ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Plaintiff-Appellant Stephen Wallace, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to vacate a summary judgment order in favor of Defendants-Appellees Terry Barker and Robert Lawrence. The district court entered summary judgment on August 1, 2002, in favor of Barker and Lawrence when Plainiffs did not respond to the motion. Docs. 202 & 203. On August 8, 2002, Mr. Wallace filed his motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3).

Although we have stated that “[rjegardless of how it is styled, a post-judgment motion filed within ten days of entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a Rule 59(e) motion,” Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1983), the current appellate rules envision that a Rule 60 motion may be filed within ten days after entry of judgment. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). Our review of the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(3) motion is for an abuse of discretion. Looking at the motion before the district court, Mr. Wallace argued the merits of his case in general terms, stating in the last sentence that he never received a copy of “Defendants Response.” Aplt. Br. attach., first Ex. 8. Given a certificate of service on the summary judgment motion, Doc. 174 at 12-13, and the district court’s repeated warnings that Plaintiffs must respond to motions, it is dear that Mr. Wallace was required to do more to substantiate his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, as fraud by one’s adversary in the course of litigation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 952 (10th Cir. 1990). The district court did not abuse its discretion on these facts.

AFFIRMED.