Earl David Shaffer v. David M. Cook, Larry D. Lahman, and Stephen Jones
Cases that cite this one
22 later published cases cite this decision. The 21 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Pillette v. Detroit Police Department (District Court, E.D. Michigan 1987)
- Sooner Products Company v. Paul Mcbride (10th Cir. 1983)
- Sooner Products Co. v. McBride (10th Cir. 1983)
- Archuleta v. City of Roswell (District Court, D. New Mexico 2012)
- Vento v. Colorado National (10th Cir. 1999)
- Mikhail v. Kahn (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 2014)
- Roemer v. Security Bancshares, Inc. (District Court, D. Kansas 1997)
- Allen v. Cunningham (10th Cir. 1995)
- Jenkins v. Security Sav. Bank of Michigan (10th Cir. 1994)
- Sack v. Huggins (10th Cir. 1994)
- Mann v. Rigtrup (10th Cir. 1991)
- Robert H. Ketchum Also Known as Kent C. Norman v. Mark Fogg, Cooper & Kelley, P.C., Attorney at Law (10th Cir. 1991)
- Crabtree ex rel. Crabtree v. Muchmore (10th Cir. 1990)
- Karen Hammond v. Waldo Bales and Roger Hammond (10th Cir. 1988)
- Doe v. Smith (District Court, S.D. New York 1988)
- Bertucci v. Brown (District Court, E.D. New York 1987)
- Stafford v. Goff (United States District Court for the District of Colorado 1985)
- Milton v. Wilson (United States District Court for the District of Colorado 1985)
- Miami International Realty Co. v. Town of Mt. Crested Butte (United States District Court for the District of Colorado 1984)
- Ralph Herbert Lindley v. Amoco Production Company and Floyd L. Walker (10th Cir. 1981)
- Mourat v. Common Pleas Court of Lehigh County (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 1981)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing appellant’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The complaint was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, alleging violation of the appellant’s civil rights. It alleged that appellee Cook (an Oklahoma state trial judge) and appellees Jones and Lahman (attorneys who were involved in a state case brought by appellant and dismissed by appellee Cook) conspired to deprive appellant of his civil rights, specifically a fair trial.
No allegation of the complaint indicates that appellee, Judge Cook, acted outside the scope of the jurisdiction of his court. Thus, he is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).
As to the claim against the two attorneys, the district court, in dismissing the action against them, concluded that “a private person who is alleged to have conspired with a state district judge who is entitled to immunity cannot be held liable . . .. ” While we agree that the conspiracy element of appellant’s claim, see Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), would not be fulfilled even if appellant’s allegations were true, we have recently held that the immunity of a state official will not necessarily protect a private individual alleged to have conspired with him. Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980). The test laid out in Norton to determine whether a private individual has actively conspired with an immune state official is as follows:
It is our view that the critical inquiry in making this determination is: Has the plaintiff demonstrated the existence of a significant nexus or entanglement between the absolutely immune State official and the private party in relation to the steps taken by each to fulfill the objects of their conspiracy? The resolution of such issues must, of necessity, be made on a case-to-case basis.
Appellant’s only allegation supporting his conspiracy theory against the attorneys is that he saw one of them speak with the judge in the courthouse before each hearing. The complaint thus concludes that that attorney, and the other by association apparently, had defrauded him in a conspiracy with the court. Nothing in the complaint indicates that the court or the attorneys were acting outside the confines of the neutral function of a judicial forum. There is no cause of action under the Civil Rights Act in this case where the state did no more than furnish a forum to private parties and had no interest in the outcome. See Torres *1261 v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 588 F.2d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 1978). We have stated before that “[Ijawyers do not act under color of state law solely by engaging in private litigation on behalf of their clients.” Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979). Appellant’s amended complaint fails to allege the kind of conspiratorial nexus between Judge Cook and the attorneys contemplated in Norton that would support a cognizable § 1983 or § 1985 non-immune conspiracy intended to deprive appellant of his constitutional rights. The pro se complaint was thus properly dismissed. 1 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
. Appellant’s § 1985 and § 1986 claims were also properly dismissed due to appellant’s failure to allege any “invidiously discriminatory motivation” of appellees. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (§ 1985); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469-70 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 54 (1976) (§ 1986 claim is dependent upon successful § 1985 claim).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.