United States v. Norred
United States v. Norred
Opinion
F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 98-6336 v. (W.D. Oklahoma) RONNY NORRED, JR., (D.C. No. CR-98-31-C)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On February 19, 1998, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count
indictment against defendant Ronny Norred, Jr. and co-defendant Dana Miller.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the *
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Counts 1 and 2 charged Norred with knowingly and intentionally distributing
methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count 3 charged Norred
with knowingly and intentionally possessing methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count 4 charged Norred with knowingly carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); Count 5 charged Norred with being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Count 6 charged both Norred and
Miller with possessing chemicals and other items with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and Count 7 charged
both Norred and Miller with possessing chemicals and other items with the intent
to manufacture methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 860(a).
On April 2, 1998, Miller entered into a plea agreement with the
government. The government agreed to dismiss both counts against her, and
obtain a superseding indictment charging her with using a telephone to facilitate
the distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Miller
agreed to plead guilty to this new and lesser offense, and she agreed to fully
cooperate with the government in their prosecution of Norred and others charged
with related offenses. Miller was later sentenced to a term of 48 months’
imprisonment.
-2- On April 9, 1998, Norred also entered into a plea agreement with the
government. Under the terms of the agreement, the government dismissed Counts
4 and 7, and Norred pled guilty to Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Norred’s Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR) was issued on June 23, 1998, and it recommended a
sentence of between 235 and 293 months’ imprisonment. This sentence
recommendation was based on an adjusted base offense level of 33 and a criminal
history category of VI.
The adjusted base offense level recommended by the PSR was based on a
determination that Norred was responsible for “3,228.3 grams of
methamphetamine, and 347.6 grams of actual methamphetamine.” IV R. at ¶ 18.
The PSR arrived at this amount of drugs based in part on the testimony of Miller
and another person, both of whom had entered into favorable plea agreements
with the government. Norred lodged objections to the PSR, arguing that the drug
amounts were arrived at in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). See United States
v. Singleton ,
144 F.3d 1343(10th Cir. 1998), vacated ,
144 F.3d 1361(10th Cir.
1998), on rehearing en banc ,
165 F.3d 1297(10th Cir. 1999). The district court
overruled Norred’s objections and sentenced Norred to 235 months’ imprisonment
on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6, and to 120 months’ imprisonment on Count 5, with all
sentences to run concurrently. Norred now appeals from the sentence imposed by
the district court.
-3- Essentially, Norred asked the district court, and is asking us on appeal, to
adopt the reasoning of the vacated panel opinion in Singleton . 1 This we cannot
do. We have, sitting en banc, rejected precisely the reasoning Norred urges on us
here. See United States v. Singleton ,
165 F.3d 1297(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The district court properly overruled Norred’s objections to the PSR.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and sentence of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge
1 In his brief, Norred admits that “he has filed an appeal to preserve this issue in the event that the Supreme Court” grants certiorari to review this court’s en banc opinion in Singleton. Appellant’s Br. at 1. A petition for certiorari was filed in the case on March 31, 1999, but the Supreme Court has not yet acted on the petition.
-4-
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished