Stockton & Linden Gravel Road Co. v. Stockton & Copperopolis Railroad
Stockton & Linden Gravel Road Co. v. Stockton & Copperopolis Railroad
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff was a corporation de facto at all events, and, as such, was in the undisputed possession and control of the road running along East street and Weber Avenue, under the grant it obtained from the Board of Supervisors of San Joaquin County, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March 14th, 1868, enlarging the powers of the Board. In this condition of things the defendant entered upon the road along-Weber Avenue and took it into possession, and now undertakes to defend this action on the ground that the plaintiff was not a corporation de jure, nor de jure entitled to the franchise of which it has been by this means deprived.
We think that, under such circumstances, the title of the plaintiff cannot be inquired into by the defendant, who is a mere intruder upon the Weber Avenue road, and that, until ousted by some direct proceeding instituted for that purpose, its possession cannot be rightfully disturbed.
There is nothing in the other points.
Order denying new trial reversed and cause remanded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- THE STOCKTON AND LINDEN GRAVEL ROAD COMPANY v. THE STOCKTON AND COPPEROPOLIS RAILROAD COMPANY, and E. S. HOLDEN, A. CLARK, FRANCES AVERY, A. JACKSON, D. H. McDonald, J. H. MOULTON, EUGENE SULLIVAN, SAMUEL PURDY, and A. H. WHITNEY
- Status
- and that unless the whole amount of capital stock designated shall be subscribed and the final organization be made within six months after the preliminary organization
- Syllabus
- Corporation De Facto.—If a plank and turnpike road company effects a preliminary organization and adopts a code of by-laws, and in .good faith thereafter acts as a corporation, it becomes a corporation de facto, although a final organization is not effected. Trespass on Property op Corporation De Facto.—If a corporation de facto is in the actual possession of a public highway, under a grant of a franchise to improve and collect tolls on the same, a mere trespasser cannot justify his entry thereon on the ground that it was only a corporation de facto, and was not de jure entitled to the franchise. Idem.—A mere intruder upon the property of a corporation de facto cannot inquire into its right as a corporation to hold such property.