TRO.               In a November 1 written order, it

ordered the government to use the contingency funds to supplement

SNAP benefits.       The court also acknowledged that those contingency


       2The plaintiffs also brought claims arising from the
government's handling of work requirements related to the SNAP
program. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal, so we do
not discuss them further.


                                      - 9 -
funds would be insufficient to fully cover SNAP benefit payments

for November.

           In light of the shortfall in funds, the district court

presented the government with two options to comply with its TRO.

First, the government could, "within its discretion, find the

additional funds necessary (beyond the contingency funds) to fully

fund the November SNAP payments."          (Emphasis added.)     The court

explained that the government could do so by using its § 2257

authority to transfer money from a fund established by section 32

of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935,              7 U.S.C. § 612c

("Section 32 fund"). The government conceded during the October 31

TRO hearing that it had the authority to fund November SNAP

payments in this way.      The court further ordered that, should the

government select this option, it must make the SNAP payments by

Monday, November 3.

           Second, and alternatively, the district court permitted

the   government   to    make   "partial    payments"   of   November   SNAP

benefits, including by using the contingency funds (but not the

Section 32 fund).       The court specified that in doing so, however,

the government "must expeditiously resolve the administrative and

clerical burdens [associated with the partial payments that] it

described in its" prior filings.           The court explained that this

option would require the government to "come up with a plan" to

distribute the partial payments "to all entitled beneficiaries."


                                  - 10 -
And "under no circumstances," the TRO stated, "shall the partial

payments be made later than Wednesday, November 5, 2025." Finally,

the court specified that if the government selected this second

option and chose, in its discretion, "not [to] use other funds in

addition to the contingency funds to make a full payment," any

decision      to    use   such    discretion         "cannot   be     arbitrary     or

capricious."

              At no point did the government challenge the October 31

TRO after the district court issued it or request that the court

modify   it    in   any   way.       Instead,    on    Monday,    November 3,      the

government submitted a report to the district court that it had

chosen the second option and had "worked diligently to comply with

the Court's order."          It stated that by the end of the day on

November 3, the government would have "made the necessary funds

available" and "generat[ed] the table required for [s]tates to

calculate     the     [partial]   benefits      available      for   each    eligible

household," given that full payments would not be forthcoming.                      An

accompanying declaration by a USDA official explained, however,

that   even    once    the   funds    were    made    available      and    the   table

circulated, at least some states would have to implement technical

changes to their SNAP systems that "w[ould] take anywhere from a

few weeks to up to several months."

              The following day, November 4, the plaintiffs asked the

district court to enforce the October 31 TRO by requiring the


                                     - 11 -
government to provide full SNAP benefits in November.                   They argued

that, given the government's representation that it had elected to

make partial payments despite acknowledging that those partial

payments   were    unlikely        to   reach    many    SNAP    recipients     during

November, it had not complied with the court's original TRO.                       The

plaintiffs also asked, "in the alternative," for the district court

to "grant additional preliminary relief on the ground that the

decision to deny full benefits is arbitrary and capricious."

            Following       a    November 6      hearing,      the   district   court

granted both parts of the plaintiffs' November 4 motion -- that

is, it decided to enforce its October 31 TRO and to enter a new

TRO.   It ruled first that the government had failed to comply with

the October 31 TRO, both by not resolving the administrative

burdens of making partial payments and by failing to ensure that

partial payments were actually disbursed to needy individuals by

November 5.    The court explained that despite the government's

admission that partial payments would mean no SNAP payments in

November for many individuals, the government chose that option

anyway.     Given     the       foreseeability     of    the    problems    that   the

government's chosen path would entail, the court concluded that

the    government's     noncompliance           with    the    October 31   TRO    was

inexcusable.      In order to effectuate its October 31 TRO, the court

thus required the government to make full November SNAP payments

by November 7.


                                        - 12 -
          As to the plaintiffs' alternative request for a new TRO,

the district court agreed that the government's decision not to

make full SNAP payments was likely arbitrary and capricious.           It

concluded that the plaintiffs' APA claim was likely to succeed on

four   grounds: the   government's    failure   to    account   for   the

practical consequences of trying to make partial payments, the

government's legal misunderstanding of its § 2257 authority, the

government's implausible reasoning for refusing to access the

Section 32 fund, and the pretextual nature of that reasoning in

light of the government's shifting positions.           Because of the

plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, along with the

weight of the equities in their favor, the court issued a second

TRO.   That new TRO required the government to make full SNAP

payments by November 7, "by utilizing available Section 32 funds

in combination with the contingency funds."

          On November 6, the government filed a notice of appeal

of the district court's orders.   On November 7, it moved this court

for a stay pending appeal and an immediate administrative stay.

          In the early evening of November 7, we denied the request

for an administrative stay and noted that the government's request

for a stay pending appeal remained pending.          Shortly before our

order issued, the government filed an emergency motion in the U.S.

Supreme Court, also requesting a stay pending appeal             and an

administrative stay.    Justice Jackson granted an administrative


                             - 13 -
stay pending our disposition of the government's motion for a stay.

That administrative stay is set to expire forty-eight hours after

we issue our decision on the government's stay request.

          We conclude that the government has not met its burden

under the applicable stay factors and thus deny its request to

stay the district court's order granting the motion to enforce.

                              II. DISCUSSION

                              A. Jurisdiction

          Before turning to the merits of the government's stay

motion, we address whether we have jurisdiction to consider it.

Generally, a TRO is not immediately reviewable on appeal.           See 

(a)(1).        But we do have statutory jurisdiction to

review a TRO that has the "'practical effect' of granting or

denying an injunction."      Abbott v. Perez, 

 (2018)

(quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 

 (1981)).

          The    government    argues,    and   the   plaintiffs   do    not

dispute, that the      November 6    orders     amount to a preliminary

injunction.     We agree.   Regardless of how we resolve this appeal,

the consequences are substantial and immediate.          If we grant the

stay, millions of Americans will not receive their SNAP benefits.

If we deny the stay, the district court's orders require the

transfer and disbursement of billions of dollars.           Further, the

district court entered the orders after adversarial briefing and

a hearing.    See Sampson v. Murray, 

 (1974).            Thus,


                                 - 14 -
the "practical effect" of the orders is a preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) to consider

this motion.

                        B. The Government's Motion

            "A stay pending appeal is an 'intrusion into the ordinary

processes    of   administration    and     judicial    review,'"   so    this

"'extraordinary' relief" is never "granted as 'a matter of right.'"

Rhode Island v. Trump, 

, 41 (1st Cir. 2025) (first

quoting New York v. Trump, 

 (1st Cir. 2025); and

then quoting Somerville Pub. Schs. v. McMahon, 

, 68

(1st Cir. 2025)).       "As the party seeking a stay pending appeal,

the [government] bears the burden of justifying the extraordinary

relief it requests."       Am. Pub. Health Ass'n v. Nat'l Insts. of

Health, 

, 47 (1st Cir. 2025) (citing Nken v. Holder,

 (2009)).

            To meet its burden for a stay, the government must

satisfy four well-established requirements.            It must make: "(1) a

strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) a

showing that it will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) a

showing that the issuance of the stay will [not] substantially

injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) a

showing   that    the   public   interest    lies   with    [it],   not   the

plaintiffs."      

 (first two alterations in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Does 1-3 v. Mills, 

,


                                 - 15 -
24 (1st Cir. 2022)).      When we consider a stay motion, "[w]e rely

on the parties to frame the issues for decision."             Rhode Island,

155 F.4th at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New

York, 

).

            The government has asked us to stay two orders entered

by the district court on November 6: the enforcement order and the

second TRO.3    Both of these orders granted the same relief -- full

payment of November SNAP benefits, including through the use of

the Section 32 fund, by November 7.

            In its stay papers, the government largely ignores the

enforcement order.      Instead, it focuses on why it is likely to

succeed in showing that the district court lacked authority under

the APA to require it to expend funds to fully cover November SNAP

benefits.      It claims that there are no legal standards against

which the district court could review its decision under § 2257

not to draw on Section 32 funds and that Congress left that

discretionary     decision     entirely    up   to   the   agency.    In    so

contending, the government makes a serious argument that, under

Lincoln v. Vigil, 

 (1993), the district court could

not   review   that   purely   discretionary     decision    to   decline   to

transfer money in the Section 32 fund to cover SNAP.



      3The government also asks us to stay the October 31 order
"[t]o the extent [that it] require[s] USDA to expend funds beyond
the SNAP contingency fund."


                                  - 16 -
          But the district court did not order the government to

use the Section 32 fund until November 6.                   It did so after it

concluded that     the government had failed to comply with                       its

October 31 TRO.        As a remedy for that noncompliance, the court

ordered the government to make the full payment of November SNAP

benefits by November 7.      Thus, even if we were to stay the second

TRO, the government could not obtain the relief that it seeks

unless it also meets its burden under the stay factors as to the

enforcement order.

          For    the    reasons   that   follow,       we    conclude      that   the

government   has   failed    to   meet     the    stay      factors   as    to    the

enforcement order, and we deny a stay of that order.

                1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

          "The     most   important"     of      the   stay    factors      is    the

"likelihood of success on the merits."             Akebia Therapeutics, Inc.

v. Azar, 

 (1st Cir. 2020).              If the government fails

to make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the

merits, "the remaining elements are of little consequence."                       

          We review an order to enforce a judgment for abuse of

discretion, and we see no reason not to apply the same standard to

the analogous order here.         See Harvey v. Johanns, 

 (1st Cir. 2007).      Nor does the government argue for a different

standard in its stay papers.             We review the district court's

underlying findings of fact in support of its enforcement order


                                  - 17 -
for clear error.      See, e.g., Becky's Broncos, LLC v. Town of

Nantucket, 

 (1st Cir. 2025).              In light of the

record and the arguments before us, we conclude that the government

has not met its burden to show that the district court abused its

discretion in issuing the enforcement order.

             To begin, we emphasize what the parties do not dispute.

First, the government agrees that it can use the contingency funds

to provide partial November SNAP benefits (despite its initial

position that those funds were inaccessible).          Indeed, in its stay

papers to us, the government requests a stay only "[t]o the extent

[that the district court's orders] require USDA to expend funds

beyond the SNAP contingency fund."        (Emphasis added.)     Second, the

government agrees that it has the authority, under governing

statutes including § 2257, to transfer money from the Section 32

fund and use it to pay November SNAP benefits in full.              In fact,

when the district court posed this question directly to the

government at the October 31 hearing by asking, "You would agree

under [a] statutory reading that the agency could use Section 32

to pay benefits?", the government responded, "Yes."             The Section

32 fund contains more than $23 billion.          Thus, there is no dispute

that   the   government   could --   as   both    a   legal   and   practical

matter -- pay November SNAP benefits in full by transferring about

$4 billion from that fund.      There is also no dispute that if the

government were to do so, it would avoid the considerable and


                                - 18 -
time-consuming    technical    difficulties       that    come   with    making

partial payments.

          The parties' disagreement centers on the government's

decision not to make the transfer from the Section 32 fund.                 The

government    argues   that   the    decision     is   committed    to   agency

discretion by law and that, in any event, the district court erred

in concluding that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.               See

(a)(2), 706(2)(A).

          But neither of those arguments by the government address

the November 6 enforcement order, which directed the government to

fully fund November SNAP benefits because of the government's

failure to comply with the October 31 TRO.               In its stay papers,

the government devotes, at most, three sentences to addressing

that order.

          Specifically,       as    to      the   enforcement      order,   the

government states:

          USDA complied with the district court's
          original    injunction    by   depleting   the
          multi-year contingency fund to make a partial
          payment of November SNAP benefits but declined
          to transfer billions of dollars from other
          food-security   programs,    like  the   Child
          Nutrition Programs.      That choice is not
          reviewable under the APA. Even assuming that
          USDA has some discretionary authority to
          transfer funds to support SNAP benefits in the
          absence of an appropriation for SNAP, the
          determination of whether to use that authority
          to deplete funds from one congressionally
          mandated program to pay for another program
          with an insufficient appropriation falls


                                   - 19 -
          squarely  within   the  APA  exception  for
          decisions committed to agency discretion by
          law. 

(a)(2).

          This limited argument is not persuasive, as the district

court's enforcement order was not based on an analysis of the APA.

To the contrary, the court made clear that the enforcement order

was based on the government's noncompliance with its October 31

TRO.   That TRO, it recounted, presented the government with two

options: either "use Section 32 funds, contingency funds, or both

to make a full payment of SNAP benefits," or "use contingency funds

to make a partial payment of SNAP benefits."       If the government

chose the latter option, the district court explained, it was

required to "expeditiously resolve the administrative and clerical

burdens" and "under no circumstances shall the partial payments be

made later than" November 5. The district court granted the motion

to enforce because it determined that the government "did neither."

          Of course, the government argued to the district court

that it did comply with the October 31 TRO because it exhausted

the contingency funds to issue partial payments.    But the district

court disagreed.   And the government's bare assertion in its stay

motion, which we quote above, falls far short of a strong showing

that it is likely to succeed in demonstrating that the district

court erred in finding otherwise.

          As the district court properly considered in issuing the

enforcement   order,   USDA   knew     at   the   very   latest   by


                              - 20 -
October 10 -- the    day   it   sent   its    first   memorandum    to    the

states -- that normal appropriations would be unavailable to cover

November benefits.    It also knew full well that making partial

payments would be technically difficult, as it had never been done

before.   But it proceeded to do nothing to attempt to solve that

problem over the following three weeks.         It made no calculations,

prepared no tables, and took no other logistical steps to prepare

for a shortfall.

          Instead,   in    an   unexplained    reversal   from     its   2019

position, the government announced that it would make no November

SNAP payments at all because it lacked the authority to use the

contingency funds.     Once this litigation began, the government

then changed its position again -- it agreed that it could access

the backup funding sources.        But it was, in the government's

telling, essentially too late at that point.              Making partial

payments that would actually reach individuals in any reasonable

time period was too difficult, and the government decided that

accessing the Section 32 fund to make full payments was imprudent.

Yet, even after the October 31 TRO issued, and knowing all this,

the government chose the partial funding of November SNAP benefits

that the order permitted only if those partial benefits would be

available expeditiously and by a certain date.

          The   district   court   concluded     that   the   government's

actions "undermined both the intent and the effectiveness" of its


                                - 21 -
October 31 TRO.      As it explained, the government "knew that, at

the time [it] chose [to issue partial payments], [it] would be

prolonging implementation and frustrating the very purpose of the

TRO."   The stay motion at no point addresses this basis for the

district court's finding that the government did not comply with

the October 31 TRO.

            The government does assert at one point that "[t]he

district court also erred by concluding it was unreasonable for

USDA to 'choose to go down this path [of a partial payment] in

light of the difficulties and delays attendant to making a partial

payment.'" And, in support of that argument, the government points

out that "in the separate case in Massachusetts, the [s]tates have

admitted    that   some    of   them   are   technologically   prepared   to

implement partial benefits immediately."            It then contends that

"[a]ny delays on the part of the [s]tates, who are not party to

this suit, [and] that are not so prepared are beyond the control

of USDA."

            But even if we treat the government's argument on this

point as disputing the finding that it did not comply with the

October 31 TRO, we do not see how the government has made a strong

showing that it is likely to succeed in challenging that finding.

The   district     court   held   that   the   government   undermined    its

October 31 order by proceeding down the partial funding path while

knowing that doing so would not result in satisfying the conditions


                                   - 22 -
established in that order.         The government simply does not address

that basis for the district court's finding of noncompliance.

             "[F]ederal      courts       are      not     reduced   to    issuing

injunctions . . . and hoping for compliance.                      Once issued, an

injunction may be enforced."             Hutto v. Finney, 

(1978), abrogation on other grounds recognized by, Dep't of Agric.

Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 

, 56 (2024).

"[T]he question whether a party adequately has complied with a

court order is a matter peculiarly within the ken of the judge who

issued the order."        Faigin v. Kelly, 

 (1st Cir.

1999).   And a court has "great discretion when deciding how to

enforce violations of its own orders."                 Eagle Comtronics, Inc. v.

Arrow Commc'n Lab'ys, Inc., 

, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002);

see also Kemp v. Peterson, 

 (4th Cir. 1991)

("[T]he general rule [is] that a court is authorized to issue all

orders necessary to enforce orders it has previously issued in the

exercise of its jurisdiction.").

             Here, the district court fashioned a remedy to ensure

that   its   October 31      TRO   was    followed,       after   considering   the

government's noncompliance and concluding that the obstacles it

claimed existed were in fact "the foreseeable result of [the

government's]       own   choices."             That     remedy -- requiring    the

government     to    "make    full       SNAP     payments . . . by       utilizing

available Section 32 funds in combination with the contingency


                                     - 23 -
funds" -- directly relates to the court's October 31 TRO.         And the

government does not argue in its stay motion that the enforcement

order was an improper remedy for          its noncompliance with the

October 31 TRO to the extent that it failed to comply with that

order.

            In sum, the government fails to meaningfully challenge

the district court's determination that it failed to comply with

the October 31 TRO.     Nor does the government advance any argument

that the district court lacked authority to order the full funding

of November SNAP benefits as a means of addressing any such

noncompliance.     The government has thus failed to make a "strong

showing" that it is likely to succeed on the merits -- that is, to

show that the district court abused its discretion in granting the

motion to enforce.

            To be sure, the government does argue that the district

court lacked authority to issue the October 31 TRO to the extent

that order requires the government to fully fund the November SNAP

benefits.    It contends that "Congress clearly contemplated that

USDA would reduce allotments when faced with a shortfall in annual

appropriations."      To support this point, it emphasizes that the

governing   statute    instructs   that   USDA   "shall"   make   partial

payments.    Nevertheless, the government does not contest that it

did not even begin to follow the regulatory process for making

partial payments until the district court ordered it to do so.


                               - 24 -
That is apparently why the government had to correct its own

mathematical calculations mid-stream, by informing the states on

November 4   that    contingency   funds      could   cover   65   percent    of

November payments, as opposed to 50 percent of such payments, as

the government had indicated on the previous day.

            In any event, the district court has now found that the

government failed to comply with that October 31 TRO, from which

no stay was sought and no appeal was taken that would have

prevented the order from taking effect during the period of alleged

noncompliance.      Thus, for present purposes, the question that the

government's motion to stay the enforcement order presents is

this: Has the government made a strong showing that it is likely

to succeed in establishing either (a) that the district court erred

in finding noncompliance with the October 31 TRO or (b) that,

insofar as it did not err in that regard, it could not order full

funding in consequence of that noncompliance?

            As we have explained, the answer is no.            In the single

paragraph    it   devotes   in   its   stay    motion   to    addressing     the

enforcement order, the government does not make a strong showing

of likely success in either respect.          And in the only other passage

of the stay motion that could be read to address the finding of

noncompliance, the government fails to grapple with the actual

basis for that finding.




                                 - 25 -
                    2. The Remaining Stay Factors

            Having determined that the government has failed to make

a strong showing of success on the merits, we turn to the remaining

three stay factors. The government's arguments as to these factors

fail to establish it is entitled to the "'extraordinary' relief"

it seeks.    Rhode Island, 155 F.4th at 41 (quoting Somerville Pub.

Schs., 139 F.4th at 68).

            We begin by considering the risk of irreparable harm to

the government in the absence of a stay.       See id. at 47.     The

government makes one argument: Dipping into the Section 32 fund,

it contends, will disrupt other federal nutrition benefits -- the

Child Nutrition Programs (CNP) -- that draw primarily from that

fund.    According to the government, if $4 billion is drawn from

the Section 32 fund and Congress does not make any supplemental

appropriations for the fund or the CNP in Fiscal Year 2026, those

programs will run out of money sometime next calendar year.4      The

loss of federal funds can be irreparable harm.5     See Dep't of Educ.

v. California, 

 (2025) (per curiam).       As the


     4 The district court credited the plaintiffs' assertion that,
if $4 billion were transferred to SNAP, the CNP would still be
fully funded at least through May 2026 because CNP benefits amount
to about $3 billion per month.
     5 That said, we do not credit the government's argument that
"[t]his concern will be paramount particularly if the district
court were to conclude that USDA should be required to tap these
funds again in December." The orders before us include no such
requirement.


                               - 26 -
plaintiffs point out, however, the government bears the burden of

demonstrating that it "will be irreparably injured absent a stay,"

Rhode Island, 155 F.4th at 41 (emphasis added) (quoting Nken, 

), and we cannot see how these speculative predictions

amount to making that showing, see New York, 

.

          The third and fourth stay factors, which the government

does not address in any meaningful way, require us to consider any

substantial injuries to other parties from a stay and where the

public interest lies.   The harm from a stay would be immense.   The

government, understandably, makes no attempt to argue otherwise.

As we have already noted, tens of millions of Americans rely on

monthly SNAP benefits to pay for food.   In support of their motion

for a TRO, the plaintiffs provided overwhelming evidence of the

harms that even a short suspension of benefits        would   cause,

including numerous declarations from SNAP beneficiaries and those

who serve them.   Those declarations describe a pregnant mother in

Georgia forced to skip meals to feed her son; a working grandfather

in Massachusetts who would eat twice instead of three times a day

to feed his family; a mother in North Carolina who worries about

how feeding her three children less will affect their health; and

a nonprofit leader in Rhode Island whose clients will be forced to

choose whether to "heat or eat" as the holidays approach and winter

bears down on New England.      These immediate, predictable, and

unchallenged harms facing forty-two million Americans who rely on


                             - 27 -
SNAP benefits --     including fourteen million children -- weigh

heavily against a stay.

            In   reviewing   the   district    court's   balancing   of     the

equities, we also cannot ignore the particular events preceding

this litigation.     As the district court found, "this is a problem

that could have been avoided."          The record here shows that the

government sat on its hands for nearly a month, unprepared to make

partial payments,     while people who rely on SNAP              received    no

benefits a week into November and counting.              In light of these

unique facts, we cannot conclude that the district court abused

its discretion in requiring full payment of November SNAP benefits

to effectuate the October 31 TRO after the government had failed

to comply with it.      See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 

(1944) (explaining that courts sitting in equity "mould each decree

to the necessities of the particular case").

            Taking the four stay factors together, the government

has failed to show it is entitled to the extraordinary relief of

a stay.    It has not made a strong showing that it is likely to

succeed on the merits.         Nor does it refute the extensive record

evidence of the enormous injury to individuals around the country

that a stay would cause.        We do not take lightly the government's

concern that money used to fund November SNAP payments will be

unavailable for other important nutrition assistance programs.

But   we   cannot   conclude    that   the    district   court   abused     its


                                   - 28 -
discretion      in    determining   that     the   overwhelming     evidence   of

widespread harm that a stay would cause right now, by leaving tens

of   millions    of    Americans    without    food   as   winter   approaches,

outweighed the potential monetary harm to the government and CNP,

months into the future.            Thus, we reject the government's stay

request as to the order granting the motion to enforce based on

noncompliance with the October 31 TRO.

                                C. Second TRO

           That leaves the second TRO, issued on November 6.               That

order granted        the same relief as the           enforcement order, and

plaintiffs requested the second TRO only in the alternative, if

the district court denied the motion to enforce.                  Thus, we stay

the second TRO so long as the enforcement order remains in full

force and effect.

                               III. Conclusion

           For all these reasons, the government's motion for a

stay pending appeal is denied in part.6




      6A number of local governments, states, and former governors
have moved for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in support of
the plaintiffs-appellees. We grant the motions, and the proposed
briefs are accepted as filed.      We consider these briefs only
insofar as they concern legal issues and positions raised by the
parties. See Ryan v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 

, 33
n.10 (1st Cir. 2020).


                                    - 29 -